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CORRESPONDENCE,

DESPATCHES, AND OTHER PAPERS,

OF

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH,

SECOND MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY.

EDITED BY

HIS BROTHER,

CHARLES WILLIAM VANE, MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY,

G.C.B., G.C.H., G.B.E., ETC.

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LETTERS AND DESPATCHES

OF

LORD CASTLEREAGH.

WAR AND COLONIAL DEPARTMENT.

1804—1809.

In the Memoir of Lord Castlereagh prefixed to the first volume of this Collection, I have had occasion to relate that he was appointed, under the second administration of Mr. Pitt, Secretary of State for the War and Colonial Department; that he resigned his office on the death of that great statesman, along with most of his colleagues; and that when his Whig successors, after a brief tenure of power, relinquished the helm, in March, 1807, to Mr. Spencer Perceval, Lord Castlereagh was reinstated in his former post. The contents of this division of our work bear ample testimony to his conscientious fulfilment of its duties.

Indeed, the numerous papers from his own pen which it comprehends, proposing measures for raising our military force to such a standard as to enable the

Government not only to make an abundant provision for home defence, but also to devote a considerable auxiliary army to the assistance of allies, or to separate operations, show with what earnestness and what anxiety his active mind was engaged in devising means for meeting the extraordinary circumstances in which the British empire was placed by its most ambitious and most implacable foe.

The Letters and Papers of General Dumouriez will, I doubt not, be found highly interesting, at least by military men. The General, after his precipitate retreat from the command of the French army, in April, 1793, had led an unsettled life for many years; the governments of the countries to which he retired were afraid to harbour him, lest they should incur the resentment of the revolutionary rulers of France. He at length obtained an asylum in England, with the grant of a pension of £1,200 per annum, and resided at this time in London. He was, as it will be seen, in direct correspondence with Ministers: and his Letters are well worthy of attention, as well on account of the advice and opinions which he offers on military subjects, as the earnestness with which he recommends that a kingdom should be carved out of the Spanish American provinces for the Duke of Orleans, (Louis Philippe) to whom he had manifested a warm and steady attachment ever since the Prince was serving, in the early part of the revolutionary war, in the army which he commanded.

There is also a long paper of the General's on the military defence of Ireland, in case of invasion, which,

notwithstanding the diminished importance of the subject, from the altered circumstances of the times, may, I think, still be studied with advantage by the professional reader.

Statements of the General Information as to the presumable Force of the Enemy in each Year, since the Year 1792, *to the present time.*

Admiralty Office, March 5, 1804.

Year.		Ships of the Line.	Frigates.
1793	French	—	—
	Spanish — no list	—	—
	Dutch	—	—
1794	French	65	90
	Spanish	79	66
	Dutch — no list	—	—
1795	French	60	104
	Spanish	76	51
	Dutch	19	12
1796	French	51	92
	Spanish	76	53
	Dutch	26	28
1797	French	61	94
	Spanish	76	52
	Dutch	26	16
1798	French	48	60
	——— 50 guns . .	5	
	Spanish	68	48
	Dutch	25	22
1799	French	40	60
	——— 50 guns . .	5	
	Spanish — no list	—	—
	Dutch	14	12

Year.		Ships of the Line.	Frigates.
1800	French	46	50
	——— 50 guns	3	
	Spanish no list	—	—
	Dutch	16	12
1801	French	49	62
	Spanish	63	59
	Dutch	17	12
1802	French	52	62
	Spanish	63	59
	Dutch	17	12
1803	French	50	52
	——— 50 guns	1	
	Spanish	65	60
	Dutch	16	14
1804	French	—	—
	Spanish no list	—	—
	Dutch	—	—

Mr. Henry Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

King's Arms Yard, Coleman Street, January 1, 1805.

My Lord—I was prevented waiting on your Lordship on Saturday last, in pursuance of your Lordship's letter, by the accident of its having been directed to my brother, and sent to him in the country.

I wished principally to say that the circumstances of the colony of Sierra Leone, the state also of our funds, and, above all, the sentiments recently expressed by our Directors, place, in my mind, out of all question the necessity of surrendering up the settlement at a very early period. We learn by recent despatches that our present Governor is likely to return; and, considering the uncertain tenure on which we hold the settlement, it may be extremely difficult to replace the most necessary of our servants.

A regard for the colonists, whom the Government unquestionably, as I conceive, will feel it to be their duty to protect, makes me desirous of suggesting to your Lordship the necessity of taking early measures for that purpose.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HENRY THORNTON.

Your Lordship will understand that the opinion of the Court of Proprietors will still be to be consulted on this subject.

Abstract of the Distribution of the Army at home and abroad, on July 1, 1805.

	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Total.
In England	14,191	39,824	54,015
„ Scotland	629	4,261	4,890
„ Ireland	4,538	25,460	29,998
On Foreign Stations .	2,457	60,718	63,175
In Jersey	—	3,856	3,856
Guernsey	—	4,036	4,036
Recruits and Detachments at the Army Depôt for Regiments abroad .	267	2,342	2,609
Foreign Depôt at Lymington	—	235	235
Culprits and Deserters .	—	282	282
Total	22,082	141,014	163,096

Lord Castlereagh to the Lord Chancellor.

East Sheen, Sunday, July 21, 1805.

My dear Lord—I hope you will pardon my arriving at the Council Office yesterday just as you left it. I was delayed beyond my hour by very particular business.

I send your Lordship the Instructions, together with the Draft of the Order in Council for the regulated import of Slaves

into the conquered Colonies. The former I have in some degree extended, and altered the latter, in conformity to the proposed regulations. It is a subject of considerable difficulty, and one on which it is almost impossible to arrive at *the utmost equity* of indulgence, without sacrificing the substance of the measure, by opening wide the door to fraud and evasion. I have endeavoured to steer a middle course, applying strict regulations in the first instance, and leaving their relaxation, in cases of evident hardship, to the discretion of the Governors abroad, rather than attempting to anticipate and provide for all such possible cases in the instructions from hence. I shall be happy if your Lordship should be of opinion that, with such amendments as it may occur to your lordship to suggest, they may be rendered adequate to their purpose.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Duke of York.

Downing Street, July 26, 1805.

Sir—It being of importance, in the event of hostilities on the Continent, that this country should be prepared, according to circumstances, either to menace or attack the enemy on their maritime frontier, and, by compelling them to continue in force on the coast and in Holland, weaken their efforts proportionably in other quarters, I am desirous of calling your Royal Highness's early attention to this subject, with a view of considering what proportion of our army now at home may be made applicable to such a purpose, and what preliminary arrangements are now requisite to render the whole, or a proportion, of this force ready to act on this principle at the shortest notice. As a general outline, it has occurred to me to suggest whether, taking the gross force now at home at 180,000 rank and file, of which about 70,000 is Militia, a corps of from 30 to 35,000 infantry, and from 8 to 10,000 cavalry, might not be immediately selected and appropiated to this service. When

the particular regiments have been designated which your Royal Highness may consider best suited to this purpose, it may be desirable to make a distribution of the whole, so as to station them as near the points of embarkation, and as much in connexion with each other as may be consistent with a due attention to the present system of defence against invasion.

The most convenient cantonments, with a view to the object in question, I apprehend, would be the neighbourhood of Cork for such proportion of this force as must be taken from the army now in Ireland; Portsmouth for a limited corps; and the positions in Kent for the main body of the British part of the force, with a view to embarkation in the Downs.

As the passing of troops from the Eastern District can never be productive of any very serious delay, in the event of their services being called for, the superior advantage and convenience of having the entire of the disposable force in the Southern District is not so pressing, in point of time, as to render it necessary for your Royal Highness to disturb too extensively your present distribution, for the security of that particular part of the coast.

When I am honoured with an outline of the arrangements which your Royal Highness would propose, with a view to this object, I shall be prepared to concert such measures with respect to keeping a due provision of transports in constant readiness at the several points of embarkation above alluded to, as the particular circumstances of the moment may appear to his Majesty's Government to demand. It will certainly make a part of any such arrangement to have a fleet of transports perfectly equipped and victualled for foreign service, capable of receiving about 10,000 men, constantly stationed between Cork and Portsmouth; and I am therefore to suggest to your Royal Highness the expediency of stationing as much in the vicinity of those ports as the general distribution will permit the particular regiments which your Royal Highness considers as most proper to be early detached on distant service, in order

that any demand of this description which may arise may be supplied with secrecy and despatch.

I should hope an arrangement of the above description may be made at a moderate expense, without prejudice, in the first instance, to the efficiency of our internal defence; and that, whilst it is calculated to furnish us with additional means of distracting, and, at a favourable conjuncture, of attacking the enemy, its application will always remain a question of prudence, to be judged of according to the circumstances of the moment. I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief.

Downing Street, September 14, 1805.

Sir—I communicated to Mr. Pitt the substance of the conversation with which your Royal Highness honoured me yesterday, in the enclosed Memorandum. He entirely approves of the outline of the arrangement therein proposed, and does not object to it in point of expense.

I am sanguine in my expectations of the effect of the general arrangements now in progress for the increase of the army, and shall hope to be permitted, when I wait on your Royal Highness on Tuesday, to re-consider the details of this subject, together with the conditions upon which it may be advisable to permit Deserters to surrender.

It certainly would be desirable that the Militia and the Army of Reserve could be included in the latter measure. As this, however, cannot take place without an Act of Parliament, I submit to your Royal Highness the expediency of availing ourselves without delay of what is immediately within our reach; and, in order to judge to what extent it may be expected to operate, thus restricted, it may be desirable to call for a return of the number of desertions that have taken place since the last Amnesty, specifying, as far as may be, the num-

ber that have been retaken, or have given themselves up subsequent to that period. I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

General Abstract of the Effective Strength of the Regular Army of Great Britain, on September 1, 1805.

Adjutant-General's Office, September 30, 1805.

Great Britain, including Jersey, Guernsey, &c.	65,134
Ireland	28,245
East Indies	12,363
Leeward Islands	11,871
Gibraltar	4,275
Ceylon	5,774
Malta	7,006
Canada	1,483
Jamaica	4,211
Nova Scotia	2,387
Bahamas	589
Honduras	889
New South Wales	490
Goree	280
With Sir J. H. Craig	3,707
With Sir David Baird	4,312
On Passage	8,410
	161,426
Militia	74,519
	235,945

Lord Castlereagh to H.S.H. the Duke of Orleans.

Downing Street, October 3, 1805.

Sir—I did not fail to lay before his Majesty's confidential servants the communication with which I was honoured by your Serene Highness. They have charged me to express to your Serene Highness the strong sense they entertain of this ten-

der made of your military services to his Majesty at the present moment, in a manner so highly flattering to the King's personal interests, as well as to the cause in which this country is engaged; and to express to your Serene Highness their sincere regret that the established rules of the British service do not enable them to recommend to the King the acceptance of this distinguished mark of your Serene Highness's attachment.

I am, Sir, with the utmost respect, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Memorandum relative to the disposable Force.

Downing Street, October 21, 1805.

Since the decision of the Cabinet to send a force to the Elbe was taken, the German Legion has been embarked, and will sail the moment the wind permits. Two battalions of Guards, the 4th, 14th, and 23rd Regiments of Infantry, five companies of the Rifle Corps, and a due proportion of artillery, amounting to nearly 6,000 men, are in progress of embarkation, and will be ready to sail on Saturday next. The six following regiments, viz., the 8th, 9th, 28th, 30th, 36th, and 89th Regiments, consisting of 5,638 rank and file, are ordered to embark immediately at Cork, and proceed to the Downs, there to receive further orders, where they may be expected to arrive, if the weather is favourable, in about ten days. 2,000 cavalry are held in readiness to proceed to the Continent, so soon as cavalry transports can be assembled for their reception, or those now proceeding to the Elbe are returned to England.

The only impediment at present to operations on a large scale, is the want of tonnage fit for the reception of cavalry. Our arrangements have hitherto been framed with a view to demonstrations and to expeditions, where the attack was to be made in the nature of a *coup de main*, rather than that of a regular military operation, supported by the due proportion of cavalry and horse artillery. The most active efforts are, however, now making to supply this defect in the shortest pos-

sible time. For the transport of infantry, we have a full supply of tonnage for the reception of 20,000 men. The Admiralty have been called on to state what number of men the lighter armed vessels in the navy can upon an emergency transport to the Elbe, or to the coast of Holland. No regular return has yet been received; but Lord Keith, in a private letter, states that he considers the armed ships now under his flag to be capable of receiving on board about 14,000 men. It may therefore be assumed that we have the means of conveying as large a force of infantry to the Continent, even during the present season, as the most favourable events can call for, and that our means of sending cavalry will be progressive so long as the weather is open.

With a view to facilitate the execution of any military measures which his Majesty's servants may hereafter recommend, Lord Castlereagh wishes to suggest the expediency of forming the present disposable force into one connected army for active operations, from which detachments may be made, correspondent to any service to be undertaken, and that the Staff should be immediately appointed for the whole, under the chief command of the Duke of York.

As the officers to be named will be selected from among those now on the Staff at home, no additional expense will be thereby incurred. They will be enabled at once to take charge of the particular corps to which they are to be attached on foreign service, without being altogether withdrawn, so long as they remain at home, from local duty; and, when the army is once formed as a whole, in the manner proposed, operations not requiring the application of the entire force may be undertaken without hazard of the object of attack being brought into suspicion by the selection of a particular Staff for the immediate service.

If the Cabinet should think fit to recommend the above arrangement for his Majesty's approbation, including the German Legion and the British troops embarking, the arrange-

ment may at once be framed with reference to a force of 40,000 infantry, rank and file, and 10,000 cavalry, with the due proportion of artillery, subject to be increased in whatever extent the German Legion may be augmented on its arrival at Hanover. With a view to this measure, means of equipment will be forwarded for 10,000 men.

This force may be estimated for active operations, early in the next year, at an army of 60,000 rank and file, at the least. Whether the whole or what proportion of the army is to be rendered disposable, shall be actually detached on foreign service, and at what time must necessarily depend upon events; it may, however, be satisfactory to the Cabinet, that the general distribution of our military force should be so far stated, as to bring before them what the amount of the army left for home service will be, supposing circumstances should induce them to advise that the entire of the above force should be employed in offensive operations abroad.

The total force in rank and file at present, including militia and artillery, is 256,609. The force on foreign stations, including the troops under the orders of Sir J. Craig and Sir D. Baird, amounts to—

Rank and file	75,162
At home	181,447
Total, as above . . .	256,609

If, from the home force, 50,000 rank and file, with the requisite artillery, be detached, there will remain about 130,000 rank and file for internal defence, composed as follows:

Regulars	55,251
Militia	74,749
Total, ...	130,000

The general distribution would then stand thus, stated in round numbers, considering the force under Sir J. Craig and Sir D. Baird, viz.: 12,000 men as acting offensively:—

Foreign Possessions . . .	63,000
Acting offensively . . .	63,000
Home defence	130,000
Total, as above . . .	256,000

The active force above stated at 63,000 men it is presumed may before the spring receive an addition of 10,000 Hanoverians, in which case, after appropriating above 60,000 men to colonial service, the army for offensive operations will exceed 70,000 rank and file.

Lord Castlereagh has not thought it necessary to delay submitting the above to the consideration of his Majesty's servants, till the line which the Court of Berlin means to pursue shall be finally disclosed.

The system of Prussia may influence materially the course of our future military operations; but war on the Continent having now actually commenced, and thereby a prospect being opened to this country of employing its arms offensively, whether we act separately or conjointly, whether our efforts be directed to operations on a large or on a limited scale, whether to objects strictly continental, or to those more pointedly British, the measure of rendering our active force disposable at the shortest notice, and of placing it in a condition to move as a whole, should its services be called for, seems in every view expedient.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Charles Long.[1]

Downing Street, November 6, 1805.

My dear Long—The present state of affairs, whether events on the Continent take a more or less favourable turn, make it an object of the utmost importance by every practicable means to augment our army, not only that part of it which is disposable, but even the corps for limited service. With this

[1] Mr. Long was at this time Chief Secretary in Ireland, during the Viceroyalty of Earl Hardwicke.

view, every effort is making, by augmenting the encouragement to the bringers of Recruits, by a new distribution of the recruiting staff of the country, aided by the assistance of local agents, according to the plan, the outline of which you will find detailed in the enclosed memorandum, to augment our gross force.

Upon considering over, with Mr. Pitt, the possibility of having recourse to any further means not tending to disturb the present scale of bounty, and thus to shake the fundamental principles upon which it appears desirable that the recruiting system should steadily rest, it appears to us that a considerable resource might still be drawn, both for general and home service, from the Irish Militia.

By the bill which passed in April, 1803, the Lord-Lieutenant has the power to authorize an augmentation of thirty men per company at the public expense, thereby raising the companies to 100 rank and file, which, upon the whole Militia establishment, amounts to an augmentation of about 8,000 men. This power has hitherto not been used, except so far as was requisite to replace the draft lately made from the Irish Militia for general service.

We think, under present circumstances, it might be highly expedient to act upon it with respect to such regiments, the colonels of which would enter into an understanding with Government to discharge and permit fifteen men a company to enlist annually into the line, upon condition of their being permitted to augment to 100 men a company, that is, to add thirty to their present strength.

I apprehend, such is the facility of procuring men for the Irish Militia, and such the desire of the colonels to have strong regiments, that you would find little difficulty in prevailing on nearly the whole to undertake the augmentation on these conditions. Should it succeed, it will give us an annual recruit of 4,000 men for the line, which may be replaced in the militia for a bounty of four guineas; whereas, men, intermediately entering into second battalions, receive twelve

guineas. It also would, notwithstanding the fluctuation occasioned by volunteering, keep the Irish Militia, upon the whole, on a higher establishment than at present; and so far, by adding to our defensive force, justify us in applying our disposable force more liberally to offensive operations.

The great temptation to this experiment is the low bounty at which Militia recruits can be had in Ireland. This renders a measure of this nature comparatively but little injurious to general recruiting, or even to recruiting for the second battalions; as there is a strong presumption that, where a man takes four guineas for entering into a regiment of Militia, in preference to twelve guineas for entering into a second battalion, both being for limited service, (though not equally limited) his disposition leads him to Militia service exclusively, in the first instance.

It is apprehended, upon a proper understanding with the colonels of regiments, that this measure may be carried into execution in Ireland, without any further legislative provision. Under the general Militia-law, colonels may discharge, though they cannot make the county liable to supply the vacancy, unless the discharge is approved by two Deputy Governors.

The colonel, however, having the power to discharge, in the first instance, and the Government to issue money to him to augment his regiment, and to replace vacancies created under their authority, you may clearly, without any unjustifiable stretch of the law on either side, begin the measure, leaving it for future consideration whether any proceeding in Parliament should be taken on the subject.

It would aid most materially the main object of this measure, viz., the procuring of men for the line, if the Duke of York would give an ensigncy, for every 80 or 100 men furnished, to any Militia subaltern producing the men, and recommended by the colonel. This would be as material to its success within the regiment, as the augmentation of the regiments generally is to reconcile the colonels to it.

With Mr. Pitt's concurrence, I have thought it desirable to

inform myself, through you, of the Lord-Lieutenant's sentiments, together with your own upon the measure, before I brought it under the consideration of Cabinet, or requested Lord Hawkesbury to write to Lord Hardwicke officially upon it.

What occurs to me to suggest for consideration is, that you should write a private letter to the respective colonels, desiring to know whether they chose to undertake to augment their regiments, upon the conditions above stated; that you should direct those who should accept to proceed with the levy, allowing them four months for the completion of the same, at the end of which time, volunteers, at the rate of fifteen men per company, should be allowed to enter into the line out of the regiments at large, the colonel being authorized to replace all men so enlisting at the usual bounty of four guineas. This operation to be annually repeated, or oftener, if the full number have not entered, and the colonels to understand that if a satisfactory proportion did not annually enlist, the regiments would be reduced to their regular establishments.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

[Enclosure.]

The number of recruiting parties employed throughout the United Kingdom, including the head-quarters of regiments, may be taken in round numbers at 500. The number of parishes in the United Kingdom is about 15,000, and the gross population 15,000,000, the average population being nearly 1,000 for each parish. The recruiting parties are, therefore, in the proportion of one party to thirty parishes; or, 30,000 population, one quarter of which, or 7,500, may be considered to be males of the military age.

The recruiting parties abound in the great towns where there is the best chance of getting men. They are very thinly scattered in the country parts of the kingdom, probably not more than in the proportion of one to 100 parishes, or 100,000 population.

According to the present system of only employing military persons, and those on full pay, in recruiting for general service, it is perhaps hardly worth while to incur the expense, or to lose the services of a greater number of effective soldiers, by making a more extensive distribution.

The above objections may be, however, in a great measure obviated—1st. By employing, at a reduced pay, say of one-half, discharged soldiers, their pay to be further reduced to one-third, if the soldier does not procure four recruits within the year. And, in case of such failure and reduction, if he does not produce six recruits in the following year, the allowance to be altogether discontinued.

2. By each recruiting party being authorized to appoint ten civil recruiting agents, to whom a proper form of authority should be given to enlist men. The authority to be in force (except upon misconduct) for six or twelve months—at the end of which time, any agent not having produced two, or, if for twelve months, four recruits, to be discontinued, and his commission given to some other person.

It seems material to give these agents some further encouragement, to distinguish them from the ordinary bringers, either in the shape of a reduced pay, as in the former case; or in an allowance (say a guinea) on each man they raise, to cover their personal expenses in looking out for men.

The latter principle has the advantage of not being productive of expense, except in proportion as men are procured.

In order to give effect to the above arrangements, it will be necessary to revise the present distribution of the recruiting-parties, and to station them as far as possible, so as to occupy the entire surface of the kingdom (districts barren and thinly peopled excepted). Each party may, with its ten agents, manage, without inconvenience, an extent of from fifteen to thirty miles square. The party being within so short dis-

tance of each agent, they will always be at hand to pay the bounty, and to receive the recruits, which will render any advance to the agents unnecessary.

In the great towns, agents are less wanted than in the country; but may, nevertheless, be useful.

There the advantage to be gained by raising men is familiar to every man's mind, and forces itself upon his attention. By increasing his profit above that of a bringer, you may render him more active; but every man whose habits lead him to such a pursuit will be a bringer if he can.

It is otherwise in the country. The recruiting-party, in many parts, is seldom seen. The people hear little of the army, of the bounty to the recruit, or the reward to the bringer. It is in the provinces that active agents are wanting. The idler in a great town will be most open to a recruiting-party. A country labourer will be more likely to engage at the instance of a neighbour.

Agents once introduced into the parishes, the effect will shortly not be confined merely to their own exertions. It will suggest to others that they may make nearly as much as the agents, by becoming bringers; and it is reasonable to presume, by rendering the recruiting organization general throughout the country, as well as in the towns, that we should obtain the utmost supply of recruits which can be procured by voluntary enlistment from a population so limited and employed as ours is.

The experiment, at all events, is worth a trial—it clearly can do no harm—it does not disturb any of the leading principles of the present system of recruiting; it adds little, in point of expense, except in proportion as men are actually supplied; and it affords the means of ascertaining whether the recruiting of our army may not hereafter be conducted in some degree by civil assistance, without being carried on exclusively by effective soldiers, much to the prejudice of the discipline and efficiency of the respective regiments. An

arrangement somewhat on the above principles, coupled with the additional encouragement proposed to be given to all bringers of recruits, and an offer of a pardon to deserters upon proper conditions, seems to hold out a reasonable prospect of a considerable addition to our army, before the opening of the next campaign.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Charles Long.

Downing Street, November 14, 1805.

My dear Long—The Cabinet have approved of the measure of augmenting the Irish Militia, on the conditions specified in my former letter, and the Lord-Lieutenant will receive an official despatch from Lord Hawkesbury on the subject.

I return your draft to the Colonels, with a few slight alterations, the principal objects of which are as follows:—

1. To make the augmentation of the respective regiments depend on a previous acceptation of the conditions by each Colonel.

2. To place the regiments to be augmented on the full establishment of 100 men per company, with the usual proportion of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. This will give them not only an additional Lieutenant per company, but an increase of field-officers, which is much wanted, from a number of the field-officers being frequently absent, attending Parliament.

3. The making the supply of fifteen men per company to the line annual, as a single contribution would not be worth coming to Parliament for. This will render it expedient not to leave the establishment at eighty-five men per company, but, immediately on its being reduced by the volunteering, to restore it to the full 100, in order that the regiment may be prepared for the next year's draft.

I trust you will be enabled to order the augmentation to be proceeded in without delay by such regiments as accept, in

which number you may immediately include the Galway and Londonderry regiments.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

PS. The Duke of York consents to give the Ensigncies required, in the proportion of one to forty men, and H.R.H. will, upon a representation from you of the precise claims, fulfil the assurance given by Mr. Pitt previous to the late volunteering.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. William Pitt.

East Sheen, December 12, 1805.

My dear Sir—I have not yet received the Duke's letter. There being nothing pressing in town to-day, I have remained here for the purpose of digesting something on the improvement of our levy under the additional force act. I send you a sketch of instructions for consideration; the one to be addressed to the civil, the other to the military officers. To the general principle neither the Duke nor Hawkesbury have any objection.

I am convinced that, with more activity and more persons in motion, much more might be done. If we can bring the recruiting staff to carry this inspection into effect with zeal and activity, the effects, I am inclined to hope, may tend to remove the prejudice which seems to prevail against making use of any other instrument for recruiting for the line than an able-bodied soldier, whose services are too valuable to be wasted on such a duty. No mail has yet reached me. The wind is rather higher than I could wish for our transports.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury.

East Sheen, December 14, 1805.

Dear Hawkesbury—I have stated shortly in the margin the observations that strike me to the draft sent by Mr. Smith, which correspond in principle with those you stated to me.

I send you a sketch of what has occurred to me on this subject. I am sanguine with respect to its effects on the recruiting. It will give little or no trouble to the Lieutenancy, and will assemble no meetings to cabal against the Bill. But I am principally anxious, if you see no objection, to try it, as approximating us to what I am persuaded would prove the best recruiting system, both for limited and unlimited service, namely, parochial agents, superintended and controlled by a recruiting staff. Nothing purely military can be sufficiently extensive in its operation as a means of acting; and nothing civil in its constitution can be relied on as sufficiently certain to impel, control, and regulate.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

ON THE SUPPLY OF TIMBER FOR HIS MAJESTY'S DOCKYARDS FROM CANADA.

Mrs. Van Kamp to[1]

I am sensible that the following narrative is long, but a variety of collateral circumstances, written on the spot, and since arranged into a letter to a friend, make up the information that I wish to present; and, unacquainted with the mode of official writing, I have not been able to compress it into a smaller compass.

15, North Audley Street, Grosvenor Square,
December 31, 1805.

Dear Madam—After the sanguine expectations with which I left this country in April last, your ladyship may be surprised to receive a letter from me, dated London, 31st December.

Having obtained permission from the Lords of the Admiralty, I set out, fully impressed with the practicability of sending ship-timber from Canada to his Majesty's Dockyards—a plan

[1] There is nothing upon the face of this paper showing to whom it was addressed. It was, no doubt, communicated by the writer to Lord Castlereagh in his official character of Colonial Secretary.

which would prove equally advantageous to Government and to the landholder. This idea was confirmed by every succeeding event; yet, from not being connected with trade, nor meeting, as I expected, with the protection of the Government in Canada, though supported by the Seigneurs of the Province and powerful recommendation from this country, I have effected nothing, and deem myself happy in having escaped with my life.

My voyage to Canada has fully proved that truth is not to be known or spoken by any one unconnected with two sets of persons, whose influence, jointly and separately, makes up the whole of the power of the province. I know that I possess a valuable tract of land, covered with valuable timber. I am grateful to Government for the grant, and for the power afforded me of benefitting by it; but do me the favour, madam, of reading the following narrative, and then say if I am severe in asserting that Government, on this side of the water, are *deceived;* for, while they are paying the merchants an enormous price for ship-timber, the Seigneurs of Canada, who are the old, respectable landholders, would be happy to supply Government on their own terms; *but they want interest.* Even myself, an insignificant individual, have experienced the meanest and most unmanly cruelty for attempting to sell my timber, as persons in this country may dispose of theirs: and, candidly acknowledging the value of the donation I had received, from the opposition I have met with to my plans, it has, so far from being advantageous, involved me in embarrassments. But I will proceed to my narrative, and have the honour to remain, &c., H. VAN KAMP.

Narrative.

April 17. I sailed from Portsmouth, having, through great exertion, surmounted many difficulties thrown in my way in England; and at some expense took out with me every thing necessary for felling timber fit for Government use; and, not

to lose sight of that part of my baggage so necessary to put my plans into execution, I gave up going in a neutral ship, and took my passage in the Ewretta, the captain assuring me I might depend upon its being landed with myself at Quebec, as it should be so stowed as to be got out instantly. Your ladyship may guess my surprise and disappointment when I saw the baggage of all the passengers sent on shore with the greatest ease and expedition; and not one of the things belonging to myself, which I was so anxious about, could be found, viz., my coils of rope, blocks, tackle, &c. I begged the captain, the mate, the sailors, to search, but in vain. I begged Mr. Bell, a Quebec merchant, who was a fellow-passenger, to speak to the captain and sailors. His reply was, "Good God, madam! they would find your things if they could!" and I was obliged to give up, and land without them. The ship lay at anchor the whole day, and the Captain promised me that my things should be found and sent on shore before he set sail for Montreal; instead of which, he set sail, taking my things with him, and they were not returned till sixteen days after, though I was told by Mr. Bell the Captain would send them as soon as he got to Montreal, where he arrived in two days; and, small craft coming constantly down the river, he could have sent my things with great ease: so that they detained me at Quebec at a time when I ought to have been upon my estate, to survey my timber, and mark what would be the best to fall in the proper season; besides which I should have seen the river for floating it, while the waters were out.

I could not help coupling this conduct with some conversation forced upon me, during my passage, by the merchant, who told me he had heard of my plans, and I never should be able to accomplish them; neither did he believe that I could get to my estate. I told him natural difficulties I should see, and I should also see those put in my way; but the latter should not stop me. I think I may be justified in calling this action of theirs not only an artificial difficulty put in my way, but a

dishonourable one. If I had not been so vexed as I arrived on the 4th of June, I should have been presented, but I could do nothing but complain.

It is impossible to give your ladyship any idea of the opposition and discouraging things that were started by the merchants; nothing was talked of but my sending home timber to his Majesty's dockyards; they did every thing to prevent me from getting to my estate. The roads leading to it not being post-roads, I depended upon getting a hired driver acquainted with the roads. About two days after I arrived, Francis, Lord Dorchester's old servant, called on me, and begged to drive me to my estate, as he knew the roads, and offered to go himself, with his wife, to settle on my land. He petitioned me to let his brother, and his wife and children, become settlers also, which I agreed to, and offered them good terms; but here again I was disappointed. My driver and settlers gave me up, and he would never come near me to give me a reason, though I sent many messages after him, and I had another driver to seek.

It then became the fashion to say there were no roads whatever to my estate, though in the seven townships surrounding Barford, there were, in the year 1803, 3,879 souls. It was not likely the inhabitants, being farmers, should have no roads; but, as they persisted I had no roads, and I found such difficulty, not to say impossibility, in getting a driver, I turned my thoughts to going by water: but here again I could get no person to convey me, till I had recourse to the Indians, and thought myself very fortunate in meeting with a person not unknown to Lord Dorchester and General Prescott, Francis Annance, chief of the Abenakee nation. I was struck when he was first introduced to me. In his plain, sensible manner, he informed me that he had been within a few leagues of my estate, and marked upon my map the road and also the course of the river, the carrying places, the different settlements I was to sleep at; for he advised my going by water; as the

banks of the river were so well settled that I could stop at any time, in case of bad weather. Finding that I was acquainted with Lord and Lady Dorchester, General and Mrs. Prescott, he expressed himself much attached to them. To use his own words, "he had had the honour of shaking hands with these Governors, and he loved them because they had favoured his nation, and had caused Government to be their friend, and they felt themselves bound to serve the friends of Government."

When I was nearly ready to depart, I met with a check that I did not expect. Upon reading the instructions sent me by the Navy Board, I understood that the contractors were to get a certificate for cutting the timber fit for his Majesty's use, from the Surveyor-General of the Woods; and, as I wished to omit nothing which might be necessary, and was desirous of treading on sure ground, I went first to the Attorney-General, to speak to him about it, who said I had full power to cut any timber, independent of any certificate; however, as I wished it, of course, Mr. Coffin, the Surveyor-General of the Woods, would give me a certificate.

I went to Mr. John Coffin, Surveyor-General of the Woods, to beg him to grant me a certificate, which he refused, though I showed him my letters: one written by Mr. Marsden, by command of the Lords of the Admiralty, dated 25th June, 1804; and another from the Navy Board, dated 13th March, 1805, sending me instructions, both which letters I showed him. Though he refused to grant me a certificate, I determined to act by the opinion of the Attorney-General, to proceed with the Indians to my estate, and to have some of the finest mast timber cut down and sent home. I must observe that I had the Seigneurs of the Province on my side, who were particularly interested in my success, hoping in the end to be permitted by Government to send the riches of their estates, both timber and hemp, to the mother country; for, as this Province possesses the same properties as the Baltic, they hope it will become a second Norway to England.

As I was deaf to all my opponents could say, they beset my friends, to frighten them with the danger I was going to encounter, which, they said, would end in the ruin of my circumstances. A few days before my departure, I saw Mr. Kilburn, a Surveyor, who lives in Compton, the adjoining township to Barford. He said he had been in Barford, and that all I proposed was practicable; for the roads leading from Compton were excellent roads for sleighing, being, as he said, 28 feet wide, and, if I chose to send my timber by way of Portland, I was close upon the Connecticut, and could float it to that harbour; and that there was plenty of mast timber in Barford.

I accordingly set off on the 6th of July; but I will here transcribe part of a letter, written on the 17th of September, before I found it necessary to return to England, which contains the Narrative of my Journey to and from Compton.

"What I am going to relate to your ladyship will explain why I am now at Quebec, instead of being on my estate, where I should have been but for the most atrocious conduct and combination of a certain set of people, who were determined from the first to prevent my succeeding, if possible; and, though they have succeeded in driving me from my estate, I hope they will not prevent me from sending home timber to his Majesty's dockyards; and, though I shall be obliged to alter my first plan, it may be of more service both to this Province and the mother country, by letting others, as well as myself, reap the advantages of the most valuable part of their estates, than if I sent it wholly off my own: for the people at large are ignorant of the value of their timber, whatever a certain set may be. I shall feel highly gratified if I am fortunate enough to be the cause of opening a great trade between this Province and the mother country, which the gentlemen who have promised to become my agents inform me they have no doubt of, if the combination which exists both here and at home do not, by some contrivance, prevent the timber which I shall send home from being received; for they seem deter-

mined that no one shall succeed but themselves, and thereby to keep up the price of ship-timber.

"In the first letters I had the honour of writing to your ladyship, I mentioned difficulties thrown in my way to prevent me from getting to my estate; and what happened at that time, I have reason to suspect, has since been followed up by the most atrocious conduct. I had no method of going, but under the protection of the Indian Chief; and a Mr. Gamblin, an Indian merchant, of great respectability, took upon himself to answer for the good conduct of the whole party, which consisted of the Chief and four Indians.

"Without the least difficulty or danger, I arrived at Compton, the next township to Barford. I took letters of introduction from the Attorney-General and other friends to the first people in this township, and was received so very friendly (as far as words went), that, trusting to the sincerity of their promises to see me to my estate, I dismissed my faithful Indians, the Chief, being an old man, infirm, and paralytic, thinking the next day to go by land to my estate.

"I have mentioned that a certain set of people at Quebec said there were no roads; nevertheless, bad as the roads were, or, according to their account, *no roads at all*, I soon found I was followed from Quebec by land by the son of the late Major Holland. This young man was formerly in the army, but cashiered, and obliged to quit it. He stopped at every house it was likely I should land at to sleep, but I avoided meeting him by going to other houses; for I guessed the party that had sent him. However, I could not avoid him, in the end; for he came to the house I was staying at, where my friends had introduced me at Compton. From this moment, I became a prisoner, insomuch that I could never get a step further, though within fifteen miles of my estate; but, ignorant of their intentions, and wishing to prosecute my journey, I sent to the agent of Mr. Morrogh, whose estate of 20,000 acres in Barnston is within five or six miles of my estate, Mr. Morrogh having

informed me I might depend upon the man, when I should dismiss the Indians, to conduct me to the end of my journey; but this man put such obstacles in my way, that I could not proceed, and he positively refused to conduct me to my estate, or, in fact, to render me any service.

"Disgusted with this man's conduct, I paid him for his journey, and also for the team which he had brought, according to my order, to take my baggage to Mr. Morrogh's estate, which so nearly joins mine; but he assured me, if I did go, he could be of no use, nor had he been able to procure me either a house or a lodging, but in a log-house, and that not to a certainty; though, I must observe, Mr. Morrogh has upwards of eighty families on his estate, besides mills. I feared I might do wrong to go further into the country with such a guide, and dismissed him, hoping the gentleman to whom I had brought letters would put me in some way to get forward; and I now began to repent that I had parted with my Indians.

"The greatest part of the township of Compton is granted to the Surveyors of that part of the Province, and these men are the first people there. I had made some observations going along, which I thought it right to point out to them; for I had frequently got out of the canoe, and walked, both to see the roads, and to get information concerning the method of transporting the timber. I thought it my duty to my country to tell the settlers their ship-timber was valuable, and I am persuaded their own interests will in future cause them to preserve it. The next thing I attended to was the roads, which are certainly bad for transport *during the summer*, though they may be very good for sleighing: but, as they are altogether good near the Province line leading into the States, the inhabitants of this part of the Province, which five years ago was reckoned to contain 15,000 Americans (independent of others), for the want of better roads to the St. Lawrence, draw all their necessaries from the States, and send all their produce of grain, potash, hemp, cattle, &c., in exchange, into the States, instead

of sending them to the St. Lawrence, and keeping the trade in the Province. I observed this to the Surveyors, whose place it is to look after the roads leading to the St. Lawrence; as the money for that purpose is placed in their hands; I told them it was worthy of their attention and their duty not to let the trade go out of the Province, in which they possessed fine estates granted them by our Government, whose laws protected them. I am afraid, if it remains much longer for the settlers to bring their commodities to the St. Lawrence, they may not be able to change their connexions, and a great part of the trade become lost to the Province; which, if the roads were made fit for transport in *all* seasons, would be prevented, and very little labour would make them very good.

"Another thing, perhaps of some consequence, is that a number of very fine settlements are made upon the Church and Crown Reserves, which Government wishes to lease out, the first as a revenue for the Church, and the other for Government. I stopped at three: one, a straw manufactory, which would rival any in England, on a very fine farm; another was a tavern, at one of the carrying places, where they kept teams for the purpose of carrying loads over this place; it is a house of great trade, and a very good farm. The third was one of the finest farms in the Province. The settlements on these Reserves are numberless; and, I understand, none of these leases are taken out, which would bring in an immediate revenue. The good people I spoke to assured me they wished to have their leases, if they could get them.

"But to return to myself: situated as I was, and not knowing as much as I now do, I thought I could not do better than stay in a township to which I had brought the strongest letters of introduction. I took a lodging at Mr. Kilburn's, the Surveyor I met at Quebec; it was a lone house, but on the high road. I soon found myself neglected by all the people whom my friends expected to have rendered me every service. I had told them, with all frankness, why I had come to that part of the

Province, viz., to send home my ship-timber, advised them to save theirs, and pointed out the value of our estates. I begged them to recommend a person to conduct me through the woods to my estate, which was not fifteen miles; but they pretended not to know any one they could recommend.

"Mr. Holland (the young man who had followed me from Quebec) called upon me. I told him I thought it strange that none of the gentlemen to whom I had brought letters would assist me to go the remaining fifteen miles. I was greatly surprised when he told me they did not design that I should go any further; for they had consulted each other, and concluded I was come as a spy upon their actions, and they knew not what to do about me. The idea was so extraordinary, that, coupled with what I had heard of the young man's character, and his following me from Quebec in so odd a manner, and watching me so closely, I own it frightened me. Alone, and so far from my friends, I knew not what to do.

"A few days afterwards, the man of the house, who was away when I first went, returned home from a survey, and seemed much pleased to find me at his house. On speaking to him of my timber, he said he had not surveyed the township of Barford, though he had been in it; but, when the Deputy-Surveyors took a survey, it was understood they were not to mention, when they made their return to Mr. Coffin, Surveyor-General of the Woods, that there was any timber fit for his Majesty's service; for, *if he was told there was, he must send to have it marked, that it might not be touched but for Government, and that would be attended with endless trouble.* This explained at once why Mr. Coffin, Surveyor-General of the Woods, refused to give me a certificate to cut timber to send to his Majesty's dockyards. His own certificate, had he granted it, would have condemned himself. The fact is, the lands of the Province are greatly in the hands of a set of people, who have been playing a great game. The custom is, when a township is granted, the leader of it gets it sur-

veyed; and, I fear, it is often understood what return is wished.

"But to return to Mr. Kilburn. He had not arrived many hours before the other Surveyor came to him, and he became, like the rest, reserved, and could find no possible way for me to get to my estate. I was loth to leave the place without accomplishing my journey; and at length I got some information from a medical person whom I saw, being unwell, and also from some good people of whom I bought provisions; and had nearly arranged my plan to get forward on my journey, when one of the most shameful actions drove me back to seek refuge, till I could get to my friends, *among the Indians*.

"Mr. Kilburn all at once took it into his head to go from home with his wife, and to leave me in a lone house, not within a mile of any other, with two lads of sixteen, and a girl of fifteen. I trembled at the thought of being so left, but had no resource; for he objected to every one I proposed to come to sleep in the house during his absence: and, on the night of his departure, I had not been in bed an hour, before I heard my chamber-door tried to be opened; but, as the dog did not bark, I supposed it to be the girl of the house. Some time afterwards, I heard somebody in the house; but, the dog being still silent, I tried not to be afraid, yet supposing it might be the girl of the house. Again I heard some noise, and I then called to the lads to inquire if the dog was with them; and, learning that he was in the house and quiet, I imagined it was not people, but some cattle near the house; and, desirous of being convinced it was so, I watched my chamber-window, in hopes of seeing the animal: but, instead of seeing a horse, I saw a man come to my window and open it as far as he could: fortunately, a nail prevented his getting it quite up. I was much frightened, and called to the lads to get up: the man ran away, and I kept the lads up the whole of the night. The party, whoever they were, kept near the house, in the woods; they fired and whistled, as signals to each other, and did everything

to alarm me, and, once in the night, came close to the house, and fired into the porch, while others attempted to get in, and were kept off only by the two boys. I was too much frightened at the time to reflect; but certainly, if they had wished to get in, they might have done, for there were only two lads to oppose them; and this, upon reflection, almost convinces me it was a trick to drive me away before I had accomplished my journey; and they succeeded: for, as soon as the day appeared, I sent one of the lads to the mill in the next township (Ascot) to order a team to come as soon as possible to take my baggage. I thought, if they were thieves, they would make a second attempt; and, if they were not, I was among people improper to stay with; but I was not left long alone. The man at the mill, with his son, came instantly. He had been an old soldier, under Lord Dorchester; he was shocked that I should have been so frightened, and assured me nothing should harm me. The people I had bought provisions of flocked to me, and were enraged at what had happened, and showed an attachment to me beyond anything I could have expected: looking forward to the winter, in hopes of getting money by falling and sleighing timber to Quebec, in losing me, they were losing their benefactress. These particulars show with what avidity they look up to the idea of sending ship-timber to England; and I have the satisfaction to think that I may have prevented the ship-timber from being destroyed, as far as I have travelled.

"I went to the mill as soon as I had packed up my things. Many of the inhabitants of the adjoining township came to me, more distressed than can be described, and some one or other followed me by land and met me at every portage, to see me safe through these short woods; and when I came to the Indian village, one of these good people had gone forward, to tell the Indians and Mr. Gamblin, the Indian merchant, what had happened, that, if I did not arrive at the time I ought to do, through any difficulty from passing the Rapids, they might seek after me; but the canoe-men I had engaged had been as

careful as my Indians had been. I got very safely to the Indian village, where I stayed three days, being ill. The Indian merchant prepared me a comfortable house. I then engaged an Indian and his wife, the nephew of my friend Annance, the old Chief, to take me to Three Rivers, whence I went to Quebec.

"While I have been writing this last part of my letter, a letter has been received by the Governor's Secretary, Mr. Ryland (which letter I have), from Mr. Call, one of the Esquires to whom my friends had written to pay me attention. Something of the matter is come out, I suppose, through the vigilance of the other townships, who, as I came along, declared that the matter should not rest till it was found out; and it is proved that not only Mr. Holland, but the people where I lived, and even the family where I was first received, through letters from the Attorney-General and other friends, were all in league. One of the Justices, who are the Surveyors, committed Mr. Holland and another to take their trial at Montreal. They made their escape; so no further investigation can take place into this shameful business. I cannot help adding that many in Quebec think the escape was as much a concerted plan as the first act of the play had been to frighten me away; and as his friends, the Esquires of Compton, would not bail him, they are not answerable for his non-appearance. I find, by the Attorney-General, it was the good old soldier at the mill and the people of Ascot who caused the matter to be inquired into."

To return to my Narrative. A gentleman, who went out in the spring and is now in Upper Canada, told me he had been in company where the subject of conversation was my sending home my timber to his Majesty's dockyards; and a merchant, who is concerned in sending home timber from Quebec, blamed the Surveyor-General, M. Bouchette, for having given me information respecting roads and the census surrounding my estate; and the same gentleman said he was certain they

meant, if possible, to influence the examiners of the timber at the dockyards, so as to prevent mine from being received, and advised me by all means to write home and to prepare against this.

I have every reason to believe that my land has never been properly surveyed, for the following reasons:—It is a rule that the person who has the greatest share in a township acts as agent for the rest of the grantees, to have it surveyed and subdivided, and the Church and Crown Reserves marked either on a tree, or by planting a post. I wrote constantly to Canada for information concerning my lots, to know how a purchaser was to distinguish mine from the rest; and could never get any satisfactory answer. Soon after my arrival, I dined at Colonel Green's, who had acted as agent for Barford, having a grant of 6,000 acres in it; he told me he believed Mr. Vandervelden had surveyed it. I said, No: Mr. Vandervelden was out of the Surveyor's office before Barford was granted, and it could not be he; but Colonel Green persisted he thought it was, and I had better speak to him. I knew it was not Mr. Vandervelden, for he told me to the contrary in London. It is true he had surveyed it in his general survey, when he made the map of Lower Canada for the Surveyor-General's office, and it was through him I got my information in England.

I now applied to the Surveyor-General, to see the plan of survey: he showed me a diagram, but no such plan as I saw in his office of other townships, with the rivers marked; for, at this time, I only thought of the rivers for floating my timber. I was not satisfied with what I saw in the Surveyor's office, and he referred me back to Colonel Green, the agent, to show me the plan of survey, and the agent referred me back again to the Surveyor-General, and so they went on; and neither the agent, Colonel Green, nor the Surveyor-General, knew anything of the course of the streams. It was the agent, Colonel Green, who got it surveyed, and received the money of the grantees for having had it done; and it is very strange he did not know who surveyed it.

Being much worried by a certain set of people, who were distressing me in every way, to prevent me from prosecuting my plan of sending home my timber, and to prevent my going to my estate, I had no time at this moment, and was too much vexed about other things, to see more about this business; but, on going among the new settlements, I saw the manner of marking the plots, and, what was more, I learned that the river St. Francis ran through Barford, rising from some of the lakes or rivers below the Province Line, falling into the St. Lawrence. Every one in the new settlements know the course of the River, which the agent, Colonel Green, knew nothing of till I told him, though he said he had had the township surveyed.

Another circumstance which struck me very forcibly was, that, upon getting the census surrounding the township of Barford, I was puzzled to account why it was, though I was surrounded by 3,879 souls, there was not one soul in Barford; and I could account for it still less, when I observed in the new settlements that such numbers of people placed themselves upon the Reserves in the other townships, while none could be found in Barford, a township so central to the States and other places, that travellers have, at their own expense and trouble, made a good road through it, and placed a tavern at each end, viz., a tavern at the end of Compton, and another at the beginning of Hereford, and in the centre of the road which is made through Barford, a log-house, to accommodate travellers, in case of their being benighted in bad weather; but no soul lives there; and this persuades me that, if it had been properly surveyed, many would have been glad to settle, as they do in other townships, particularly where they are in such want of a tavern, by which they make so much money: but, if there are no marks to distinguish Reserves, this accounts for it why there are no settlers in Barford, as there are in the adjoining townships.

When I returned to Quebec, it was thought politic, by the agent, Colonel Green, to carry a high hand, and not conde-

scend to speak to me on the subject: when I spoke to him, and said, "I must get the survey settled," he replied, "Then you must;" and left me instantly. Again I applied to the Surveyor-General, who seemed vexed, and sent me a field-book, which, as it contained no plan of survey, I thought it right to return; as I suspected it was no other than one made from a survey taken some years back for the Allen who petitioned for Barford (and had a survey taken), but did not succeed, on account of his misconduct respecting the ship called the Olive Branch; and this I told the Surveyor-General. He said, it might be so; but that he could justify his having made out the patent from the documents which he had received from Colonel Green; though they were not so full as some agents or leaders sent into his office, or as full as I wished; but that I requested more than any grantee of only 1,200 acres ever had done *before me.* I told him if it was the survey done by Allen's order, no one ought to have been charged with the expense of that survey; and, as to the Church and Crown Reserves, which were not set apart at that time, they might easily be placed in the diagram by a pair of compasses, which I had done myself, in taking a copy of what was sent me, which copy I sent to a friend. I told him, as I could not settle it in Canada, I should lodge my complaint at home, which might perhaps be a better way, and occasion better regulations, and be a public good; and endeavoured to represent that such neglect in the leaders and agents for the grantees was every way unjust; for, where the survey was so neglected, the grantee must sell for nothing, or be at the expense of a new survey, which few could afford; besides the trouble and loss of time such a neglect occasioned; and, besides its being wrong to individuals, it was wrong to Government to neglect making the Reserves, which would bring in a revenue to the State, whenever they chose to call for it from the settlers.

It is very hard upon me, who went out in hopes of raising a farm on my own estate, as a reserve, in case I was disappointed

in my timber being received, for I dreaded everything from a set of monopolizers, whose interest it is to oppose so simple and perhaps so beneficial a plan as I went out upon; and I met with every opposition, and have been put to a cruel and needless expense, and after all was not allowed to go upon my estate. I understand that, after my arrival in the Provinces, ship-timber has been brought up, to be sent direct to his Majesty's dockyards, at a hazard, in hopes it will be bought. This is what I always thought would be the case, with the least encouragement.

The Seigneurs of the Province are very anxious to send home timber, but their want of money prevents them. Could they raise money upon their estates, it would be the utmost of their wishes to supply Government upon Government's own terms; and, at the same time, the new land would, upon its first clearing, produce quantities of hemp.

In regard to the merchant who promised to be my agent, the letter he gave me, in return for the power of attorney, is quite different from what I understood he meant to do; and I certainly should have withdrawn my power; but, in that case, I saw clearly I should not have been permitted to return to England but through the States (and perhaps been again molested in my journey), for the merchants have entire power over the captains of the ships; and I must further observe that my agent did not take my passage till after the last conversation: for I wrote him two letters, complaining of the conditions of his letter. He came at last, but would not make any alteration; but would never see me afterwards, unless for a moment, to bid me farewell. I am sorry to have been so wholly deceived by every one; but, since my return to England, I have given my solicitor instructions to withdraw my power of attorney.

The following calculation proves the price at which the land-holders could afford to sell their timber, and what is now received for it by the merchant, which will greatly account for

the opposition. Since my return to England, the President began to grant the first leases for the Reserves in September, 1806.

Government gave, in 1805, for 38-inch masts, £190 1*s.* When I was in Canada, in 1805, many of the settlers offered to cut down and manufacture according to the Navy Board instructions, and sleigh them to the port of Quebec, at from £16 to £20, according to the size of each mast.

	£	*s.*	*d.*
Suppose I paid £20	20	0	0
The freight, even at £4 per load . . .	24	0	0
Insurance	5	0	0
Wharfage at Quebec	0	5	0
Commission to an agent in England . . .	1	0	0
	50	5	0
If, instead of £190 1*s.*, I received only half that sum, viz., £95, at which price I would send in a certain number annually	95	0	0
Deduct expenses	50	5	0
Profit on each mast . . .	44	15	0

What masts I might be allowed to send home were to be accompanied by an affidavit that they were cut down in the proper season, stating the day of the month, and that they were fallen as gently as possible.

The above calculation I had printed when I first offered my estate for sale, in 1803. The annexed letter, written on my leaving England, may throw further light on the subject.

Surely the landholders would think themselves fortunate to be allowed to send their timber to the Royal Docks at half the price that is now paid, and it would prove to them the value of their grants; and, should any difference arise with the United States, the landholders would be more firmly attached to Government, not only from gratitude, but interest: as it is obvious Great Britain would then be the only market for the

most valuable part of their estates. Many of the industrious landholders would be happy to be permitted to send their timber to his Majesty's dockyards, at half the price that is now paid. If each was to send but a few masts in the first instance, and they were approved of, they could, when they received the profit of their industry, go on the following year to a larger extent. This plan would not interfere with the contractors, who chiefly purchase their timber, in the port of Quebec, of the Americans, who bring it in rafts down the St. Lawrence to that port.

"April 1, 1805.

"Dear Madam—The long friendship your ladyship has favoured me with, and the kind interest you have expressed in my affairs, flatters me in the hope you will not be displeased, upon my leaving this country, if I give your ladyship a little history of my proceedings.

"When I received an account of my land being granted, I was altogether unacquainted with the value of it. I mentioned to a friend who had been in the United States that it was estimated at one shilling per acre. She thought it must be worth more, and asked if there were not timber and mill-sites. This induced me to inquire into the capability of my estate. I knew from common conversation that his Majesty's dockyards wanted timber, and also learned that it was imported from Russia. I thought, if my estate could furnish timber for the navy, it would greatly increase its value, and it must be more desirable for Government to be supplied by its Colonies than by foreign powers.

"With great difficulty, I made myself acquainted with the produce and advantages of situation of my estate; and, when I had ascertained the particulars in the annexed papers, I offered it, as I then knew, under value, at six thousand guineas; but, for some reason, which I find it easier to guess than properly to express, the landholders appeared to wish to depreciate its value; and, finding little probability of selling, I turned my

thoughts to making it otherwise productive: but here again I met with opposition.

"The timber-merchants, I imagined, would best furnish me with information and assistance; but they, either from their connexions with the Baltic, or a disinclination that any landholder should interfere with their trade, treated my ideas of importing timber from Canada as visionary. This appeared extraordinary, as several of the merchants I applied to were persons who supply Government with masts and ship-timber. However, from the information I obtained from Mr. Vandervelden, surveyor, and other *disinterested* persons, from Canada, I discovered that rivers were navigable which had been represented as full of impassable rapids, and roads where had been described a perfect wilderness. I was convinced of the practicability of bringing the ship-timber off my estate to this country; and I applied to the Admiralty, who, referring it to the Navy Board, granted me permission to bring home my ship-timber to his Majesty's dockyards, provided it was fit for his Majesty's service, and to pay me the same price as they paid others on delivery.

"Thus, madam, I am compelled to leave my friends, and your ladyship among those I hold most dear, to encounter the dangers of the sea, as the only means left to obtain any benefit from a property which, I am sensible, is valuable; and perhaps I have more candour than some others in acknowledging it. However, if I can benefit myself, and prove the value of lands in one of the finest Provinces of the British Empire, I shall be doubly gratified, on my return, finding my friends approve of my undertaking. I remain, &c.,

"H. Van Kamp."

MEMORANDUM ON THE DRAFT OF A BILL FOR CONSOLIDATING INTO ONE ACT THE MILITIA LAWS OF IRELAND.

The whole of the Militia code is now in two Bills: one containing the pecuniary part of the subject, which is therefore

necessarily annual, the other perpetual, and comprising every thing else.

In the former, besides the advantages of arrangement and perspicuity, it will be found that the principal changes made are in the part relating to the families of Militiamen, under the pretence of paying whom immense frauds have been practised, which it has been the object of the new regulation introduced in this Draft to prevent.

In the other Bill, as the subjects are more various, and the bulk is much greater, so have the alterations been more numerous. The first and principal Militia Act in force passed in 1793, when no Militia existed: it was drawn with a view to the immediate formation of that body; and the provisions of it were, in their form, in many instances, inapplicable to any other state of things. The clauses of the present Draft are expressed in general terms, with a view to answer for all future times and occasions. It is arranged as follows:

The first part regulates the number and amount of the Regiments and Battalions, and provides for the appointment of all Officers. The second part adjusts the discipline and distribution of the different corps, when not on actual service out of their Counties. The third part relates to Governors, Deputy Governors, and all machinery necessary for the Ballot; the fourth part applies that machinery to the purposes for which it is intended, and directs in what way men shall be raised by Ballot, according to the different exigencies that may occur. The fifth part provides for the making of parochial assessments in aid of the Ballot, and to make it unnecessary. The sixth regulates the mode of raising men by enrolling volunteers; and the last part contains several provisions, relating chiefly to matters of law, and extending over the whole Act.

Descending to particulars, the principal changes appear to be as follows—A power is given to the Lord-Lieutenant, to augment at pleasure the number of Companies in any Regiment or Battalion. In the former Act, the Lord-Lieutenant

could appoint a Colonel only after resignation; in all other cases, the appointment was given to the King. There appeared no reason for this diversity; and therefore, in the present Draft, the appointment is given in all cases to the Lord-Lieutenant, who, in fact, exercised it before. The rank of Captain-Lieutenant has been omitted, in conformity with the practice. In the Act of 1793, there was a clause, (never expressly repealed) that, when the Lord-Lieutenant should call out the Militia of more than four Counties, the Parliament should assemble: this, of course, has been omitted. A power is given to the Lord-Lieutenant of forbidding the annual exercise of the Militia, or any part of it, when not in actual service. A power is also given to the Lord-Lieutenant and Council to dissolve any Regiment of Militia. The clause in the Militiaman's oath, respecting the obligation to Ireland, has been omitted, as also the ambiguity of expression as to the Militia being called out within five years: and, in the clause of the Act limiting the Militiaman's service to Ireland, an exception is put in for the case of their volunteering individually to go to England. The appointment of Deputy Governors is given to the Lord-Lieutenant in all cases; whereas, in the former Act, it was in the Governors for fourteen days after passing the former Act, and for an indefinite period on every subsequent occasion, (subject to the Lord-Lieutenant's disapprobation) and in the Lord-Lieutenant, on their default; and, in point of fact, the Lord-Lieutenant has always appointed, and the Governors have only recommended.

In the former Acts, the Colonel of the Cork City Regiment was made a Governor with the Chief Magistrate: in the present Draft, this provision has been extended to all the cities that have Regiments, as being a useful provision, and having less the appearance of a job than the other.

The former Act (1793) provided for the returning lists of names for balloting for the Militia at its first formation, but not at any subsequent period: the present provides that new

lists shall be returned as often as the Lord-Lieutenant shall direct, and that, in the mean time, the last list returned shall be used as occasions may occur. In the present Draft, provision is made for the case of parishes in two Counties, being united episcopally or otherwise, or of more than one church being in a parish.

In this Draft, the powers of the Lord-Lieutenant, as to ordering parochial assessments, in aid or prevention of the Ballot, are made perpetual; and a power is given to him of fixing a maximum and a minimum for the average price of Substitutes, which the Governors, &c., may publish in such case.

In this Draft, an express clause provides what was before held by construction, that, if by such assessment the full quota shall not be raised, the Ballot shall proceed for the residue. A provision is introduced for raising such assessments in places extra-parochial, and in parishes having no Churchwarden.

The minimum for the height of Militiamen is fixed, in this Draft, at five feet four inches. The marching guinea and the bounty, which were before confounded, at least in practice, are discriminated here; and it should seem that they ought to be so, as coming from different funds, and being applicable in different ways. The approbation of a recruit is declared in this Draft not to be complete until he has passed through medical inspection under the Army Medical Board.

The fine on Counties, &c., for not completing their quotas, is raised from £5 to £10 a-year for each man deficient. Power is given to the Lord-Lieutenant to appropriate the produce of fines, under the Act, to the raising men. A form of conviction under the Act is given.

The above are, I think, the principal, if not the only changes which have been made, exclusive of arrangement, consolidation, and verbal emendation.

The Rt. Hon. Charles Long to Lord Castlereagh.

Castle, Dublin, Sunday, January 5 [1806].

My dear Castlereagh—I have sent twenty-four of the letters out of thirty-eight, ordering the augmentation of the companies of the Militia to 100 men; the other fourteen either disapprove, or have not returned an answer. Under these circumstances, do you wish the remainder of the letters to be sent, or do you think they should be confined to those only who, in the first instance, accept our conditions? Some conceive that the necessity will always be going on, which they conceive will be very prejudicial to the discipline of their regiments. This, I think, may be obviated by only admitting the draft to be made once or twice in the year. Some of them make a great point of having the power of setting aside a certain number who should not be permitted to volunteer. Some wish to be sent to their own counties to recruit, and others, in spite of the law, to be sent out of them. These, however, are minor difficulties; but any facilities which you will enable me to give will smooth the measure much, and we shall by degrees bring them all into it. I have seen and conversed much with the Inspector-General, and I think you will see our additional force increase; and, if I can prevail upon the Judges to fine the deficient Counties, we shall do extremely well.

I hope you have good accounts of Mr. Pitt from Bath, and that he will be quite well by the meeting. I have every reason to think we shall do well as to numbers from this part of the Empire. Ever yours, very sincerely,

C. Long.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

48, Conduit Street, March 25, [1806].

My dear Lord—I received your note on my arrival in town on Sunday, and yesterday morning received the letters from Admiral Cochrane, which I send for a confidential perusal, as

they give statements which probably cannot appear in public. You may show them to Lord Hawkesbury, and communicate to Lord Hertford the manner his nephew is spoken of; but I would not wish to have it known that Admiral Cochrane has corresponded with me. He is no favourito at the present Board of Admiralty, and it would not tend to improve their good will to him, if it was known to the full extent the favourable opinion I entertain of him, as an active, gallant, and intelligent officer. They will not now dare to attempt running him down; but I would not wish to increase the disposition to do it.

The observation on the necessity of a constant, stationary squadron in the Leeward Islands is most just. If you recollect the paper I prepared and circulated among you, when I was at the Admiralty, it was an essential ingredient in the distribution of the naval force that there should never be less than six or seven sail of the line on that station. I was prevented only from carrying it into execution by the weak, enfeebled, and inefficient state in which I found the navy: but the measures I took for restoring the navy afforded full means for doing so, after the successes of Nelson and Strachan; and it was certainly an omission in the late Admiralty not having done it after they had the means. When Mr. Pitt, at Bath, showed me the distribution of the fleet, I pointed out to him the deficiency: he told me he would have it remedied the moment he went to town—but alas!—

Remember me kindly to Lady Castlereagh; and I remain, my dear Lord, yours very sincerely,

MELVILLE.

Memorandum for the Consideration of the Cabinet.

Lord Castlereagh wishes to obtain the decision of the Cabinet on the accompanying Draft of an Order in Council for the regulated import of Slaves into the conquered Colonies, so that the Order, as approved, may be made in the first Council which is to be held at Weymouth.

The Instructions, as formerly prepared, have been in some degree extended, in consequence of suggestions since received; and the Order in Council has been altered in conformity to the proposed regulations.

The subject is one of considerable difficulty in itself, and upon which it is almost impossible to arrive at the utmost equity of indulgence without sacrificing the substance of the measure, by opening wide the door to fraud and evasion.

Lord Castlereagh has endeavoured, in framing the Instructions, to steer a middle course, applying strict regulations in the first instance, and leaving their relaxation, in cases of evident hardship, to the discretion of the Governors abroad. This course appears, on the whole, more likely to answer the ends of justice, than to attempt to anticipate and to provide for all such possible cases in the original Instructions to be sent from hence.

Vide Order in Council, referred to above, in London Gazette.

Memorandum for the Cabinet, relative to the State of the Military Force.

Draft. March, 1807.

Lord Castlereagh does not feel himself able to bring before the Cabinet any very matured statement as yet, with respect to the military situation of the country: but, as the general state of our force and the prospect of increasing it must be had in view in any decision to be taken, either in respect to diversions in favour of our allies, or in estimating our means of supporting the offensive operations in which we are at present separately engaged, he deems it his duty to submit, for the information of his colleagues, the best outline which his inquiries at this moment enable him to supply.

The total force of Regulars and Militia at home and abroad, exclusive of artillery, is, in rank and file, 259,067, of which 93,677 are serving abroad, and 165,390 remain at home, of which 88,857 are Regulars, and 7,683 Militia.

Of the force at home, a selection has been made of the regiments most fit for immediate foreign service: the strength in rank and file is:

Infantry . . .	23,596
Cavalry . . .	10,026
Total	33,622

If this force was detached, there would remain, for the defence of the United Kingdom, exclusive of Volunteers, 131,768 rank and file.

Out of 23,596 infantry above stated, we must be prepared to supply not less than 3,000 for East, and 2,000 for West India service; an augmentation of force being requisite in both these quarters, from the late symptoms of insubordination which have shown themselves among the native troops and the negroes. We must also be prepared to hold a corps of not less than 5,000 men in readiness to support, according to circumstances, our operations in South America, or to reinforce still further our East or West India possessions, should circumstances render it expedient.

It does not, therefore, seem prudent, at least till the advantages obtained over the enemy on the Continent are more decisive, to hazard a corps of more than 10 or 12,000 men in continental diversions. A force to this extent, should a practicable mode of employing it present itself, might be spared, without endangering too seriously our home defences; and, in the event of the French army being driven back towards their own frontier with loss, this corps might be reinforced, and a large body of cavalry, of from 8 to 10,000 men, held in readiness to co-operate with the allies.

If the Cabinet should approve of such a force as is above stated, viz., of 10 or 12,000 men being held in readiness to move at the shortest notice, Lord Castlereagh will immediately proceed with the necessary arrangements. This cannot be too soon undertaken, as the quantity of transports at present dis-

posable is not more than equal to the details of home service; and the German Legion, which it would be desirable to employ on this service, must be brought from Ireland.

During Mr. Pitt's Government, it was a constant rule to keep tonnage for 10,000 men always ready for service, partly stationed at Cork, partly at Portsmouth. It will appear, from the accompanying returns, that this salutary precaution, which enabled us to equip the expedition against the Cape in the space of fourteen days, has been discontinued.

With respect to the increase of the Regular Army, Lord Castlereagh does not feel that he can, without involving the Government in Parliamentary difficulties, propose to his colleagues any very decisive measure with this view. There are, however, two expedients free from objection, from which, he flatters himself, some considerable aid may be derived. The first is to direct the Lord-Lieutenant to press the Irish Militia Colonels to complete their regiments without delay. The Militia of Ireland is now 22,738 rank and file, wanting about 6,000 men to complete. With exertion, this number ought to be raised in the next three months, when it is proposed that the annual draft of 15 men a company, being about 4,000 men, should be taken from them. Although it is desirable to obtain these men for the Line as early as possible, Lord Castlereagh is, upon the whole, disposed to recommend that the volunteering should be postponed till the regiments are more nearly complete, and till the Colonels, after the rising of Parliament, return to their regiments.

The second suggestion is to extend the recruiting exertion so far as it can be done without encroaching further upon the discipline and efficiency of the army, which is already much injured by not less than 600 recruiting parties being detached from the regiments at home. This cannot be done by any parochial effort, without coming to Parliament; it cannot be adequately performed by employing officers on half-pay, or those retired from the service, to recruit. They are too few in

number; those already employed are found to be more expensive than effective, as they chiefly frequent the large towns, where the recruiting parties abound sufficiently. What we want is some arrangement which will cover the country more generally, which may enable us to draw a supply of men from those parts of it which are less frequented by recruiting parties, and which will cost the public nothing but the premium allowed upon the men when actually found. With this view, it is proposed that beating orders, similar to those now given to persons employed in what is called the Extra Recruiting service, should be distributed, by the inspecting field-officers employed under the Inspector-General, to such sergeants of the Volunteer corps within their respective districts as may choose to undertake to levy men on the terms therein proposed. It is to be presumed that many will gladly accept of them. With a little management, the Volunteer officers may be prevailed on to countenance them in doing so; and certainly there is no class of men who are more likely not only to get recruits generally, but especially to prevail on the privates of their corps to enlist into the King's service.

It only remains to call the attention of the Cabinet to the situation of the Volunteers, and to the measure now in progress for Training the population of the country. The latter has been proceeded in so far as that lists have been taken, an apportionment of 200,000 men made by his Majesty in Council, and a Warrant under the Sign Manual been issued, directing the ballot and enrolment within the respective counties to take place, which is now going on.

The order for proceeding to train was reserved for a separate Warrant; and it does not appear that the late Government had at all settled in their own minds how this part of the measure was to be executed. Indeed, upon a careful perusal of the Act, it appears so totally impracticable, that Lord Castlereagh is induced to recommend to his colleagues to suffer its execution to proceed no further than the ballot and enrolment.

This process will give the country some trouble, but it may at least serve to keep up the number of the Volunteers. In a future session, it may perhaps be desirable, in the room of this fleeting and inapplicable mass, to substitute a less numerous, but a more regularly appointed and officered force, to be trained within their respective counties, as a Sedentary Militia, for 30 or 40 days in each year, of which a proportion of the men should be suffered annually to enter into the Line; but this cannot be now attempted, as, exclusive of objections on the score of hastiness and convenience, the ballots, as prescribed by the Act, are on the point of commencing in several counties.

As the country cannot hope to derive any aid whatever, in the course of the present year, from this description of force, it seems more necessary than ever to revive the zeal and discipline of the Volunteers, to replace them under the superintendence of the Generals commanding districts, and to restore them to that state of order and efficiency from which they have been rapidly declining, during the last fifteen months.

In order to effect this, little additional expense need be incurred. It is not proposed to alter the rate of the allowance, nor will it be necessary to replace the corps, which before were entitled to 80 days' exercise, on their former high establishment; but the allowance as now settled for clothing, &c., must be issued upon the full establishment of the respective corps; by which means, new members joining the corps will, as formerly, be relieved from the expense of equipping themselves.

Neither is it proposed to incur the charge, unless the danger of invasion should become imminent, of brigading the Volunteers, under Brigadiers-General; however requisite officers of this description might be to lead them against the enemy, they certainly are not necessary, in addition to the inspecting field-officers, for the mere purpose of preserving discipline and regularity, previous to the corps being assembled for service. It appears, however, indispensably necessary that the inspecting field-officers, in the proportion of one to about 5,000 men,

should be again employed. Without their superintendence and reports, Government could have no security for the faithful application of the allowances granted. They can know nothing of the state of their discipline or numbers, considered in a military sense. The corps may assemble in great force, for the purpose of entitling themselves to exemptions, and yet be incapable of rendering any service if called upon; nor can they have any means of assembling or moving this great army, in case of attack, or of supplying the General Officers commanding districts with a proper channel through which their orders may be circulated, and by which their arrangements may be carried into execution.

An estimate has been prepared of the additional expense which would be occasioned by thus partially recurring to the system which was acted upon with so much advantage during Mr. Pitt's last Government, the amount of which is trifling, compared with the use it would give of this powerful instrument of defence. There is only one other head of expense, under which it appears to be highly desirable that something should be done, namely, that of permanent duty. The corps are now universally allowed 20 days' drill, at one shilling a day. Such corps as consent to pass not less than 14 days on permanent duty, might have say six additional days allowed them, which, leaving them a parade in each month, for inspection of arms, &c., would consolidate the remaining 14 days into one continued practice, and thereby improve their discipline and military habits more than could be done by double the number of days employed in ordinary drills.

It only remains to suggest the propriety of a very cordial, early, and flattering appeal being made, in his Majesty's name, to the Volunteers, to rouse them to new exertions; to satisfy them that his Majesty's present Ministers have not changed their sentiments with respect to them; that their utmost exertions are become indispensably necessary towards enabling his Majesty to employ his Regular forces (consistently with a

due attention to our security at home) with effect against the enemy; that, for this purpose, his Majesty has been pleased to make such arrangements as, with due exertions on their part, will enable them to confirm their discipline, &c.; that an inspection of the whole of the Volunteers will take place by General Officers, early in autumn, when a special Report of the state of each corps will be laid before the King, in order that such as are not then deemed serviceable may be reduced.

Minute for the Cabinet relative to the Necessity of a Reinforcement for the Army in India.

Downing Street, May, 1807.

Lord Castlereagh takes the earliest opportunity of calling the attention of his colleagues to the recent intelligence received from India. There is much voluminous information sent home on the spirit of insubordination and revolt which has lately shown itself among several bodies of the native troops, with the perusal of which he does not feel it necessary at present to trouble the Cabinet.

The accompanying letters will explain the most recent instance in which this spirit has broke forth. The unfortunate massacre at Vellore was followed by strong indications of disaffection among the subsidiary forces at Hydrabad, consisting of eight battalions, and also among the native corps in garrison at Fort St. George; but, in both these cases, the insubordination of the troops was suppressed without the effusion of blood. Several concurring causes are stated to have contributed to produce these effects, which have been confined to Mussulman Sepoys—a general desire to restore the Mahometan Government and religion, in the person of one of the sons of Tippoo; a repugnance, or pretended repugnance, to some alterations in the turban and dress of the troops; and perhaps too great a number of the turbulent and refractory Poligar chieftains having been suffered latterly to enter our service.

The descendants of Tippoo have been sent off, without

trouble, to Bengal, where the most perfect order and tranquillity have continued to prevail, both among the inhabitants and the troops.

Under the above critical circumstances, (however much he may be solicitous to husband the disposable force for other services) Lord Castlereagh cannot hesitate in proposing to the Cabinet to embark immediately three regiments, of 1,000 rank and file each, for India. The transports will be ready to receive them in fourteen days from the present time. This reinforcement, in addition to one regiment which General Whitelocke has been positively ordered to detach from Buenos Ayres, and, if possible, a second, Lord Castlereagh conceives to be an adequate reinforcement to the army on the coast, at least till further advices are received.

Lord Castlereagh will, however, take such steps in the mean time as will enable his Majesty's Ministers to detach a still larger force to India, without delay, should the next despatches, which may be shortly expected, render such a measure necessary.

Measures proposed for Improving the State of the Military Force.

Downing Street, May 12, 1807.

Lord Castlereagh is desirous of taking the earliest opportunity, during the recess, of bringing the state of the Military Force under the consideration of the Cabinet, in order that the measures to be taken on the meeting of the new Parliament may be previously prepared, and that their execution may thereby be attended with the least possible delay.

The present state of the Army will be best exhibited by examining the composition and amount of the regular infantry. Including the Guards, it consists of 106,466 rank and file, being, upon an average, about 777 men a battalion. These regiments are perfectly efficient, and fit for any service.

The remaining battalions now at home, not less than 54 in

number, consist only of 14,098 men, and are not, upon an average, more than 260 men a battalion. A considerable proportion of their strength is detached on the recruiting service; and, with the exception of three battalions, whose effectives are between 4 and 500 men each, they can hardly be considered, in their present state, as applicable to any military purpose.

It appears, upon a comparison of the effectives of the Army with the establishment as voted by Parliament, that there is at present a deficiency of about 35,000 men; and it also appears that no less than 23,000 men are required to complete the 54 battalions now at home, which are at present under 500 men, to an average strength of about 700 men a battalion.

It is also evident that the really effective British infantry for service does not exceed 30,000 men, out of which force the waste in our foreign garrisons and distant operations is to be supplied, and a considerable proportion of the corps destined for continental operations to be furnished. Should the former drain be increased by any peculiar contingency, or the corps destined for continental service meet with any disaster, as the Army now stands, we should be destitute of any considerable proportion of regular infantry for the purposes of home defence.

The above statement is calculated to show the indispensable necessity (if we mean to combine security at home with activity abroad) of adopting, without delay, some decisive measure for the augmentation of our Army; the produce of our present system of raising men not being more than sufficient to counterbalance the casualties of the service.

It is impossible to expect that any measure can be devised adequate to such an object, which shall not be liable to considerable objections, and which shall not excite, more or less, the opposition of some considerable class of interests, both in and out of Parliament. There are but two expedients that occur, between which an option must be made (taking it always for granted that we are not yet pressed to the adoption of an unqualified personal conscription): the one is a draft from the

Militia, leaving that defensive force gradually to repair its numbers; the other is some very active local assessment, to be enforced by fine, &c., which, like the Army of Reserve Act, shall be competent to extort a large number of men from the parishes in a short space of time.

With respect to the success of such a measure, had it even received the sanction of Parliament, very considerable doubts may be entertained, when the contempt into which fines have fallen, from their enforcement being always neglected, and latterly wholly abandoned by an express enactment, is considered: and it is clear that a recurrence to such a system at present would be productive of the utmost resistance and dissatisfaction both in and out of Parliament.

There appears, then, in the course to pursue, but to encounter the minor difficulty, namely, that of drawing a large supply of men from the Militia. There is the stronger inducement to this attempt, as it will be infinitely the most speedy in its operation. The disposable force thus to be obtained may be placed in a serviceable state in a few weeks: that to be procured by the other process, calculating upon the time consumed in divisional meetings, finding substitutes for the men drawn, and drilling the recruits when formed, could not be rendered effective in the course of the present year.

It seems, therefore, essential to make the Militia the basis of the measure; and Lord Castlereagh is not without hopes, from the communications he has had with several Militia officers, that the importance, if not the absolute necessity, of procuring a large supply of force at the present conjuncture may be so strongly made out, and the draft taken from the Militia under such regulations as will reconcile the officers of that service very generally to its adoption.

In order to avoid any unnecessary difficulty on the first meeting of Parliament, Lord Castlereagh is disposed to recommend that the proceeding should be confined as much as possible to the simple principle of increasing our disposable force,

reserving all more disputable regulations of military detail for future decision. The only point, in addition to procuring the men, which need now be pressed, is that, with a view to the conservation of our military strength, the men should have the option, if they think fit, of engaging for life, at a somewhat higher bounty. With respect to all the rest of Mr. Windham's system, it will be more prudent to manifest no impatience abruptly to subvert it, but reserve such alterations as, from full deliberation, may appear to be expedient to be proposed in the subsequent session.

With respect to the extent and detail of the measure, Lord Castlereagh would propose that 20,000 men, exclusive of the annual draft from the Irish Militia, should be permitted to enlist into the line from the Militia of Great Britain, to be proportionably assessed upon the regiments according to their effective strength. This draft will not, it is to be hoped, be complained of as falling too heavy; their numbers amounting at present to 54,873 men; more especially when considered in connexion with the mode by which it is proposed to replace them.

Exclusive of the largeness of the draft, what has generally most revolted the feelings of Militia officers to this species of measure has been the scene of disorder and indiscipline which has been introduced into their respective regiments during the interval of volunteering, and frequently protracted for a period of three weeks together. With a view to obviate this inconvenience, it is proposed that general volunteering should only be had recourse to after a given time, and that a considerable one, (say two months) and then only in case the Colonel or commanding officer should fail within that time to obtain by his own influence and management the full quota of men required. It may be desirable even then to limit the period of volunteering to a single week, to be repeated, however, for a like period, every three months, till the number of men are supplied.

In the interval between the times of volunteering, the Colonel, or officer commanding, should be authorized to discharge any number of men, not exceeding the full quota, for whom, upon delivery to the officers of the recruiting staff, receipts should be subsequently admitted, in discharge of the numbers required to be furnished by the regiment.

Instead of giving the men the option, as heretofore, of choosing amongst thirty or forty regiments, into which they shall enter, for none of which they can have any natural preference, the regiments of the line might be appropriated, according to the number of men wanting to render them effective, to the respective regiments of Militia, following, as far as possible, the existing designation of county regiments. By this means, you would have your battalions tolerably well levelled, instead of having an inconvenient disproportion of men thrown from caprice into a few corps of popular name. This would also put an end to the struggle between the different corps of the line for the men at the moment of volunteering, and the excessive expense of sending numerous recruiting parties to a distance, upon the chance of getting men. In Ireland, last summer, no less than forty-two parties came to Belfast from different parts of England, to contend for their share of 150 men, which was the utmost number that by law the Londonderry regiment of Militia could furnish. This inconvenience would be avoided by confining the choice of the soldier either to enter into the regiment named, or to enter for general service; and, in order to avoid all jealousy on the part of the Militia, the receiving depôt of the regiment into which the men were to be permitted to enter might be placed, except during the week of volunteering, at such a distance from the headquarters of the Militia corps, as to prevent, on the part of the Militia, all jealousy with respect to the interference of the line.

In the above mode, the full number of 20,000 men might be obtained for the line, if not immediately, certainly in a very short time. The Militia would be protected against those in-

conveniences which they have most complained of; the execution of the measure would, in the first instance, be thrown entirely into the hands of the officers commanding the Militia; and it is only upon their failure that any interference whatever would take place; and that interference would be restricted as much as possible, in point of time, and only repealed upon a continued omission on their part to satisfy the claim upon them.

To this extent, with an option to all persons entering the regular service, whether from the Militia or otherwise, to enlist at once for life, if they think fit, at such an advanced bounty as his Majesty would propose, Lord Castlereagh would propose to confine the measure to be proposed to Parliament in this year, so far as the regular army is concerned.

In order to have the use of the disposable force to be thus created *for offensive purposes*, measures must be taken for restoring the defensive force to its present standard. It will probably be thought right, when Parliament meets after Christmas, in the room of a levy *en masse* of 200,000 men, incapable of any useful application, to create a sedentary Militia of 50 or 60,000 men, to be assembled and trained for a month in each year, as the Militia is in time of peace, which shall not only afford an organized and effective reserve, to be marched out of their respective counties, in case of actual invasion or rebellion, but which shall also be made a source of annual supply of men to the regular Army.

It may also hereafter deserve consideration, if we shall succeed in procuring, by these various expedients, a redundance of force, whether the defensive force of the country should not be composed in a greater proportion, if not entirely, of second battalions of the line, converting the existing Militia into a still more numerous sedentary Militia. But, until the means of keeping up our Army are better secured, exclusive of the objection to too sudden a change of system, the superior facility of recruiting for the Militia, and the necessity of having an

adequate amount of force to occupy the country, in the absence of so large a proportion of our regular Army, points out the necessity of progressively replacing the men proposed to be drafted from the Militia.

In order to avoid as much as possible recurring to ballot, and to relieve the counties, at least in the first instance, from any charge as connected with the men to be thus obtained, it is proposed that ten guineas be paid by the public to the respective Militia regiments for each man furnished to the line; to be applied by them in finding substitutes to serve in the room of the men so given. Should, however, the full number not have been raised by the regiment within twelve months, a ballot then to take place in the usual manner for the number deficient; the persons drawn being, however, entitled to receive the ten guineas, in mitigation of the burden thus imposed upon them. By this arrangement, supposing the Militiaman to transfer his services to the line for seven years, receiving a bounty of eight guineas, which would be an ample inducement, the actual expense to the public of the man so procured, including the ten guineas payable to the regiment, or to the men balloted, would not exceed the sum at present allowed for recruits, payment to the party included.

The permitting the Colonels of Militia, in the first instance, to endeavour to replace their own men, rather than proceed at once to a ballot, may be objected to by some as an innovation upon the strict Militia principle, but so is the whole of the arrangement; and if it affords a chance of replacing, with less inconvenience to the country and less prejudice to the ordinary recruiting service, the men thus withdrawn, there will be no serious reluctance, it is to be presumed, to adopt in a qualified manner what has been the general practice in Ireland, since the institution of the Militia, and which has certainly very much tended to keep down the rate of bounty, and consequently the pressure of the measure, in point of expense, upon the people of that country.

It is conceived this measure may be the less objected to by the Militia; as it is a sacrifice which they are not likely, for the following reasons, at least in this war, to be again called upon to make: 1st, Because the Army will be thereby at once raised to its full establishment, and the means will only be required of keeping it up. 2ndly, Because the ordinary recruiting, even as at present regulated, appears adequate to afford that supply, taking the casualties of the service at the highest rate, either of the last or present war. 3rdly, Because there is every reason to hope, by the measure now in progress, of extensively employing the Volunteer officers and non-commissioned officers, in the levy of men for the line, that the number of men to be obtained may be considerably increased. And, 4thly, Because the annual supply may be still further extended, if a numerous sedentary Militia, as above suggested, from which one-fifth or one-sixth of the men may be allowed in each year to volunteer into the line, shall be established.

Nothing further of detail occurs as necessary to be at present submitted to the Cabinet on this subject. As it will be material to the success of this measure that the principle of it should be decided on as early as possible, so as to admit of communication being had with such individuals in the Militia service as are likely to facilitate its execution, Lord Castlereagh is desirous of having an early decision upon it. He presumes the Cabinet will be of opinion, in case the measure should be proceeded in, that his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief should be requested to recommend to the King that ensigncies, in the proportion given on former occasions, should be placed at the disposal of the Colonels of the respective regiments, as an encouragement to the subalterns of Militia to promote the levy.

With this aid, Lord Castlereagh does not on his own part entertain any apprehension of the measure not being successful; and he is of opinion that it will be productive of much

less difficulty in Parliament than any other measure of equal military efficiency.

Abstract of Measures proposed for augmenting the Regular Army, contained in the preceding Paper.

1. Twenty thousand men to be allowed to volunteer from the British Militia into the line, to be taken proportionably from the respective regiments, according to their effective strength.

2. The men, at their option, to enlist, as at present, for seven years, at a bounty of eight guineas, or for life, at a bounty of twelve guineas.

3. The regiments of the line now deficient to be appropriated (preserving as far as possible the County connexion) to the Militia regiments, according to the number of men the former may require and the latter are to give; and no Militiaman to be permitted to volunteer into any other than the regiment named, unless to enter for general service.

4. Two months to be allowed, within which time, if the number of men shall not have been delivered over by the officer in command of the Militia, a general volunteering for one week shall take place, to be repeated for a like period every three months, till the full number is furnished, it being competent for the commanding officer to supply the number in the intervals of general volunteering.

5. Twenty thousand men to be raised for the Militia, in the room of those who shall transfer their services to the line; to be enlisted, in the first instance, by the regiments of Militia, who are to receive from the Treasury ten guineas for each man. If the full number of men shall not be thus raised within twelve months by the regiments, a ballot then to take place in the usual manner; the men drawn, and who shall serve either personally or by substitute, being entitled to receive the ten guineas advanced by Government for replacing the men.

6. Ensigncies to be allowed in the usual proportion to such

subalterns of Militia as the Colonel shall recommend for their exertions in promoting this levy.

Memorandum respecting the State of the Military Force.

Downing Street, May 26, 1807.

Before the state of the Army is again brought under consideration, Lord Castlereagh is desirous of furnishing the Cabinet with some further information on those points which were principally subjects of doubt when this question was last under discussion: and, first, as to the necessity of any considerable increase being made to the present strength of our military establishment.

Return No. 1 will show the total force required in the Commander-in-Chief's letter to Mr. Windham, of the 18th March, 1806, with its distribution abroad and at home; also the effectives now serving at each station, and the deficiency.

From the above, it will appear that, on our ordinary Colonial establishment, there is a deficiency of about 10,000 men, principally in the East and West Indies, both which stations, from peculiar circumstances, at present require very particular attention.

There is on the establishment at home a deficiency of 47,464 men, which is the more serious, as about 16,000 of the force for internal defence is in its present state very little effective, viz., the 56 skeleton battalions.

The 28,618 men serving in the Mediterranean and South America cannot be reckoned upon, from the remoteness of those stations, as bearing, in any degree, upon our home defence.

Before the 16,000 men now preparing for service are detached, the Cabinet will therefore naturally weigh the probable consequences of exposing the home defence to have this amount of force, by any military disaster, added to the above deficiency of 47,464 men; more especially if no effective measures are in the mean time in progress for augmenting the Army.

Return No. 2 will show what our really disposable infantry will be at home, when the troops now under orders for foreign service are gone: there will remain only eight battalions of 500 rank and file and upwards, amounting to 7,787 men, including the three battalions of Guards; only sixteen battalions in Ireland, consisting of 10,966 men; and four in the Islands, of 2,537—total, 28 battalions, amounting to 21,290 men, for the defence of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Islands, subject, nevertheless, to all demands from abroad for reinforcements.

The residue of the regular infantry at home, amounting to 28,698 men, is composed of the 56 skeleton 2nd battalions above described, together with the garrison and veteran battalions, which, though sufficiently effective for garrison purposes, cannot be relied upon for active service in the field.

Under the above circumstances, it will be for the Cabinet to consider whether they can venture (if no measures for the reproduction of force be taken) to send 13,000 infantry, as proposed, to the Continent, bearing in mind that any operation in the North of Germany, however important to the common cause, must, in its nature, be a very hazardous one. If not, are we not giving our allies rather too strong expectations, and putting the public to more expense in preparations than is requisite for a mere menace? The expense of transports alone for the corps now under orders will, when completed, exceed £60,000 a month.

There is another important view in which this subject ought to be considered. Return No. 3 proves that the recruits actually joined at head-quarters in the last twenty weeks, during which time the ordinary recruiting has somewhat improved, after deducting the loss by previous casualties and boys, is not, in net produce, more than at the rate of 16,319 men a year, though this estimate is taken from the months most favourable to recruiting.

The Return No. 4 will show that the above produce is little more than equal to the average casualties in the two last years,

when our force serving abroad was considerably less than at present.

That our army is at present stationary, and likely to continue so, if no extraordinary measure be taken for its increase, (notwithstanding Mr. Windham's system has already added half a million to its annual expense) is further proved from Return No 5, in which no sensible alteration appears to have taken place, during the last five months, in its strength, although the number of recruiting parties has been more than doubled, and all the second battalions have been menaced with reduction, in case they did not raise 400 men each in the six months now on the point of expiring.

If, then, no reasonable hope can be entertained that the 56 skeleton battalions can be rendered effective by ordinary recruiting; and if it shall be decided that no extraordinary measure can be had recourse to, to render them really capable of military service, it deserves consideration whether an extensive alteration in the constitution of the Army itself must not be the necessary consequence of such a determination.

This is now the third year since these second battalions were created. They have been of the utmost service in keeping the first battalions complete; but hitherto the attempt to render them complete in themselves has totally failed. As they now stand, it is impossible to represent them as capable of rendering any useful service in the field. They can only be depended on as an instrument for recruiting and keeping up the Army; and, as applicable to this single purpose, we are bound to consider what, as a means of recruiting, they cost the public.

Return No. 6 shows that they are quite complete in officers and non-commissioned officers; but that they have not, on an average, above 260 privates each.

Return No. 7 shows that they are kept up in their present state at an annual expense of £911,869.—Can you propose to Parliament to persevere in voting an annual charge of this amount for the mere purpose of levying 16,319 men, being

at the rate of £55 a man, exclusive of the £18 bounty, &c., which each recruit costs the public, and also exclusive of the half million above referred to, which was also incurred solely with a view to the raising of men, and ought in like manner to be charged upon the number procured?

In point of military utility, these battalions, as at present composed, rather operate injuriously, inasmuch as they keep 16,000 men for general service dispersed over 56 battalions, each too weak to be of use, which, if consolidated in one-third of the number, would become effective. But this consolidation can only be made by bounty and volunteering, as the men are not liable to be transferred, except to the first battalions, and such arrangement necessarily presupposes the abandonment of the plan of second battalions.

Nothing appears more perfect than the system of second battalions, if they can have the double quality of being reasonably efficient in themselves for purposes of home defence, while they, at the same time, feed their first battalions on foreign service. But they never can be upheld merely for recruiting purposes; and, if they cannot now by an effort be placed on a respectable footing, in point of numbers, they ought to be reduced, and the less efficient but more economical plan of recruiting companies be again had recourse to.

If, on the contrary, they are now raised to an establishment of about 700 effective rank and file, by some measure sufficiently productive at once to furnish 20,000 men, there seems little reason to doubt that the ordinary recruiting, with the aid of the improvements now in progress, may, during the war, preserve them in a state of efficiency, and, through them, the Army at large.

Upon the possibility, if not objectionable upon the grounds of political expediency, of procuring almost immediately 20,000 men from the Militia, there can be no room, from past experience, to doubt. Upon the possibility of replacing these men in the Militia, in three months, if an immediate ballot be

deemed expedient, rather than an attempt to obtain them by recruiting, as little doubt can be entertained. What the probable injury is which ordinary recruiting would sustain by the operation of a Militia ballot, for such a short period, may be judged of from what happened during the four months in 1803, when the more injurious competition of the Army of Reserve ballot was in full operation. This is shown in Return No. 8, by which the levy of 38,708 men under that law does not appear to have occasioned a diminution of produce in ordinary recruiting of more than 1,373 men.[1]

Memorandum of the Language which may be held to the Allies on the subject of Military and Naval Succours.

That we have now in Sicily an army of 20,000 British troops; that the Neapolitan army, for the payment of which advances are made by this country, amounts to nearly 15,000 men; that 24,000 stand of arms have been sent to Sicily, to arm the Sicilian militia, and thereby render the regular force within the island more disposable.

That a large fleet of transports is constantly kept in readiness in that quarter, to move the troops at the shortest notice, and that a diversion may be undertaken by an army of about 20,000 men, British and Neapolitan, from thence, or an effort made for the recovery of Naples, should the advance of the Russians in Turkey, or the movement of the Austrians, render such an operation practicable.

That, with a view to aid the Allies in the North of Europe, a squadron of 16 sail of two-deckers has been prepared, and will be ready shortly to proceed to the Baltic, there to co-operate with the Russian and Swedish navies.

That measures are taking for preparing a corps of 15,000 men[2]

[1] As the nature and the general results of the Returns attached to this paper are sufficiently explained in it, I have considered their introduction as unnecessary.—EDITOR.

[2] This corps has since been augmented to 25,000.

for immediate service. That it is the wish of his Majesty's Government that, by the time this corps is ready to move, the relative state of the Allies, as opposed to the enemy, may be such as to justify them in prudence in undertaking a direct operation against the enemy in the narrow seas, either in the quarter of the Elbe and Weser, or on the Dutch, Flemish, or French coasts; this being infinitely the most easy of execution, as far as depends on our own efforts, from the facility of transporting cavalry, draught horses, and supplies from hence. But, as this mode of attack may be then deemed too hazardous, from the strength and position of the French corps under Mortier, and their means of resistance from the troops in garrison at Magdeburg, Hameln, and in Holland, his Majesty's Ministers are desirous of ascertaining, by a previous concert, how far an effective operation might in that case be undertaken from Stralsund, by a combined Swedish, Russian, and British force.

If such a concert can be settled, and adequate supplies procured there, for rendering the army moveable on its arrival, and for enabling it to move forward, his Majesty's Ministers would be disposed to recommend that the German Legion, from 8 to 10,000 strong, should be sent to Stralsund as early in the season as the necessary arrangements for their transport can be completed. But they cannot hold out any expectation that it will be in their power to send any considerable force in cavalry to a point so distant; and it will be necessary, even before the infantry proceeds, that it should be ascertained what supplies can be procured within the Baltic, and what must be sent from hence.

A further corps of British infantry, and a large force in cavalry, if requisite, of 10,000, will be held in readiness to co-operate, so soon as the successes of the Allies have opened a direct entrance for them to the Continent; but, so long as the French armies are in sufficient strength to maintain themselves at a distance from home, and may, within a limited time, resume

offensive measures against the United Kingdom, his Majesty's Ministers do not feel themselves justified in recommending that any larger proportion of disposable force than what is above proposed should be detached on a service so remote as an operation commencing from Stralsund must be deemed to be, but consider it more advisable, for the interest of the common cause, to remain in force at home, to be employed, according to circumstances, either in offensive operations less distant, or in protecting the country against the enemy.

General Dumouriez to Lord Castlereagh.

11, Leicester Place, Vendredy, 12 Juin, 1807.

Mylord—J'ose vous prier de faire la plus grande attention sur ce que vous deciderez sur l'Egypte. Rien n'a été plus imprudent que l'occupation d'Alexandrie. Il valait beaucoup mieux laisser cette Province dans l'anarchie qui la rendait nulle et à charge à la Porte, que d'affaiblir votre armée de Sicile de 5,000 hommes. Une seconde imprudence, la conséquence nécessaire de la première, est d'avoir affaibli la garnison d'Alexandrie, déjà trop faible, pour aller occuper Aboukir et Rosette. Le Général Anglais est excusable, parcequ'on ne peut pas se maintenir en Alexandrie, sans le secours du Nil, dont Rosette est la clef, parceque, sans même attaquer cette ville de vive force, l'ennemi peut l'affamer. Ainsi Alexandrie est intenable si on n'a pas le cours du Nil et par conséquent Rosette.

Si vous y envoyez des renforts, vous ruinerez très vîte votre armée d'Italie, vous finirez par être chassés de l'Egypte, et la Sicile sera dégarnie et exposée. Il faut avoir le courage de renoncer au mauvais plan de vos prédecesseurs, et de retirer au plus tôt les restes de l'expédition de l'Egypte, avant de vous trouver engagés dans une suite de guerre désastreuse, qui épuiserait vos forces et vous écarterait de plans plus directs et mieux combinés.

Jamais l'Angleterre n'a fait une combinaison plus déraisonnable et plus funeste que l'expédition des Dardanelles, et surtout d'en avoir distrait les troupes de terre pour les envoyer à Alexandrie, au lieu de leur avoir fait occuper les 4 châteaux du détroit. Cette occupation d'Alexandrie au même moment où Mr. Arbuthnot et l'Amiral Duckworth ne parlaient que de paix a donné à toute l'expédition un air de perfidie dont les évènements ont amené une première punition, qui sera encore plus sevère si, par un faux point d'honneur, on s'obstine à suivre un mauvais plan. Je voudrais pouvoir vous parler de tout cela à fonds, si vous vouliez me donner un rendez-vous.

Vous connaissez, mylord, mon tendre et respectueux attachement. DUMOURIEZ.

General Dumouriez to Lord Castlereagh.

11, Leicester Place, Dimanche, 14 Juin, 1807.

Mylord — C'est par zèle pour l'honneur des armes du Roy, c'est par considération pour vos collégues, c'est par égard pour la sûreté des braves troupes qu'il faut ménager pour des occasions plus utiles, et par amitié particulière pour vous que, sans en être requis, je vous ai envoyé mon opinion invariable sur la necessité d'évacuer Alexandrie, qui anéantirait votre armée de Sicile, si vous vous opiniatrerez à soutenir cette place contre un ennemi plus fort que les Turcs—la famine. Je vous prie pour le bien public d'avoir confiance à ma longue expérience.

Je vous demande par le même motif la même confiance sur la proposition que je vous ai faite du voyage du Duc d'Orléans à l'Amérique du Sud. Ne le considérez point comme une affaire hardie et avantureuse : elle ne compromet en rien le Gouvernement, et n'exige aucuns moyens extraordinaires. C'est au contraire une mesure de prudence, dont le succès est plus que probable, qui vous procurera la paix, debarrassera vos troupes, et assurera solidement votre commerce.

J'ai diné hier chez le Duc de Kent avec le Général Beresford, et quoique cet estimable officier n'eut point de mission pour

approfondir les opinions et les sentiments des habitans de ces contrées relativement à l'affranchissement de leur patrie, tout ce qu'il m'en a dit est parfaitement d'accord avec tous les rapports qui sont unanimes en faveur du succès, si le Conseil se résoud au prompt voyage de ce Prince.

Mgr. le Duc d'Orléans arrive demain en ville, Long Hôtel, Dover Street ; il ne compte y passer que quelques jours, pour se débarrasser de sa maison de Twickenham, qu'il ne peut pas se résoudre à habiter. Son projet est de se retirer pour quelque tems dans le Hampt-shire, si le Ministère ne dispose rien en sa faveur. Vous avez en ce moment un grand convoi prêt à partir pour Montevideo. Si le Conseil peut se convaincre du peu d'inconvenient et de l'extrême utilité de la proposition que j'ai faite, son voyage peut être arrangé encore dans cette semaine, et son projet de séjourner quelques mois dans le Hampt-shire peut servir a en assurer le secret assez longtems pour détourner l'attention publique sur son départ et sa destination.

Vous m'avez fait faire hier des compliments, et vous m'avez fait dire que vous me verriez avec plaisir dans la semaine. La circonstance de l'arrivée du Duc d'Orléans en ville m'engage à vous prier de m'accorder une audience mardy ou mercredy au plus tard, soit chez vous, soit au War Office. Je vous prie de vouloir bien m'assigner l'heure ; ou plustôt assigner la à ce Prince lui-même pour un de ces deux jours.

Soyez bien persuadé que mon empressement a pour motifs l'utilité et la gloire de l'Etat, et particulièrement le sincère et respectueux attachement avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être, mylord, votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

Général DUMOURIEZ.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Wimbledon, July 7, 1807.

My dear Lord—I send you a letter I yesterday received from Lord Seaforth. You will see, from the contents of it, he

expects an answer from me, and I shall be sorry to send him an unfavourable one. At the same time, I think he has already suffered much from a West India climate, and I should be happy if he could be otherwise taken care of.

I remain, &c., MELVILLE.

Lord Seaforth to Lord Melville.

Clarges Street, July 6, 1807.

My dear Lord—I hope, now the bustle of elections is over, I may venture to put you in mind of the little conversation I had with you in Cleveland Row, when you desired me to put my wishes in writing. I have forborne to trouble your lordship hitherto, as I could not bring myself to intrude on you at times when I know you must be very busy. I will now be as concise as possible.

Your lordship knows I have already spent above six years between the tropics, and have had some difficult business to manage in that time, with what success or approbation I cannot say; but I have no official reason to think my conduct has been disapproved of. I wish to return to my gridiron, but I would fain hope you will support me in my claim to a little (though it is but a little) better basting: for my former Government (from the circumstances of the head-quarters of both army and navy being fixed close to the Government House) has been very costly to me. In short, all I wish or want is that, along with Berbice, I might have the Government of Demerary and its dependencies. This will be no disadvantage to Government, and both Berbice and Demerary are at this moment governed by the same Lieutenant-Governor (Brigadier-General Montgomery). This circumstance will, I hope, obviate any objection that can be made.

Let me, above all, entreat that you will have the goodness soon to let me know my fate. If you encourage me with hopes of success, I would directly wait on Lord Castlereagh, and state my wishes. If I cannot be listened to, and must still remain

almost (I believe quite) the only individual, civil or military, who has not met some promotion in return for service in those abominable climates, I must relinquish my hopes, and submit to retire to my hills. Wherever I go, or whatever is my fate, I shall at all times retain a deep sense of the obligations I already owe to your lordship's friendship, and shall remain at all times with unalterable attachment, &c.,

SEAFORTH.

I leave town in a few days, and I need not add how anxious I am to learn my fate.

Heads of a Plan for Increasing the Military Force of the Country.

July 12, 1807.

Thirty-five thousand men to be raised immediately for the Militia of the United Kingdom in the usual manner; 30,000 to be raised in Great Britain, according to the proportions at present chargeable upon the counties respectively; 5,000 to be raised according to the like proportions in Ireland.

The deficiency of 2,017 men now existing upon the present Militia establishment to be added to the quotas of the counties in which such deficiencies respectively exist. The supernumeraries borne upon the establishment of the other regiments, amounting to 1,661 men, to be deducted from quota previous to ballot.

In consideration of the above number of men to be raised for the Militia, exceeding in Great Britain one half of the present establishment of the Militia, a number of men, equal to two-fifths of the establishment, viz., 21,792, to be permitted to volunteer into the regular infantry of the line.

That a number equal to the proposed quota to be raised in Ireland, viz., 5,000 men, be permitted to volunteer from the Irish Militia into the line, exclusive of the annual draft of 15 men a company, which the augmented Militia regiments of that country are now liable to furnish.

This draft will be at the rate of 20 men per company. It

is proposed that the nine regiments which have not accepted the late augmentation should furnish the 20 men per company in the present year; that the twenty-nine regiments which did accept the augmentation should supply 25 men per company in this, and a like number in the ensuing year, in order to avoid too heavy a draft either year—thus adding half the draft in each year to their accustomed annual supply.

That the men so volunteering be enlisted for general service, and be entitled to a bounty of ten guineas, except in the case to be hereinafter stated.

In order to prevent any unnecessary prejudice to the discipline of the Militia, the mode of furnishing the men, in the first instance, to be left entirely to the discretion of the Colonels or officers commanding the respective regiments, without any interference whatever on the part of the line. But the quota which each regiment is required to furnish to remain a charge against the regiment, till the whole number are completely supplied.

Parties from the regiments of the line designated to receive the men from the Militia regiments to be stationed within a convenient distance of the respective head-quarters, but not suffered to approach the same till the time allowed to the Colonel or commanding-officer to supply the men has elapsed.

That thirty days be allowed to each regiment of Militia, from the receipt of his Majesty's warrant for supplying the quota of men in such manner as they may think fit; at the expiration of which time a general volunteering in the usual manner to take place for ten days, under the inspection of such officers of the line as his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief may appoint.

No man to be received for the line who has not been inspected and approved in the usual manner, and none to be taken under [blank] height, and [blank] years of age.

Militia regiments, furnishing one-third of their full quota of men within the thirty days allowed previous to any general

volunteering taking place, to be relieved from any further volunteering, by supplying men in the proportion of one-third, instead of two-fifths, of the establishment of their respective regiments.

Should the full quota, in the proportion of two-fifths of any regiment, not be completed at the expiration of the ten days allowed for general volunteering, his Majesty may direct, at such successive intervals as he may think fit, (not less than three months intervening between each) a further volunteering for the deficiency remaining to take place from such regiment, till the whole quota is supplied—such volunteering at each interval not, however, to be continued for more than three days.

Between the periods of volunteering, the Colonel, or commanding-officer, may, at his discretion, discharge any number of men necessary to complete the quota of the regiment; but no Militiaman, during such interval, to be entitled to claim his discharge for the purpose of so enlisting into the line.

The men now to be balloted for the Militia to be permitted to enter into the line, in discharge of the quota of any regiment not previously completed, but at a reduced bounty not exceeding seven guineas.

The excess of the number of Militiamen raised above the number permitted to enter into the line to be borne as supernumeraries upon the establishments of the respective regiments, to supply vacancies in such establishments as they may arise; it being intended that no further Militia ballot shall take place for the two years next ensuing, in order that the line may have an absolute monopoly in the recruiting market of the country.

In order the better to level the strength of the several battalions of the line which are to receive men from the Militia, those regiments which are now deficient to be appropriated, according to the number of men wanted to render them effective, to the regiments of Militia, following, as far as possible, the existing designation of County Regiments.

No Militiaman to be permitted to volunteer, except upon

special cause stated to the satisfaction of the approving officer, into any other regiment of the line than the regiment designated, or, if he should decline to enter into such regiment, such man may be permitted to enter for general service.

Ensigncies in the line, in the usual proportion, according to the quota furnished, to be placed at the recommendation of the respective Colonels of Militia.

In order to facilitate the volunteering of the men into the particular regiments designated, the Militia officers so recommended for ensigncies to be commissioned in those particular regiments, to be borne, if necessary, as supernumeraries upon the establishment of such battalions, till vacancies occur.

General Dumouriez to Lord Castlereagh.

Ryde, Isle of Wight, le 14 Juillet, 1807.

Mylord—Le travail que je vous ai annoncé par ma lettre du 13 se partage naturellement en deux sections. La première est fondée sur l'hypothèse de la paix de la Russie et de la Prusse, qui malheureusement est très probable, malgré tous les motifs qui sembleraient devoir exiger imperieusement la continuation de la guerre, que je détaillerai à la tête de la seconde section, fondée sur l'hypothèse de la continuation de la guerre.

La décision du sort de la Pologne rend la négociation de cette paix très difficile. Il est même possible que l'Empereur d'Autriche, qui y a le même intérêt que la Russie, et auquel la Silesie ne présente peut-être pas une compensation d'indemnité suffisante, de médiateur ne devienne partie, et n'occasionne au moins un grand retard, si non la rupture de cette négociation. L'armistice étant indéfini, la cessation devant en être annoncée un mois avant la reprise des hostilités, les Russes ayant un grand intérêt à le prolonger pour rétablir et renforcer leur armée, on peut calculer au moins sur deux mois, Juillet et Aoust, pour la durée des négociations, et si le tems est bien employé par le Gouvernement Anglais, pour l'arrangement et

la mise en train de ses diversions, il peut parvenir ou à rendre le courage à ses deux alliés vaincus, et faire continuer la guerre continentale avec moins de désavantage, ou, s'il doit essuyer la défection de ses deux alliés, se procurer par ses propres forces de terre et de mer des possessions assez essentielles pour compenser cette perte, et pour se trouver les mains garnies pour négocier sa propre paix, et la rendre même utile et glorieuse.

En supposant même, ce qu'il faut prévoir, que Buonaparte, après avoir accordé la paix au Continent, eut le projet et l'espoir de changer cette paix en une coalition du Continent, et plus particulièrement des trois Puissances navales du Nord, contre l'Angleterre, il faudrait au moins un an pour disposer les plans et les moyens d'agir de la coalition de ces Puissances, qui manquent d'argent, et auxquelles il n'en peut pas fournir assez pour des préparatifs aussi dispendieux qu'exigeait une guerre maritime et de grands transports de troupes pour l'invasion de l'Angleterre.

Certainement, pendant l'année qu'exigeraient les préparatifs d'une aussi immense expédition, le Gouvernement Anglais, s'il ne perd pas de tems, s'il suit un plan vigoureux, sans tâtonnemens et sans variations, s'il développe les forces immenses de la marine et l'énergie nationale a le tems et les moyens de

I°. En évacuant promptement l'Egypte, de renforcer son armée de Sicile, soit pour assurer cette Isle contre l'invasion des Français, en cas que, par la défection de ses alliés il ne puisse pas établir la guerre en Italie ; soit pour établir en Italie une puissante diversion, en cas que la guerre reprenne en Pologne. Deux operations, purement navales et indépendantes de la guerre ou de la paix du Continent, peuvent réussir et doivent être tentées dans la Méditerranée. La première et la plus essentielle est de s'emparer de Minorque, ce qui aurait du être exécuté dès la rupture de la paix d'Amiens : la seconde, de s'emparer de l'Isle d'Elbe par les intelligences du Comité d'insurrection d'Italie. Quand il n'y aurait eu que ce seul objet, on aurait déjà du faire partir le Colonel Bey.

II°. L'émancipation de l'Amérique du Sud. C'est précisément à l'époque où nous sommes menacés de la défection de nos alliés du Continent que, n'ayant plus aucun ménagement à garder, nous devons tâcher d'arracher à l'Espagne ses riches Colonies, et d'épuiser pour toujours la source du numéraire de Buonaparte. C'est un des plus sûrs moyens d'anéantir son projet de coalition et d'invasion en Angleterre. C'est de tous les plans de diversion le plus simple, exigeant ni une chaloupe ni un soldat de plus, le plus national pour l'Angleterre et le plus funeste pour Buonaparte.

III°. Si ce projet réussit, si l'Amérique du Sud s'émancipe sous notre protection, ce succès nous rend sept à huit mille hommes, qu'on peut renvoyer au Cap, d'où, avec des renforts de l'Europe et de l'Inde, ils peuvent attaquer et prendre l'Isle de France, et aller razer Batavia qu'il faut anéantir et rendre aux habitans du pays, en n'y conservant qu'un comptoir fortifié dans l'Isle d'Onrust, pour que les Hollandais ne puissent jamais relever cet établissement.

IV°. Si la guerre continue entre le Roy de Suède et Buonaparte, malgré la paix de la Russie et de la Prusse, on peut peut-être engager ce monarque à s'embarquer avec 15 à 20,000 Suédois, se joindre à l'expédition Anglaise, et débarquer en Normandie, ayant soin de faire lever en même tems la Vendée et la Bretagne, établissant ainsi une grande guerre dans l'intérieur de la France. Je débattrai le pour et le contre de ce projet dans la seconde section à l'article de la Suède.

V°. Si le Roy de Suède est forcé de faire sa paix d'après celle de la Russie, ce qui est très apparent, Lord Cathcart, au lieu de débarquer son armée en Angleterre, peut aller brusquement se présenter à Lisbonne, faire signer au Régent une ligue offensive et défensive, prendre l'armée Portugaise à la solde Anglaise, et marcher rapidement sur Madrid, pendant que l'Espagne est dégarnie de son armée.

Voilà les cinq plans d'opération que l'Angleterre peut exé-

cuter par elle-même, et sans que la paix ou la guerre du Continent y puisse porter aucun obstacle.

Je prends le parti de vous écrire cette seconde lettre avant d'avoir reçu votre réponse, pour d'après l'aperçu du plan général regardant la seule Angleterre, vous inspirer plus d'intérêt à son développement. Si vous ne me faites pas l'honneur de me répondre, je me renfermerai dans le silence que je crois devoir m'imposer, pour ne pas être importun, et je redeviendrai un vieux Dictionaire politique et militaire qu'on feuilletera quand on jugera à propos.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec un sincère et respectueux attachement, &c.,

Le Général DUMOURIEZ.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Wimbledon, July 16, 1807.

My dear Lord—I have received your letter, and shall communicate the contents to Lord Seaforth. I cannot see you before Friday. I go this day to Hampshire on a visit to my grandson, Henry Drummond. I don't return till Saturday.

Report says you are going to make another draft on the Militia. I am truly sorry for it. Depend upon it, you will disgust your most respectable Militia officers, and many of them will leave it; and I really believe it will go far to overturn that establishment altogether. The times are very different now from what they ever were at any former period when that measure was reverted to. I don't pry into the secrets of Government, to know whether there is any circumstance which calls for any immediate great body of force disposable abroad. In the general aspect of affairs, there seems nothing to impress a bystander with the immediate urgency of such a resource.

It is impossible for the most superficial observer not to perceive circumstances in the political state of this country to create a conviction that ere long the most gigantic exertions

may be requisite for the security of your foreign possessions in the east, the west, and the southern quarters of the globe; and it is not improbable that the wonted panic of invasion may again press on the Government of the country. This manifest combination of circumstances must and ought to excite in his Majesty's servants the greatest anxiety to complete your military establishment. But still there is no immediate prominent object before the public to induce an impression that another attack on the Militia establishment is necessary. Such was the state of the country when I first introduced the measure of a recruit to the army from the Supplementary Militia. The prospect of an aid to a revolution in Holland was then in the view of every person, and the draft from the Militia for such an object was universally popular with every body but a few Militia Colonels. There is nothing in the present moment to produce such a feeling in the public mind; so that the objection to the interference with the *constitutional* force of the country, which is a sentiment generally appropriated to the Militia system, will come forward in its naked and undisguised form, without any immediate collateral object in the view of the public to justify the measure.

It is astonishing to me that, among all the projects for keeping up the army, there never has been the good sense to revert back to the system of the Army of Reserve. By that system you could receive a supply of 30,000 men by *ballot*, which, I am sure, is more than the most sanguine of you can look for from any new attempt on the Militia. I admit that, if you could get the same number from the Militia, they would be better men, and more ready for service; but this single circumstance does not counterbalance the manifold objections to the measure. Thirty-thousand men, raised by ballot, and put under the command of the King's regular officers, would, although at first a force only for home service, speedily find its way into the regular army; and as there would be no other ballot going on to interfere with it, you might annually, in the same way, by

ballot, recruit the deficiencies created by the enlisting into the regular army.

I could pledge my existence for it, that, if this system was invariably adhered to, and all visionary projects and nonsense laid aside, the army would always be kept up; and to supply your regular army to its present establishment, together with the Army of Reserve, and the Militia, and the Navy, is the utmost that the population of the country can afford. For the remainder we must trust to a well regulated Volunteer force.

I never could figure a reason why the Army of Reserve was laid aside, unless because it was necessary to run down the administration which first introduced it. I never could join in that cry, for I always have, as I do now consider it as the very best expedient ever devised for keeping up the regular army through the medium of a ballot, which it cannot be in any other mode; and, even during the period before their military habits induce them to pass from limited to unlimited service, they are a useful body for the internal defence of the country.

As you express a wish to have spoken to me on this subject, and I can have no opportunity for doing so, I have loosely thrown together the outline of my ideas on this interesting subject, and I am, &c. MELVILLE.

Lieutenant-General Don to Lord Hawkesbury.

Jersey, August 13, 1807.

My Lord—Considering it probable that the enemy, in the course of a short time, will have a large force assembled on the opposite coast, I judged it expedient to address a letter (a copy of which is enclosed) to Major-General Leighton, second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Le Couteur, Assistant Quartermaster-General, Colonel Humfrey, commanding Engineer, and Captain Egan, commanding the Artillery, requesting their

opinion on the force necessary for the defence of this island at the present crisis, and I have the honour to lay before your lordship their answer.

From the information I have received from every captain of the navy who has been on this station since my arrival here, I find that this island cannot be protected by our squadron from the end of October to the end of April. I therefore agree in opinion with the officers above mentioned, that the force they have stated is necessary for the safety of the island.

I take the liberty of mentioning that I think three brigades of Car Artillery, requiring 164 men, might with great advantage be employed in this island, and the remainder of the 300 artillerymen to be stationed at the heavy batteries and towers as directors. The cavalry I think indispensably necessary; and when it is considered that one tide can bring from the opposite coast any force the enemy may choose to send, and that this island can be attacked at three vulnerable points at the same moment, I hope your lordship will not think the infantry overrated.

I trust your lordship will not consider me presumptuous in saying that, if this island is once lost, it cannot be regained. The islands of Guernsey, Alderney, and Sark, would, consequently, soon fall, and the enemy in possession of those islands would so completely command the navigation of the Channel, that our merchant-ships could never venture to sea without strong convoys.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

GEORGE DON, Lieut.-General.

Lieut.-General Don to Major-General Leighton, &c.

Jersey, August 11, 1807.

Gentlemen — From the exercise which has this summer taken place round the whole of the coast of this island, you must have acquired a full knowledge of the bays, landing-places, and creeks; and, as you have seen the various modes

adopted for their defence, according to the nature of the ground, shore, anchorage, tides, &c., it must have occurred to you what arms, and the proportion of each, are likely to produce the greatest effect in opposing the enemy.

Formerly, there were no military communications in this island, and, consequently, no rapid movements could be effected; but, as broad communications have now been opened between the large bays, cavalry and field artillery can move with facility from one extremity of the island to the other. The four large and extensive bays admit, in the fullest manner, of combined movements of field artillery, cavalry, and infantry; and I wish to be favoured with your opinion of the necessary force of each of these arms, calculating the invading force at from 18 to 25,000 men.

You know that the coast of this island is forty-eight miles in extent; that there are upon it four large bays, and thirty-four small bays, landing-places, and creeks; and that the principle I have in view for their defence is the meeting of the enemy at the water's edge. Three attacks can certainly be made at the same moment; and, when the tides and currents favour, these attacks can be varied. Change of positions must consequently follow, and our safety will then depend on the celerity of movement. I have, &c.,

GEORGE DON, Lieut.-General.

Major-General Leighton, &c., to Lieut.-General Don.

Jersey, August 12, 1807.

Sir—In answer to your letter of yesterday's date, desiring our opinion as to the proportion of the different arms that may be required for the defence of this island, in the event of an attack by a force of from 18 to 25,000 men, and, having taken into consideration the different modes of attack likely to be adopted by an enterprising and intelligent enemy, we have the honour to state our opinion as follows:—

Taking it for granted that the enemy would not attempt

the conquest of the island with a less force of troops than you have stated, we consider it would be necessary to have a force to oppose him of not less than 8,000 infantry, 600 light horse, and 300 artillery, with a proportion of field-pieces, exclusive of the island Militia.

And that it is likewise necessary to have armed vessels stationed off the assailable parts of the island, as advanced picquets to apprize the troops of the approach of the enemy, should he attempt a surprise in the night; as he might, without that precaution, make good his landing before the troops were sufficiently prepared to meet him at the water's edge—the point we have always considered as the most advisable to meet him at.

We have the honour, &c.,

BALD. LEIGHTON, Major-General.
J. LE COUTEUR, Quartermaster-General.
J. HUMFREY, Lieut.-Colonel R.E.
CHARLES EGAN, Capt. R.A.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

St. James's Square, September 11, 1807.

Lord Castlereagh humbly begs leave to acquaint your Majesty that a telegraphic report has been received this evening from Portsmouth, by which it appears that the attack on Buenos Ayres has failed, and that a Convention to evacuate the country in two months has been agreed to. Lord Castlereagh laments to add that the loss in killed and wounded is stated to amount to 1,300 men.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Mulgrave.

Wildernesse, September 12, 1807.

My dear Mulgrave—Under the circumstances you state, I do not think we ought to detain the India fleet, without

making a secret communication to the India House, in exoneration of the Admiralty. As the wind is now hanging in the north-west, which makes a junction with the force at Cork difficult, I hardly think this worth while. The unfortunate dispersion of the 60th, on its way to Cork, will, I fear, (as the wind now stands) be productive of further delay. Under all these circumstances, you have my full consent to order the India fleet to sail. The service will, I think, be simplified (if it is to proceed) by this divorce increasing proportionably our separate naval and military means. We shall have an opportunity on Wednesday of revising our decision about Portugal: in the mean time, I cannot suppose that Souza has more ground for his threats than his promises; both are probably his own.

The news from Buenos Ayres is very mortifying—having given directions with respect to the circulation of the despatches, and the case being of a nature not to admit of any step being taken which can bear upon the result.

I shall not return to town till Tuesday, unless we hear from the Baltic. The army must have embarked on its return from the Rio de la Plata before this time; and, if we had any instructions to give them, the chance of meeting them on their passage home is too small to be relied on.

Ever yours, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Extract of a Letter from Lord Castlereagh to[1]

Wildernesse, September 13, [1807].

My dear Sir—I have not yet seen your American paper—have you considered the first effects of a rupture upon the subsistence of our islands, with or without the reduction of our North American Colonies?

As an additional fund for the supply of our army, I have latterly been considering the expediency of establishing, at four

[1] This letter is without address.

or five eligible stations, a seminary into which boys should be received from twelve to fourteen years of age, and from whence, after they have been clothed and educated for three years, they should be transferred to the Line. I have reason to believe that both parents and parishes would favour such an institution, and that it might be carried to a very considerable extent, producing the very best class of recruits for the army, and not costing more than the present levies do, desertions and high bounties considered.

I shall not trouble you at present with the details of this subject; but, as I recollect you had a plan in contemplation for bringing up boys for the sea-service, I wish to know how far the two schemes might not, as a general system, for the two services, be brought forward together; and I should also wish to be informed what you consider as the lowest expense for which a boy of the age above stated could be clothed, fed, and taught reading, writing, and a trade suitable to a soldier, by the year: it being unnecessary to give him any pay till he was of an age to be transferred to a regiment of the Line.

The news from Buenos Ayres is most afflicting, both in plan and result. Our difficulties in Zealand are much greater than the world supposes. I see no reason, however, to doubt a favourable result.

Yours, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Robert Dundas.

Priory, September 20, [1807].

My dear Dundas—Our successes at Copenhagen make the South American news somewhat more bearable. It is, however, very intolerable still—bad in point of character, rendering doubly difficult all enterprises of a like nature, and depriving us of all option on the great question you allude to. We do not, perhaps, differ much on the unprofitableness of the principle of simple conquest as applied by us to any great

portion of the continental world. While we held Monte Video, we had always the choice either to retire in favour of some other object, or to advance upon more practicable principles.

Whitelocke has not yet officially reported the distribution of his army. I understand, however, that he certainly sends, in obedience to his former instructions, two regiments to India. What alterations do you think (if any) this ought to make in the arrangements, as settled before you left town? I shall not answer your letter officially relative to tonnage, &c., till I hear from you on this point.

The Chairs have notified to me their having taken up ships to carry a full regiment to Ceylon; the 2,000 men additional for India remaining to be provided. We have reason to believe that our Baltic operations have produced a favourable impression in Russia.

I shall write to Hawkesbury upon the Duke of Buccleuch's letter: my opinion is, that the Scotch regiments should have ten days more allowed them. Your draft relative to raising the duties is yet before the Cabinet: I hope to obtain a decision to-morrow. Yours faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. John Beckett.

Priory, September 20, 1807.

Dear Sir—As I apprehend Lord Hawkesbury is gone to Walmer, I send you a letter from the Duke of Buccleuch, relative to the Scotch military. From the first notice taking effect later in Scotland, and the termination of their harvest being considerably later, it appears to me both reasonable and politic to extend the commencement of their thirty days to the 15th, instead of the 1st of September; by which arrangement they would have to the 15th of October to give their men, before the ten days ordinary volunteering began. Should Lord H. approve of this, it may save time to send him down the official letter for signature by to-morrow's post.

I omitted, before I left town, to reply to your query relative to the establishment of the Buckingham and other regiments, under the Militia Completion Bill. I apprehend that the present establishment of each regiment, both in officers and men, must continue to be considered as the *regular* and *permanent* establishment; and that the excess of men above such regular establishment must be considered as supernumeraries, and be borne as such. As, in some cases, the number would be such as inconveniently to swell the size of companies, which certainly ought not to exceed 100 rank and file, I see no objection to the excess beyond the 100 being thrown into an additional company; but, as the county will not be called upon to replace these men, the regiment will, in process of time, return to its present number of companies, of officers, and men.

I am &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Spencer Perceval.

Sudborne Hall, October 1, 1807.

Dear Perceval—I have written to Cooke, to desire the provisional orders, pending the result of the reference to the Crown lawyers and Mr. Stevens, whose aid on these subjects will be of great value, to be prepared for my signature, and they shall be forwarded to the respective Colonial Governments by the first opportunity. I am sorry that any possibility of abuse should have happened in the execution of this Act; but it really never occurred to me that any steps on my part were requisite, still less prior to the period when the clause prohibiting import takes effect.

The more I have had time to reflect on our future prospects in this war, the more impressed I am with a conviction that neither peace nor independence can be the lot of this nation, till we have found the means of making France feel that her new anti-social and anti-commercial system will not avail her against a power that can, for its own preservation, and conse-

quently legitimately, counteract at sea what she lawlessly inflicts and enforces on shore.

I wish you would turn in your mind whether we are of necessity bound to postpone measures in furtherance of this great purpose, with reference to the American question; or whether, even upon the reservation of the late Government, the right of retaliation may not be exercised by us without prejudice to these discussions. The late proceedings in Holland, Portugal, &c., seem to create a new era, which, if suffered to pass by, may not be easily recoverable in point of impression. Time is the more valuable; as, the sooner we can take up our ground on this great question, the more obvious is our answer to any proposition of negociation.

The detail of such an arrangement will require much consideration—the general principle is sufficiently obvious. I think it might be so managed as to direct the resentment of the neutrals against the enemy, and not against us. The public sentiment of this country is now ripe for it, and would, I am convinced, support the Government, not only in adopting this extreme remedy, as a war measure, but would steadily go along with us in rejecting every notion of peace which did not restore Europe to a reasonable state of commercial independence, and which did not provide, even as between France and Great Britain, some system of intercourse more compatible with a state of peace than that which followed the peace of Amiens.

Yours, my dear Perceval, very faithfully,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Downing Street, October 7, 1807.

The officer in the chief command of your Majesty's forces in the Mediterranean having deemed it expedient, upon conference with Sir Arthur Paget, and upon a consideration of the change of circumstances which had taken place subsequent to

the despatch of the orders from hence for the evacuation of Egypt, to suspend the execution of those orders till the result of the mission to Constantinople was ascertained, your Majesty's confidential servants are humbly of opinion that it may be expedient, till the views of France and Russia are more fully developed in the Mediterranean, still further to suspend those orders, as also those subsequently transmitted, which directed a detachment to be made from the army in Sicily, under Lieutenant-General Moore's orders.

Should, however, the corps under Lieutenant-General Moore have sailed from Sicily for Gibraltar, they humbly recommend that orders should be sent to Gibraltar, directing the troops, in that case, to return to England, leaving the regiment of Watteville and one British regiment at Gibraltar, as a reinforcement to that garrison.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Hawkesbury.

Sudborne Hall, October 8, 1807.

Dear Hawkesbury—The importance of despatching Pole with as little delay as possible prevented my sending back your messenger last night, with the instructions to the Mediterranean. I perfectly concur with you in your reasoning about the proposed order; it probably will not influence the transaction, but it may relieve the Government from the imputation of the gratuitous abandonment of a position to which some persons attach considerable importance.

There is, however, one branch of our former orders, to which your Memorandum does not apply, which there is rather more chance of having, in point of time, within our control, and upon which I can hardly be silent, in replying to the letters recently received. I allude to the order to Lieutenant-General Moore, in the event of the troops having returned from Egypt, to move with 7,000 men to Gibraltar. I think it by no means improbable that Egypt may have been evacuated early in Sep-

tember, and the troops reach Sicily early in October. The same may have happened somewhat later. In the former case, orders now sent will probably find Moore at Gibraltar, or at least sailed from Sicily: in the latter case, they may still find him in Sicily. We must, therefore, decide the question of distribution upon the two suppositions above stated, as well as that of our being still in possession of Alexandria.

The mode in which you will occupy Sicily connects itself with another delicate question with respect to the interior of that island, viz., the system to be adopted towards the Government, and the arrangement of the command of our army there. I was in hopes, without awkwardness towards Moore, that I had so arranged that it would pass into Stuart's hands; but, if any thing has occurred to detain the former, with his army, in Sicily, you are brought to the dry question of a recal; and, if the whole force is to remain, the supersession in favour of an officer so much his junior as Stuart will be a severe mortification to Moore.

At the same time, I cannot disguise from myself the objections to his remaining there, unless we are prepared to act up to his principle of setting the Government aside, which I certainly am not. You will see, from the enclosed confidential letter, that his mind goes the whole length. I should not despair of his obedience, if of his conversion, to any system we might lay down for him; but, unfortunately, the Sicilian Government know the extent of his opinions, which deprives him of all influence, and makes him a less effectual instrument for enforcing any measures of authority short of the extreme one of subversion. I had agreed with Canning to reserve this question for consideration immediately on my return.

I feel the necessity of not losing time in sending our orders with respect to Egypt. I think, however, you will agree with me that they ought to be confined to that point alone; and that we had, therefore, better postpone writing till after our meeting on Wednesday, when we may agree so far upon the

general outline, as to despatch the orders with respect to the distribution of the army on Thursday.

I propose setting out from hence early on Tuesday morning. We shall meet at the Queen's House, and, I hope, afterwards at dinner. Any thing you have to send me will find me on Tuesday night at Ingatestone.

Yours, my dear Hawkesbury, very sincerely,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Arthur Wellesley.

Brighton, November 23, 1807.

My dear Wellesley—In addition to my suggestion of yesterday, with a view of accelerating the levy of Militiamen in Ireland, it has occurred to me to propose for your consideration, whether it might not be advantageous, where the Colonel of the regiment expected to derive advantage from it in obtaining men, to send the regiment for a couple of months into a cantonment within its own county.

The return of the troops from the Baltic, and the facility of strengthening Ireland, is now such as may admit of such an arrangement, without embarrassing your internal distribution.

And if by this means the Irish regiments of Militia could, during the winter, be raised to their full standard, we might then take measures for bringing over a portion of them to this country, and thereby lay the foundation of a system, which, I know, the Duke of Richmond and yourself concur with us in thinking would be highly desirable.

With respect to my own regiment, I have no doubt that, if an exchange is made by sending it to Londonderry, and moving the regiment now there, we should very soon be able to complete to our full establishment, and that several of the officers of the regiment, being Deputy Governors, would be enabled to give additional activity to the civil proceedings under the Militia Act.

Believe me, my dear Wellesley, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Robert Dundas.

Brighton, December 10, 1807.

My dear Dundas—Many thanks for your note respecting Mr. M'Naghten. I shall, in consequence of it, apprize him that he may make his arrangements, as I conceive his qualifications fully fall within Lord Eldon's definition of a practising lawyer, being but lately returned from India, where he was in very high practice, and was appointed by Lord Wellesley, from public character alone, to the second law office under the Government. It is not to be wondered at that, in the multiplicity of points which pass through Lord Eldon's head, Mr. M'Naghten's qualifications should have escaped his recollection. But when he last held the seals, he had fully satisfied himself of their adequacy, and given his concurrence to the arrangement entered into by Mr. Pitt's Government, namely, that Mr. M'Naghten should have the first vacant Puisne seat on the Bengal Bench.

As the period when a vacancy may happen there is uncertain, it seems more eligible both for Mr. M'Naghten and the public service that he shall, in the first instance, go to Madras, looking forward to a transfer to Bengal, rather than remain for any length of time professionally unemployed.

Yours, my dear Dundas, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. I hope you have settled the military arrangement in the manner we talked it over. You can ascertain from Mr. Cooke whether the supply of provisions from the Cape can be relied upon for revictualling the ships now under despatch. If not, you can settle with him that a victualler, to accompany them, shall be prepared immediately at Portsmouth.

I conclude you would wish that the regiment of cavalry should go to Bengal. This must be attended to in settling the ships in which they are to go. Upon reflection, I am additionally impressed with the importance of their proceeding by

the ships of this season; and I find that all the previous arrangements for their departure, viz., keeping them in a dismounted state, have been made at the Horse Guards.

I saw Colonel Gordon yesterday, and mentioned to him the arrangement we had talked over, to which he saw no objection.

The Right Hon. Robert Dundas to Lord Castlereagh.

Wimbledon, December 12, 1807.

Dear Castlereagh—I believe I mentioned to you, in Downing Street, that the taking possession of the Portuguese settlements, Mozambique and Delagoa Bay, on the east coast of Africa, had been suggested to me by the Deputy Chairman; Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Perceval, and Mr. Rose, have also spoken to me on the same subject.

I now enclose a letter which I have received from the Chairs, and shall be glad to have your opinion on the whole matter as soon as possible; because, if any orders are to be sent to Bombay, they should go by the fleet for that Presidency now at Portsmouth, and which, I hope, will sail from thence on this day se'nnight.

I am satisfied (with all deference to the East India Company, that the possession of those places will not be so generally useful to the British trade in their hands, as if they were held by a small regular force, like other settlements of the same description, and were open to all British ships; but, perhaps, as long as the Company has the exclusive trade in those seas, it is more fair that they should have the expense of those acquisitions.

It may be a matter of doubt (if the suggestion of the Chairs is complied with) whether the first seizure of the two places, particularly of Delagoa Bay, should not be by detachments from the Cape, more especially as the 89th Regiment will certainly be there till August or September, before the St. Helena store-ships arrive to carry them on to Ceylon; and, in all

probability, the Bombay troops may by that time have relieved the detachments from the Cape. If the *first*, as well as the permanent occupation of the two settlements is to take place from Bombay, there may be some risk of our being anticipated from the Mauritius; otherwise, the plan of the Chairs may, on the whole, be the most advisable.

If the measure is resolved upon, either from Bombay or the Cape, it must be arranged with the Admiralty; and it will be necessary to ascertain what force is at either of those two places. I remain, dear Castlereagh, &c.

ROB. DUNDAS.

Lord Castlereagh to the Right Hon. Robert Dundas.

Brighton, Sunday, December 13, 1807.

My dear Dundas—I return the Mozambique papers. I agree with you that it is impossible for us to attempt any infraction with the Company's jurisdiction in that quarter without their consent. From the statement you have sent me relative to the trade of those stations, I can hardly believe, where the total annual exports to the Continent of India do not exceed from 30 to £40,000, that it can be a very profitable concern to the Company at present; and I cannot but think that it is brought forward, by our friend Grant, on grounds of Anti-Slave Trade and not commercial policy.

This deserves the more attention on grounds of military arrangements, as we must be prepared, if we go there to knock up their most profitable trade, viz., that in slaves, to have all the European population against us; and consequently a larger garrison will be required to hold the place against the temper of the people, and a possible visit from the French at the Mauritius. In this view, it may be necessary for you to talk with the Admiralty not only upon the naval force necessary for carrying the troops that are to reduce the place, the number of which I cannot judge of, not knowing the strength of the Portuguese garrisons, but with respect to affording the place,

when reduced, permanent naval protection, which, I conceive, would be necessary, as well to secure it against a visit from the French, as to enable us to derive any commercial benefit from the possession, it being altogether out of the ordinary track of our cruisers.

While the place remains in the hands of the Portuguese, the French have very little inducement, not being themselves capable of using it commercially, to lay hold of it; but, if we were to take possession of it with means insufficient for its defence, it will then become an object to them to expel us and plunder the place.

I should doubt, therefore, whether, if the service is to be undertaken, it would not be better to leave it entirely in the hands of the Company, to be executed from Bombay, under the protection of some of the lighter cruisers on that station, rather than risk the arrival of the 89th at Ceylon this season, by diverting it to other services; and although Mahometans are certainly a description of native force which would be ill suited to such a station, I should hope that some of the native regiments might furnish a Hindoo detachment, which would render it unnecessary to lose the services of so large a proportion of our regular troops, which might become requisite if the defence of the two stations was thrown entirely upon them. Indeed, I should almost wish and hope that the policy upon which we acted with respect to Prince of Wales's Island should not be forgotten in the present instance, namely, that of providing for its defence by a native rather than a European garrison. Yours, my dear Dundas, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

PS. If it is thought desirable to take possession of these points, in order to gain time by a force from the Cape rather than from Bombay, instead of detaching the whole or any part of the 89th Regiment, which might not be relieved from Bombay, and returned to the Cape in time to proceed to Ceylon, I should prefer making the detachment from the gar-

rison of the Cape. As soon as the force sent from thence was in possession, a cutter might proceed to Bombay, to order the relief which might previously be directed to be held in readiness to sail for the coast of Africa, and upon their arrival the Cape detachment might resume their former position.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon.

Brighton, Sunday, December 13, 1807.

Dear Gordon—I should wish to postpone replying to his Royal Highness's letter of the 10th, relative to an increase of subalterns in the Veteran Battalions, till I have an opportunity of communicating, on my return to town, personally with H.R.H. upon it.

I apprehend the measure goes to add 110 Lieutenants to the Veteran establishment, consisting of eleven regiments, with the exception of the regiment in Ireland, which stands at an establishment of 1,000, rank and file. I observe the other battalions are at an establishment of only 650 rank and file, and that they are in general incomplete to that strength. I apprehend it is unusual to give a third subaltern to corps upon so low an establishment. Should it, upon further consideration, be deemed necessary, as the expense will be considerable, it may perhaps be better to bring it forward as an item in the estimates of the ensuing year, rather than decide upon it before it has been submitted to the consideration of Parliament. I am, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

Memorandum for Cabinet Measures suggested respecting South America.

St. James's Square, December 21, 1807.

Lord Castlereagh, finding, on his return to town, that General Spencer has been instructed, on his arrival at Gibraltar, in case General Moore's corps should still be within the Mediterranean, to proceed on to Sicily with his force, leaving a small reinforce-

ment at Gibraltar; and, having understood that the principal ground on which this decision was taken by Cabinet was to avoid exposing the troops to a second voyage across the Bay of Biscay, in the present season of the year, he feels it his duty to state to the Cabinet that, in the event of General Moore's and General Spencer's corps being assembled in Sicily, the proportion of our disposable force that will then be allotted to service in the Mediterranean, including the garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar, will amount to not less than 34,500 rank and file, of which there will be in Sicily about 23,000 men.

Lord Castlereagh is not aware of any system of offensive operations that can, in the present state of the Continent, be advantageously prosecuted in that quarter; and, considering the demands for force in other parts of the world, he cannot but deem it a very serious consideration to determine to appropriate so large a proportion of disposable force to purposes merely defensive. With a view to the security of Sicily, it does not strike him that so large a reinforcement is necessary in the present state of the enemy's preparations, supposing General Moore to be still in that island. His effective force (exclusive of General Spencer's), including recruits on passage, will exceed 16,000 men. With a view to the reduction of Corfu, he entertains great doubts (while we are in possession of Malta and Sicily) of the policy of charging ourselves with the defence of a third naval station in the Mediterranean. It may occasion the necessity of detaching further from home to strengthen Sicily, in case that island should be menaced by serious preparations on the part of the enemy, and will not leave us in sufficient force on any one of those stations to look beyond their immediate occupation.

If the Cabinet adhere to their opinion that bringing General Spencer's corps back to England is inexpedient, Lord Castlereagh wishes to submit to their consideration how far, under present circumstances, a different destination might not be advantageously given to that force.

If we are again to look to any operation against the possessions of Spain in South America, particularly in Rio de la Plata, the present moment seems to be peculiarly favourable to such an attempt. A force immediately proceeding thither would take the Spaniards completely by surprise, and we should have the advantage, in point of impression, of Spain being now, for the first time, not merely under the influence but actually in the military occupation of France.

If such an attack is postponed, and the enemy, having determined no longer to preserve measures with Spain, should send a small force to the La Plata in frigates, or even in single transports, and offer independence to the people of the country, Lord Castlereagh is apprehensive, from an attentive perusal of Admiral Campbell's able paper on the Brasils, that France may lay the foundation not only of her own power in the Spanish Colonies, but render the Brasils not tenable even with our military aid to the Portuguese Government.

He therefore submits whether it might not be expedient to direct General Spencer, in the case of General Moore's having returned to Sicily, to proceed from Gibraltar to the Madeiras, there to await further orders. Lord Castlereagh has understood from Sir Samuel Achmuty that he considers 8,000 men fully capable of reducing Monte Video. General Spencer's force amounts to 6,800 rank and file. This corps, with the addition of 2,000 men from hence, and some additional artillery preparation, would, it is conceived, be fully sufficient to regain possession of that important military post; which conclusion is further supported by the lately intercepted letters from Spanish officers, particularly from that of Don Velasquez, the second in command under General Liniers; which letters distinctly state that a British force inferior in amount to that lately employed in South America would still, with reasonable good management, be completely equal to the reduction of the whole province of Buenos Ayres.

The additional force above required, in aid of General

Spencer's, might be soon prepared for service. Every day we may expect accounts, which will ascertain whether General Moore is still in Sicily, or on his way home. His being in Sicily would establish that General Spencer was gone on to the Madeiras, and the reinforcement might then sail to join him at that rendezvous, whence the whole would proceed to the La Plata. If, on the other hand, General Moore had passed the Straits, and was on his return, we should know that General Spencer was gone on to Sicily, and the reduction of Monte Video might, in that case, be undertaken by a force to be sent from hence.

We are yet, perhaps, uninformed of what may be the wishes of the Portuguese Government, or what the necessity for military force in the Brasils. Were we in possession of Monte Video, by not, at least in the first instance, attempting any forward movements from thence against Buenos Ayres, we should be in a situation to answer any requisition from that Government to the extent of 4 or 5,000 men, leaving an adequate garrison to hold Monte Video against any possible effort to be made by the force within the country to reduce it.

Should it be deemed unwise in the first instance to commit ourselves to be parties in any change in the government of the Spanish possessions, till we could satisfy our own minds as to the nature of the change, and the influence it was likely to have upon the Brasils and the Portuguese power in that country; we might declare that we came not to attempt the conquest of the province by force of arms, but to establish a commercial intercourse with the country, under the protection of the military occupancy of an armed post, and to protect them against the French, who had now taken possession of both Spain and Portugal—that, if the inhabitants conducted themselves amicably towards us, and showed a disposition peaceably to cultivate that intercourse, it was not our wish to undertake further operations of a hostile nature.

In this situation, we should probably succeed in establishing our *trade in that quarter.* Any attempt on the part of the

French, by the introduction of a small force, to avail themselves of the disposition of the people to render themselves independent, would be defeated. We should cover effectually that flank of the Portuguese possessions which is the weakest and most exposed. Our influence over the Portuguese Government would be thereby increased in the least offensive manner; and we should have it in our power, according to circumstances, to influence, if not to direct, any change that might take place in Spanish America, so as to render it as little as possible injurious to the interests of Portugal in the Brasils.

Our military reputation in the country would be vindicated by so early a reparation of the late disaster; and, independent of any feeling of party triumph, we should have shown that the views of the Government were not limited to procuring for the nation the commercial benefits resulting from an intercourse with four millions of Portuguese inhabitants, but that they looked to the larger object of ten millions of Spanish subjects; and, above all, to the withdrawing from France the immense resources of that vast Continent.

The Duke of Portland to Lord Castlereagh.

Monday night, December 21, 1807.

My dear Lord—I have read the paper,[1] you have been so good as to send me, with as much pleasure as attention, and I return it herewith, with the anxious hope that it may produce the same effect upon the minds of our colleagues as it has upon mine. With regard to the Mediterranean, those who contend the most strenuously for having a large military force there can only have two objects in view—the keeping faith with the King of Naples, and checking the attempts that France may make upon our East India possessions from that quarter; and, as you very well observed this morning, with respect to the first, the protection of Sicily is all that we can look to with all

[1] The preceding Memorandum is evidently referred to in this, and in the letter from Lord Camden which follows.

the military force we can spare for that quarter; and the security of our East India possessions, as far as they can be secured by any protection we can afford them in the Mediterranean, must be by means of our naval rather than our military superiority. I am glad to find that you intend to have some *conversation* with some of our colleagues before you communicate the paper to them: experience has proved the good effects of that mode of proceeding, and as far as I can assist in it I will do it with pleasure.

I am most anxious for the success of your measure. It must be productive of the greatest possible advantages, in every point of view, and is certainly as reconcilable to the morality as to the policy of the nation.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c., PORTLAND.

Lord Camden to Lord Castlereagh.

Tuesday, 11 A.M. [December 22, 1807.]

I approve of your paper as much upon a re-perusal of it, as I did on the hasty consideration I gave it yesterday.

I am glad the Duke of Portland has confirmed my caution of first speaking to some of our colleagues before you publish the proposition; but I think this morning should not pass without our sending orders to Spencer either to return, or to remain at Gibraltar till further orders.

I will endeavour to see Mulgrave and Canning.

Yours, &c., CAMDEN.

Memorandum for the Cabinet relative to Vigo.

[Not dated.][1]

Lord Castlereagh submits for the information of the Cabinet the information which has been received by Lord Mulgrave,

[1] From the allusion in the next letter to the projected attempt on Vigo, it is evident that this Memorandum must have been written nearly about the same time.

relative to the practicability of an attack on the enemy's ships in Vigo, together with Sir George Prevost's observations thereupon; after considering Sir George Collier's proposal, and conferring with Lord William Stuart, who has served for a long time on that station.

The prudence of the attempt seems to depend partly on the season, and partly on any alteration that has taken place in the enemy's force and works at Vigo since September last. There is reason to suppose that the Spaniards have moved a body of troops from Ferrol, subsequent to that period, to Ponte Vedra, a town about thirty miles from Vigo, which have been replaced at Ferrol by a French garrison. The actual arrival of the above troops at Ponte Vedra has been since confirmed to Lord William Stuart, from a quarter that he can depend on.

A corps of four regiments, composing a force of 4,000 men, is now in a course of preparation, and may be ready to proceed in a fortnight, to execute the Halifax and Bermuda services, as already determined on by the Cabinet and approved by the King. In conformity to Sir George Prevost's suggestions, an engineer may precede the corps off Vigo, to collect the required information, and meet Sir George Prevost's corps off Cape Finisterre, or any other rendezvous, and report to him the result.

Should the Cabinet be of opinion that all the circumstances of the case are sufficiently encouraging to justify a discretionary authority being given to Sir George Prevost to make the attempt, in case he should deem it prudent upon the engineer's report, it will not divert him materially from his ulterior destination to call off Cape Finisterre.

It seems the opinion both of the naval and military officers that the service must be completed in four and twenty, or at most eight and forty hours, or relinquished. The difficulties of the enterprise appear to be to take up an anchorage with a fleet of transports, to land the troops, to take three forts, the precise strength of which is not ascertained, and to march

about ten miles to destroy the ships at Redondella, and to re-embark before the enemy can assemble in force.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Chatham.

Brighton, December 28, 1807.

My dear Lord—Knowing at last where Moore is, our arrangements will become more simple. Spencer's whole force going on, and Moore's coming home, with the exception of the two regiments left at Gibraltar, the Bermuda and Halifax services remain to be provided for.

I have settled with the Duke to prepare immediately four regiments at Portsmouth for embarkation. This corps may undertake the service *en passant*, if, upon further investigation, the attempt should be deemed prudent. I have desired my brother to send you Sir G. Collier's plan for consideration. The Duke is of opinion we could not entrust this operation to a better officer than Sir George Prevost. His being stationed at Portsmouth will enable him to make the arrangements without attracting much notice. I have desired to meet him in town on Monday night. In the mean time, may I trouble you to consider a little the artillery arrangements both for this *coup de main* and the ulterior objects to which the force would be applicable. Of course the corps, should it be sent to Vigo, ought to go as little encumbered as possible, and any ordnance or stores for Halifax or the Bermudas to be despatched separately.

With respect to the defence of Halifax, without determining to defend it in extreme force, which would call for a much greater amount of army, I conceive our present purpose is to make the present force going there efficient on its arrival, and to have the means of calling forth with effect and employing the militia in the field. I rather believe a supply of small arms will be desirable for Sir J. Craig's command, to be distributed according to circumstances, but to be sent, in the first instance, to Halifax. I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Earl of Chatham.

Brighton, December 31, 1807.

My dear Lord—I have desired Mr. Cooke to forward you a letter which I have received from Sir James Craig, respecting the situation in which he found things on his arrival at Quebec, and stating the supplies which are of the most pressing necessity, with a view to his defensive arrangements. I have directed also the letter from Halifax, lately received, to accompany Sir James Craig's letter, as furnishing a general outline of the means which the North American provinces afford of defending themselves against an attack from the United States.

Should we be engaged in hostilities with America, my notion of transporting such a regular force to that Continent as was formerly employed there, or indeed any force which could enable us to act on the offensive, must be considered as out of the question. But what I should wish you to consider is, whether the population of the Canadas and Nova Scotia, well affected as it appears to be to the cause of Great Britain, if properly called forth and organized, may not, when supplied by a regular corps of 10 or 12,000 men, oppose such a resistance to an attack from America, as might possibly defeat, or more probably discourage them from making such an attempt.

The militia capable of bearing arms in these provinces, should we think it right to go to the expense of collecting and training them, might certainly, in point of number, furnish a respectable army. In their present state, they are as far advanced in military preparation, I apprehend, as the militia of the United States, and, I should conceive, might be rendered, with exertion, efficient for the purposes of defence, as speedily as their invaders could be for attack.

There can be no doubt that, if the military power of the American Government could be put in motion like that of other States, any attempt on our part to maintain ourselves in those provinces would be hopeless, and the most prudent course

we could pursue would perhaps be to withdraw our forces in time, and to confine ourselves to the protection of Newfoundland.

But we have seen so much of the difficulty the American Government has found in assembling any portion of their militia to repress the incursions either of the Spaniards or the Indians—we know how difficult, in case of war, they would find it to make loans to equip an army, and how fatal a rupture must prove to their existing revenue—that I cannot but entertain hopes, if proper defensive exertions are made on our part, and if our squadrons on their coast alarm them for the safety of their principal sea-ports, that they will find it difficult, if not impossible, to assemble a large army for offensive purposes.

The northern States of the Union, it is also to be considered, are those which are the least disposed to a contest with us, and will be the most difficult to put in motion against us.

Were we to attempt an attack on them by land, their resources would be called forth, as formerly, by every exertion of power. But, if they are to undertake a campaign at a distance from home, the Government will be obliged to put the army in motion by the ordinary operations of financial resource, and I should much doubt their possessing sufficient energy and authority to bring any large number of troops into the field.

I am certainly aware that the grounds must be uncertain upon which we can at present pretend to estimate either our means of resistance or their means of attack. But, considering the value of those provinces in point of naval resources, as well as their importance as a means of supply to the West Indies, and recollecting also the feeling which exists in this country towards them, their ultimate influence upon the security of Newfoundland, and the protection the Crown owes to the Loyalists who formerly adhered to it, and now compose a large proportion of the population of those dependencies, I hardly see the possibility of deliberately directing their evacuation without a struggle; and, if not, it seems desirable to throw the conflict, as far as we can, upon the local force, in which we risk

nothing but the expense, without exposing a large British army.

The Brazils certainly hold out a prospect, when the channels of trade are once open, of counter-securing us against the loss both of the Russian and the North American markets. But, notwithstanding their abundant resources in timber, &c., and capacity of producing provisions, it will require time to call forth these resources. Our West India Colonies would suffer considerably during the interval; and I think, unless the attempt was obviously hopeless, that we never could justify the employing a force of 18 or 20,000 men to defend Sicily, while we turned our back upon our own possessions and subjects of North America.

When the three regiments now under orders for Halifax arrive, we shall have above 9,000 regular troops within Sir James Craig's command, about 4,000 of which will be stationed in Canada, and about 5,000 in Nova Scotia. Should he be enabled to call forth a body of from 15 to 20,000 militia (and I see no reason why the number might not be carried further), the reduction of these provinces may prove an effort beyond the powers of the American Government.

On your return to town, I shall be anxious to communicate with you upon this question. If it should be determined to put these provinces in a tolerable state of defence, an additional supply of small arms will be required, and, I conclude, of ammunition. It may also be thought desirable to send out some unattached officers to superintend the formation and training of the militia. Possibly, it might also be thought wise, should the prospect of a rupture increase, to carry our regular force to be employed there somewhat higher. I should propose, in case it is determined to employ a force in that quarter, that a due proportion of transports should be attached both to the army at Halifax and Quebec, in which they might retire, in the last extremity, to Newfoundland, and by means of which, if our discussions with America should terminate amicably, the redundance of our force in these provinces might speedily be

directed to some point where their active services may be more required. Believe me, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Memorandum respecting the State of the Naval and Military Forces of Great Britain, with reference to Operations defensive and offensive.

BY THE EARL OF WESTMORLAND.

Considering a statement of the force of the enemy, the points from which he can attack this country, and its dominions, and a comparative statement of our means of offensive and defensive warfare, as essential to the discussion of every question brought before the Cabinet, although I have not the means which the respective Departments may have for an accurate account, I have endeavoured to form one with the defective materials I have; hoping that my statement, however imperfect, may lead to a more general investigation of the state of our existing force, naval and military; and, if any necessity shall appear for augmentation, that the different plans for that purpose may be considered.

The fleet of the enemy appears to consist of

	Ready.	Ordinary.	Building.	
French .	43	25	20	27
Spanish .	21	14	—	—
Dutch . .	9	4	3	2
Russian .	23	20	—	11 Archangel
Danish . .	2	2	—	—
Turkish .	11	11	—	—
	109	76	23	40

To this must be added the Russian force in the Black Sea, and likewise the Turkish, whatever it may be. The Russian is stated in a publication, which appears of authority, to be 12; which accounts make 20 sail of the line in the Baltic, exclusive of 11 at sea and 10 building—total 53 Russian, having

Ready.	Ordinary.	Building.
121	76	23	40

The total force of the enemy for the present seems to be one

hundred and twenty, from which, perhaps, may be deducted the Russian fleet in the Black Sea as not available at present: of these 26 are ready, and there are about 23+40=63 in building and ordinary. What the precise state of these is should be accurately ascertained, their preparation, and means of equipment, and manning. The equipment of those in the north would seem more easy than that of those to the southward.

		Ready.	Ordinary.	Building.
Enemy	121	76	23	40
Deduct Russian Black Sea	12			
	109			

British ships in commission 107—31 more than, according to the statement, the united navies of the enemy: to this account are to be added the ships in ordinary that may be made serviceable. The Danish navy: on the same side is to be added 8 sail of Portuguese and a Swedish squadron.

For the purpose of observing and counteracting the operations of the enemy's fleet, it might be well to divide them into three parts—the North Seas, the Ocean, and the Mediterranean, including Cadiz.

North Seas.

At present at Texel and Flushing . .	15	As the Russian fleet cannot easily unite, and the ships building probably cannot be all ready, 30 sail might be sufficient for the North Seas 30
Building . .	13	
Russian at Cronstadt	13	
——— at Archangel	6	
Danes	2	Are at present . . . 5
	49	

Ocean.

Brest	13	To this service nearly an equal number, considering the cruizing 35
St. Omer	1	
Vigo	3	
Rochefort	6	Are at present . . . 32
	22 or 23	

To this must be added
Portuguese and Russian
squadron 10

33—35

Mediterranean.

Cadiz	14	25	Considering the extent of this service, not less than 30 would be required	30
Carthagena	6			
Toulon	5			
Russian	5	17	Are at present	27
Turkish	12			
	42			

Total ships at present on these three services . . 67
Number supposed to be required 95
Additional . . 28

That an estimate must be formed of what force is requisite for the East Indies, America, and convoys.

At present, East Indies, Cape, and St. Helena . . .	11	Cadiz, same numbers: 11
America	3	3
Convoys	14	14
To the Brazils . . .	6	6
	20	20

Total number calculated . . . . . 115 ships.

To this must be added what may be wanted for occasional services, convoys, &c.

What further force, if America should be hostile—whether the numbers appropriated for each division are sufficient, exclusive or inclusive of the reliefs—and it would seem a very moderate calculation to add for all those services 10 sail more 125
Present force in commission 107

18

making an addition of 18 sail to our present numbers. Whether

this addition is or is not necessary, and, if it is, how to be made, is a question on which we should well reflect.

	Mediterranean.		
Gibraltar	5,827	28,189	
Malta	5,433		
Sicily	16,929		
	East Indies and Cape.		
Cape	5,974	31,533	
Ceylon	5,118		
Madras	6,874		
Bengal	4,156		
Bombay	4,146		
On passage	5,265		
	West Indies, &c.		
Curaçoa	784	22,129	
Jamaica	4,828		
Windward Islands	13,974		
Bahamas	798		
Bermudas	392		
Honduras	832		
New South Wales	521		
	North America.		
Canada	3,666	5,660	
Nova Scotia	1,994		
Add			
Spencer's Corps	6,756	9,863	
Beresford's Corps	3,107		
Great Britain	48,627	105,958	
Ireland	27,278		
Guernsey	7,136		
Returning from South America	5,897		
Infantry	88,958		
Cavalry	17,000		
On Foreign Service			97,273
At home			105,958
			203,231

From 88,000 infantry you must deduct what is necessary for Ireland, and the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, at least 22,000

66,000

What may be necessary for England—and, before we come to what is disposable for expeditions against the enemy, what further force is necessary for

Canada
Nova Scotia } on American hostility.
West Indies
East Indies

In case of attack by land.

By treaty to the Brazils.

However, as about 8,000 may be expected from the Militia, and the Militia will be augmented, it is hoped, a considerable force may be for services at not too great a distance—from 25 to 30,000. In looking to the attackable points of the enemy, however, our attempts should be made successively and in great force, and not, by attempting several objects at once, be inefficient in all. Our principal objects would seem to be to obtain and maintain a continental communication for the purpose of supply of Northern articles, especially naval stores, and the destruction of the naval preparations and means of the enemy.

Iceland and Greenland — have been talked of as valuable and easy acquisitions. The force requisite not stated.
Norway — in co-operation with a Swedish army.
Cronstadt — a conjunct expedition, with fleet to the Baltic.
Walcheren — if ships are brought down.
Brest — the naval preparations there seem too small to hazard so great an enterprise.
Vigo — represented as an easy conquest.
Cadiz.
Ceuta.

Some of the Western Islands.

Further Operations in Mediterranean. } The force at present in the Mediterranean must be adequate to that.

Spanish America.

Whether any offensive operations are undertaken or not, it seems most important that a large body of troops should be prepared for service, to alarm the enemy, to be ready in case any favourable opportunity should arise, and, most of all, to be ready to sail the first possible moment for our American possessions, in case any alarm should be given in that quarter. W.

Memorandum relative to the Volunteering of the Militia.

Should a part of the Militia force be again permitted to extend its services into the regular army, there is little doubt that if a proportion of non-commissioned officers (say five Sergeants and five Corporals for every 100 of the quota to be furnished) were allowed to enlist into the Line, where they could be received as supernumeraries till vacancies occurred, they would have great influence in inducing the men of their companies to follow their example.

In the last volunteering of the Militia, there was a clause in the Act of Parliament which prevents the men from being transferred to other corps, *even with their own consent;* and which has caused considerable inconvenience, as, when they become unfit for active service, (which was the case with many before they joined their regiments) they could not be placed in Garrison Battalions, but were either discharged, or became a burden upon the service.

Parties should not, under any pretence whatever, be allowed

to approach the Militia regiments, but depôts be formed under the command of proper officers, for the reception of the Volunteers, from which they could be marched at leisure, to join their respective regiments.

If the Volunteering immediately takes place, it is presumed that it would be better for the men to leave the clothing of the present year, and receive new clothing with the regiments of the Line.

If the Volunteering of the Militia in North Britain does not commence till that in South Britain has finished, and that in Ireland till after the Volunteering in North Britain, less confusion will be created, and better arrangements can be made for completing the several corps in want of men.

As five guineas' additional bounty is given to Recruits who enlist into the Line for unlimited service, it may be advisable to make the same difference in the bounty to men who extend their services without limitation from the Militia.

Memorandum on the System of Defence, more particularly on the Formation of a Sedentary Militia and the Training of the People.

Exclusive of a regular army of 300,000 men, including 80,000 Militia in Great Britain and Ireland, liable to service out of their own counties, suppose the less regular force for England alone to be as follows—a corresponding arrangement being extended so far as local circumstances will permit to Ireland and Scotland.

1. Volunteers of the best description . . 100,000
2. Sedentary Militia, to be trained for 28 days, but not to leave their counties except in case of invasion or rebellion 200,000
3. To be trained and liable to service in Line, in case of invasion 200,000

This last number will be much increased, should the plan hereafter recommended of requiring all persons between certain

ages to be trained to arms and liable to service under certain restrictions, be adopted.

Taking the counties of England, in round numbers, at 50, it would charge each county, on an average, (exclusive of Volunteers) with supplying 4,000 Sedentary Militia and 4,000 trained men. Taking the parishes at 10,000, it would, upon a like estimate, charge each parish, on an average, with supplying 20 men for Sedentary Militia, and a like number to be trained.

Supposing the 4,000 Sedentary Militia to be formed in each county into four regiments of 1,000 rank and file each, with an establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers as follows, viz.—

1 Colonel.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel.
2 Majors.
10 Captains.
22 Lieutenants.
8 Ensigns.
1 Adjutant.
1 Quartermaster.
1 Surgeon and Mate.
1 Paymaster.
1 Sergeant-Major.
1 Quartermaster-Sergeant.
50 Sergeants.
50 Corporals.
12 Drummers.

Of the above establishment to be permanent :

1 Adjutant.
1 Sergeant-Major.
1 Quartermaster-Sergeant.
20 Sergeants.
20 Corporals.
12 Drummers.

There would then be, exclusive of Adjutants and Staff Sergeants, 80 Sergeants and Corporals in each county on permanent pay, liable to be employed during the eleven months the regiment was not assembled, in the discharge of any other military duties that might be imposed on them, being themselves trained soldiers, and fully capable, it is to be presumed, of training others.

In creating these several descriptions of force, the following considerations occur:

The Volunteers will create themselves. They will naturally consist of persons in business, and in easy circumstances, who will resort to these corps to escape service in other modes, less consistent with their habits and avocations. They will be chiefly confined to the great towns and populous manufacturing districts, and will be so much an object to numbers to be included in, as to furnish to the State the means of imposing on them conditions that will make them a cheap, efficient, and most useful force.

The next consideration is the Sedentary Militia, to give more efficacy to which it is proposed that it should be always supplied by ballot out of the trained men, who, being previously instructed in the manual and platoon exercise, and in a rough knowledge of the firelock, will, in the course of twenty-eight days in each year, become sufficiently expert in the movements and the higher branches of discipline.

In order to render these corps completely effective, both at the annual training and on service, if called out, and also to avoid the trouble of repeated meetings for balloting, it is proposed that, at the time of the annual ballot or muster for trained men, to be regulated as hereafter, over and above the full number of effectives required for the Sedentary Militia, supplementary men, to the amount of one-third or one-fourth of the establishment, should be then drawn, who should be liable to be called on to serve upon vacancies in the order in which they were drawn.

With respect to the last of the three descriptions of forces, viz., the men to be trained, two courses may be pursued: either to pursue the principle of the present Training Act, that is, to choose by ballot the number required out of all men between the ages of eighteen to forty-five, not otherwise serving or exempted, or to proceed more upon the plan of conscription, and to require all persons within certain ages to be trained to arms, and, for a time, to be limited, to render to the State a qualified military service.

The latter course would certainly be the most efficient, in a *military* sense, inasmuch as it would give you preferably the use of the flower of the population. It would not be felt to be inequitable in itself, that the young and able within certain ages should, in succession, be required for a few years, under regulations not burdensome in themselves, to be prepared to defend the country, and it certainly would gradually introduce a military spirit more uniformly than any other system into the people at large.

I conclude that no difficulty will occur either in England or Scotland, in executing a measure of this nature: the poor, as well as the rich, are in the habit of baptismal registry. In Ireland, parochial registers do not generally exist to such an extent as to afford any effectual check with respect to the ages of the people: but the whole measure will, perhaps, require to be specially modified, before it can be applied to Ireland.

In Great Britain, every parish might be required to keep at all times a correct registry of all its male inhabitants within the military ages. The Lieutenancy to have the same powers as at present, causing lists to be taken, duplicates to be sent to parishes, and corrected upon reference to registry.

Every individual to be required, under a penalty progressive in proportion as it is delayed, to enrol himself in the registry of his parish, upon his attaining the age of eighteen; upon changing his parish, to enrol himself in the parish to which he removes, under a like penalty.

Every householder having an inmate, servant, or lodger, not regularly enrolled, to be liable to a penalty.

The lists to be twice a year revised in vestry, to be open to inspection, and producible on the order of the Lieutenancy, and to be kept in such form as shall be prescribed, showing the age of each man, whether serving, having served, or liable to service.

Out of the lists so taken and corrected, the annual ballot for the Sedentary Militia to be publicly made either in subdivisions, parishes, or districts, as the Lieutenancy may order.

Men serving in the Sedentary Militia to be at liberty, at any time, to enlist into the army, navy, marines, or the regular Militia of the county; their places to be immediately supplied from the roll of supplementaries. The roll of supplementaries, when exhausted, to be replenished by a proportional levy upon all the districts or parishes within the county. The Lieutenancy may order such levy to be made between the periods of the annual general meetings, if the roll requires it; or if, at such meeting, they find the roll sufficiently strong, they may reduce the number to be balloted for accordingly.

Trained men balloted to serve in the Sedentary Militia may serve by substitute, paying also a fine of [blank]. Substitutes to be in all cases trained men, within the military age: if drawn themselves while serving, to serve their own three years, after having completed their service as substitutes; and all men to complete their period of service, if begun within the military age, notwithstanding they may have reached the age of exemption during such service.

Trained men having served three years in the Sedentary Militia not to be liable to serve again till all the others have served in rotation. The exemptions to stand as under the additional force act.

The Regular Militia to be balloted for as at present, and out of the same class of persons, neither the Trained men nor the *Sedentary Militia being* exempted from such ballot. The

Sedentary Militia will facilitate the supply of substitutes, but it does not seem fair to throw the whole burden of the Regular Militia upon the limited class out of which the Sedentary Militia is to be chosen; and, if the Sedentary Militia were exclusively liable to be balloted to supply the Regular Militia, it would totally alter the character of its service, and would render it a much more serious subject of apprehension to those who were called upon to enter it. Necessity may lead hereafter, and, consequently, justify us in applying the principle of conscription more directly; but, in the first instance, our object should be to make the service of the Sedentary Militia as little onerous as possible, to try what resources can be drawn by proper encouragement and voluntary enlistment from a body so constituted, and calculated in its nature to comprehend in succession nearly all the population, during that period of life when they are most open to the attraction of military temptations.

It only remains to consider how that portion of the military class not at the moment serving in the Sedentary Militia, in the Volunteers, or any of the more regular branches of the military service, can be best trained to arms. By training, it is assumed, is not meant a knowledge of tactics, but such a knowledge of, and facility in the use of the firelock, as may render the individual capable of doing service, if placed on an emergency in the ranks, among men previously disciplined.

The subject presents for solution perhaps the most difficult problem of any to be found in the successive gradation of problems which the general system of defence presents.

1. The finances of the country will not admit of its being done upon the principle of offering an equivalent in money to each individual, for the sacrifice of time and labour connected with its accomplishment. Mr. Windham very inconsiderately attempted this: had his measure been acted upon, it would, notwithstanding its expense, have been found severely burdensome to individuals, and the fruits, in a military point of view,

would have been in no degree commensurate either with the individual or public charge and sacrifice attendant upon it.

2. It is impossible to bring the people together, even though paid, so frequently as is required for military instruction without great personal inconvenience, great loss of time, and great confusion in some places, where the population is numerous; while, in other places, the number of persons to be found within the distance of five miles, as limited by the Act, is too inconsiderable to admit of any arrangement being made for their instruction. Still less is it practicable to get over all these difficulties within the short space of twelve months, for which alone the individuals now balloted have to be trained.

3. Large bodies of men cannot be frequently brought together either with safety or utility, unless previously officered and organized. Officers cannot be conveniently found for such a large number, nor can the civil power be brought forward, without rendering it ridiculous, to supply their want, and to execute a duty for which peace-officers are so little qualified.

The following principles are suggested as the basis of the proposed system of training:

That learning the use of arms should be imposed as *a positive duty* upon all individuals within certain ages—say between the ages of eighteen and thirty—to be enforced by fine.

That the State should furnish the means and pay the expense of instruction, but not to allow any pay to those to be trained for attendance on drill, musters, &c.

In order to put individuals to the least possible inconvenience, instead of compelling them to assemble at times and places that may be extremely inconvenient to them, to be drilled, they should be released from all such attendance, and should be required, however, in lieu thereof, to have themselves trained at their own times and places, in the manual and platoon exercises.

In order to facilitate instruction, Government to employ and distribute in each county such a number of drill-sergeants as

might be adequate gradually to instruct all the individuals within the military ages. These might consist of the permanent sergeants and corporals of the Sedentary Militia, of sergeants of Volunteer corps, choosing to undertake the duty, or of any other individuals who might be approved as competent by the inspecting field officers and adjutants of the Sedentary Militia, to whom the control and superintendence of the whole system might be given.

To each sergeant, &c., so appointed to drill, might be entrusted a proportion of muskets and accoutrements, for the use of those to be instructed within his district, for which he should be answerable.

The drill-sergeants to be allowed five shillings, for each man certified by the inspecting field-officers or adjutants, perfected in the use of the firelock.

The inspecting field-officers to attend at certain periods, in each parish or district, to pass such men as may tender themselves as qualified; and men so passed and certified to be released from all further attendance at parish musters, or fines, for three years; after which time they shall be required to renew their certificate, as a proof that they still continue competently trained.

Men not certified as trained to be mustered once in six months in their respective parishes, and, if found not drilled, to be fined ten shillings, the fine to be increased ten shillings every succeeding half-yearly muster, till a certificate is obtained—the fine to be double on persons worth the sum of [blank], or [blank] per year.

By the above plan, properly modified, it is conceived training might soon become general, with very little trouble to individuals and small expense to the public. Every man of the military age would feel that he *must* learn the use of the firelock; and his only consideration, in order to avoid fines, musters, &c., would be how he could do it soonest, and with least inconvenience to himself. Mutual convenience would soon

induce neighbours to form themselves into squads, and to arrange with the drill-sergeants the hours and place of meeting. The sergeants having the object of profit in view, and the individuals that of qualifying themselves to obtain their certificates, would learn more in one parade of this kind than in several as usually regulated. Those who were compelled to appear repeatedly at musters would feel their ignorance a disgrace as well as an expense; and the knowledge of the firelock would soon be so diffused, that every man might almost learn it from his neighbour.

In order to ascertain that the men certified were qualified to act together, fewer than twelve men should not be instructed together for certificates. The sergeants would easily manage to bring forward their men for inspection in squads; and this would lead the people previously to form themselves into such small bodies as would be most favourable to instruction.

In the above outline, the general principle alone has been attempted to be stated. The application of it in detail to local circumstances would require much consideration. If the main idea is right, it will be advisable to have it reduced as early as possible into form, so as to have the local regulations examined by those to whom such matters are most familiar, before it is submitted to Parliament.

If the above plan were adopted, our system of military defence in war might be constituted as nearly as follows:

Troops in constant Pay.

Regulars	220,000
Militia	80,000
	300,000

Regular Army.

The regular army to be kept up.

1. By ordinary recruiting.
2. By Volunteers from Sedentary Militia.

3. By an establishment for the reception of boys, who should pass two or three years in education, before they were attached to regiments. It is conceived that an institution of this description on a large scale might be adopted on very economical principles, to which both parents and parishes would be anxious to send their children, if they were assured that they would be previously educated, and not compelled to carry arms too soon. The term of service to boys so entering should certainly not exceed seven years, from their attaining the age of eighteen.

With respect to all other recruits, they should have the option of entering for general service, either limited or unlimited in point of time. The former would be thrown principally into the second, the latter into the first battalions. The embarrassment and endless complexity of performing colonial and distant services by troops serving on short and determinable engagements would thus be in a great degree avoided, while the army would, at the same time, have the benefit of inviting into its ranks those who may be averse to enlist into it without some limitation of time.

The second battalions, though chiefly composed of men whose service was limited in point of time, would, nevertheless, be liable to be employed in any part of the world, should occasion require it: and should it be found at any time necessary during war to levy suddenly by ballot a large body of men for the regular army, it would not be difficult at the moment to appropriate either garrison or a limited selection of second battalions to receive them, from whence, though originally entering only for home service, they would gradually engage for a more extended description of service.

Regular Militia.

The Regular Militia, liable to service out of their counties, would be constituted and raised precisely as at present, with only the additional facility of procuring men by enlistment

from the Sedentary Militia. A corps of this description seems an indispensable ingredient in the army of a State which must reduce its military force suddenly in time of peace, and call it forth as suddenly upon the recurrence of war. Without such a force, capable of being rapidly disembodied and reassembled, we should be either too strong an army in peace, or too weak in war. To compose the entire army on constant pay of regular troops would be to subject the country to an enormous half-pay list; and to leave such a chasm in our military force to be filled up on the breaking out of a war, before we could arrive at our standard strength, as to doom the country, for the three or four first campaigns, either to weakness at home or inactivity abroad.

The Volunteers.

The number of these must be uncertain, but cannot fail to be considerable. The regulations under which they ought permanently to be established, both in point of allowances and discipline, should be such as very much to reduce their number in proportion as the Sedentary Militia can be formed. One hundred thousand Volunteers may always be kept up, so long as the compulsory measures for creating other descriptions of force are in operation, at a very inconsiderable expense to Government.

Sedentary Militia.

To consist of not less than 200,000 men for England, with a corresponding proportion for Scotland. It is perhaps too hazardous either to train or to arm the people of Ireland indiscriminately, where the men, so brought together, are not permanently subjected to the constraint of military discipline. Perhaps an extension and regenerating of the Volunteer corps, under an obligation to pass a certain number of days in each year on permanent duty, might for the present be more applicable to the situation of the country, as preserving to the officers the power of selecting those in whom they can confide.

The Sedentary Militia in Great Britain, as it has been

already stated, to be chosen by ballot, for a service of three years, out of the trained men; to be regimented and officered as the Militia now is; to be trained in war as the regular Militia now is in time of peace; and to be liable to service out of their counties only in case of invasion or rebellion.

Trained Men.

All males, between the ages of eighteen and thirty, with certain limited exceptions, to be trained to arms. This class, exclusive of those of the above ages serving in the army, the navy, and the regular Militia, would probably amount to at least 700,000 men, out of which number the 200,000 Sedentary Militia is to be furnished for service for three years in rotation. The trained men not serving in the Sedentary Militia to be liable to service in regular regiments during rebellion or invasion.

Men above thirty to be wholly exempt from military service, either in Sedentary Militia or in regular regiments, upon invasion, but to be liable to be balloted as at present for Army of Reserve or Regular Militia, and to be subject to all other duties under the Defence Act in such emergency.

The number of men directly or indirectly engaged by the above system in the public service, would stand nearly thus:

Navy, Marines, and Sea Fencibles .	150,000
Line and Regular Militia, gross . .	350,000
Volunteers, Great Britain . . .	100,000
——— Ireland	80,000
Sedentary Militia, gross, for England and Scotland	300,000
Trained Men, do. do. . .	400,000
Serving, or liable to service in arms .	1,380,000
Liable to civil service under Defence Act, about	2,000,000

the quarter of a population of 15 millions being generally reputed capable of bearing arms.

Memorandum on the Expediency of increasing the Military Force.

Lord Castlereagh is desirous of submitting to the Cabinet the expediency of immediately making such an addition to the military force of the country, and particularly to the disposable part of it, as may enable his Majesty to sustain the contest in which he is engaged abroad, without unduly exposing the security of his dominions at home.

With respect to the extent and mode of doing so, he would recommend that the measure adopted in 1806, with a similar view, should be repeated, with the alteration hereafter stated.

That measure allowed two-fifths of the Militia of Great Britain and Ireland to volunteer into the line. The quota was—

For Great Britain	19,832
For Ireland	8,556
Total . . .	28,388

Of the above, there have entered into the Line, exclusive of 3,226 men since obtained from the Irish Militia under the annual enlistment—

From the British Militia . . .	19,118
From the Irish Militia . . .	8,353
	27,471

leaving only a deficiency of 917 men on the whole quota, viz.:

For Great Britain	714
For Ireland	203
Total . . .	917

Should a recruit equal to the above now be obtained for the Line, it would render all the weak second battalions at home, being about twenty in number, completely serviceable, and would complete the infantry regiments throughout the service, on an average, to above 900 rank and file effectives.

As the object of the measure of 1806 was not only to transfer from the Militia to the Line, but to increase the British part of the Militia, whilst the number proposed to be transferred was only two-fifths of the establishment, a number of men, equal to three-fourths of the same, was ordered to be levied by ballot. The Act required that there should be raised—

In Great Britain	36,000
In Ireland	9,000
	45,000

By the accompanying return, it appears there was actually raised within the six months allowed by law—

In Great Britain	32,812
In Ireland	8,974
Total . . .	41,786

leaving a deficiency for which the penalties prescribed by the Act were to attach of only 3,214 men.

As it does not appear necessary at present to do more than replace the men who may volunteer into the Line, it may be sufficient to levy a number of men equal to one-half, instead of three-fourths of the Militia establishment, which will be—

For Great Britain	24,000
For Ireland	9,000
Total . . .	33,000

which number, allowing for deficiencies in the produce of the levy, will rather more than replace the draft into the Line.

As it would be desirable that this ballot should be had upon fresh lists, the interval will enable the respective counties at once to complete their battalions of Local Militia without ballot, or even bounty, if it should be thought desirable to reduce or get rid altogether of the present bounty of two guineas, chargeable ultimately upon the parishes.

Of the 210,137 men, of which our regular army (exclusive

of artillery) now consists, there are 141,913 abroad, and 68,224 at home. Of the latter, about 5,000 cavalry, and a like number of infantry, are under orders for foreign service. Of the remainder of the force at home, the composition is by no means as effective as could be wished. With the exception of about 10,000 good infantry in Ireland, and the cavalry, it consists principally of weak second battalions.

Whilst so large a British force as 45,000 men is exposed to the hazards of war on the Continent, it seems indispensable to provide in due time adequate means as well for repairing the waste inseparable from military operations, as of providing for home defence, should the army in Spain and Portugal unfortunately sustain any more serious disaster.

It may be the more necessary, as it will certainly require a considerably increased force at Gibraltar, Malta, and Sicily, if the enemy should succeed in possessing themselves of the Peninsula.

Lord Castlereagh to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Copy. St. James's Square.

My Lord—In consequence of the communication with which your Grace honoured me relative to the ecclesiastical establishment at New South Wales, I have had a communication with Mr. Marsden on the subject. He concurs with your Grace in opinion, that £200 a year ought to operate as a sufficient inducement to secure a respectable priesthood for the colony; but he very strongly recommends, on grounds of policy, that some distinction, however small, should be made in the emoluments of the respective congregations, in order to excite emulation among the clergy, and to hold out to the deserving some prospect of advancement.

Mr. Marsden has suggested that the congregations should be classed in the order which the importance of their respective settlements point out, and is of opinion that the following scale of provision will be adequate to the proposed object:—

Sidney	£300
Paramatta	260
Hawkesbury	240
Port Dalrymple	220
Norfolk	200

I should be very thankful to your Grace to favour me with your sentiments upon this arrangement; and, if it meet your approbation, your Grace will render a public service to the settlement, by recommending three proper persons to officiate at Paramatta, Hawkesbury, and Port Dalrymple, leaving Mr. Fulton to officiate at Norfolk Island, where his past life will operate least inconveniently to himself in the discharge of his functions.

With respect to the schools, Mr. Marsden is of opinion that we cannot make any effectual progress with less than two schoolmasters for educating male children, exclusive of the schoolmaster and mistress required for the female orphan school.

With respect to the latter, he is of opinion that a salary of £100 ought to induce a man and his wife, qualified for the trust, to remove to New South Wales. For the two other schoolmasters, he proposes £60 for the one, and £50 for the other. I can hardly expect your Grace's researches will be directed to this inferior branch of the arrangement. But, if you should accidentally hear of proper persons, to whom may safely be entrusted the reformation of the rising generation in that unfortunate country, you will oblige me very much by favouring me with your assistance in accomplishing so important an object. I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

MÉMOIRE MILITAIRE SUR L'IRLANDE.

[Endorsed, "Le Général Dumouriez—Jan. 2, 1808."]

Le sort de l'Empire Britannique dépend de celui de l'Irlande. Cette isle est susceptible d'une grande descente dans plus de

trente Bayes profondes, ou ports, sur toute sa circonference. L'inquiétude naturelle des habitants, fomentée par des contrariétés politiques et religieuses, qui a déjà produit plusieurs rébellions, dont celle de 1798 aurait été très dangereuse et presque décisive, si elle avait été conduite par un chef habile et secondée par des secours étrangers suffisans, est continuellement alimentée par les Irlandais proscrits que Buonaparte entretient en France, avec lesquels depuis plusieurs années il organise une insurrection générale, pendant que dans les ports du Midi et de l'Ouest du Continent il dispose des armées et des flottes pour tenter l'invasion de l'Irlande.

Il faut donc s'attendre que, dès que ses vaisseaux paraitront sur les côtes d'Irlande, il s'y opérera de grands inconveniens intérieurs. Il faut donc se persuader, pour assurer sa défense, qu'on aura tout-à-la-fois à combattre l'ennemi extérieur, et à se garantir de l'ennemi intérieur. C'est sur cette double supposition, qu'il faut arranger d'avance la défensive de l'Irlande, pour ne pas tomber dans la confusion qui a régné en 1798, lorsque le Général Humbert à la tête d'une poignée de Français, est descendu à Killala, et, joint par quelques miserables paysans indisciplinables, a battu à Ballina et à Castlebar l'armée Anglaise, beaucoup plus nombreuse que son corps, et resté maître de plus de 40 milles de pays, et ne s'est rendu par une composition très honorable, avec 7 à 800 Français qui lui restaient, qu'après s'être vu entouré par Lord Cornwallis à la tête de plus de 20,000 hommes.

Pour éviter à l'avenir une pareille algarade, qui serait bien plus dangereuse, par l'organisation qu'apporteraient de France les Irlandais qui feraient l'avant-garde d'une grande descente, je crois devoir soumettre au Conseil du Roi et au Général en Chef des Armées—

1°. L'examen detaillé des Bayes de l'Irlande, relevés sur les Cartes Marines et Topographiques. Je joindrai pour chacune la position à donner d'avance aux troupes nécessaires pour s'opposer au premier effort de l'ennemi.

2°. La force nécessaire de l'armée chargée de la défense de l'Irlande, son partage en divisions, la position de ces divisions, correspondante à l'espace des côtes et aux nombre des Bayes que chacune est chargée particulièrement de protéger, leurs quartiers, leurs places d'armes, leurs marchés, leurs points de correspondance, tant pour assurer leur secours mutuel que pour effectuer la tranquillité de l'intérieur, et pour couper toute communication des mal-intentionnés du dedans avec l'ennemi extérieur.

PREMIÈRE SECTION.

EXAMEN DES BAYES ET DES CÔTES DE L'IRLANDE.

BAYES DE L'IRLANDE SUR L'ATLANTIQUE, DEPUIS LONDONDERRY JUSQU'À CORK.

Ces Bayes, par leur nombre et par leur profondeur, presentent un très grand nombre de points de descente. Les territoires qui les séparent forment de longs promontoires ou presqu'îles, dont la plupart se terminent en isthmes assez rétrécis, bornés par des montagnes, qui peuvent servir de points de rassemblement et de barrières pour l'armée chargée de la défense contre l'armée chargée de l'attaque.

Les territoires de ces longs promontoires sont la plupart steriles et peu peuplés, où l'armée étrangère ne pourrait pas subsister, surtout si les Anglais restaient maîtres de la mer, et si leur armée de terre prenait positions assez fortes pour empêcher l'ennemi de pénétrer au delà de l'isthme, où il serait assiégé par terre et par mer, et affamé, surtout si, au moment de la descente, on avait eu soin de retirer tous les chevaux et les bestiaux du promontoire ou l'ennemi serait descendu, et des deux promontoires adjacens: l'exemple en deviendra sensible par l'examen detaillé de ces Bayes.

1. *Lough Foyle.*

La Baye de Londonderry, 14 milles de longueur, 8 de largeur. Le chenal a 4 brasses d'eau et est facile entre deux

bancs de sable, de plus d'un mille d'étendue à gauche et beaucoup plus étroit à droite. L'ouverture d'une côte à l'autre, est de plus d'un mille. L'entrée de cette Baye peut être très bien défendue par une forte batterie à Magilligan, en avant de Tamlagtara, sur la droite, par des batteries à Green, Red, et White Castles à gauche, et par une forte batterie, pareille à celle de Magilligan Point, croisant avec elle à mi-côte, ou au bas de Lower Movill, à la pointe de la côte de l'Est. On peut y ajouter un ou deux block-ships, et plusieurs galiotes à bombes, canonières, et brûlots, qu'on tiendra dans la rivière de Londonderry, pour les lancer au milieu de la flotte ennemie, si elle avait forcé l'entrée de la Baye, surtout en faisant sortir ces brûlots pendant la nuit des petites rivières des deux côtes opposées, Upper Movill à l'Ouest, et Rée à l'Est. Si une fois l'expédition Française avait mise en mer, il faudrait tenir dans Londonderry une garnison fixe de mille hommes qui ne serait point nombré dans les cinq divisions de l'armée mobile.

2. *Lough Swilley.*

Entre cette Baye et le Lough Foyle, est la petite Baye de Strabargy, sous le Cap Malin, qui a trop peu de développement pour être un point de descente. Lough Swilley a 25 milles de longueur sur 4 à 5 milles de largeur jusqu'à l'isle d'Inch. Le mouillage est constamment de 8, 7, et 6 brasses d'eau, entre Inch Island et Bunerana. La côte de l'Ouest est trop montagneuse pour y descendre. Comme ce Golphe est très étroit, on peut en empêcher la navigation par des feux croisés de batteries placées à différentes distances sur les deux côtes et par un fort plaçé sur la pointe nord de l'Isle d'Inch. L'isthme qui termine les deux Bayes de Foyle et de Swilley a environ 11 milles de largeur, entre Londonderry et Bert-Church où la garnison de Londonderry se porterait sur le champ pour renforcer la garnison du Fort d'Inch, et attendre le secours de la division militaire d'Enniskillen qui y serait rendu en trois heures, et qui occuperait un camp très fort en avant de Raphoe,

pour disputer le passage des deux rivières de Foyle et de Swilley, et de la chaîne des montagnes de Gorey et de Culan, ce qui donnerait au Général en Chef le tems d'arriver avec le reste de l'armée. La presqu'île de Inishowen où serait renfermé l'ennemi est aride, dépeuplée, sans ressources pour vivre, et sans chemins pour pénétrer plus avant.

Mutroy Bay et Sheep-Haven à l'Ouest du Lough Swilley, ne sont pas des points de descente. Depuis Sheep-Haven jusqu'à Aranmore, la côte est impraticable pour une grande descente. Entre les isles d'Arran et Tiallen-Head, il existe deux ou trois petites Bayes, qui ne peuvent pas servir à une grande descente. Le pays est stérile, dépeuplé, et sans routes.

3. *Donegal Bay.*

Cette Baye est fort ouverte entre Tiallen Head et Galin Head. La navigation en est dangereuse. La côte du nord très dentelée, présente dans un développement de 15 à 25 milles trois petites Bayes, dont la meilleure est Inver Bay: il faut placer des batteries pour défendre ces trois Bayes. La plus étendue est la Baye proprement de Donegal, au fond de la grande Baye, bornée au sud par le petit port de Drumholm et au sud-ouest par Ballyshannon harbour, bon port, qu'il est aisé de défendre par des batteries, ainsi que celui de Drumholm. 3,000 hommes de la division militaire d'Enniskillen doivent être places à Donegal, pour être prêts à se porter en cas de descente, à celle des Bayes du Nord ou du Sud, qui serait abordée, et pour arrêter l'ennemi, soit derrière la rivière d'Esk, si la descente se faisait à la côte du nord, soit entre l'Esk et les Lacs, si elle s'effectuait à la côte du sud, afin de donner le tems à la division d'Enniskillen de se rassembler en entier, et de disputer les Lacs, jusqu'à l'arrivée du Général en Chef avec l'armée.

4. *Sligo Bay.*

La Baye de Sligo peut être fort bien défendue par un fort sur l'isle de Cuny, une batterie formée sur celle d'Oida, et des

batteries sur les trois pointes qui battent les deux passes. Il faut tenir dans Sligo 1,000 hommes de garnison fixe, qui défendraient aussi Ardinglas Harbour à l'ouest dans la même Baye, le long des deux côtes formant le canal de ce port. Ce pays est plus peuplé et plus riche que les précédens; mais il est très à portée du secours de la division d'Enniskillen, et susceptible d'une guerre de chicane.

5. *Killala Bay.*

Cette Baye est spacieuse et facile pour une descente: elle ne peut être défendue que par des chaloupes canonières, de block-ships, et des brûlots, et par des batteries sur les deux côtes, est et ouest, entre Elley et Killervan, Kilglass et Ross, et un fort sur Bartract Island pour défendre Killala, où il doit avoir une garnison de 1,000 hommes du corps détaché a Castlebar de la division d'Enniskillen. C'est la même défensive que celle de Sligo. L'ennemi descendu, il faut prendre une position entre le Moy et le Lough Conn, pour donner à la grande armée le tems d'arriver au secours.

6. *Broad Haven et Black Sod Bay.*

Broad Haven et Black Sod Bay présentent de points de descente difficiles sur des côtes désertes, sans chemins, sans subsistances. Si l'ennemi avait la témérité d'y descendre, on aurait certainement le tems de rassembler les trois divisions militaires d'Enniskillen, Athlone, et Limerick à Castlebar pour l'empêcher de pénétrer entre Kilmina et le fond de Newport ou Clew Bay, et il périrait par la famine dans ce canton désert. La division militaire d'Enniskillen doit tenir un corps détaché de 3,000 hommes à Castlebar.

7. *Newport ou Clew Bay.*

Cette Baye est très vaste et d'un mouillage très sûr, étant couvert au Nord et au Sud par les montagnes de Burrishoole et de Morisk, et des vents de l'Ouest par l'isle de Clare. On

doit armer de batteries les points de cette Baye ou la descente est la plus facile, ainsi que Killory Harbour, Ballynakill Bay, Cloagan Bay. Ce pays est sauvage et sans subsistances. Les 3,000 hommes stationnés à Castlebar s'y porteraient d'abord, et seraient bientôt suivis par la division d'Athlone, qui donnerait le tems à celle d'Enniskillen et de Limerick de se joindre à elle, pour empêcher l'ennemi de pénétrer au delà des Lacs Dilmain et Corrib, et pour l'affamer dans cet affreux canton, sans habitans, sans routes, et sans subsistances.

Mannin Bay, Round Stone Bay, Piterbury Bay, Kilkeran Bay, sont de mouillages peu surs et très dangereux, où quelques batteries suffisent pour éloigner l'ennemi: 3,000 hommes de la division d'Athlone placés à Galway, suffiraient pour repousser l'ennemi, ou au moins pour l'arrêter dans une contrée pareille, jusqu'au rassemblement de l'armée entière à Galway, d'où elle l'empêcherait facilement de pénétrer plus avant.

8. *Galway Bay.*

La Baye de Galway est très large et très profonde: la navigation y est très facile et l'ancrage très bon, étant abritée des vents de l'Ouest par les South Arran Islands. Toute sa côte du Nord est pleine d'écueils très dangereux, et, par conséquence, n'est pas susceptible d'une descente. Sa côte du Sud est plus saine. Il est facile d'y établir une défensive navale, et de terre par des batteries sur des isles en avant du port Galway, sur la pointe de Killergan, de l'isle Eddy, d'Aghnish, sur deux isles à l'entrée de la petite Baye de Ballywaghan. On placerait aussi des batteries sur les Bayes de Ballida et de Dunmore, qui forment Malbay. 3,000 hommes de la division militaire de Limerick, placés à Killendy, veilleraient sur toute cette partie, et donneraient la main au corps détaché à Galway.

9. *Shannon Mouth.*

Le Shannon, à son embouchure entre Loop Head et Kerry Head, a dix milles d'ouverture. Il se rétrécit après avoir

formé un golphe presque carré entre les deux pointes de Killaly-bone et Kilcouly, où il n'a plus que 2 milles de largeur. Il conserve à peu près la même largeur pendant un cours de plus de 50 milles jusqu'à Limerick. Le Shannon a une grande profondeur d'eau, ce qui en rend la navigation facile et commode. Il sépare, dans son cours de près de 200 milles, l'Irlande en deux parties, dont la plus intéressante et la plus riche est la méridionale, qui comprend les villes importantes de Limerick, Dublin, Waterford, et Cork. Six lacs considérables, situés sur la rive droite, forment une ligne de défense, qui couvre toute la partie du nord-est, est, et sud-est, en cas que l'ennemi, descendu avec une grande force dans une des Bayes que nous venons de décrire, nous eut forcé d'abandonner la province de Connaught et une partie de l'Ulster.

Il est très aisé d'empêcher aucun débarquement considérable dans le Shannon, en plaçant des batteries formées aux deux bords de Cashill River, et près de Killahiny sur le golphe, en avant de l'embouchure de la rivière, deux batteries croisantes à cette embouchure rétrécie, en avant de Killaly-bone et Kilcouly, une batterie sur l'isle de Carrique, un fort sur l'isle d'Inniscattery, une batterie sur Flag Island, un fort sur le promontoire de Killalin, et une batterie sur Foynt Island. En joignant à cette défensive de terre quelques chaloupes canonières, galiotes à bombes, et surtout quelques brûlots, il est impossible à l'ennemi de tenter d'entrer dans le Shannon sans échouer et se perdre. Les brûlots doivent être mouillés très près du rivage, et le plus cachés que possible, le long de la rive droite, sous Kilrush, dans la baye de Clandeday, derrière les islots en avant de Buaraly; le long de la rive gauche, dans l'anse d'Ayhavallan, dans le port de Tarbert, dans celui de Loghall, pour ne pouvoir pas être enlevés per les chaloupes de l'ennemi, et pour pouvoir être lancés de suite dans la flotte dans toutes les directions. Telle doit être en général la disposition des brûlots qu'on employera pour la défense des Bayes, c'est à dire plutôt sur les flancs que dans le fond.

10. *Tralee Bay.*

Cette Baye est formée par Kerry Head et Maghazee, ou Seven Hogs Point. Son ouverture est de 6 milles de largeur, sur 8 à 9 milles de profondeur. La navigation en est difficile à cause des bas-fonds, des roches, et des isles: elle n'est practicable que pour des petits bâtimens. Le canal est au milieu de la Baye, entre deux petites isles, appellées Sampier Islands. Pour sa défense il faut une batterie sous Ballyheigh, une sous Killeney, et un fort dans l'isle de Tinil ou Tinor. Il faut aussi deux batteries à droite et à gauche, pour défendre la petite Baye de St. Brandon, ainsi qu'à Smerwick Harbour à la pointe de cette presqu'isle; mais ces trois Bayes ne sont pas dangereuses.

11. *Dingle Bay.*

Cette Baye a près de 12 milles d'ouverture entre Mounteagle et Canglass Point, et 17 à 18 milles de profondeur jusqu'à Dich Point et Rosbegh Point, qui ferment l'entrée de Castlemaine Harbour. Sur la côte du Nord-Ouest se trouve Ventry Harbour, dont le chenal est fort étroit, et peut aisement être défendu par des batteries croisantes. La même défense au port de Dingle, et à celui de Kinnard; une batterie à Imard, une à Inch Point, une à Rosbegh Point, défendraient tout le fond de la Baye. Toute la côte du Sud-Ouest est impracticable pour une descente. Deux mille hommes de la division de Limerick, au moment de l'arrivée de l'ennemi, suffiraient pour défendre cette Baye et celle de Tralee.

12. *Valentia Island.*

L'isle de Valentia est la meilleure protection pour empêcher toute tentative de descente dans toutes les Bayes de la côte de l'Ouest d'Irlande. Cette isle à toutes propriétés nécessaires pour faire un grand établissement de marine. Cromwell, qui en avait reconnu l'importance, y avait fait construire deux forts, aux deux extrémités, Nord et Sud. Elle a été si fort négligée depuis que ces deux forts n'existent plus, que pendant le règne

de la Reine Anne, Valentia était devenue le repaire des corsaires Français, qui, au moyen de leurs sentinelles à terre sur les deux pointes Nord et Sud, étaient avertis de celle des deux passes par la quelle entraient les vaisseaux de guerre Anglais, qui venaient visiter ce mouillage, et sortaient en sûreté par l'autre passe.

Dans une guerre ordinaire vu la grande supériorité de la marine Anglaise, et le peu d'importance qu'on pouvait attacher aux projets d'une invasion en Irlande, on a pu ne pas s'occuper comme station, encore moins penser à faire un établissement solide et perpetuel de marine militaire à Valentia. Mais depuis que Buonaparte est le maître de toutes les marines et de tous les ports du Continent, depuis que ses projets d'invasion se sont accrus, et ont acquis de la consistance, depuis surtout qu'il organise en grand la rébellion des Irlandais, cette station est devenue très pressante et très nécessaire: car s'il s'en emparait dans le cours de l'expédition qu'il destine contre l'Irlande, on l'en chasserait difficilement: il serait bientôt maître des deux Bayes de Dingle et de Kenmare, et il pénétrerait dans les comtés de Kerry et de Limerick, et sur la rive gauche du Shannon. Ainsi on doit regarder l'établissement militaire de marine à Valentia comme le point de salut de toute la côte de l'Ouest de l'Irlande.

13. *Ballynaskellig Bay.*

Cette Baye n'a pas assez d'étendue pour une grande descente. Il y faut cependant des batteries sur les flancs et dans le fond, pour éviter toute insulte. Cette contrée est inculte, sans habitans, et sans chemins.

14. *Kenmare Bay.*

Cette Baye a une ouverture ou un golphe de plus de 25 milles de largeur et plus de 36 milles de longueur navigable. Elle se rétrécit depuis 6 jusqu'à 3 et 2 milles vis-à-vis de Enosista et un peu plus haut; elle est environnée de mon-

tagnes inaccessibles dans toute sa longueur. Quelques batteries bien placées et quelques brûlots suffisent pour sa défense. Ces brûlots peuvent se préparer en vingt-quatre heures, et seulement dans le cas d'une descente, mais il est bon de tenir d'avance à portée de chaque endroit susceptible d'une grande descente quelques bons marins destinés à ce service.

15. *Bantry Bay.*

Comme les Français ont déjà tenté une grande descente dans cette Baye, qui n'a manqué que par un hazard imprévu, qui à cette époque a sauvé l'Irlande, ils sont certainement instruits par les rebelles Irlandais qu'ils ont recueillis en France de l'importance de ce point de descente, et on ne peut pas prendre trop de mesures pour les empêcher de la tenter de nouveau, ou pour la faire échouer s'ils l'entreprennent.

Cette Baye a 12 à 13 milles d'ouverture depuis Crow Head jusqu'à Sheep's Head et plus de 20 milles de profondeur jusqu'à Widdy Island. Il faut établir au moins trois batteries sur Bear Island : il serait encore mieux d'y établir un bon fort à demeure. Il faut des batteries corréspondantes sur la côte autour de Bear Haven où stationnerait la *small craft* destinée à la défense de la Baye. Il faut aussi une batterie formée à la pointe de Widdy Island. La côte du Sud de cette Baye est entièrement inabordable à cause des montagnes, ainsi que la Baye de Dunmanus, qui suit celle de Bantry au Sud-Ouest.

3,000 hommes de la garnison de Limerick, placés à poste fixe à Killarney, se trouvent dans un point central très rapproché pour courir à la défense de Dingle Bay, Kenmare river, et Bantry Bay. 3,000 hommes de la division militaire de Cork, placés à Kenmare, assureraient parfaitement ces Bayes, en se joignant au corps cantonné à Killarney. Toutes les Bayes du Sud-Ouest seraient entièrement couvertes par la station navale de Valentia.

16. *Baltimore.*

Entre Mizen Head et Baltimore est un Archipel très difficile qui forme la Roaring Water. Cette côte de 25 à 30 milles d'etendue, n'est susceptible d'aucune grande descente. Elle est d'ailleurs trop rapprochée et trop soumise à la station navale de Cork et à sa division militaire pour que l'ennemi ose la tenter. Baltimore a été pillé en 1631 par les Algériens, et il y faut des batteries, ainsi qu'à Castlehaven Harbour. On peut y stationner pour plus de sûreté une petite division de la *small craft* de la station navale de Cork, comme une garde avancée.

17. *Ross Bay.*

Cette Baye, Glendore Harbour, Clonakilty Bay, Courtmacsherry Bay, et le port de Kinsale, sont sous la protection immédiate de la station navale de Cork, qui certainement dans le cas d'une menace prochaine d'une descente en Irlande serait renforcée au point qu'elle ne put être exécutée ni sur les côtes méridionales, ni dans le Canal St. George. Il ne faut pas négliger les batteries nécessaires dans les points de mouillage, ni la *small craft*, qu'en ce cas il faut multiplier. 1,000 hommes de la division de Cork, à Ross, et 1,000 à Kinsale assureront cette défensive.

18. *Cork Harbour.*

La défense de terre de ce port est très facile à arranger, la Nâture ayant rétréci l'entrée du Cove par deux pointes qui n'y laissent qu'une passe très étroite, inforçable au moyen de quelques batteries croisantes. Il en faut placer aussi quelques unes à droite et à gauche, sur les deux côtes entre Flat Head et Ballycoolen Island.

BAYES SUR LE CANAL DE ST. GEORGE,

DU SUD AU NORD PAR EST.

1. *Youghall Bay.*

Cette Baye doit être armée de batteries ainsi que celle d'Ardmore, avec quelques autres batteries protégeantes les

petites anses de la côte, depuis Ballycoolen Bay jusqu'au Cap de Minehead.

2. *Dungarvan Bay.*

Elle est encore plus aisée que les autres à mettre en état de défense par des batteries sur la langue de terre du Sud-Ouest, et sur la pointe de Ballinacoury, et quelques batteries dans Cloma Bay. On peut stationner quelque *small craft* dans la Baye de Dungarvan, et 1,000 hommes de la division de Cork dans cette ville, pour veiller aussi sur la Baye de Youghall.

3. *Tramore Bay.*

Cette Baye et Waterford Harbour sont dans le cas d'une défensive conjointe par leur proximité. Il faut y placer à poste fixe 1,000 hommes de la division de Cork. La Baye de Tramore est très dangereuse et entièrement impracticable pour une grande descente. On ne peut pas pénétrer dans Waterford Harbour si les batteries sont bien disposées. En général, la mer est si forte, les flots sont si élevés et si rapides dans le Canal St. George, que l'ennemi ne peut pas y tenter de descente sur la côte découverte ; il faut nécessairement qu'il entre dans une Baye. Celles de l'Irlande sur ce Canal sont peu profondes, et sont très dangereuses par la quantité d'isles, d'écueils, et de roches, dont elles sont parsemées.

4. *Ballyteague Bay.*

C'est une de ces Bayes dangereuses, dans lesquelles il suffit de placer quelques batteries dans les points les plus abordables, comme en avant de Bannow, non pas dans la crainte d'une grande descente mais pour éviter les insultes et surtout les communications avec les mal-intentionnés de l'intérieur. Cette même nature de côtes inabordables pour une grande descente s'étend jusqu'à Cansore Head.

5. *Wexford Haven.*

L'entrée de ce port est defendue par les deux forts Marget et Rosclair, et on ne peut pas tenter de descente sur cette côte

pleine de bancs et d'écueils. 1,000 hommes de la division de Dublin suffisent pour la sûreté de ce canton : on en peut même repartir les deux tiers à Gorey, Enniscorthy, Arklow, Blessington, pour la tranquillité du pays et des communications.

6. *Dublin Bay.*

Il faudrait que toute la marine d'Angleterre fut anéantie pour que Dublin devient la pointe de descente de l'ennemi. Cette capitale ne court certainement aucun danger, mais elle doit être le point de rassemblement, ainsi que les côtes opposées de l'Angleterre, de quelques vaisseaux ou frégates de garde et d'une *small craft* considérable pour veiller sur les côtes du Sud, entre Wexford et Dublin, et sur celles du Nord, entre Dublin et Belfast. Quelques batteries dans les points les plus abordables de la côte sont suffisantes entre Dublin et Dundalk.

7. *Dundalk Bay.*

Cette Baye a 10 à 12 milles d'ouverture entre Dunany Point et Cooly Point, et 10 milles de profondeur. Elle doit être armée de quelques batteries depuis Bellingham Castle jusqu'à Dundalk. Il faut aussi armer les deux pointes de la Baye longue et étroite de Carlingford.

8. *Dundrum Bay.*

Il serait utile de rétablir l'ancienne forteresse qui domine toute la Baye, ou au moins une bonne batterie dans son emplacement, et dresser quelques batteries sur les flancs, dans les endroits de la côte les plus accessibles. Au reste, cette Baye, à cause de ses bancs, de ses écueils, et de sa trop grande ouverture n'est pas susceptible d'une grande descente, non plus que la petite Baye de Killough, très facile à défendre par des batteries sur les deux pointes, surtout sur celle de St. John.

9. *Strangford Bay.*

Une escadre, avec un grand convoi, ne pourrait pas s'engager dans le goulet long et étroit qui entre dans le Lough de Strang-

ford, les marées y étant trop fortes, et cette Baye n'est pas abordable par dehors, la côte étant abritée par des bancs de sable mouvans, des isles, et des roches. Toute cette côte continue de la même nature jusqu'à Belfast.

10. *Belfast Lough, ou Carrickfergus Bay.*

3,000 hommes de la division militaire de Dublin doivent être stationnés a Belfast pour la défense de Carrickfergus et de Bangor, placés sur les deux flancs, à l'entrée de la Baye, qui a huit milles d'ouverture, entre Killroot Point et Salt Hill Point, et 12 à 13 milles de profondeur jusqu'au mouillage de Belfast. Cette Baye est un excellent point pour une grande descente, étant nette et sûre. Le Maréchal de Schomberg y a débarqué avec 10,000 hommes, en 1689, à Groomsport Bay, près de Bangor: le Capitaine Thurot y a aussi descendu, en 1760. Le Château de Carrickfergus peut être remis en bon état, outre plusieurs batteries à sa droite et à sa gauche, et quelque *small craft* partagée entre Carrickfergus et Bangor. Il faut aussi des batteries en avant et sur les flancs de Bangor. Olderfleet Harbour, qui n'a aucune communication avec la Baye de Carrickfergus mérite quelques batteries à la pointe Nord-Est de l'Isle Magee. La côte n'est pas abordable jusqu'à Red Bay, qui mérite une ou deux batteries, mais qui n'est pas susceptible d'une grande descente. La côte qui suit, en tournant au Nord jusqu'à Ballycastle, n'est susceptible d'aucune descente, ni grande ni petite.

11. *Rathlin ou Raughlan Island.*

Cette Isle a une Baye qui presente un bon mouillage, Church Bay, au centre méridional de l'isle, pour une escadre stationnaire, qui, pendant l'été, couvrirait toute la côte du Nord, entre le Lough Swilley et Belfast. La marée rétrécie entre cette isle et Sheep Island est très forte; mais l'escadre peut se mettre à l'abri du vent de Sud-Ouest dans la rade de Ballycastle, qui est très sûre. Si les vents sont de l'Ouest ou Est

par Nord, l'escadre est en sureté dans la rade de Christ Church, sous l'isle même.

Cet examen détaillé des Bayes de l'Irlande presente 18 points de descente à l'Ouest, Nord, et Sud, depuis Londonderry jusqu'à Cork. Ils ne sont pas tous également dangereux, et comme ces Bayes s'avancent profondément dans le pays, et sont environnées de presqu'isles montueuses et stériles, les isthmes qui les séparent sont la plupart très rapprochés, et procurent contre l'ennemi descendu dans ces Bayes des points d'où on peut aisément arrêter ses progrès. Les principaux de ces points d'arrêt, ou de première ligne de défense, sont Londonderry, qui couvre les deux Bayes de Foyle et de Swilley; 2°., Donegal, pour celles qui se trouvent entre Arranmore Island et Donegal Bay; 3°., Sligo, pour les Bayes de Sligo et Killala; 4°., Castlebar, pour Clew Bay, Marin Bay, Roundstone Bay, Pitterbury Bay, Kilkeran Bay; 5°., Galway et Killendy, pour les Bayes de Galway, Ballida, Dunmore, entre les South Arran Islands et le Shannon: 6°., Killarney pour les Bayes de Dingle, Ballynaskelig, Kenmare, Bantry, Dunmanus. Ces six positions suffisent pour arrêter les premiers progrès de l'ennemi descendu, et pour donner le tems aux cinq divisions de l'armée de se rassembler par échelons.

Les onze Bayes de l'Est, depuis Cork jusqu'à Rathlin Island ne sont pas exposées à une grande descente, comme celles de l'Ouest, parce que il faudrait que l'ennemi s'enfournat dans la Manche, ce que ne lui permettra jamais l'immense supériorité de la marine Anglaise, et qu'il s'enforçat dans le dangereux Canal de St. George.

Mais la grande sûreté de l'Irlande, ce qui empêchera ou fera échouer toutes les descentes, ce qui coupera tous les secours et toute retraite à l'ennemi, en cas qu'il eût réussi à en exécuter une, c'est l'établissement fixe et arrangé d'avance, dès à present de 4 stations de marine militaire: 1°., Cork, qui est déjà établi; 2°., Valentia, qui couvre tout l'Ouest de l'Irlande, et

dont l'escadre peut sans difficulté se mettre au vent de la flotte ennemie, et suivre tous les mouvemens au Nord et au Sud; 3°., Rathlin, qui presente le même avantage au Nord contre toute attaque qui partirait des ports du Nord et de la Baltique; 4°., Dublin, qui tient en sureté tout le Canal. Ces quatre stations navales garantiraient l'Irlande de tous les côtés. Si elles n'existent pas, on ne peut pas empêcher l'ennemi de tenter à son choix une grande descente sur toute la côte de l'Ouest de l'Isle, du Nord au Sud, depuis Londonderry jusqu'à Baltimore.

DEUXIÈME PARTIE.

FORCE ET DISPOSITION DE L'ARMÉE NÉCESSAIRE POUR LA DÉFENSE DE L'IRLANDE.

On doit s'attendre que, si Buonaparte tente une descente en Irlande, il partira des ports de l'Espagne et de Portugal, après avoir joint aux forces navales de ces deux Puissances toutes celles qu'il aura pu rassembler de la Méditerranée, pour donner une escorte formidable à ses vaisseaux de transport. Son armée de terre sera certainement de trente à cinquante mille hommes: elle ne peut pas être plus faible, s'il veut réussir; mais elle ne peut pas non plus être plus forte. D'après l'expédition de Copenhague, qui n'était guère plus que la moitié de l'armée que Buonaparte doit destiner à la conquête de l'Irlande, le Conseil peut juger de l'encombrement qui résulterait du transport d'une armée de 50,000 hommes, obligée de porter tout avec elle dans un pays où elle ne trouverait ni chevaux pour trainer son artillerie et monter sa cavalerie, ni bestiaux, ni grains. Il faudrait pour une pareille expédition cinq à six cens bâtimens de transport: un tel convoi serait extrêmement lent à rassembler, lent à naviguer. Je ne parle ni de l'effrayante dépense, ni du danger de la mer pour cette énorme *Armada*, ni du danger encore plus grand de la poursuite et de la rencontre de nos escadres. Je veux supposer toutes ces difficultés vaincues, et cette armée de cinquante mille hommes arrivée sans inconveniens et prête à être débarquée; mais, c'est le

maximum de ma supposition. Il m'est démontré impossible que Buonaparte transporte en Irlande une armée plus forte de quelque part que ce soit du Continent.

Mais on m'objectera que le plan de Buonaparte est plus vaste ; que, pendant que l'*Armada* partira du Midi de l'Europe, une flotte Russe, Danoise, *peut-être* Suédoise, Hollandaise, Française amenera du Nord de l'Europe un second convoi, et fera le tour d'Ecosse, pour venir envahir l'Irlande par le Nord. Cette idée gigantesque ne peut entrer que dans la tête d'un homme qui ne connait pas l'élément sur lequel se projette cette expédition. Le rendez-vous de deux Armadas partant à vents opposés de points aussi éloignés ne peut pas avoir la même précision que la jonction de deux armées de terre. Certainement si le Général chargé de la défense de l'Irlande est habile, il aura eu le tems, surtout avec le secours de notre marine invincible, de détruire l'armée, les vaisseaux de guerre, et les transports, de la première Armada avant que la seconde n'arrive ; mais, pour ne rien mettre au hasard, il faut qu'il soit d'avance supérieur en forces à une armée de cinquante mille hommes. On doit donc fixer l'armée d'Irlande à soixante-quinze mille hommes, donc un tiers de troupes de ligne, le surplus en Milices et Volontaires Anglais et Irlandais, en s'assurant bien de la fidélité de ces derniers. Cette armée doit avoir un dixième, 7 à 8,000 hommes de cavalarie, et dix compagnies ou batteries d'Artillerie volante, outre l'Artillerie de campagne proportionnée.

Cette armée doit être partagée en cinq divisions égales, qu'on peut designer par le chef-lieu de leur position respective ; trois d'avant-garde, Inniskillen, Limerick, et Cork ; une en réserve, Athlone ; une en arrière-garde, Dublin. Je detaillerai les places-d'armes, les quartiers, les partis détachés, de chacune de ces divisions dans le même ordre.

Chacun des Généraux commandans en chef de chacune de ces divisions, doit recevoir en avance une Instruction détaillée du Général en Chef de l'armée, sur les postes fixes à

occuper pour la sureté des côtes, ports, et bayes, dont la défense lui est particulièrement confiée, sur les secours mutuels à donner et à recevoir des divisions voisines, en cas de descente, sur les points de rassemblement de plusieurs divisions, ou de l'armée entière.

Chaque Général Divisionnaire, pour se mettre en état de bien remplir son instruction, doit inspecter soigneusement tous le points de la côte compris dans le département de sa division ; les batteries de côte, les défenses navales, et les chemins de communication : il doit veiller sur la régularité du service, la discipline, la sûreté et la promptitude des signaux, tant dans l'étendue de la division, que pour la correspondance avec les divisions voisines, et surtout avec le Général en Chef, auquel il doit rendre de comptes fréquens, de jour et de nuit, de tout ce qui arrive, par des moyens télégraphiques et des signaux, outre les comptes par écrit, par les ordonnances.

Il doit connaître parfaitement le nombre exact des chariots, chevaux de train et de selle, du gros et menu bétail, qui existent dans son arrondissement, pour les faire retirer promptement en arrière de sa place d'armes, en cas de descente. Il ne doit laisser aucun magazin, ou rassemblement de grains, d'armes, de munitions de guerre, le long des côtes.

Il doit chercher à connaître parfaitement l'esprit des habitans de son departement, et, sans s'immiscer dans le Gouvernement civil, veiller sur ceux dont les intentions sont douteuses, s'entendre avec les Magistrats en les surveillant, et leur prêter main forte dès qu'ils le requerront, au nom de la loi, pour la sûreté du pays.

Il doit, sous les peines militaires les plus sévères, empêcher que les Commandans particuliers détachés de sa division n'empiètent sur le Civil, ne menacent ou laissent menacer, ne vexent ou laissent vexer, les habitans, qui doivent être traités avec beaucoup de douceur, et comme des frères. Il pourra même changer ses détachemens le plus qu'il pourra, en tout ou en partie, pour que la négligence et le relâchement de disci-

pline ne s'introduisent pas. Toute sa division, et surtout ses détachemens, doivent être toujours prêts à marcher au premier signal, en avant ou en arrière, selon l'ordre qu'il en donnera.

Il doit à cet effet savoir où prendre et avoir sous sa main les chariots et chevaux nécessaires, pour que rien ne retarde sa marche, soit en tout soit en partie, sur l'ordre du Général en Chef, ou sur l'apparence de l'ennemi sur un point de la côte. Dans ce dernier cas, il doit avertir de son mouvement le Général en Chef et les Généraux Divisionnaires qui l'avoisinent, pour qu'ils fassent pour l'appuyer les mouvements convenus d'avance, correspondans à celui qu'il est obligé de faire. Ces mouvemens seront désignés à chaque Général Divisionnaire dans l'Instruction de son Général en Chef.

DIVISION D'INNISKILLEN,

PREMIÈRE D'AVANT-GARDE.

Cette division est chargée de garder la côte depuis Londonderry jusqu'à Galway. On a trouvé, dans la première partie, l'examen des Bayes comprises dans ce département. Le quartier-général et la place d'armes de cette division est Inniskillen, d'où on doit détacher trois corps, chacun de trois mille hommes, cantonnés ou campés à poste fixe ; 3,000 hommes dont un dixième de cavalerie, avec une demi-compagnie d'Artillerie à cheval, à Lifford, situé sur trois grandes routes, pour protéger les Loughs Foyle et Swilley, Sheep Haven et les petites Bayes entre Arranmore et Malin Head. Ces Bayes et ces ports sont tout au plus à une journée de marche de Lifford excepté Leathermacaward qui en est à 40 milles, mais tout près du corps détaché à Donegal ; 2°., un pareil corps à Donegal, pour protéger toute la côte entre Leathermacaward et Sligo, soutenu à sa droite par le corps placé à Lifford, et à sa gauche par celui placé à Castlebar ; 3°., un pareil corps à Castlebar, pour protéger la côte entre Sligo et Slim's Head, soutenu à sa droite par le corps placé a Donegal, à sa gauche par celui de la division d'Athlone, placé à Galway.

Si l'ennemi tentait la descente entre Londonderry et Sligo, le corps ou brigade de Lifford s'y porterait sur-le-champ. La brigade de Donegal le joindrait et serait remplacée par celle de Castlebar : celle-ci serait suivie par celle de Galway. Ce mouvement successif et par échelons produirait en douze heures un corps de 6,000 hommes, et en 24 ou 30 heures, toute la division réunie, et suivie de près par les divisions d'Athlone et de Limerick, qui seraient successivement remplacées par celles de Cork et de Dublin, lorsque la descente serait entièrement déterminée et qu'on pourrait sans imprudence dégarnier les côtes du Sud-Ouest et du Sud, depuis le Shannon jusqu'à Waterford.

Si l'ennemi tentait le débarquement entre Sligo et le Shannon, le rassemblement de l'armée deviendrait plus aisé et plus prompt, étant plus central. La brigade placée a Galway serait tirée de la division d'Athlone. Il faut d'avance arranger une route militaire, dans la ligne la plus droite possible le long de la côte entre Galway, Castlebar, Donegal, Sligo, et Lifford, et de pareilles routes, aux deux points de centre, Inniskillen et Athlone, pour que les marches s'exécutent sans gêne et avec promptitude.

DIVISION DE LIMERICK,

DEUXIÈME D'AVANT-GARDE.

Le quartier-général et la place d'armes de cette division est Limerick. On placerait un détachement de 300 hommes de cette division, dont 50 à cheval, avec un canon de bataillon à Cashel pour assurer la tranquillité du comté de Tipperary. Trois brigades en seraient detachées : 1°., à Killendy, pour veiller sur la côte entre la Baye de Galway et le Shannon ; cette brigade serait appuyée à sa droite par la brigade de la division d'Athlone stationnée à Galway, qu'elle soutiendrait elle-meme en cas de besoin ; par derrière par la division d'Athlone, et a sa gauche par celle de Limerick ; 2°., une seconde brigade serait placée au bas de la rivière par détachemens ;

mais 1,000 hommes de cette brigade resteraient ensemble sous le Brigadier Général, avec la demi-batterie cheval à Killcarragh ou quelqu'autre cantonnement sur la petite rivière de Feal, pour veiller sur Tralee Bay et Dingle Bay ; 3°., une autre brigade serait détachée à Killarney, pour veiller sur les Bayes du comté de Kerry, entre l'Isle Valentia et Mizen Head, en se réunissant sur le point d'attaque avec la brigade de la division de Cork placée à Kenmare.

Il faudrait ouvrir des routes militaires, entre Limerick et Killarney, Killarney et Kenmare, Kenmare et Cork, pour la réunion de ces deux divisions. Celle d'Athlone prendrait la route de Limerick, celle de Dublin prendrait la route de Cork, si l'ennemi avait exécuté sa descente dans une des Bayes au sud du Shannon, et s'il fallait faire la grande guerre dans la province de Munster.

La position de Killarney est le point le plus essentiel pour la défense de la province de Munster. Ses montagnes et les lacs qui l'environnent la rendent très susceptible de n'être ni forcée ni tournée : elle couvre Cork et Limerick. C'est le point le meilleur pour le rassemblement de l'armée, et si l'ennemi etait descendu dans une des Bayes du Sud-Ouest il ne pouvait pas pénétrer plus avant, et serait trop heureux de se rembarquer, si notre marine le lui permettait.

DIVISION DE CORK,

TROISIÈME; D'AVANT-GARDE.

Le quartier-général et la place d'armes de cette division est Cork. Elle doit tenir un détachement de 300 hommes à Lismore pour la tranquillité du pays. Elle doit avoir trois brigades detachées : 1°., à Kenmare, dont on a vu la destination ; 2°., une à Bandon Bridge, qui fournira 1,000 hommes à Kinsale, et 1,000 à Ross, que le Brigadier-Général retirera, s'il est dans le cas de marcher vers Kenmare ; 3°., une à Waterford et Dungarvan qui enverra un détachement de 300 hommes à Clonmell pour la tranquillité du pays. Il n'y a aucune ap-

parence que l'on tente aucune descente sur les côtes méridionales de l'Irlande, d'après la supériorité de la marine Anglaise, dans ces parages.

DIVISION D'ATHLONE.

RÉSERVE.

Le quartier général et la place d'armes de cette division est Athlone, qui sera, en même tems, la residence du Général en Chef de l'armée. Une seule brigade de cette division sera détachée à Galway. Il établira des petits détachemens de correspondance avec les quatre autres divisions ; d'autres pour assurer la tranquillité du pays, dont le Général en Chef conviendra avec le Viceroi, d'après les dispositions plus ou moins dangereuses des habitans. Il donnera ordre aux cinq Généraux Divisionnaires, dans le cas où ils seront obligés de faire un mouvement général, de laisser en arrière un dixième de leur division, chacun 1,500 hommes, dont 150 de cavalerie, et deux pièces de canon de campagne, qui se rassembleront dans les cinq places d'armes pour garder les magazins, escorter les convois, et assurer la tranquillité de l'intérieur.

DIVISION DE DUBLIN,

OU D'ARRIÈRE-GARDE.

Le quartier général et la place d'armes de cette division sera Dublin. Elle détachera 1°., une brigade à Belfast ; 2°., une à Wexford ; 3°., une en communication avec la division d'Athlone, subdivisée chacune, pour la tranquillité du pays, entre Dublin et ces trois points, d'après les dispositions concertées entre le Viceroi et le Général en Chef sur cet objet. Si cette division est dans le cas de marcher en entier pour joindre l'armée, les 1,500 hommes qu'elle laissera à Dublin seront à la disposition du Viceroi, qui d'ailleurs recevra d'autres troupes d'Angleterre.

Pour la facilité du service, et pour ne pas tronquer et affaiblir les différens corps de l'armée, il serait bon, l'ayant déjà partagée en cinq divisions, de partager chaque division

en cinq brigades, chaque brigade composée de 2,700 hommes d'infanterie pésante ou légère, 300 de cavalerie, et une demi-batterie d'artillerie volante; la cinquième brigade seule formant réserve avec le parc d'artillerie. Deux brigades formeraient une sous-division commandée par un Général Major, chaque brigade par un Brigadier-Général. Chaque Lieutenant-Général Divisionnaire aurait une portion d'Officiers d'Etat-Major, ou Staff, relevant de l'Etat-Major Général, dépendant du Général en Chef.

Indépendamment de cette armée, il serait employé en Irlande cinq mille hommes de garnisons fixes; 1,000 au Château de Dublin, 1,000 à Londonderry, 1,000 à Sligo, 1,000 à Galway, 1,000 à l'Isle de Valentia.

Dublin, siège du Gouvernement, résidence du Viceroi, doit être le dépôt et le point de rassemblement de tous les secours venans d'Angleterre. Cependant dans un cas pressé, les troupes partant d'Ecosse gagneraient beaucoup de tems en venant débarquer à Belfast, ou à Londonderry, si l'attaque de l'ennemi se faisait à la côte du Nord-Ouest entre Londonderry et le Shannon; ou pour se rendre directement d'un de ces deux points de débarquement sur Athlone, pour se diriger par la ligne la plus courte de ce point central à la partie attaquée de la côte du Sud-Ouest entre le Shannon et Cork.

Mais comme toutes les munitions de guerre, voitures, chevaux de selle et de trait, équipement de toute espèce, armes, hôpitaux, provisions de bouche, &c., doivent arriver par Dublin, le Viceroi doit à mesure en donner avis au Général en Chef, responsable de la défense générale. C'est sur sa réquisition que le Viceroi doit en ordonner la distribution et le transport dans les points préscrits par le Général en Chef.

Le Viceroi doit se réserver tous les moyens des charrois que peut lui fournir, du Nord au Sud, la bande de pays entre Belfast et Cork, pour que ce service soit régulier, prompt, et sans embarras. Il doit arranger une grande route militaire

entre Dublin et Athlone, et une autre entre Dublin et Cork, pour faciliter ce service.

Il doit assurer la tranquillité de l'intérieur du pays, surtout du côté de Wicklow et de Waterford, en faisant passer des détachemens à portée de communiquer avec la division militaire de Cork et avec celle d'Athlone, tant pour assurer les convois que pour couper toute communication aux mal-intentionnés entre les côtes de l'Est et de l'Ouest.

DE LA GRANDE GUERRE EN IRLANDE.

Il est à peu près certain que Buonaparte ne peut tenter une grande descente que sur toute la bande occidentale des côtes et de Bayes qu'il peut aborder facilement, partant des ports du Sud et même de ceux du Nord du Continent, sans se hasarder dans la Manche. Ainsi la grande ligne de défense s'étend naturellement par l'Ouest de Londonderry à Baltimore.

Si l'ennemi descend tout-à-fait au Nord dans une des Bayes entre Londonderry et Sligo, le pivot de la défense est Lifford. Si on ne peut pas venir à bout de repousser sa première attaque, s'il fait des progrès avant qu'on ne soit en force, s'il nous oblige à lui céder du terrain, le Général en Chef a une superbe ligne de défense à prendre, depuis Inniskillen jusqu'au Lough Neagh, par les comtés de Fermanagh, Tyrone, Monaghan, et Armagh, en chargeant la division de Dublin, renforcée des secours qui arriveraient par Belfast, de garder la rive droite de la rivière de Bann jusqu'à la mer.

Ne pouvant pas tourner notre droite, l'ennemi serait forcé de tenter de tourner notre gauche, par le côté occidental du Lough Earne où il trouverait une partie de notre gauche postée derrière Donegal; car alors nous aurions abandonné tout le comté de Donegal et partie de celui de Londonderry. Il serait le maître d'une grande étendue de côtes, mais il n'en serait pas mieux pour subsister.

Le Général en Chef l'observerait, le feraient harceler, peut-être même attaquer, par la division de Dublin, et marcherait

par sa gauche, pour être toujours en face du mouvement qu'il (l'ennemi) ferait par sa droite; et si on ne pouvait pas tenir la position de Donegal, on l'arrêterait au passage de l'Earne, entre le lac Earne et la mer. Ne pouvant plus tourner, il serait forcé de venir attaquer de front la position d'Inniskillen, qu'il est impossible de forcer, defendue par une armée. Cependant il risquerait de perdre sa commuuication avec Londonderry, parceque la division de Dublin, ayant passé le Bann, avec sa retraite assurée, avancerait toujours derrière son flanc gauche, pour le couper d'avec sa flotte.

S'il tentait le mouvement par sa gauche, et s'il parvenait à passer le Bann, la division de Dublin, après avoir chicané le terrain tant qu'elle aurait pu, se placerait derrière le Canal de Belfast, entre la mer et le Lac Neagh. Alors la division de gauche de notre armée pénétrerait derrière la droite de l'ennemi jusqu'à Londonderry, pour lui couper la communication navale, pendant que le centre se portant a Newry, soutiendrait d'un côté la défensive de la division de Dublin, et appuyerait de l'autre l'offensive de son aile gauche. Comme l'ennemi ne pourrait, dans ce cas, ou nous donner bataille malgré nous, ni pénétrer bien loin par la droite, ni par la gauche, au bout de huit jours de disette de vivres, il serait forcé ou de chercher à se rembarquer, ou de capituler.

Si l'ennemi descend dans une des Bayes entre le Lough Swilley et Donegal, on l'arrêtera d'abord à sa gauche par le Lough Swilley, et à sa droite par Donegal: c'est là la première ligne de défense. S'il la force par sa droite, notre gauche se retirera, comme on l'a déjà dit derrière l'Earne, entre le Lough Earne et la mer; et le Général en Chef prenant l'excellente position d'Inniskillen et renforçant sa droite postée derrière le Lough Swilley, l'ennemi se trouvera de même dans une position resserrée et sans substances.

Si l'ennemi est descendu entre Donegal et Castlebar, il trou-

vera en front les deux divisions d'Inniskillen et d'Athlone, qui l'arrêteront facilement dans un pays sans subsistances, sans chemins, et sans moyens de transport, sa descente ne pouvant bien se faire qu'à Killala. Alors Sligo et Castlebar seront les deux points de la défensive, ce qui donnera au Général en Chef tout le tems de rassembler son armée. Si l'ennemi veut forcer sa gauche, il arrive aux Lacs multipliés et aux grands marais sous Inniskillen. S'il pousse de front en avant, il est arrêté par les mêmes inconveniens du terrain, et ensuite par Athlone et par le Shannon. S'il pousse par sa droite sur Castlebar, notre gauche défend cette position formidable, tandis que notre centre le tient en échec par une position de montagnes, entre Lough Conn et la rivière de Moy, et que notre droite pénétre derrière son flanc gauche, pour lui couper la communication de Killala. En supposant qu'il ait vaincu toutes ces difficultés, et que nous soyons obligés de reculer, notre droite se replie sur Inniskillen, et notre armée reprend une forte ligne de défense entre Athlone et Galway. Cependant, plus il se sera éloigné de la mer, plus il sera sans ressources; et, sans bataille, par des combats partiels, on ruinera son armée.

Il n'y a pas de grande descente à craindre entre Castlebar et Galway: elle ne peut-être tentée que dans la Baye de Galway même. Galway a été une très bonne place, qu'il est nécessaire de remettre en état de défense; le plutôt qu'on s'y determinera sera le mieux. Elle n'exige que des reparations: dès qu'elles seront faites, toute cette contrée sera en sûreté. Cette place est le point de défense qui protége d'ailleurs toute la côte jusqu'au Shannon.

Si l'ennemi était enfourné entre Galway, le Shannon, et Limerick, il serait perdu sans ressource dès que ce petit coin de terre serait épuisé, à quoi nous travaillerions à mesure qu'il s'avancerait. Limerick est inattaquable par la droite de la rivière; et il ne peut pas forcer l'embouchure du Shannon, si les défenses navales et des côtes sont bien arrangées d'avance.

Cette défensive à la droite du Shannon rejette nécessairement l'ennemi à son point de débarquement après avoir peut-être dévasté quelques contrées des provinces d'Ulster et de Connaught, et avoir démontré aux habitans combien cette expédition dont ils attendaient peut-être leur prétendue émancipation, est funeste dans ses résultats pour un pays pauvre et à peine en état de nourrir miserablement ses propres habitans. L'ennemi sera encore heureux si l'armée et la marine Anglaise lui laissent le tems de se rembarquer. Plus il s'éloignera de son point de descente plus ce danger augmentera. Plus il séjournera dans le pays, plus son nombre diminuera par les maladies, le fer, et la famine. Tel est le sort qui attend une armée étrangère en Irlande, si on lui oppose un plan méthodique, arrangé d'avance, et suivi avec constance et sang-froid.

La défensive au Sud du Shannon jusqu'à Baltimore se réduit à un seul point: c'est Killarney qui commande les Bayes de Tralee, de Dingle, Kenmare, Bantry, et Dunmanus. Si malgré toutes les oppositions des deux stations navales de Cork et Valentia, et des deux divisions réunies de Cork et de Limerick, l'ennemi force la descente dans l'une de ces Bayes, le point de rassemblement de l'armée sera à Killarney, où se réuniront les cinq divisions qui arriveront par échelons; d'abord celles de Cork, Limerick, et Athlone, dont les deux premières seront arrivées en vingt-quatre heures, et dont la troisième ne mettra pas plus de trois jours à faire ce chemin. Celle d'Inniskillen la suivra, laissant une brigade dans la province de Connaught, et une dans Limerick. Celle de Dublin arrivera la dernière prenant la route d'Athlone, ou celle de Cork, suivant la direction que lui donnera le Général en Chef.

Si l'ennemi à descendu à Bantry ou à Kenmare, notre armée prendra la position des Shehy Mountains, sans dégarnir entièrement la position de Killarney. Si l'ennemi est descendu dans une des Bayes plus au Nord, la position de Killarney deviendra la principale, pour couvrir Limerick, en continuant à occuper

les Shehy Mountains avec la division de Cork. On rendra facilement ces deux positions inexpugnable, et l'ennemi ne pourra pas passer entre deux. Ainsi il ne lui restera que la ressource de se rembarquer, après avoir épuisé ses vivres dans un pays, sans habitans, sans chemins, et sans subsistances.

Il faut surtout, d'après l'exemple des malheurs que se sont attirés les Autrichiens, les Prussiens, et les Russes, éviter les batailles: c'est l'unique ressource de l'ennemi descendu. La tactique Française deviendra inutile dans ces montagnes: ils ne pourront ni manœuvrer, ni se développer. Tout l'avantage dans les attaques et les défenses de postes sera en faveur des Anglais, dont la valeur froide arrêtera l'impetuosité Française à chaque pas, sans craindre d'être tournés par les flancs; parceque l'ennemi sera toujours renfermé dans un angle rentrant dont les deux lignes laterales le harcéleront, pendant que celle du front résistera à ses attaques. Tel est le système de guerre que j'ai développé dans onze mémoires que j'ai donnés en 1803 1804 sur la défense des côtes de l'Angleterre, l'Ecosse, et l'Irlande.

Si après l'avoir mûrement examiné, après l'avoir fait discuter à fonds par les Généraux les plus habiles, le Gouvernement adopte ce Mémoire militaire sur l'Irlande, en tout ou en partie, il doit être distribué sans delai aux trois départemens qui doivent le plus concourir à son exécution.

Le département de la Marine doit le plutôt possible arranger la disposition, le nombre, et l'éspèce des bâtimens de guerre qui doivent composer les quatre stations de Cork, Valentia, Rathlin, et Dublin. Le département de la Guerre doit ordonner dès à présent la construction des deux forts et des barraques dans l'isle de Valentia, et le rétablissement des fortifications de Galway; car on ne peut pas attendre le moment de l'invasion pour faire ces travaux. Il doit faire d'avance le choix du Général en Chef, arranger la disposition, le nombre, l'éspèce des troupes qui doivent composer l'armée d'Irlande: il doit les

placer, dès qu'on apprendra avec certitude les préparatifs de l'Armada, pour que les Généraux et les troupes connaissent leur terrain et leur besogne. Il doit arranger d'avance tous les details de l'artillerie, des subsistances, des hôpitaux, de l'armement, &c.

Le département civil d'Irelande doit envoyer d'avance une Instruction au Viceroi sur les routes et les communications, sur tout ce qui est relatif à ce grand établissement de guerre, sur les rapports mutuels entre lui et le Général en Chef, leur union étant très nécessaire.

On trouvera peut-être extraordinaire que je porte à quatre-vingt mille hommes le nombre des troupes que me parait exiger la défense de l'Irlande. Qu'on pèse bien l'étendue de cette isle, le mauvais esprit d'une grande partie de ses habitans, le nombre des points de descente, la distribution que j'ai donnée des cinq divisions de l'armée d'après les règles de l'Art—on sera convaincu qu'il n'y a pas mille hommes de trop, puisque si on sauve Irlande, on sauve l'Angleterre, et que si elle est envahie et révolutionnisée, l'Empire Britannique est perdu, et nous tomberons comme le Continent, dans l'esclavage de Buonaparte.

The Right Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh.

Foreign Office, January 4, 1808.

Mr. Canning presents his compliments to Lord Castlereagh, and has the honour to transmit to his lordship a letter which he has just received from Mr. Dunlop, of Glasgow.

Mr. James Dunlop to the Right Hon. G. Canning.

Glasgow, January 1, 1808.

Sir—As I consider that matters with the American Government are approaching nearly a crisis, and being of opinion that the issue will be our going to war with that country, I judge it my duty to say that my letters of the 21st of November, written

that day at Quebec, and received by me here yesterday, state that the health of General Sir James H. Craig remained in a very precarious situation; that he had quitted the Chateau, and gone to the Upper Town of Quebec, to a situation not so bleak; and that many gentlemen feared much he might never get the better of his complaints, which I understand are that of the liver and dropsy. Should any misfortune happen to him, I know Lieutenant-Colonel Brock, of the 49th Regiment, intimately, and that he is as brave a soldier as ever wore a sword, and a sensible, discreet gentleman, who is much respected by all the Canadians—the British of course are highly attached to him. Notwithstanding all this, in the event of the death of General Craig, it might be proper that an officer of superior rank to Lieutenant-Colonel Brock should be with the troops. At any rate, it will be highly necessary that there should be immediately a Governor-General in the country. The Government, during President Dunn's administration, was not of that efficient nature as is proper in a country where war may exist. Mr. Dunn is one of the best men in the world, but is now rather, indeed a great deal, superannuated.

I am, with the highest respect, &c., JAMES DUNLOP.

The Right Hon. G. Canning to Lord Castlereagh.

Stanhope Street, January 4, 1808, 5 P.M.

Dear Castlereagh—I deferred answering your letter from Brighton, in expectation of your return to town, and am very sorry that I missed you when I called in St. James's Square this morning. I would have made another attempt to find you at your Office, but that I was obliged to come home by three o'clock, to meet General Miranda, who, in your absence, had desired an interview with me. He has just left me; but, as he expects to see you to-morrow, I need not trouble you with what you will hear from him, or indeed, I believe, have already heard from him by letter. His representations are certainly very inviting.

I hope I have prevailed upon Sir Arthur Paget to undertake Sicily. If so, he is, I think, by much the best person that could be found, both for objects purely Sicilian, and for the management of whatever may arise relating to Eastern concerns and to Turkey, with the affairs of which country he has at least the most recent acquaintance. I confess I rate Corfu much higher than you seem disposed to do; but I shall be very glad to hear your opinion more fully upon that subject.

I shall be very glad also to co-operate in putting into train a Persian mission or two, in addition to Sir H. Jones's, which, as you know, was not matter of my choice, but of inheritance, and which I have all along thought inadequate to its object.

I enclose a copy of Stahremberg's note, the proposed answer to which I shall submit to the Cabinet to-morrow. It is drawn, but the only (legible) copy is with the Duke of Portland.

Yours sincerely, GEORGE CANNING.

The Duke of Portland to Lord Castlereagh.

Bulstrode, Monday, January 4, 1808.

My dear Lord Castlereagh—I am much obliged to you for the communication of the letters you have written to Lord Chatham and Canning, to whom I am very happy you have opened your sentiments so fully. The state of the troops, I should say fleet as well as army, under the command of Sir Charles Cotton and General Spencer, is certainly very alarming; but that which you represent the army to be placed in by Windham's regulations is so much more so, and of a nature and extent so difficult to be brought within reasonable bounds, as to render the fate of that expedition a consideration of very secondary magnitude; at the same time, the danger with which the country is threatened by means of those regulations is too great not to be met, and (rash as it may be for a person so little able as myself to suggest any means of obviating it, to hazard an opinion) with a determination to get the better of

it, or to perish in the attempt. For, if I see it rightly, unless it is got the better of, and that *speedily*, it must be the infallible ruin and the annihilation of this country.

However disposed you might be to indulge us with a longer recess, intimations which Canning has received from Stahremberg, and the conversations and notes which have passed between them, make it impossible to defer the meeting of the Cabinet. I therefore consider the summons for a meeting to-morrow as coming from Canning, and not from your lordship, and I shall come to town accordingly, with an intention of fixing my residence there.

Believe me ever, my dear Lord, most faithfully yours,

PORTLAND.

STATE OF THE ARMY.

Comparison of the effective Rank and File on the formation of the Government and at present.

[February 1, 1808.]

	Regulars.	Militia.	Total.
March 1, 1807 .	181,856	77,211	259,067
February 1, 1808 .	204,815	77,164	281,979
Increase .	22,959		22,912

Exclusive of the number of Militia above-stated, from 7 to 10,000 men have been enrolled in their respective counties; but, not having joined at head-quarters, do not appear in the returns.

About 4,000 men more may be expected to be obtained between this and the month of August from the Militia, for general service; after furnishing which supply, the probable effective strength of the Militia may be taken at 90,000, rank and file, upon the expiration of the six months allowed for completing the present levy, viz., the 28th of April next; making the gross effective strength of the army, including 11,120 Artillery, 310,000 rank and file.

The distribution and composition of this army will be as follows:—

Total force, including Artillery, about . .		310,000
On Foreign Service, including Major-General Spencer's and Sir George Prevost's corps .		93,134
For Home Defence and disposable . . .		216,866
Of which, Regulars . . .	126,866	
Militia	90,000	
	216,866	

With a view to any offensive operations his Majesty's servants may see occasion to recommend, Lord Castlereagh has made arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief for brigading and cantoning near the most considerable points of embarkation, viz., Cork, Portsmouth, the Downs, and Harwich, 30,000 infantry, of which 10,000 have been selected with a view to more distant operations, and the remainder to services which may be considered as not separating them altogether from the system of Home Defence.

Since the return of the transports from the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and South America, a considerable proportion have been discharged, particularly of the cavalry transports. After appropriating the requisite tonnage to receive the troops sent on service under Generals Spencer and Prevost, the transports remaining in the service at home have been progressively refitted, while the monthly hire has, upon the whole, been reduced from 15 to 20 per cent.

Under a full experience of the delay and difficulty attendant upon taking up any large supply of transports, when immediately wanted for service, Lord Castlereagh has not deemed it prudent to proceed to any decisive reduction of the infantry tonnage, till the Cabinet shall have considered and determined upon the military system to be pursued in the course of the ensuing campaign. Lord Castlereagh is desirous of bringing this important subject under the early consideration of his colleagues.

In the mean time, he has the satisfaction to acquaint them that he does not, under the existing arrangements, foresee that there will be any difficulty in executing, with promptitude and effect, any service which it may be deemed prudent to undertake.

He has only further to remark, that the present army exceeds very largely in amount the force which this country has, at any former time, possessed, and that the composition of the Regular army, particularly of the infantry, has been so much improved by the late drafts from the Militia, that the respective battalions average about 700 rank and file each. The force at home, including the new Militia levies, will exceed, by nearly 25,000 men, the greatest amount of force which has hitherto been stationed in Great Britain and Ireland for its Home Defence.

Should events lead to the making a detachment of 10,000 men on distant operations, the scale of our Home Defence will still remain very largely provided for; nor is there any reason to apprehend that, out of an army of not less than 200,000 men, so stationed at home, a very considerable force may not be safely employed in offensive operations, provided the points of attack shall not be so distant as to preclude the return of such force in time to meet any attempts the enemy may direct against our internal safety.

Extract of a Letter from David Boyle, Esq., M.P., to Lord Melville.[1]

15, Charles Street, Berkeley Square, March 19, 1808.

My dear Lord—Subsequent to my return for Ayrshire, in June last, I had occasion to mention to your lordship an application on behalf of Mr. John Kelso, son of Colonel Kelso, of Dankeith.

[1] Forwarded by his lordship to Lord Castlereagh, with a letter, dated March 28, 1808.

Mr. John Kelso, who is about twenty-two years of age, after receiving a good education, a few years ago went out to India, to his uncle, who is settled at Calcutta as a merchant, but without having obtained any appointment or leave from the Company. The climate having disagreed with his health, he took a voyage to Prince of Wales's Island, but was unfortunately captured by the French, and carried to the Isle of France. During his confinement there, he directed his attention to the state and condition of that and the neighbouring island; and, from a laudable zeal for the interests of his country, he afterwards committed his observations to writing, which he lately sent to this country, with the view of their being submitted to the consideration of Government. These observations I lately had the honour of transmitting to your lordship, and was happy to find that they were considered as doing Mr. Kelso great credit, considering his age and the difficulties he must have encountered in his inquiries. I have again taken the liberty of transmitting them to your lordship, as the best evidence of Mr. Kelso's talents and industry being not undeserving of attention.

The climate of India not agreeing with his constitution, his father and other friends are anxious that he should be appointed to some respectable situation at the Cape of Good Hope, which I most earnestly request, through your lordship's interest with Lord Castlereagh; and if such an appointment can be obtained from his lordship, I can venture to assert that the fullest reliance may be placed upon Mr. Kelso's zeal, fidelity, and integrity.

I shall only add that, from what I know of Colonel Kelso's character, he is not likely soon to forget any favour he may receive.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

DAVID BOYLE.

Mr. John Kelso to David Cathcart, Esq.

Calcutta, March 20, 1808.

Sir—Having lately visited the Island of Bourbon, or, as it is now denominated, La Réunion, being carried there by the Semillante, French national frigate, I beg leave to state, for your information and that of your friends, the substance of a few observations and reflections I made when resident there, and subsequent to my leaving that valuable island.

Conceiving that the subject is of such importance as to require a detailed account of every particular relative to the Colony, I beg leave to commence my remarks by acquainting you with its local situation, extent, productions, climate, commerce, manners and customs of the inhabitants, together with the resources and advantages pertaining to it. As the interests of this island are intimately connected with those of its neighbour, the Mauritius, or Isle of France, I shall have occasion to introduce a few hints respecting that island also in the course of my letter, which, I flatter myself, will not be altogether uninteresting.

Bourbon, or La Réunion, is situated in about South latitude 20° 52′, longitude 55° 30′ East of Greenwich, and at the distance of about two degrees from the Isle of France. It is about 150 miles in circumference, of an oval form, cultivated from the sea almost (in some places) to the summit of the mountains, which in general are very high, and clothed with various kinds of wood. As nearly as I can calculate, there may be 250 square miles of land capable of cultivation, and of the utmost variety of soil, fit to produce almost every article in the world, to an enumeration of which I now beg leave to call your attention.

The Island of Bourbon produces coffee in great abundance and of superior quality, cotton, cinnamon, cloves, and nutmegs, plentifully, every kind of grain, gums, resins, benzoin, &c., vegetables and fruit of every species in the utmost luxuriance, both European and Oriental; and, what is of still greater con-

sequence, the soil and climate afford two crops of most articles in the year. Although rice is not produced in great abundance by any means, yet that objection is easily obviated by its vicinity to the island of Madagascar, where rice is procurable with the greatest facility, and at a moderate expense.

In addition to the fertility of the soil, the climate is also peculiarly favourable, being in general of the mildest though various temperature. From the greatest degree of heat in India to the frigid temperature of Iceland, you can experience in Bourbon; and, to confirm this, I might relate many circumstances mentioned to me by very respectable people in the island, which surprised me extremely. This, however, I deem unnecessary on the present occasion.

On the subject of commerce, which comes next to be considered, I shall not occupy your attention long, having so minutely stated the productions of the Colony, from which a sufficient estimate of its commercial resources may be formed. The Americans, Danes, and Portuguese, particularly the former, avail themselves chiefly of an exclusive trade; but the inhabitants, who well know how to appreciate the value of the different commodities in their possession, naturally reap the most benefit. Besides their foreign connexions in trade, the inhabitants of both Colonies—Bourbon and Isle of France—have constant transactions with each other, bartering the produce of one island for that of the other. In stating this particular, I would merely notice that the Isle of France furnishes indigo, sugar, arrack, equal, if not superior, to that of Batavia; very fine ebony, and, with care and attention, cochineal might also be reared, independent of the fly which is said to destroy it. These valuable articles are given in exchange for the rich produce of Bourbon. Though these four commodities are the chief commercial productions of this land, yet the Isle of France yields most of the common produce of Bourbon, as cattle, grain, vegetables, and fruits, though not in such great abundance.

The mercantile interest of the two islands maintain constant communications with the fruitful island of Madagascar, by which they profit considerably. What might the British expect, were they to form connexions with the natives, when they permit the French, with all their principles and prejudices, to benefit by them! Those principles of equalization, and at the same time universal submission to the will and power of the strongest, which, though apparently paradoxical, seem to characterize the French nation at the present era, prevail, to a certain degree, among the Creoles of Bourbon and the Isle of France; but there are various parties in the community, all impressed with different ideas relative to their situation as connected with the mother country; and from what I could generally perceive, a strong sense of the severity approaching tyranny of the Emperor's present mode of government and general proceedings chiefly and forcibly prevailed. Many of them could not help expressing astonishment, and at the same time admiration at the mildness of the British Government, and the lenity of its measures. Their knowledge of the world is more extended and their research greater than you could expect to find among a class of people who have scarcely ever quitted the islands farther than the boundaries of their Indian trade require, and of these even who have had the opportunity of traversing the ocean, and of making inquiries, the number is but few, and not of the first rank and consequent education in the Colonies.

As the French are in general, so are the Creoles, of a lively, communicative, engaging disposition: they are commonly happy among themselves, and perfectly (as they imagine) secure.

I certainly have every reason to believe that the opinion they entertain of the British, and their feelings towards them, are more favourable and pacific than people are generally aware of: but on this subject I shall again touch in its proper place. They are not of a laborious turn of mind by any means, and,

like the natives of India, are content to do merely as much business as is necessary to support themselves moderately, without aspiring to riches or luxury. So far, perhaps, they are in the right, when you consider that their universal principle is to spend every hour that can possibly be afforded in mirth and amusement of every nature you can conceive.

Having, therefore, discussed, as far as necessary, the general and natural advantages of the two islands, La Réunion and Isle de France, more particularly, however, confining my observations to the former than to the latter, being, in my opinion, a much more valuable colony, I next proceed to offer a plan for the reduction of both islands, at the same time taking particular notice of their present military force as well as natural strength.

Both islands are very high, elevated, I imagine, from 12 to 14,000 feet above the level of the sea; but, of the two, the Isle of France is the highest. Both, likewise, present a very bold shore, very strongly fortified by nature in most positions. Of this advantage, however, the French do not appear to be sufficiently sensible; for, although a train of batteries extend along the coast of both islands, yet they are not so numerous as the defence of the islands might require. Neither are they strong, nor their situations well chosen, for the defence of the island against an enemy—I allude particularly to Bourbon. These circumstances were remarked not only by me, but also by several prisoners then on the island, who were more competent to judge than (from inexperience) I could possibly be. Of this the Government of the island do not appear to be aware, supposing I am convinced that any hostile attempt is foreign to the intentions of the British Government or that of the Honourable Company.

The military establishment which they conceive equal to the defence of the island consists, in the Isle of France, of about 2,000 European regular troops, infantry and cavalry. I am sorry not to be able to state exactly the number of each,

but, as nearly as I could learn, the cavalry amounted to 500 men, rank and file, all mounted chiefly on Arabs pillaged chiefly out of English or Arab merchant ships, legal and illegal prizes to their squadron. Besides this force, they form a kind of *armée en masse*, of Creoles, ill disciplined, many (I am convinced) ill affected to the cause,[1] and widely scattered with their families over the island. This I had an opportunity of witnessing in the Island of Bourbon, and am creditably assured the same system is adopted in the Isle of France.

This feeble force, therefore, including regulars and irregulars, is the principal safety on which the two colonies depend — 500 European infantry, whom they are pleased to denominate Veterans, (having served with Moreau's army in Italy) together with a small, scattered army of Creoles, exactly similar to those described in the Isle of France, compose the safeguard of Bourbon. On this island they have no cavalry, at which I was astonished, as the breed of horses, though small, seem powerful and well adapted for the island.[2]

You may then easily judge how simple a matter it would be for 4,000 European infantry, even without cavalry, or 2,000 European infantry and 3,000 Sepoys, to reduce both islands. The attack would require, however, to be made on both islands at the same moment, so as not to allow an opportunity to one or other of them to collect their force into one position, which might be attended with inconvenience and more trouble.

A squadron of three ships of the line and four frigates,

[1] These men know very well that, were they to go and encounter the enemy, in the event of an attack, many of them must inevitably lose their lives. "And why," say they, "should I risk my own life in defence of my greatest enemy, my own Government? and not only that, but with the conviction that, should I be spared to return home, I must support the horrible spectacle of my murdered family and the total loss of my property, of which valuable concerns my own negroes will deprive me in my absence."

[2] They are generally of a mixed breed, between an Arab and either a native or Madagascar mare.

accompanied by a proper proportion of transports, would be perfectly sufficient, I should certainly conceive, to attend the troops on this expedition; for convinced am I that one ship of the line and two frigates are fully equivalent to silence the batteries of St. Denis and St. Paul, in the Island of Bourbon, and the remainder of the squadron would make an easy prey of the Isle of France.

The manner in which our ships ought to approach the islands should be well considered. I would propose that, as soon as the fleet brought the high land of both islands in sight from the deck, they should immediately take in every sail, and lie-to till they are perfectly satisfied they shall be able to get close in shore at daybreak next morning, when, the boats being all prepared, the troops may be instantly landed and operations commenced, thus taking the inhabitants asleep, and, consequently, preventing an effusion of blood on both sides. The policy of this mode, then, I have no doubt, appears to you pretty evident; but there is still another, and, perhaps, less expensive plan of getting possession of these valuable colonies, to which I beg your attention for a few moments.

Could five or six of the fastest sailing frigates in our navy (such as the Revolutionnaire, the Africaine, the Egyptienne) be spared from their respective stations, to cruise off the two islands in question for the space of six months, they would absolutely starve the inhabitants of these colonies into submission, by preventing them from obtaining rice and other indispensable articles of provision from the island of Madagascar and the mainland of Africa, and from any other quarter whatever within the limits of their trade. Besides, they would ere long capture or drive away the three frigates, Cannonier, Piedmontaise,[1] and Semillante, which compose their present squadron in India, as also two or three corsaires, or privateers, which

[1] This ship, for the first and as yet only cruise, pillaged from the British commerce and that of the Arabs 40 lacs of rupees in less than four months, with which booty she has gone to the Isle of France.

are all now remaining of that pillaging fleet, which has infested the Indian seas for some years back, and on which the Government of the colonies depend very much for support, being seldom furnished with supplies of cash or any thing else from the bounty of their Emperor. This is not all: for every communication between the two islands would be entirely cut off, and the trade which is carried on between them totally annihilated. Americans, or even Danes, who chiefly resort to these islands, could not supply the absolute want of provision, it being contrary to their treaty with England to trade from one enemy's port to another in India, and it would be impossible to supply the deficiency from America or Europe in due time. Were a longer cruise necessary, and the squadron, consequently, in want of provisions and water, there are several small islands in the immediate neighbourhood of both islands, from which supplies of excellent fish and water, nay, even a few vegetables, are procurable.[1]

These supplies might be easily obtained by employing small vessels of 40, 50, or 60 tons burden, at very little expense, so as not to make it necessary for any of the frigates to quit the station, which might be taken advantage of by the enemy. The inestimable advantage arising from having fresh provisions and water in the immediate vicinity of the islands would likewise be felt in the event of these islands falling into our hands, and a squadron, of course, employed for their immediate defence.

This, though perhaps a less expensive manner of subduing the colonies of Bourbon (I call this island Bourbon, being better distinguished by its ancient name) and Isle of France, might not be considered so speedy or so humane a plan of execution; and, for my own part, I am of opinion that, as troops would

[1] This is consistent with my own knowledge and experience, having been detained prisoner on board the Semillante at one of them, called Cargadores, distant about four degrees from the Isle of France, for above a month, and fed the whole time on the excellent fish, &c., procured there, and which abundantly supplied the crews of all the ships (prizes) in company with us regularly every day.

require to be sent to protect the islands after their reduction, occasioning, of course, a certain degree of expense, that the most effective plan of the two would be the former manner of attack.

Suppose, then, that our most sanguine expectations are fulfilled, and that both colonies surrender to the British arms, private property religiously respected, and the mildest and most soothing language and measures made use of towards the inhabitants, in the first instance, to attract and confirm their most favourable opinion of British Government, I trust you will not consider it presumption on my part, and at my time of life, to offer a few ideas on the subject of a Government fit to be established there, and requisite to profit and benefit by the new colonies.

Should Great Britain entertain similar ideas as to the value and support these colonies might be of to her interests in India, and pursue any part of the plan I have had the audacity to point out, a form of Government, similar in some degree to that established by the Honourable Company at Prince of Wales's Island, but on a much less expensive footing, and considerably circumscribed in the number of public servants, might, with care and assiduity, manage the affairs of both islands with honour and merit to themselves, and with great advantage and security to the mother country. On whatever island it was resolved the Government Council should reside, deputies from it must, of course, be established in the other, subject in every respect to the power and control of Government.

The civil establishment having, therefore, been arranged, and every one acquainted with the nature and power of his particular situation, that of the military comes next to be considered, which, aided by the prodigious natural strength of the island, does not require to be of great magnitude. The strongest positions for batteries and fortifications which may be required having been taken, and these put into a strong, serviceable situation, with every necessary line of communication formed for the general co-operation of the whole, in case

of attack or danger of any kind, I think I may safely declare that one complete regiment of European infantry, a small detachment of artillery, and a trifling body of well disciplined native militia, consisting of infantry and cavalry, would be a force sufficiently powerful for the defence of both islands, together with the assistance they would, on all occasions, receive from the squadron attached to the station. The idea of raising a Militia on the islands from among the inhabitants may perhaps stagger you, but it need not; for well assured am I that the feelings of the Creoles are so totally estranged from the Napoleon principle of Government, and so sensible are they of the mildness and freedom of ours, that they only require an opening to embrace our cause with the utmost cordiality.

To them—I mean the inhabitants—and likewise to every individual, with the exception of the Governor, Council, and Military, every freedom and encouragement to trade should be given, from which I purpose the total expenses of the island to be paid. I am so thoroughly sensible of the vast commercial resources of the islands of Bourbon and Isle of France, that the revenues arising from various and moderate imposts to be levied on all articles of trade exported and imported, together with a trifling land-tax, and a few other exactions, will be sufficiently adequate to the expense of holding the islands, besides affording pecuniary advantage to the mother country, which advantage might be more than equal to the support of a strong squadron, for the maritime protection of the colonies, as well as that part of the Indian seas.

But the possession of these islands involves another consideration of still greater importance to the British interests in India, and one which is of such weight that it ought not to be neglected.

The Emperor Napoleon, having adjusted, or nearly so, all his matters of dispute on the Continent, begins now, depend upon it, again to turn his thoughts towards India. He has been already completely frustrated in his attempt to visit our immense territory in India by land, but he certainly has not lost sight of an

expedition by sea, through the medium of the Island of Bourbon and Isle of France; and of this I have good reason to believe General Decaen (Governor of both islands) has been apprized. If you reflect on this plan of getting a footing in India, you must immediately see that it would be the wisest and the most likely to be attended with success of any scheme he could possibly form.

The difficulties and dangers he would have to encounter in a second attempt to reach India by land, constantly encroaching on the territory of others, and provoking their resentment, deter him from attempting that mode, independent of the rapidity by which Great Britain could check his first proceeding, having the complete command in the Mediterranean, and the utmost facility of every necessary information. But how easily could he fit out an expedition, consisting of 8 or 10,000 men, and send them direct to these islands, and afterwards, holding them in readiness, take the first opportunity of transporting them to the coast of Malabar, on the first appearance of an insurrection among the natives of India, intelligence of which he could easily procure by means of his emissaries, who would not fail to take every step to delude and poison the minds of the natives, by promises of freedom, plunder, and protection; and, if we are to judge from what has already taken place, that might be no difficult undertaking.

It is true the expedition might meet with some interruptions in its progress from Europe to the islands; but it is equally fair to conjecture that it might not; and, should they be so fortunate as to reach the termination of their first voyage without molestation, surely no obstacle in this country would prevent the continuation of it; for this reason, that seldom or never have we a squadron together, of the force fit to combat an enemy's fleet of the strength it would require for the conveyance and protection of the troops.

This subject, then, is, or, I presume, ought to be, of no immaterial consequence to Great Britain and the Honourable

Company; for the total expulsion of such an enemy as the French nation from the vicinity of the most valuable territory in the world, which the possession of the islands of Bourbon and Isle of France would have the effect to produce, I should imagine, would be no unimportant consideration to them.

These islands would no doubt have considerable influence, and be a valuable gift in our possession, in the event of our treating in an amicable manner with the present enemy of our country, which, likewise, should be recollected. Happy should I be to contribute my feeble assistance to such an undertaking, and as proud as I am confident of its success.

I have the honour to be, sir,

Your most obedient servant, JOHN KELSO.

N.B. On the Ile de la Réunion there are about 230 square miles at present in cultivation. A square mile contains 625 French arpents. An arpent is 200 feet square, and contains, of course, 40,000 square feet. Two hundred square miles of arable ground contain 125,000 arpents: an arpent will produce in coffee, on an average, 2,000lb a year from 1,000 trees. An arpentwill produce in cloves, from 400 trees, about 1,200lb per annum. An arpent will produce in cotton about 350lb, well cleaned and free of seed. An arpent only requires one negro for the cultivation of that quantity of ground.

Petion, President of Hayti, to Mr. Canning.

LIBERTÉ. ÉGALITÉ.

REPUBLIQUE D'HAYTI.

Au Port-au-Prince, le 6me Avril, 1808.

An 5ème de l'indépendance.

ALEXANDRE PETION, PRÉSIDENT D'HAYTI,

À SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR CANNING,

Secrétaire d'État en Angleterre, au Département des relations extérieures.

Monsieur—Cette Lettre que j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser vous sera remise par Monsieur Théodat Trichet qui se rend

en Angleterre. Ses principes et ses mœurs m'etant parfaitement connus, j'espère qu'il obtiendra votre bienveillance, et votre estime. Il est muni des pouvoirs nécessaires pour agir dans toutes les affaires qui pourront intéresser le Gouvernement d'Hayti. Il vous fera connoître notre véritable situation, et vous mettra à même de juger par les faits combien sont fausses certaines assertions répandues en Angleterre par les agents de Christophe, à quelle portion de territoire, à quel nombre de partisans il se trouve réduit.

Si Monsieur Trichet peut réussir dans sa mission, la guerre que Christophe a suscitée sera de suite terminée. Alors l'humanité cessera de souffrir, nos relations avec la Grande Bretagne s'affermiront, et le commerce prendra un cours plus sûr, plus régulier, et plus étendu.

J'ai l'honneur d'être parfaitement,

Monsieur, votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

PETION.

Par le Président. Le Secrétaire Général, BNO BLANCHET.

Sir Arthur Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Dublin Castle, June 29, 1808.

My dear Lord—I received a letter, of which I enclose a copy, from Colonel Gordon, last night, and I have written to him this day to tell him that Handfield and I are of opinion that the drivers of the Commissariat will not embark without their officers; and that, if I should find that the Duke of York continues to think that the officers ought not to go, I shall direct that the attestations for general service of those men who do not choose to embark may be destroyed. In that case, I hope that Lord Chatham[1] will have no objection to allow the former drivers to be removed to the transports in which the horses will be embarked.

There is no doubt that, in case the troops should land, these drivers would be highly useful, and that their utility would be

[1] *Master*-General of the Ordnance.—EDITOR.

much increased by the superintendence of their officers; most particularly would they take better care of their horses, if their officers were with them, than they would otherwise. In fact, they won't embark at all, unless the officers embark likewise.

While writing upon this subject, I wish to recall to your recollection that, in the first paper which I gave you upon the proposed service, I stated the necessity of having 300 drivers of the Commissariat. I did this from a knowledge of the use to be derived from persons of this description; that they are always wanted, and that their places are invariably supplied, and very ill supplied, by the use of the soldiers for the services which they would perform. I hope, therefore, that you will consider of the mode of supplying persons of this description.

I declare that I do not understand the principles on which our military establishments are formed, if, when large corps of troops are sent out to perform important and difficult services, they are not to have with them those means of equipment which they require and which the establishment can afford, such as horses to draw artillery, and drivers attached to the Commissariat, when these means are not wanted at home; and, what is more, considering the number of horses and drivers in England, all of whom the public could command in case of emergency, and who never can be wanted excepting for foreign service.

Ever, my dear lord, yours most sincerely,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Since writing the above, I have received your letter of the 26th instant, in which you approve of the suggestion which I had made respecting the drivers of the Commissariat; and also your letter of the 27th.

Sir A. Wellesley has been told that the officers were to embark with the men, and to send a return of the whole to me, when both officers, men, and horses, would, from the period

of such embarkation, be placed upon the establishment of the Royal Waggon Train. J. H. G.

Horse Guards, July 2, 1808.

[This explanation, written across a corner of the last page of the letter, is evidently appended by Colonel Gordon.]

His Royal Highness the Duke of York to Lord Castlereagh.

Stable Yard, July 25, 1808.

My dear Lord—I take the earliest opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's two letters of yesterday by a special messenger—the first marked *most secret*, desiring that the corps under orders at Cork may be augmented to 5,000 rank and file, and suggesting Sir David Baird being appointed to the command of them; the second, marked *most secret and confidential*, proposing that a force between 12 and 15,000 men should be, without delay, held in readiness to embark, with a view to an operation against Boulogne; of which force you mention the whole of the Guards, except one battalion to be left in London, composing a part.

With regard to the first letter, I will take care to order the three second battalions of the 23rd, 31st, and 81st, to be immediately moved towards Cork; all of whom, being now encamped upon the canals and in Dublin, will arrive at Cork in ten days from the time they receive the order; and, as Sir David Baird is an officer of great merit, I can see no difficulty, in compliance with your lordship's wishes, in recommending to his Majesty to order them upon this service: but I should not think that I fulfilled my duty, if I did not transmit to your lordship, upon this occasion, the copy of a letter which I received on Saturday from Lord Harrington, representing the want of regular force in Ireland.

In regard to your lordship's second letter, I transmit to you the list of every battalion in England above 500 men, which, with the two brigades of Guards, of 5,000 men, will make toge-

gether a force of only 10,000 rank and file (2nd battalion 4th, 2nd battalion 7th, 1st battalion 43rd, 2nd battalion 59th, 2nd battalion 87th, 1st battalion 88th, and 11 companies of the 95th), to which I must, however, add that the 1st battalion of the 43rd, which is but just recovering from the effects of the ophthalmia, and the 87th and 88th are at this moment considerably affected by it, which three battalions are the strongest of the whole of those of the line.

With respect to your lordship's suggestion of augmenting this force, by taking two out of the three battalions of Guards doing duty in London, I beg strongly to represent to your lordship, in the first place, that upon the strength of those three battalions are borne all the sick, all the recruits, and all the worn-out men of the whole brigade. These battalions, therefore, if ordered to march, and those men, of course, deducted from them, would be considerably weaker than your lordship can possibly be aware of; and, in the next place, the duty of London is such, that it would be totally impossible for the single battalion then remaining, with the addition of the men of the other two who would be thus left behind, to perform it; and, from the above statement, your lordship will yourself see how impossible it would be to find any other troops to assist them.

As I shall be anxious for an early opportunity of conferring with your lordship upon this most important subject, I will, if you have no objection, call upon you to-morrow at your house in St. James's Square, at twelve o'clock.

I am, my dear lord, ever yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

The Earl of Harrington, Commander of the Forces in Ireland, to his Royal Highness the Duke of York.

Camp, Curragh of Kildare, July 18, 1808.

Sir—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Royal Highness's letter of the 13th instant, and have given

the necessary orders for the march of the regiments therein mentioned.

Were the policy of collecting a large force in the south of Europe even less obvious, it is not within my province to argue on the general distribution of his Majesty's troops. It may not, however, I trust, be thought presumptuous that I should, on this occasion, call your Royal Highness's serious attention to the state of the military forces remaining in Ireland, and to the danger of leaving its internal, no less than external, defence in the hands of the Militia of the country, who, at a time when the minds of the lowest class of the people are agitated by discontents, and alienated from the common interests of the empire, may possibly, feeling themselves masters, throw the balance, when an opportunity offers, on the wrong side.

I have the honour, &c., HARRINGTON, General,
Commander of the Forces in Ireland.

Memorandum concerning the State of the Army.

BY H.R.H. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Horse Guards, August 1, 1808.

It may, I think, be stated, without fear of dispute, that the army of this country is, at the present moment, larger, more efficient, and more disposable, than at any former period of our history. Great and unusual exertions have been made to procure the men, and the circumstances of the war have allowed a sufficient time to discipline and form them; but these extraordinary measures are not often in our power, and cannot, in any case, be frequently resorted to: it becomes, therefore, a consideration of the utmost importance in what manner this force can be most effectually employed to the advantage and honour of the country and the King, in support and furtherance of the great cause in which we are engaged.

The weakness and apathy of all the powers on the Continent have rendered them incapable of opposing, or subser-

vient to the views of France; and it is this country alone from which any effectual opposition can be made against the inordinate ambition of the French ruler, and upon which the rest of Europe can alone depend for support and assistance in the restoration of civil government and the ancient order of things.

Prior to the disasters in 1806, we could always look forward with a reasonable hope, whenever the powers of the Continent were awakened to a sense of their true interests, and persuaded to unite together and oppose the ambitious views of France, that they would furnish a force sufficiently strong to cope with the common enemy, requiring little other than pecuniary aid from us.

Since, however, the unfortunate campaign of 1806, and the total subversion of the Prussian empire, and of the Germanic body, these resources no longer exist, nor are there any means now left in that quarter of providing such a body of troops as could cope with France, or sufficient time to enable the people of those countries, however zealously and loyally inclined, or however great their hatred of the yoke under which they are groaning, to come forward and unite in defence or support of the common cause.

The situation of Spain forms a new epoch. The recent events in that country evince a determination on the part of the people to resist the usurpation of the enemy to the last extremity, and to maintain at all risks the established laws and religion of their empire.

The Spaniards are the first people that have risen in one mass, and that have enthusiastically united in support of their own cause against the common enemy: they are the first nation upon the Continent that appear to have made their country's cause individually their own; and, actuated as they are by one national spirit and determined animosity against their invaders, there is no doubt really fair ground for hope of their success.

But, though we cannot but admire, we must not be misled

by the enthusiasm of these brave men, or expect them to perform impossibilities; and it becomes our duty, therefore, in our cordial endeavours to assist them to the utmost, to examine into the actual situation of the country where this convulsion took place, and to be guided in our plans of operation, which we may, on cool and mature reflection, judge most competent to ensure ultimate success, rather than risk misfortune by the hasty adoption of partial measures, which, either from eagerness or jealousy, may be strongly urged upon our attention.

At the commencement of the insurrection, Spain was deprived of the whole force of the kingdom. The troops that remained were the Guards, at Madrid, the garrisons in the different fortresses upon a low establishment, and the depôt battalions belonging to the regiments on service in the north of Europe and in the colonies. To these may be added the militia of the kingdom, a small part of which adjoining the principal seaports were only called out, and that very badly appointed and disciplined.

The troops of the enemy, in detached bodies, occupied most of the principal fortresses and posts of the empire, and measures were taken to augment this force to a more considerable extent; and the only advantage which Spain still possessed was that her population, not having suffered by the disasters common to the rest of the Continent, remained still entire. In this state of things, the utmost that could be reasonably expected from the most enthusiastic efforts of the people was that, by dint of numbers, some detached and scattered bodies of the enemy should be destroyed, and that, by this means, some of the provinces might be so cleared as to admit of a rapid formation of the peasantry, and an incorporation of them with the weak battalions of the line.

This appears to have been the real situation of the country at the period of our latest advices, and the formation of the levies to have been so ably and actively entered upon, as, in

the province of Andalusia alone, to have held in check a considerable division of the enemy, supposed to exceed 10,000 men. To these successes, as well as to their national jealousy against this country, may be attributed their present disinclination to receive any other support from us than ammunition, arms, and money, and the partial co-operation of small detached corps. The most sanguine, however, can scarcely yet venture to flatter himself, from any advantages already obtained by the patriots, that their final success can be considered as certain.

The greatest exertions will be made by the enemy to augment and direct his force to those points where the insurrection is most general, and where the leaders have most weight; convinced that, in crushing the principal, the lesser force will be easily disposed of afterwards.

We must, therefore, look to the possibility of a reverse, and of the patriots being under the necessity of calling upon us for more substantial aid; but, should we at this period unfortunately have given way to their prior wishes, of dividing and frittering away our force, we should no longer have it in our power to furnish that effectual support which their necessities would then require, which could alone, in my opinion, bring the contest to a favourable termination.

It is in this view, therefore, of the subject that it appears to me that we should be prepared to direct the whole force we are now capable of sending to some one given point, persuaded that the calls of the Spaniards will very shortly be loud and urgent, and that, by acting in one solid body, we shall not only use our own force to the greatest advantage, but shall afford them one firm point of *appui*, to which the whole kingdom may safely look, and upon which they should then be called upon to form, as the sole point of direction for the permanent re-establishment of their empire.

This position being admitted, and it is the only true one that suggests itself to my mind, I feel it an indispensable duty to the army and to the country to give my strongest opinion

against any partial employment or distribution of our force into detached commands, which will not only subject these auxiliary divisions to be commanded by and to follow the fortunes of the several provincial Generals, to whose corps they may be attached; but, as they would be thus acting, in defiance of every military principle, against a skilful and powerful enemy, I should greatly fear that no exertions on our part could prevent the contest ending in misfortune and defeat.

FREDERICK.

Sir Rupert George to Mr. Cooke.

Transport Office, August 17, 1808.

Dear Sir—The French, this war, have exchanged but fourteen persons of all descriptions. They have kept, and continue to keep, all non-combatants; not a boy, however young, is allowed to leave France, after once being in the power of Bonaparte. I think the only chance of getting Englishmen over, is to keep every Frenchman who is brought into this country, unless exchanged for an Englishman.

This is my opinion and the opinion of the Board, as well as of all the English prisoners in France. Our sending so many Frenchmen to France, without an Englishman being allowed to return, has encouraged Bonaparte to adopt the cruel system now acting upon by him, of dooming every British subject who falls into his power to imprisonment during the war.

I am, &c., RUPT. GEORGE.

The *Détenus* we have no connexion with; they never have reported to us, not being prisoners of war.

Right Hon. George Canning to Mr. Cooke.

Foreign Office, August 17, 1808, 5 P.M.

Dear Sir—I return Sir R. George's letter, with many thanks for the communication of it. I not only agree most entirely in every word of it, but I am very, *very* much inclined to wish that our reciprocity should be carried much farther, and that

we should treat *here* the French officers, our prisoners, precisely as ours are treated in France.

I am persuaded (as Sir Rupert George is) that no other system will ever produce a relaxation on the part of Buonaparte; and I think nothing can be more unjust to our prisoners in France, than to omit the employment of any means that may lead either to their release, or to the mitigation of their imprisonment. Yours very sincerely,

GEO. CANNING.

Have any *Détenus* been released by exchange? I wished to know this, that I may be enabled to answer correctly a letter which I have received from Lady Beverley, begging that Lord B. may be claimed in return for any French General who may fall into our hands. Certainly this must not be; but I can better answer her ladyship, if I can say that it never has been done yet.

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester.

Downing Street, September 8, 1808.

My dear Lord—The state in which the affairs of Spain have latterly been placed has discouraged me from taking any step upon the private letter with which your Grace honoured me some time since; foreseeing that, if that country continued successfully to maintain itself against France, the intercourse by licenses would be at an end, and consequently that, if the objections to raising the present rate of fees on those licenses could, in point of fact, be got over—to which the Board of Trade would, I have every reason to believe, very strongly object—the effect would, in truth, under the circumstances, be of no avail towards increasing the income of the Governor of Jamaica.

I assure your lordship I remain very strongly impressed with the inadequacy of the provision which at present exists for that important trust, which your Grace has charged yourself with. Unconnected with the emoluments of the Com-

mander-in-Chief, it appears to me quite inadequate to the situation; but, strongly as I feel this, unless the House of Assembly could be prevailed on to come forward, and, on public grounds, propose placing it on a footing with the Governments of the Cape and Ceylon, offering themselves to contribute in their accustomed proportion, I do not see how it is to be remedied in these times of retrenchment and inquiry.

I am persuaded your Grace will not infer, from the interval which has taken place since I first heard from you on this subject, that I have been unmindful of the object, or indifferent to its accomplishment. I certainly am, upon public grounds, deliberately impressed with its expediency, and I can assure your Grace that its rendering the station more suitable to your Grace would add largely to the satisfaction I should feel in seeing it accomplished. I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Abstract of the Disposable Force equipped for offensive operations, together with a statement of the Force that will remain applicable to purposes of defence at home and abroad.

September 15, 1808.

Services.	Infantry, Officers and Men.	Artillery, Officers and Men, including Drivers.	Cavalry, Officers and Men.	Total, Officers and Men.	Horses for Artillery and Cavalry.	Number of Transports	Tons.
Serving in Portugal	34,397	2,748	1,805	38,950	2,917	393	99,385
Under orders to embark	12,550	1,027	3,100	16,667	4,238	207	49,330
Total Force disposable from home	46,947	3,775	4,905	55,627	7,155	600	148,715
Disposable in Mediterranean	10,000	800	258	11,058	258	36	18,615
Ditto, at Halifax	4,400	400	——	4,400	——	23	7,385
Total British Force equipped	60,947	4,975	5,163	71,085	7,413	659	174,715
Spaniards from Baltic	10,000	——	——	10,000	——	41	11,841
	70,947	4,975	5,163 A.	81,085 B.	7,413	700 C.	186,556

A. The number of cavalry may be increased, upon the return of the horse transports.

B. Every corps proceeding on service, exclusive of ten weeks' provisions in their transports, is accompanied by victuallers with supplies for three months, and three months' provisions for 20,000 men are embarked and kept as a depôt at home, from which any loss can be immediately replaced. A large provision of forage has also been made to accompany the cavalry.

C. Exclusive of the 700 sail of transports employed in this equipment, there are 273 sail employed in various other services, making the total transport establishment 973 sail, and 241,058 tons.

After appropriating for offensive operations the above force of 71,085 men, (officers included) being about 63,187, rank and file, there will remain for purposes of defence in rank and file as follows, including artillery:

	Regulars.	Militia.	Total.
Serving abroad in Colonies, including East Indies and Sicily	83,167		83,167
Serving at home . . .	81,213	85,395	166,608
Total defensive force . .	164,380	85,395	249,775
Total offensive force . .	63,187		63,187
Total, army, rank and file .	227,567	85,395	312,962

Lord Castlereagh to Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon.

Stanmore, Sunday, November 20, 1808.

Dear Gordon—I propose paying my duty to the Duke on Tuesday: in the mean time, I should be obliged to you to look at the effective strength of our regiments serving in Spain and Portugal, in order to see what their deficiencies are, and

how far their second battalions afford the means of raising them to their full establishments.

The arrangements now in progress with respect to shoes promise a supply of not less than 700,000 pair within the year: but the produce will be inadequate at the outset for our own wants, and afford no means of aiding the Spaniards. I have some notion the half-yearly delivery of shoes to the army at home is about soon to take place. If this supply could be laid hold of, and the delivery postponed to the Regulars and Militia at home, for six weeks or two months, till our contractors could replace the shoes so given up, it might give us the immediate use of from 50 to 100,000 pair: this, with the 50,000 embarked, would place the army in Spain beyond the reach of want. Turn this in your mind.

Not to accumulate too much at Falmouth, I mean, on Tuesday, to propose to the Duke to embark one of the heavy regiments from Canterbury at Portsmouth.

Burrard, in his letter received yesterday, reports that five brigades of artillery remain in Portugal, but without horses—300 artillery horses are now embarking at Portsmouth, exclusive of horse-artillery, possibly for two of these brigades: but, if so, and they are meant for service in Spain, would it not be right to order the brigades round, to meet their horses at Corunna? May be, you will bring this subject under his Royal Highness's consideration.

Sir John Moore's despatches have, by some accident, been left behind, so that I am as yet unapprized of the detail of his arrangements or the extent of his wants. Have you received any information?

If I recollect right, it was the 1st battalions of the 48th and 61st, that the Duke proposed to relieve at Gibraltar by the 2nd battalions of the 23rd and 31st from Portugal.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Abstract of the Effective Strength and Establishment of the British Army on the 1st of November, 1808, *specifying also the Establishment and Number which would be wanting to complete the British numbered Regiments, at an Establishment of* 100 *Rank and File per Troop or Company.*

Adjutant-General's Office, December 8, 1808.

	Effectives.	Present Establishment.	Establishment at 100 Rank and File per Troop or Company.	Wanting to complete the Establishment to 100 Rank and File per Troop or Company.
CAVALRY.				
British	24,246	25,916	32,000	8,627
German	2,948	3,040		
Ceylonese	35			
	27,229	28,956		
Foot Guards . . .	8,116	9,360		
INFANTRY.				
British numbered Regiments	129,853	145,272	173,000	45,256
Veteran Battalions . .	6,490	8,000		
Garrison Battalions, including those at Bahamas . .	5,757	7,975		
New South Wales Corps .	820	800		
Royal Staff Corps . .	391	400		
Royal African Corps . .	421	600		
Royal West India Rangers .	1,166	1,000		
Royal York Rangers . .	1,046	1,100		
Royal Manx Fencibles .	583	592		
Germans	8,194	8,690		
Four American Fencible Regiments	1,942	2,800		
Ceylonese	3,074	2,800		
Other Foreign Corps . .	14,928	16,100		
Unattached men at the Army Depôts	127			
Total . . .	174,792	196,129		
General Total . .	210,137	234,445		

Memorandum respecting the Army in India.

Downing Street, December 22, 1808.

The principal alterations which it is proposed to make in the constitution of the Army in India are as follows:

1st. That the regimental officers shall be appointed by the King, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief in India to the Commander-in-Chief in England. The rule of seniority to be adhered to.

2nd. In like manner, all Staff situations in regiments, garrisons, or the field, which are now appointed by the local governments, on the recommendation of the Commanders at the different Presidencies, to be appointed by the King, on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief in India.

3rd. The appointment of *all* General Officers to the Staff in India to be vested in the Commander-in-Chief in England, who at present appoints a certain proportion of them.

4th. The only duties of a nature purely military, and exclusive of pecuniary questions, which the Court of Directors now exercise, viz., judging of alleged offences against military discipline, revising the sentences of Courts-Martial, granting furloughs, &c., for all which they are wholly incompetent, to be transmitted to the Commander-in Chief in England.

In all other respects, the present system to be continued, and the Governments at home and in India to retain the same superintending authority which they now possess.

A copy of a letter from his Royal Highness the Duke of York, with its enclosure, is herewith transmitted.

H.R.H. the Duke of York to the Right Hon. Robert Dundas.

Horse Guards, September 12, 1808.

Dear Sir—I transmit to you an outline of the plan for incorporating the native troops of the East India Company with those of his Majesty, and which I have drawn up in consequence of our late conversation on that subject.

The measure appears to me extremely simple, and calculated as much for the interest of the individuals concerned as it is for the public advantage: there are, however, some of the Articles proposed, upon which it may be necessary to offer a more enlarged explanation.

The promotion in the native troops should, I think, go on progressively in regimental succession, but not beyond the rank of Captain, as, by stopping at this rank, you will not only effectually prevent one corps obtaining a more rapid share of promotion than another, and thereby give a more equitable distribution of promotion among the whole body of native troops, which are to roll together throughout all the Presidencies; but you will be enabled to select such efficient men for the important station of Field-Officers as may have distinguished themselves from the generality of the Senior Captains of the respective corps. It appears to me that this arrangement tends as much to the encouragement of the good officers as it does to the advantage of the public service.

The subject of exchanges is sufficiently explicit; and it is only necessary to observe that, by the restriction I have recommended, it will be impossible for any officer to profit by the regulation for retirement adopted by the East India Company, except such as shall have served the whole of the prescribed time in the Native Troops.

I propose that the Cadets should be appointed by his Majesty, as tending to ensure the introduction of a better description of officer into the Native Corps than what I have always understood to have been hitherto the case, and to prevent the possibility of any person being borne on the strength of those corps who is not perfectly competent to perform the duties of his station.

It is needless to observe that this must be considered merely as an outline of the intended arrangement, the details of which I shall be glad of an opportunity of discussing with you more fully, and which, as far as I can judge, will be very simple in

their execution, and eminently calculated for the advantage of both services and for the general interest of the country.

I remain, dear Sir, yours very sincerely,

FREDERICK.

1st. The East India Company's Officers to become his Majesty's Officers, with the dates of their respective commissions.

2nd. No purchase or sale of commissions in that part of his Majesty's troops.

3rd. The promotion in the Native Troops to be progressive in the regiment up to the rank of Captain; but, above that rank, the promotion may be made by his Majesty generally throughout the whole Native Army.

4th. The whole of the Native Army to roll together, and not by Presidencies.

5th. Exchanges between the Officers of the Native Troops and those of his Majesty to be allowed, if expressly recommended by the Commander-in-Chief in India; but the right of the Officers exchanging into the Native Troops to the allowance granted by the East India Company, after a service of twenty-five years, can only be considered to commence from the period of such exchange to the Native Troops.

6th. Cadets to be appointed by his Majesty.

FREDERICK, Commander-in-Chief.

Marginal Observations, by Lord Castlereagh.

1. Proper.

2. Proper.

3. No alteration in the system of promotion in the Native Army would be advisable, at least at present. It need not be the subject of Parliamentary interference.

4. Proper.

5. Exchanges ought not to be allowed. It would be impossible to agree that a European Officer, of *any* rank, who had never served in India, or perhaps only for a short period,

should become at once an Officer in a Native Battalion. It would also be considered as a hardship by the Officers of the Native corps.

6. Objectionable, on account of the patronage.

Inquiry respecting Turkish Vessels detained at Malta.

Orders were issued in May, 1807, for an embargo and detention of all Turkish property. A number of Turkish vessels were in consequence detained in the harbour of Malta; and others were captured by different cruisers, and carried into that port.

In April, 1808, those vessels were delivered over to William Higgins, Esq., the Agent for Crown Droits at that island, and several of them were afterwards sold by him to persons resident there. None of those vessels were condemned, as there never has been any declaration of war against Turkey; and it is understood that Mr. Higgins sold them under some authority, transmitted either to him direct, or through Sir Alexander Ball, in order to prevent a loss by the property perishing.

The Commissioners for Turkish property did not give any orders for that purpose; neither has Sir Claude Crespigny, the General Receiver of Droits, nor the Lords of the Treasury, and it is to be presumed that the directions were transmitted by the Secretary of State.

Quere.—If any orders were transmitted from Lord Castlereagh's Office on this subject?

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

Lord Castlereagh, in submitting his humble request that your Majesty would be graciously pleased to confer the Government of Fort Charles, in the island of Jamaica, vacated by the death of General Smith, on Brigadier-General Charles Stewart, hopes his attachment to his brother may not have

induced him to intrude this request improperly on your Majesty's gracious favour and indulgence.[1]

London, January 8, 1809.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

January, 1809.

Under the present circumstances of the war, and the amount of your Majesty's disposable force employed in operations on the Continent, your Majesty's confidential servants consider it their indispensable duty humbly to recommend to your Majesty to call the attention of Parliament, immediately on its meeting, to the adoption of such measures for increasing the Regular Army as may enable your Majesty adequately to sustain the contest abroad, without thereby unduly exposing the security of your Majesty's dominions at home.

It also appearing of the utmost importance that a British corps should be in readiness in the Tagus to proceed to Cadiz at the shortest notice, in case circumstances should render the Spaniards desirous of receiving the aid of British troops for the security of that place; and it is highly desirable that the amount of force now under the orders of Sir John Moore, and upon which his arrangements have probably been already framed, should not be broken in upon for this object, however important in itself; your Majesty's confidential servants are therefore induced humbly to recommend that the 5,000 infantry now under orders should forthwith proceed to the Tagus.

The accompanying Instructions are submitted, in execution of this purpose, should the measure itself be honoured with your Majesty's gracious approbation. Lord Castlereagh also

[1] This Government was resigned by me into the hands of George IV., to facilitate his arrangements with the late Lord Bloomfield. I never had any other Government conferred on me. That of Fort Charles was a clear £1,200 per annum, which, since 1809, would be no small sacrifice for a *thin* soldier of fortune.—EDITOR.

presumes to submit to your Majesty a Memorandum explanatory of the principles upon which it appears that your Majesty's Regular Army may be most speedily and effectually augmented at the present moment.

Your Majesty's confidential servants are fully aware of the magnitude of the exertion which your Majesty's subjects are thus called upon to make; but they humbly conceive that it is not more than commensurate with the exigency of the crisis, for which your Majesty's Government consider themselves bound in duty to your Majesty to make every exertion to provide.

Plan for Improving the Military Force of the Country.

Horse Guards, February 6, 1809.

I would propose that every regiment of the line, with the exception of the 60th, should be composed of two battalions.

The first battalion should, according to its effective strength, be on the establishment of 800, 1,000, or 1,200, and should, as at present, be engaged for unlimited service, in regard to time and place. This, if the plan succeeded, as I feel confident it would, gives on an average a disposable force of 100,000 men.

The second battalion should be uniformly of the establishment of 1,000, composed of men obtained by ballot, as the present Militia, but officered by officers of the Regular service, forming, in every respect, an integral part of the regiment, passing in their turn, according to rank, into the 1st battalion.

The services of the men of the second battalions, in consideration of their being raised by ballot, must be limited to Great Britain and Ireland, and the Islands in the Channel: this would give us a force for home defence of rather more than 100,000 men—a number, it is to be observed, inferior to that which was raised for the Militia service during the late war, but possessing this marked superiority over the present Militia, that it

would be commanded by officers of the Army, whose habits and feelings would naturally introduce among their men a predilection for the Regular service, and that its services would be equally applicable to Ireland as to Britain.

I would recommend that the ten Royal Veteran Battalions should be retained, with the power of placing such of their officers as may, from time to time, become, through age and infirmities, unfit for duty, on a retired pay, becoming their respective ranks, and referring to their best years devoted to their country. Without some such arrangement, it is evident, from the nature of things, these respectable and highly useful corps must become inefficient.

I would place all the rest of the force of the country in Local Militia, Yeomanry Cavalry, and Volunteer Corps, the latter composed of officers and men who are willing to enrol themselves in corps of not less than 600, under engagements to subject themselves to such drills as may be deemed necessary to fit them to act with Regular troops, to serve, in case of emergency, in any part of Great Britain, and to support themselves entirely at their own expense, (arms excepted) till called out on permanent duty, when they should receive military pay, and be in every respect amenable to *Martial* Law.

No officer of the two latter descriptions of force should receive a higher rank than that of Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant.

The Local Militia to be formed upon the same military principle as the other parts of the Army. The numbers of the battalions must depend on the extent and population of the counties to which they belong; but the strength of the companies and the establishment of the battalions should, as far as circumstances will permit, be equalized. The whole, or any part, should be liable to be called out according to the exigency of the service; but by this arrangement their duties would become comparatively so little burdensome, that it might be presumed the commissions would be held by gentlemen of the first respectability in their respective counties.

The amount of the force produced by this plan is as follows:

Regular Infantry of the Line for general service, exclusive of Regular Cavalry, Foot Guards, and Veteran Battalions, and the 6 Battalions of the 60th Regiment[1]	100,000
Second Battalions, Balloted men, with officers of the Line, for service limited to Great Britain and Ireland	100,000
Local Militia, at least	200,000
Volunteer Cavalry	32,000
Volunteer Corps, on a principle calculated to render them really effective for general service; probably not less than	100,000

The result would prove, I conclude, as follows:—

The Militia becomes what it ought constitutionally to be—the basis of our national force. The Local Militia assumes the uniform, colours, and every other article of equipment of the Regiment of the Line belonging to its county. In short, it adopts the County Regiment as part of itself, and gives every encouragement to its men to enlist into this corps. Let the men of the 2nd battalion receive the same encouragement to extend their services into the 1st battalion, and their places be immediately supplied by Volunteers at a low bounty from the Local Militia—I say by Volunteers, because I do not believe there would be found any difficulty in filling up these vacancies; but if, contrary to expectation, there should be any, a ballot must be resorted to, because the very essence of the plan I venture to submit for consideration is the absolute certainty of the 2nd battalions being kept complete as long as their services are required; and I humbly conceive that a very little arrangement would be necessary to ensure a large proportion of the men repairing to their colours, in the event of

[1] This refers only to the numbered regiments. The West India regiments, the Garrison Battalions, the Foreign and Provisional Corps, are not included in this computation.

any sudden emergency calling for their services, at times when they might not be embodied.

If I see the subject right, this would establish what has yet been unsuccessfully attempted—a real and useful connexion between the different branches of the Military force of the country, and by these means actually connect the Regiment of the Line with the county whose name it bears.

It would, by these means, present the fairest prospect of placing the recruiting of regiments on the most certain and respectable footing, without at all preventing their employing the means now in practice, if they found it desirable. My opinion of the eligibility of this, or of some plan of the same nature, has been long formed; and the experience of each year more and more convinces me that every measure adopted for the increase of our military force, which does not place it on an *assured* and *permanent* footing, is illusory and inadequate to the object. After the long and repeated warnings we have had, it will be most unpardonable, if we are not prepared to repel the attack of our enemy, by efforts commensurate with the difficulties and dangers with which we are threatened, and the importance of the objects for which we contend.

H. C.[1]

Lord Castlereagh to the Duke of Manchester.

Downing Street, February 11, 1809.

My dear Lord—I don't know that I have much to add to my official letters. I cannot, however, avoid expressing my regret that anything should have occurred to give your Grace embarrassment in your Government, which your Grace has conducted with equal satisfaction to his Majesty's Ministers and the inhabitants of Jamaica. These occurrences are inevitable in the administration of public affairs: they are most likely to arise on abstract questions of right; and the

[1] The signature attached to this paper is that of Lieut.-General Harry Calvert, *then Adjutant*-General of the Forces.

object is, without conceding any principle, to dispose of them amicably.

Your Grace can best judge how far my impressions are correct; but I am strongly inclined to recommend that, if possible, the immediate subject of controversy should be settled with the present Assembly, rather than hazard the choice of a new one under present circumstances, which would probably be chosen under a pledge to persevere in the contest.

It is not without considerable reluctance that I have consented to the production of the minutes of the Court Martial, as there are some points of evidence which may afford a handle for running down the loyalty and fidelity of the old soldiers of the 2nd West India Regiment, which every consideration of justice and policy requires we should uphold. But, unless it were possible to preclude the examination of the witnesses to the circumstances of the mutiny, which appears to the King's Government quite impossible, nothing could be gained by withholding this document, whilst additional insinuations would grow out of such a reserve.

The pretension of the Assembly to all the rights and privileges of the House of Commons is quite absurd: they have no other privileges than those naturally arising out of and connected with the colonial and limited purposes for which, *by the act of the Crown*, they have been created. The control of the army does not belong to them. Inquiries on their part into the conduct of military officers, in the sense the Commons inquire at home, are quite foreign to their jurisdiction. The individuals, however, composing the King's army can never justifiably refuse to answer upon matters *not secret* in themselves, and which fairly appertain to the internal interests of the Colony. If they are called upon to disclose their military instructions, or to betray any facts from which prejudice might arise to the State, they must object rather to the particular question than to the general principle of being examined. The present case, arising out of a Court Martial, might seem to

create some preclusion to their being interrogated as to facts already examined and adjudged; but the decided opinion here is that this distinction is not maintainable.

I shall be most anxious to learn that this unpleasant discussion has been terminated in a manner satisfactory to your Grace's feelings, and without further interruption to the public business, the delay of which is productive of considerable embarrassment both to his Majesty's interests and those of the Island.

I have the honour to be, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

I cannot but very much disapprove of the steps taken by General Carmichael, pending these discussions, to disturb the ordinary course in which the island supplies are furnished to the troops. Such an interference cannot fail very materially to embarrass the transaction.

The King to the Duke of Portland.

Windsor Castle, March 18, 1809.

The King acquaints the Duke of Portland that he has this day reluctantly accepted the resignation of the Duke of York, which has been conveyed to his Majesty in a letter, of which he has sent the copy to Mr. Perceval, and which he will, of course, communicate to his colleagues.

Under these painful circumstances, his Majesty's attention has been directed to the necessary arrangements for the future administration of the army; and, after consulting the Army List, the King has satisfied himself that General Sir David Dundas is, of all those whose names have occurred to him, the fittest person to be entrusted with the chief temporary command, both from habits of business, respectability of character, and from the disposition which his Majesty is convinced he will feel to attend strictly to the maintenance of that system, and those regulations which, under the direction of the Duke of York, have proved so beneficial to the service.

It does not appear to his Majesty that any change will be

required in the constitution of the Commander-in-Chief's Office, or in the various official establishments connected with it.

GEORGE R.

Lord Castlereagh to the King.

St. James's Square, April 8, 1809.

Major-General Nightingale's health having for some time precluded his departure for New South Wales, Lord Castlereagh, in the present state of the Colony, is humbly of opinion that your Majesty's service will be best consulted by detaching the 73rd Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Macquarrie's command, immediately to that station, leaving the Major-General to follow as soon as his health will permit; and, in order that the necessary means for restoring regular authority within the settlement may be forthwith adopted, Lord Castlereagh begs leave humbly to recommend that the Lieutenant-Government should be entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Macquarrie while his regiment continues to be in New South Wales.

Lord Castlereagh to J. H. Sumner, Esq.

Downing Street, April 13, 1809.

Sir—I am sorry to find the proposed clause, authorizing training in an adjacent county, has been misunderstood in the county of Surrey. The object of Government has always been, and continues to be, to train the local militia, as far as possible, in their own counties; but there are some counties so particularly circumstanced, that it has been deemed indispensable to authorize the training, in an adjacent county, such regiments as the Lord-Lieutenant of the county may represent cannot conveniently be cantoned in any of the towns within their own county, without carrying the men further from home than by marching them to some town in the neighbouring county—a case which perhaps does not at all apply to the county of Surrey.

It is in this view of accommodation to the local militia force, and not from any wish to alter the original plan of generally training within the county, that the present clause is brought forward. I have the honour, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Chevalier de Tinseau to Lord Castlereagh.

4, Suffolk Street, Berners Street, Avril 19, 1809.

Mylord—J'ai reçu hier la réponse que votre Seigneurie a bien voulu faire à mon application en date du 10 du courant. Pour ménager autant qu'il est possible un tems aussi précieux que le votre, je vais mettre succinctement sous vos yeux l'objet précis que je prends la liberté de proposer.

Je propose donc d'attaquer les villes de Cette et d'Agde ainsi que l'espèce d'isle, formée par la mer, l'étang de Cette, l'Hérault, et le Canal Royal, et je démontre

1°. Que si on l'attaque avec un corps d'armée de 10,000 hommes, savoir 7,500 d'infanterie, 1,200 marines, 1,000 de cavalerie, et le surplus d'artillerie, la prise de ces deux villes et de l'isle est presqu'immanquable, en y joignant quelques chaloupes canonnières et barques armées aux bateaux de la flotte.

2°. Qu'avec 3,000 hommes de garnison, quelques barques armées, et un retranchement très facile à élever en peu de jours, non seulement la ville, mais encore toute la montagne de Cette, qui a près de deux milles Anglois de long sur autant de large, est imprénable entre les mains de la puissance navale prépondérante, et de plus qu'elle est à l'abri de la bombe et de la mine. J'indique le lieu du débarquement, ainsi que la manière de procéder à l'attaque de Cette.

3°. Que le porte de Cette, étant à portée de Minorque et de toute la côte d'Espagne, donne de grandes facilités pour y former un grand dépôt, que sa situation met dans une parfaite sureté.

4°. Que cet emplacement est également propre à recevoir

un corps de 10,000 hommes, un double, et même une armée de 40 à 50,000 hommes, ou simplement une garnison telle que je l'ai indiquée plus haut, borneé à sa défense.

5°. Que le port de Cette est le seul de tout le Languedoc, celui auquel aboutit tout le commerce d'importation et d'exportation de cette riche et immense province; qu'il donne l'entrée et le domaine de tous les lacs qui s'étendent depuis Agde jusqu'au Delta du Rhône, et de plus la possession des Salines de Languedoc, objet d'un produit immense et de première nécessité.

6°. Que le corps d'armée qui agira depuis Cette et Agde aura au devant de lui, sur un front de plus de 50 lieues, depuis le pont St. Esprit sur le Rhône jusqu'aux portes de Perpignan, et sur une profondeur indéfinie, un pays tout ouvert, denué de troupes et des forteresses, peuplé de villes considérables, couvert sur son flanc droit par le Rhône, en arrière dans toute sa longueur par la mer; enfin que cette armée, par une excellente route qui ne s'éloigne jamais de la mer, peut, dans cinq ou six jours de marche, se porter à Perpignan, et donner la main à une armée Espagnole, qui descendroit en Roussillon, et transporter le théâtre de la guerre de Catalogne en Languedoc.

7°. Que la facilité que l'Angleterre a de renforcer à l'insçu de son ennemi le corps d'armée qui sera établi a Cette, oblige celui-ci d'envoyer des forces plus considérables pour contenir ou repousser ce corps d'armée.

8°. Que, par conséquent, on ne peut pas mettre en doute qu'il ne s'empresse à y envoyer ces secours, et qu'il ne peut les tirer que de Catalogne.

9°. Que cette opération portera un secours immédiat à la Catalogne, beaucoup plus prompt et plus efficace que s'il était transporté directement en Catalogne, où il n'y a aucun port, commode et en même tems fortifié, qui puisse servir de base aux opérations militaires des Anglois dans cette province.

10°. Que lorsque la lutte qui va avoir lieu en Portugal entre

les forces Françaises qui l'attaquent de deux côtés et les forces Angloises et Portugaises qui le défendent, aura son issue, soit par des succès, qui obligent les François de se retirer, soit par des revers, qui mettent les forces Angloises dans le cas de l'évacuer, le Languedoc offrira, par la possession du port de Cette, le meilleur champ d'action et le plus efficace sur la France, à l'armée Angloise de Portugal. En effet, dans le premier cas, l'armée Angloise, après avoir aidé ses alliés à repousser l'ennemi jusqu'à Madrid, qu'il abandonnera précipitamment dans cette supposition, pourra, au lieu de continuer à agir avec les troupes Espagnoles (coopération, dont on ne sent que trop les inconvénients) se porter vers Valence, et s'y embarquer pour Cette, ou ensemble ou partiellement et successivement, suivant les facilités d'embarquement. Ce plan aura les avantages suivants: 1°., d'éviter les inconvénients si sensibles d'une coopération trop longue d'une armée angloise avec une armée espagnole; 2°., de transporter le théâtre de la guerre du territoire espagnol sur le territoire François, qui ressentira enfin toutes les horreurs et les calamités, que jusqu'ici les François ont eu l'adresse de rejetter sur les autres nations; 3°., de sauver de leur destruction Barcelone et les autres forteresses de la Catalogne, que la soldatesque féroce qui les occupe, ne se fera pas le moindre scrupule de dévouer à une destruction complete, ainsi que leurs malheureux habitants, pour en prolonger la défense de quelques jours.

Votre Seigneurie sentira par ce simple aperçu du projet mis sous ses yeux, qu'il ne peut acquérir d'évidence, ni même être soumis à une discussion rigoureuse, qu'à l'aide d'un grand nombre de documents de différentes éspèces, comme des plans des villes de Cette et d'Agde, des cartes détaillées sur une grande échelle du terrain qui sépare ces deux villes, des sondes des différents ports, canaux, et eaux qui les entourent, &c., d'une carte à grande échelle de toute la côte de Languedoc, jusqu'à une certaine profondeur dans les terres; que ces pièces même remises avec ce mémoire ne pourroient servir à l'éclaircir

parceque celui qui le recevrait n'auroit aucune direction pour s'en servir ; enfin que le mémoire ne pouvant contenir tous détails et les éclaircissements nécessaires, il faut nécessairement y suppléer par une discussion verbale.

C'est par ces raisons, mylord, que je prends la liberté de supplier votre Seigneurie de me désigner des personnes en qui elle ait confiance, devant lesquelles je puisse remplir cette tâche, pour qu'elles vous en rendent compte, d'après quoi mylord pourra plus aisément se déterminer ou à m'accorder ou à me refuser l'audience que j'ai pris la liberté de solliciter pour le moment où ses occupations le lui permettroient.

Je terminerai cette esquisse du projet en vous rappelant, mylord, que cette même expédition sur Cette et Agde a déjà été exécuté par les Anglois en 1710. Un détachement de 700 hommes, avec une escadre aux ordres de Sir J. Norris, partit de Barcelone en Août, prit Cette et Agde. Le Duc de Roquelaure, Gouverneur du Bas Languedoc, essaya de les reprendre avec 4,000 hommes milices et 400 dragons ; mais il fut repoussé par l'assistance des bateaux de l'escadre. Le danger parut si pressant au Duc de Noailles, qui commandoit une armée sous les murs de Perpignan, la seule qui restât pour repousser une invasion des armées Angloise et Autrichienne, qui venoient de conquérir l'Arragon et la Catalogne, qu'il partit immédiatement avec mille grenadiers d'élite et 900 chevaux, donnant ordre à un plus gros corps de le suivre pour Agde, qu'il reprit, ainsi que Cette, pour la défense desquelles un simple bataillon étoit évidemment insuffisant.

Je suis, avec profond respect, &c.,

Le Chevalier de TINSEAU.

General Dumouriez to Lord Castlereagh.

11, Leicester Place, 8 Mai, 1809.

Mylord—En 1805, je me suis adressé à vous pour obtenir du Gouvernement la permission d'aller servir en Autriche.

J'ai fait le voyage d'après cette permission ; mais étant parti le 20 Novembre, je ne suis arrivé en Moravie qu'après la défaite d'Austerlitz et lorsqu'un armistice préparait la funeste paix de Presbourg.

Les mêmes circonstances existent ainsi que les mêmes devoirs pour moy. Je vous prie de présenter ma demande au Conseil, comme vous l'avez fait en 1805 et de me faire passer le plustot possible cette permission. Si je trouve la paix faite je reviendrai ; si on résiste encore je pourrai être utile.

J'ay l'honneur d'être avec respect, &c.,

Le Général DUMOURIEZ.

Lord Castlereagh to Henry Alexander, Esq.

London, May 13, 1809.

Dear Alexander—I am much obliged to you for the information you have been so kind as to send me of the state of affairs at the Cape. It seems to prosper as much as we could wish or expect, under Lord Caledon's management. I certainly should be sorry to see it pass into other hands.

Upon a full consideration upon the state of New South Wales, I have deemed it necessary to send out a regiment of the line and a military Governor to that settlement. I do not, therefore, feel enabled to accept the offer of your services, which I have no doubt would have been very honourably and zealously directed to introduce order and good government into the Colony.

As I conclude every ship that sails for the Cape carries accounts of what is passing in this quarter of the globe, to be found nearly as early in the common newspapers as they are known to Ministers, I shall not attempt to send you any news, and shall only beg you to believe me, with my best regards to Lord Caledon, very faithfully and sincerely yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

Downing Street, June 16, 1809.

My Lords—The practice of the enemy having of late years invariably been to lay hold of and carry to France, to be employed in their dockyards, all artificers and shipwrights found in the seaports of the countries overrun by their arms; and having further introduced the system of regimenting and training to arms, and occasionally of employing with their armies in the field persons of this description, I am to signify to your lordships the King's pleasure that you do instruct the officers in the chief command of his Majesty's naval forces to consider all such persons as prisoners of war, and to detain them as such.

I am also to call your lordships' attention to the case of naval and military stores found on shore, not being public property. Although, according to the mitigated usage of war, as exercised by this country, the property of individuals being alien enemies, if found or taken on shore, is not considered as booty, unless it should have been landed pending hostile operations, and with a view to its capture afloat, it does not follow from this practice that the rights which, in the stricter exercise of our belligerent power, would accrue to us over such property, are, in no instance, and under no modifications, to be enforced. In such cases, however, which, it is conceived, can only arise where the interests or safety of the State may require that such property should be removed out of the reach of the enemy, or when, from the nature of the property, it may be applicable to naval or military purposes, it would best accord with the liberal intentions of his Majesty, in recurring to such measures as may secure to this country the possession of the property, to avoid, as much as possible, anything like injury or oppression to unoffending individuals.

Bearing in mind these principles, it is his Majesty's pleasure

that, in the progress of the proposed service, strict search should be made for naval stores, more especially hemp, cordage, sail-cloth, pitch, tar, and timber, of every description, and generally any article fit for naval purposes for which we are dependent on foreign powers, or the renewal of which, though not so important in this respect, might, in your judgment, materially distress the future naval exertions of the enemy; and that you should direct the officer commanding the naval force to require from the owners of all such articles to deliver them up forthwith, in order to their being brought to England, if, upon inspection, they should be approved of as fit for his Majesty's service.

In making this requisition, the owners of all such articles should be apprized that they will be paid for by bills upon England, to be drawn at the rate pointed out to the Commissary-General in his Instructions, either at the prices mentioned in the enclosed list, or at such prices, not exceeding those therein specified as, upon inquiry, may be found, as nearly as possible, the average prices of the country, before the commencement of hostilities; it being his Majesty's intention, as much as circumstances will permit, to apply to property of this description the right of pre-emption which has at all times belonged to a belligerent, with respect to similar articles, belonging to neutrals; and surely it cannot be complained of as an aggravated exercise of the rights of war, if, to the like articles, when found upon a hostile territory, and belonging to an alien enemy, we extend the same measure of indulgence as is customary when they are met with upon the high seas, and *bonâ fide* the property of a neutral.

To this I shall only add, that it will be not less the duty of the Commander than the interest of the forces to be employed on the present expedition, to use every precaution to prevent public property being covered by individual claims, or a fraudulent transfer of it, in contemplation of capture; and that, in the event of any naval or military stores being removed from

Antwerp or any other place, pending the operations, it will be the duty of the respective Commanders to use every endeavour to compel the enemy to place at their disposal the property so removed. I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Return of the Regiments now under Orders for Foreign Service, showing the probable number of Rank and File which will embark with each Corps; leaving behind such men as are at present unfit for Duty.

Adjutant-General's Office, July 15, 1809.

CAVALRY.

	Rank and File.
3d Dragoons, 6 troops	510
9th Light Dragoons, do.	510
12th do. do.	510
Including five dismounted men per troop.	
2d German Lt. Dragoons	580
3d do. 2 troops	152
Waggon Train 5 do.	395
	2,657

ARTILLERY.

Horse Artillery, 1 troop	150
Foot Artillery, 16 Comps.	1,839
Gunner Drivers.	1,043
	3,032

Including fifty-seven Artificers.

FOOT GUARDS.

1st Foot Guards, 1st Bat.	1,329
——— 3rd do.	1,101
Flank Companies	437
	2,867

INFANTRY.

	Rank and File.
Royals, 3rd Battalion	957
2nd	833
4th 1st	1,000
— 2nd	930
5th 1st	939
6th 1st	971
8th, 2 Companies, 2nd	200
9th 1st	932
11th 2nd	839
14th 2nd	781
20th	873
23rd, 4 Companies, 2nd	400
26th 1st	687
28th 1st	650
32nd 1st Battalion	579
35th 2nd	737
36th 1st	657
38th 1st	793
42nd 1st	799
43rd 2nd	604
50th 1st	853
51st	652
52nd, 4 Companies 2nd	418
59th 2nd	740
63rd, 4 Companies 2nd	400
68th	777
71st 1st	963
76th	742
77th	559
79th 1st	1,003
81st 2nd	661
82nd 1st	1,000
	23,929

Brought forward . . .	23,929
84th 2nd	855
85th	581
91st 1st	660
92nd 1st	987
95th 2nd	1,000
Staff Corps, 2 Companies . . .	100
1 German Light Battalion . . .	704
do. do. . . .	613
Embodied Detachments . . .	800
	30,229

N.B. A regiment of Dragoons will be named for service, instead of the two troops of the 3rd German Light Dragoons, above inserted. It is expected that the regiments will embark something stronger than is here stated.

Abstract.	Rank and File.
Cavalry	2,657
Artillery	3,032
Foot Guards	2,867
Infantry	30,229
	38,785
Increase of Cavalry	510
	39,295
Deduct 2 troops withdrawn . .	152
Total . . .	39,143

HARRY CALVERT, A. G.

Amount of Naval Force.

Admiralty, July 11, 1809.

Sail of the Line	35
Ships of 50 guns	2
Do. of 44 do.	3
Frigates	18
Sloops	33

Bomb Vessels	5
Gun Brigs, 5 carrying Mortars	23
Hired Cutters	17
Revenue Vessels	14
Tenders	5
Gun Boats	82

Together with the craft employed in his Majesty's dock-yards.

Lord Castlereagh to Mr Lyon.

Downing Street, August 19, 1809.

Sir—I consider the substance of what passed between us yesterday, upon the claim made by the Assembly of Jamaica, to be accurately stated. I should only wish to observe, in addition, that what the Assembly of Jamaica have always declared their intention of doing, and *have done*, is to victual 3,000 of his Majesty's troops employed in the defence of the island. I do not understand that they wish to recede from the contribution thus made towards their own defence. If that is not the intention, the question is between the troops and the Government at home, and not between the Assembly and the troops. Whenever the King victuals his own troops, he gives them 6*d.* a day pay, instead of 1*s.* When the Island of Jamaica victuals them, he allows them 8½*d.* a day pay, instead of 6*d.*; so that the soldier in Jamaica (supposing the rations the same as those given to the King's troops on service elsewhere) is better off by 2½*d.* a day than on any other station.

I don't know that the soldier in Jamaica would have any reason to complain, if he only received 6*d.* instead of 8½*d.* This is, however, a question for his Majesty in his liberality to judge of; but I do not see, if the Assembly of Jamaica undertake to victual a certain number of men, that their interests are at all affected by the scale of pay established for the troops, exclusive of their rations.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

An Account of the Extraordinary Expenses incurred in the Transport Department on Account of the Expedition to the Scheldt, so far as the same can at present be made up, prepared in pursuance of Directions from the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury.

Transport Office, February 1, 1810.

Tonnage of Transports employed.	Tons.	£	s.	d.
For the Army	65,687			
——— Navy	3,976			
——— Ordnance	22,978			
——— Waggon Train	4,581	462,000	0	0
——— Barrack Department	2,510			
——— Commissariat	1,006			
	100,738			
Building and Repairing Cabins for Soldiers, and Horse Stalls, Horse Gear, Bedding Stores, and Medical Comforts for the Troops		17,000	0	0
Forage for Horses		19,671	10	0
Pay to Officers of the Navy employed as Agents of Transports		2,430	0	0
		501,101	10	0
Part of the Transports above mentioned were withdrawn from Portugal, in aid of this Service, to the amount of 48,000 Tons, where they would probably have remained, had not this Expedition taken place; it is therefore presumed that a Deduction should be made from this Account to the Amount of the freight which would have been incurred, had the Ships remained in Portugal		220,135	0	0
Making the Extraordinary Expense of the Expedition		280,966	10	0

AFFAIRS OF SICILY, SPAIN, &c.

1810—1812.

It will be recollected that the rupture between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, in September, 1809, occasioned the retirement of both from office, and this circumstance sufficiently accounts for the very small number of papers that present themselves during the two following years. The Marquess Wellesley succeeded Mr. Canning as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and, on his resignation in January, 1812, Lord Castlereagh was appointed to that important post.

And here commences a new era in his official career —an era unparalleled in the annals of our country— an era emblazoned with glorious, with astounding events, to the accomplishment of which the efforts of his energetic mind contributed more largely than those of any other man, as the numerous details that are hereafter recorded will convincingly demonstrate.

General Sir John Stuart to the Earl of Liverpool.

Messina, April 30, 1810.

My Lord—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 20th of March, directing that the 1st battalions specified in the margin[1] should be held in readiness to be relieved by an equal number of 2nd battalions from England.

[1] 21st, 31st, 39th Chasseurs Britanniques.

Your lordship is already aware of the composition of this army, and my communications to you of the preparations of the enemy will have apprized you of the circumstances under which it may be called upon to act. It will be my duty, however, to carry into immediate execution every arrangement which his Majesty has deemed proper to dictate, unless the intermediate occurrence of any events which could not have been foreseen should prescribe to me the necessity, as an equal duty, to exercise a momentary discretion upon the subject. On this principle, it is possible that, should the preparations of the enemy assume a more decisive aspect, I may be prompted to detain both the first and the second battalions in question, until I can receive a further intimation of his Majesty's pleasure upon the subject.

I am not without an impression that I may have incurred a reprehension from your lordship, as having acted without authority in the question of the Duke of Orleans,[1] as detailed in the copies transmitted of my correspondence with Lord Amherst. Yet I trust your lordship will be inclined to appreciate my motives in having presumed to reason upon a question, which, independently of the consequences with which it was fraught to this country at large, had such immediate connexion with my own official position, and upon which, as in every other, where specific instructions may be wanting, it becomes my duty to act under the suggestions of my humble judgment.

I might perhaps be considered by your lordship as stepping without my particular province, in any reference to the political circumstances of this country, did they not generally blend an influence upon its military relations.

Time only can develop the justice of a suspicion generally admitted through the kingdom, that the recent marriage of Buonaparte with a grand-daughter of their Sicilian Majesties has been attended with new hopes and new impressions at

[1] I opposed as much as I could the nomination of the Duke of Orleans to the command of the Sicilian army.

Palermo. I do not, nor can I, believe that a great female personage, among all her real and imputed misconceptions, can have any interest in common with the invader of her continental dominions; but her Majesty does not at all times think or act for herself; and she is surrounded and influenced by many whose principles are greatly to be doubted.

The present French party in her councils evidently can have no attachment to England, by whose Government and by whose people they know themselves to be mistrusted; a drop of Bourbon blood upon the new Imperial throne will hallow with them the usurpation, and be an easy source of reasoning to them for new political doctrines.

The Neapolitan emigrant nobility have all their sons, their parents, their brothers, their nephews, at Naples; it is natural they should wish for a reunion of the two kingdoms; whether under a Joachim or a Ferdinand is a question upon which there is little room to consider their loyalty disposed to bleed.

The barons of the kingdom, the minor nobility, the better class of citizens, as well as the settled population, in the event of an invasion, might in general be neuter—it is the best at present that I should expect from them. Were I to form a conclusion upon their principles from my own observation, it would be, that they are by no means inclined to the French; on the contrary, much more so to the English; but that they would be ready to admit any party in preference to their own Government. The Militia is a non-existence. The marine is not upon an extended scale, but two Frenchmen are at the head of it; and, such as it is, should it happen to fall into the hands of the enemy, its momentary application might be rendered extremely injurious to us: under our direction, on the other hand, it might be proportionally useful.

The regular army, consisting of about 7 or 8,000 effectives, is divided into almost as many factions. The officers are indifferent to, or disgusted with, their own service; the soldiers wretchedly paid, as wretchedly fed, are ready to pass from their

present to any other chief who would promise them an addition of two baiochi per day, or two ounces of bread to their allowance.

The isolated British army, without authorities to command any of the military resources of the country, except such as in a moment of emergency might be derived from the law of force, consists, as your lordship knows, of about 14,000 men, of which about one half are foreigners. After the necessary distributions to the five garrisons which we occupy, and the habitual deduction of sick and other casualties, I should be able to take the field with from 6 to 7,000 men; but, if circumstances should urge me from the protection of the Streight, the exposure would be serious. Should we be driven to resistance entirely in our fortresses, the always humiliating, however coercive, measure of retreat from Sicily, must inevitably be the consequence.

Some reinforcement, on the other hand, even of a few thousand men, to our present British force, added to the advantages of an insular position, and a power vested in the British General, to command and apply the military resources of the country itself, might still warrant the sanguine hope of the successful defence of Sicily; but the unity of command is a point which I feel it my duty to press again on the consideration of your lordship; and if any positive concession from this Court on the subject is an object, which motives of delicacy or forbearance on the part of his Majesty's Government is likely yet to retard, still the effect of such an arrangement might in a great degree be operated by the measure originally proposed by Lord Castlereagh, as intimated in my own instructions from his lordship, of placing the distribution of that part of the subsidy designed for the maintenance of the Sicilian army in the hands of the British Commander.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. STUART.

Some Account of the Present State of Sicily.[1]

The situation in which we now stand with respect to Sicily appears to be this: we defend it from the French at the expense of £400,000 per annum, and without any diminution of our disposable force; the Sicilian and Neapolitan troops placed at our disposal nearly equalling in number the troops in English pay now employed in Sicily. The Sicilian Ministers, appointed by our influence, are endeavouring, with the assistance of Lord W. Bentinck, to form a Constitution for their country upon the English model.

All that has yet been done has been done for ourselves, and even to us is productive only of temporary advantage. It is proposed to do more for England by doing something for Sicily—to exert the influence we possess and English mind in ameliorating the condition of the Sicilians. This will not be done merely by giving them a form of government theoretically perfect. It is necessary to consider the state of Sicily; how its situation may be best improved; and how, consistently with the happiness of the people, we may derive most advantage from the possession of the country.

Sicily, once the granary of Italy, now hardly supplies its own inhabitants with corn. One third of the country only is cultivated, and that third is so ill cultivated, that it produces barely a third of what it might produce under an improved system of agriculture. This is chiefly to be attributed to the corn laws. The whole country is divided into small districts; each district contains a single village or town and the land for some miles about it. The villages in the interior are generally at the distance of fifteen miles from each other. Only the land just about the village is cultivated. All the inhabitants of the district live in the village or town; and, if the town should happen to be large, the labourer must lose half the day

[1] This and the following paper are by the same hand; but there is nothing about them to lead to a conjecture as to the writer, who has furnished in them much interesting and important information.

in going to and returning from his field. The fear of robbers prevents them from living in separate and distant cottages. Each district is under the government of a university or corporation. The members of this body are appointed by the Crown, and generally buy their situations of the Minister. They hold their places for three years, and may be continued, but for this too they must pay.

The members of these corporations are the contractors by law for supplying the whole district with corn. To perform their contract, they are armed with the power of obliging every man to keep his corn unsold until they have completed their purchases. They give the lowest price that can have the effect of producing the commodity, and exact the highest that can be torn from the starving peasant. The difference between the two prices is theirs, and out of that they must pay the necessary bribes at Palermo: what remains is the salary which Government pays them for acting as spies over their fellow-citizens. If their bad conduct produces any ferment, they are sacrificed. This happened when I was at Messina. The members of the corporation who were then displaced had made vast fortunes. The bread, too, is made by the same monopolists, and may be only bought of them. The inhabitants of some villages six or seven miles from Messina were obliged to buy their bread in the city. This regulation naturally crowds together the whole population of a district in one spot. Between one village and another not a single cottage is seen; and the greatest part of the intermediate space is perfectly desolate. I have travelled five-and-twenty miles without seeing the trace of a man. The territory that once formed the States of Segesta and Selinuntium, now does not produce the food of a single family. The consequence of these regulations besides is, that no more corn is ever produced than, in average years, is just sufficient for the scanty support of the inhabitants; for exportation is prohibited in years of moderate plenty, and, when allowed, subjected to regulations and restric-

tions so burdensome, that they almost effect the same object as absolute prohibition.

It follows, from the nature of this system, that no communication is permitted between the different districts. The over-abundant crop in one district never alleviates the distress of the next. I have known a difference of 25 per cent. in the price of bread, at the distance of fourteen miles. Artificial scarcities are frequently made in different districts, to increase the profits of the corporations. The scarcity all over Sicily, in 1811, was artificial and effected by the Government, to make the English odious; for we were accused of having exported so much corn as to have occasioned it. We had exported none, and had even imported some.

In the different districts, the administration of justice is annually placed in the hands of a Captain of Justice, generally selected for his wealth, sometimes for his obnoxiousness to the Government; for this is an office of risk and expense. The Captain of Justice is answerable for all robberies committed in his district between the setting and rising of the sun. Of course he must provide a police; and the security of the public depends upon the zeal and riches of this annual officer. As both their zeal and riches vary very much, the police changes with them, and the best disposed man finds he has every thing to create. At a glance, it is seen what a dreadful engine of power and oppression this system places in the hands of the Crown against the officer, and in the hands of the Officer against his personal and unfriended enemies: for he alone decides in all causes of inferior importance, and imprisons. The communication with Palermo is not frequent, and even there is found no security. The only hope of the weak is in the protection of some powerful nobleman there. The slow and perplexed process in the courts of law ruins the greatest fortunes. Indeed, the law is one of the greatest engines of oppression, and its perplexity one chief mode by which the Court brings the obnoxious under its power. The laws respecting property

are in particular so contradictory, that no man knows what is his own, and decision, difficult in itself, is made impossible, by the knavery of the lawyers and the judges, all acting under the influence of the Court. The Prince of Villa Dorata, a friend of the English, and therefore most obnoxious at Court, had two-and-twenty lawsuits depending at once, and, by lengthening the process, the Court was destroying his fortune, without incurring the odium of taking it away at once.

Education, in Sicily, is entirely in the hands of the Jesuits and Benedictines. I doubt whether the whole number of educated persons exceeds 1,500—I mean the number of those who know how to write and read—there are princes who know neither. The only persons so far educated are to be found in the monasteries. The universities teach the sciences as they were two hundred years ago. No man in Sicily knows that water will rise to its own level, as a matter of science. By experience, they know that it will at a small distance, and their aqueducts are formed on that principle. History is quite unknown; so is geography. The Spanish war was unheard of except at Palermo, and where the English were.

Except for about twenty miles in all directions from Palermo, and for fifty miles in one, there are no roads in Sicily, only small paths. It is with difficulty that a mule proceeds along these paths thirty miles in a summer's day. The proprietors of land are all collected in the great towns, almost all at Palermo, some at Messina, and Catanea. They never visit their estates. Few have ever passed the gates of their native city. There are not four country houses in Sicily. There are no farmers except in the small County of Modica, and the land is cultivated as it was in England, in the time of the Barons. They still use the plough described in the Georgics, and employ the ox to beat out the corn, and rub their linen between two boards, in the water, never cleaning it with soap. Each peasant makes his own wine, and many their own silk.

There is no middle rank. The disproportion of fortunes is very great. The Prince of Butera has 78,000 ounces a year, the Prince of Paterno 50,000. An ounce is about eleven and sixpence, or two dollars and a half; but in Sicily it must be worth a pound in England. I imagine the fortune of those two princes, their annual income, equals about an eighth of the national revenue. It is in a country so situated with respect to property, and in which the population is so ignorant, that the Prince of Belmonte has thought of establishing the English Constitution!

The monks have been so pillaged by the Queen, that they look forward with pleasure to a change of Government; they have not much influence. No religious jealousies prevail—not much superstition: along the eastern coast none, more in the interior. The Roman Catholics hate the Greeks much more than they do the Protestants. They think that there is very little difference between our religion and theirs, and a Bishop of Cefalù was going to publish a book to prove that there was none material. They like the appearance of attention to religion, and highly eulogized Sir John Stuart for having fitted up a chapel behind his house in Messina.

The English are most known in the Val Demone, and, in that division of the island, the inhabitants to a man would fight for us. In the Val di Noto, the disaffection towards their own Government is very great, and particularly in the country of Modica. In the Val di Mazzara, the people are quiet and well disposed rather towards the Court. The Val di Mazzara is the least populous of the divisions. It must be understood that the Sicilians are generally more disposed against the old Government than in our favour, except where we are well known. They desire a change, and, if we accomplish that beneficial change, they will serve us with fidelity and enthusiasm.

They consider the Neapolitans much more foreigners than they do us. It is impossible to conceive any enthusiasm greater

than that of the Sicilians employed in our gun-boats, and in the arsenal at Messina. They consider the black cockade as the highest honour, and to deprive them of it is the only punishment. Indeed, the ascendency of our character is so great, that, where we are known, we are followed as superior beings with blind confidence and enthusiasm. This was the case two years ago. I know not how our conduct, which has so much disappointed all, may have changed these sentiments.

The Sicilians have no commerce. There is a little coasting trade in large open boats; but the whole island possesses scarcely a decked vessel. They have hardly any merchants: almost all the exportation and importation is carried on by the English. There are two English merchants established at Mazzara and Marsala, for the wine trade, and one or two at Palermo and Messina, one at Syracuse. The wine is made by the small tenants for their own use: it is quite a home manufacture. The old and new wine is mixed. The grapes are thrown in, stalks and all, and the casks are never cleansed. More care might make the Sicilian wines, particularly those about the Mountain, rival those of any part of Europe. Their variety is infinite, and some are even now very fine.

The silk manufacture, too, is generally a home manufacture. There is some very fine machinery at Catanea, invented and set up by a Neapolitan refugee.

The Sicilians are by no means deficient in ingenuity. Captain Robinson did not find a single workman at Messina, and now the arsenal supplies itself with every thing, and a small gun-brig might be fitted out there. The only wood fit for ship-building is high up Etna. Except on the Mountain, there are only olive trees and orange trees throughout the whole island.

There is hardly a single physician in Sicily. Drugs for medicine are procured with difficulty, and used with so much ignorance, that it is humane not to give them.

The press is, of course, under regulations extremely strict,

yet almost unnecessary, where few read and none write. The only newspaper in Sicily, when the English first occupied it, was the Royal Gazette, published, I think, twice a week, and circulated only in Palermo. Sir John Stuart established a press for the army at Messina, and had a regular newspaper, which has been of the greatest advantage to our cause. The circulation was much more extended than that of the Royal Gazette.

The persons whom I happen to have seen or heard of in Sicily, who might be advantageously employed in our service in the departments of the State, are, besides the Prince of Belmonte, Don Cesare Airoldi, the nephew of the head of the Sicilian Church, generally known by the title of Monsignor della Monarchia; the Abate Balsamo, a Professor in the University of Palermo; Don Salvadore Scuderi, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Catanea; and Don Francisco Strano, Secretary to the Marquis of San Giuliano of Catanea. The last (Don F. Strano) I do not know; but he is, I understand, an extremely able man.

Of the English, no man is so thoroughly acquainted with Sicily as Mr. Burgman, the Commissary-General, and he is a very able, honest man. Sir John Dalrymple, the Inspector of the Calabrese corps, who has resided long in the Mediterranean, and latterly two or three years at Messina, now at Palermo, is a man whose considerable talents and acquirements are rendered rather less available, on account of his unfortunate manner, which prejudices the English against him. Towards the Sicilians he is more conciliatory. I have already mentioned Captain Robinson of the Marine Artillery, the Superintendent of the Arsenal at Messina, Colonel, I believe, in the Sicilian service. He is a most active, clever, brave officer; and I must not omit the name of Major Reide, of the 27th Regiment, who for a long time commanded the united flotilla. I may say of him what I have said of Captain Robinson; and they are both adored by the Sicilians. The Calabrians should always be placed under the command of Colonel

Robertson, of the Sicilian regiment, who so gallantly defended the Castle of Scilla. Major Thackeray of the Engineers, now Chief Engineer at Alicant, is an officer whose services may be employed every where with perfect confidence. In Sicily he is much wanted.

Sir John Stuart will be able to afford Government any information as to the talents of the officers that served under him in Sicily. The chief talent appears to be that of discovering and knowing how best to employ talents in others.

Hints for the Improvement of Sicily.

If we wish to preserve Sicily, and make it happy in itself and useful to us, we must commence by resolving to govern it in the name of the present dynasty, and by declaring solemnly to the Sicilians that we will never abandon them in war or at a peace. Before we can operate any radical and beneficial changes, we must possess ourselves entirely of the Government; which is to be done by obtaining complete mastery over the minds of those who administer it. How this is to be done can only be determined by persons on the spot; and it can only be done by many able men acting under one head, and having plenty of money at their disposal.

There exists not in Sicily the mind or the knowledge necessary to regenerate a country two hundred years behind the rest of Europe. The mind must be English. English mind and knowledge must run through every department of the Government. It must be recollected that the Sicilians feel too much our superiority and love us too much to be jealous. They have more confidence in us than in their own countrymen.

I should propose that at the head of our embassy in Sicily there be placed a man, it matters not of what profession, fit to become the regenerator of the country. Let him, in addition to the qualities which it is immediately seen his situation will

require, have a mind more formed to direct in chief than to be busy in details. Select a man born to be a King and his own Minister. Under this head should be placed intelligent men, whose labours he might direct—an excellent financier and political economist, two or three good lawyers, agriculturists, civil engineers, &c.

These persons should be furnished with every possible information, and joined with the very few intelligent Sicilians in framing Reports upon the particular subjects to which their inquiries would be directed, which Reports should be presented to and decided upon by the head of the Government. The first thing to be done would be to obtain complete knowledge of the country and its actual state, of its agriculture, commerce, manufactures, police, laws, population, productions, &c. When this knowledge was once obtained, the head of the Government, availing himself of the opinions of the persons skilled in each department, to form his judgment, would decide upon the several plans for ameliorating the condition of the people: for it must always be held in mind that in Sicily every thing is to be made new. I know of no other plan than this at all calculated to advance the prosperity of Sicily, and make the possession of that country advantageous to England.

I will now mention some of the changes which, I imagine, might possibly occur to the persons charged with the office of legislating for and regenerating Sicily.

It has been seen in the preceding paper that the two great sources of misery in Sicily are the Corn Laws, and the mode of administering the civil and criminal code, in itself very deficient. The monopoly existing in each district, with respect to corn, would probably be immediately done away, and the internal commerce of the country rendered perfectly free. Our first grand object would be to increase the quantity of corn produced in Sicily, as it would more directly affect the riches and population of the country, and as it would make us independent of all the Barbary States.

It would be necessary, however, in the first instance, to impose certain restrictions upon exportation, because, the intercourse between the different districts being now first opened by the proposed destruction of the existing Corn Laws, it could not immediately, in a country in which there are no roads, in which one town is fifteen or twenty miles from another, and the intermediate space desolate, in which each district has hitherto been accustomed to provide in all ways for itself only, and where travelling is almost unknown—in such a country, intercouse could not immediately become so general, or information so widely diffused, as to make it safe to allow each district to export unlimitedly; because one might be exporting what might be required to prevent famine in another.

It would be necessary for the Government first to inform itself of the whole quantity of corn produced in the year, and then to allow exportation to go on, until the difference between the whole produce and the quantity required for the consumption of the inhabitants was sent out of the country. Under this restriction, every encouragement should certainly be given to exportation.

It would be necessary, in the first instance, to collect all the different codes of laws, and then, with reference to the character of the people and local circumstances, to reform the code and publish it. The greatest improvement would be the establishment of Circuits, which bring unbiassed judges to the decision of causes. I said the code must be reformed with reference to the character of the people. The Trial by Jury could not be safely introduced. The people is not virtuous enough. The judges must be chiefly English. Even in the higher ranks, it would be difficult to find the virtue that would resist a bribe.

It appears, then, that the character of the people requires reformation. It would be hopeless to attempt to do any thing with the present generation; but of the next we may make what we please, by example and education. The grand object

is to reform the higher classes, and it may be done most easily. The chief nobility should be induced to send their sons to be educated in England. Those now grown up should be invited to travel in this country. This would have the effect, too, of making them attached to the English yet more. A regiment of native Sicilian guards, officered by young men of the first families and fortunes, almost a Guard of Honour, should be sent to serve with the English army. But the people should be educated too, and generally. English professors of the sciences should be sent to the universities of Catanea and Palermo. There are already in both universities some intelligent Sicilians.

The persons of rank, indeed all persons, are already sufficiently disposed to learn the English language. That disposition ought to be encouraged. French should not be taught. Italian, and not the barbarous Sicilian dialect, might be taught in the schools. The course of study in the universities should be remodelled, and the young men should be educated for useful citizens, and not mere pedants. Honour, not fear, should be the principle upon which the discipline of the universities and schools rested. Emulation should be excited to the greatest possible degree, and the ferment raised in the mind of the schoolboy continued in the man, by making merit the road to preferment in the different professions.

One great bar to improvement now in Sicily is the want of capital. But English capital would soon cultivate the fallows of a thousand years that overspread Sicily: but, first, all must be convinced of our secure possession of the country. Some works, which form the first step to prosperity, must be executed by the Government. Roads are indispensably necessary. The country is so very mountainous, and so intersected by torrents, that the making of roads would be at first very expensive and difficult. Much would depend upon the first tracing; and it would be necessary to have the most ingenious and scientific engineers. The first road of absolute necessity

is a military road from Messina to Palermo, about 160 miles, to connect the capital and the principal military and naval station. The next in importance would be a continuation of the present road to Girgenti from Palermo. Girgenti the packets touch at, and it is the nearest point of communication with Malta. The third road would be from Palermo to Syracuse. Great roads should cross the island in other directions, and Castro Giovanni should be the central point, where there should always be a strong garrison, with light artillery and some cavalry. It is by nature impregnable, and not much more than two marches from all the important points in the island.

The Sicilians want not only instruction but example, and the country should be garrisoned too. Colonies should be the garrisons and instructresses by example: for the colonies are required strong positions, the neighbourhood of the sea, and plenty of fertile land. The first colony should be planted at Syracuse, and the ground opposite to the island and only remaining town should be occupied. It is high ground, peninsular, the ground at the narrowest part very low. It is free, too, from the malaria that infects some parts of the country. The second colony might be at Augusta, within the walls; the third at Taormina. Castro Giovanni, the strong central position, should be occupied, too, by a colony. Other situations would afterwards be discovered: these are the principal.

I believe the taxes to be very injudicious, and I know the expense of collecting them is enormous. After mature consideration and accurate investigation, I believe much more might be drawn, with much less suffering, from the people. The inquiries of intelligent men would, of course, be directed to that object. Relief to the revenue and permanent advantage to the country might be obtained in process of time by the sale of some of the Crown lands—not now, for the Crown wants the support of property, and there would yet be no purchasers.

As the people became industrious, they would attend less to ceremonies and shows. These are extremely expensive, and, I know, in the district of Catanea absorb one half of the revenue. In Messina, where the presence of the English has introduced industry, the Church shows are very much neglected, in Malta almost entirely. Monking and nunning, too, would go out of fashion, as people could live better by other trades. No more should be allowed to enter the convents; and, as the decreasing number of those now existing required less and less funds, the difference should belong to the State. We must not offend the clergy, for their body contains our very best friends, and the only informed and intelligent people in the island. They would make excellent soldiers, though.

If we resolve to keep Sicily for ourselves, money laid out there would yield hundreds per cent. If it could well be obtained from Parliament, I am sure an increase of £100,000 a-year to the subsidy, to be employed in improving the country, would not only conciliate the people, but be productive of immense ultimate advantage to ourselves. A great disposable revenue is wanted in Sicily immediately, and a national debt is wanted too. There is no bank in the island. If a man wishes to live upon the interest of his capital, he must lend it out, at great risk, and of course at enormous interest, to individuals. To accommodate the moneyed men and commence the great improvements, we might borrow money, and allow the subsidy to be mortgaged for the payment of the interest and final repayment. The increased revenue, in consequence of the improvements, would soon realize the subsidy. Roads are the more necessary in Sicily, as there is no inland navigation: I much doubt whether it would be possible to effect any. There have been small rivers, but either earthquakes have engulphed their springs, or sand has been allowed to accumulate at their mouths. The Tiumara from Camarata to the sea, and the streams that pass through the plains of Catanea especially, should be surveyed by engineers. The plains of Catanea, the

famous Campi Leontini, are now desolate. They should supply the English colonies of Augusta and Syracuse.

The *malaria*, or infectious vapours, would occupy the attention of an active and beneficent Government. Numbers die annually, and many more are afflicted by dreadful distortions of body and perpetual illness, in consequence of their effects.

Our necessities would make us encourage the production of corn in Sicily, and our policy should engage us to encourage the wines of that country, and, if possible, its silks. The climate and soil of Sicily would enable an enlightened administration to call forth extraordinary resources. It is proposed to apply to that country, in which, it may be said, every thing is to be created, the arts and sciences in the full maturity they have now obtained, and to direct the progress of the Sicilians to civilization and general improvement by English minds. The next generation will see Sicily not inferior to the rest of Europe. But now that country wants every thing, and with every thing we may supply it, and it is our interest to do so.

It remains only to consider Sicily as a subsidiary station, and with reference to the countries on the Mediterranean Sea.

There is no reason why the Sicilians should have large ships of war. Gun-boats are necessary for her defence, and gun-boats only. We can protect her from the navy of France, and with her gun-boats she will protect herself from invasion by the strait of Messina. The Arsenal at Messina, under the direction of Captain Robinson, of the Marine Artillery, created in a single year and brought to perfection, requires very little to make it serve all the purposes of Sicily. There was a cannon-foundry at Palermo, but it has not been used since the beginning of the war, nor is there any manufactory of small arms. These articles are brought from England at a great expense, and perhaps might better be made in Sicily. There is no iron in Sicily, but the island of Elba has very fine mines of iron; and, for that and ulterior objects, we should have possession of it.

I have heard the officers of the navy employed in the Adriatic and on the coast of Italy lament that they had so few men, as they were prevented from doing a great many things along the coast that they might otherwise do with safety. Would it not be advantageous to send, as marines, on board the English ships in the Mediterranean, at least, those near Sicily, Sicilians in the proportion of about two to one to the marines, there to serve half a year or a year, and then be relieved? The objects accomplished would be those of teaching them the English language, and gaining them discipline, courage, hatred of the enemy, and generally English feelings and manners.

With regard to the army, I should propose extending immediately the number of troops placed at our disposal from 6,000 to 10,000, and taking only Sicilian regiments. The Neapolitans will desert, that they may return to Naples, and there is no object in making soldiers of them, and attaching them to us. These Sicilian regiments should be always kept at their complement, and always employed with the English. The regiments should be formed, as the Portuguese regiments are, with English officers; and, in the first instance, some of those officers might be selected who have long served in Sicily, and who know the Sicilians well. The same frequent interchange of officers that takes place between the European and Sepoy regiments, in the Company's service, would take place between the English and Sicilian, and for the same reasons. Thus there should be no diminution of disposable force, in consequence of the occupation of Sicily; for there should be employed out of Sicily as many Sicilians as there were English in it. The Sicilian regiments at our disposal should be changed about every three years. If common enlisting did not fill the ranks of the Sicilian army, recourse should be had to a conscription; and, since we cannot keep our army up to its complement, or near it, we had better have those foreigners of whose native soil we are in possession than any others, because

they will never desert, and the others whenever they can. The basis of the treaty between England and Sicily, on this subject, should be, that we should, for 10,000 Sicilians at our disposal, paid by us, send to Sicily 10,000 English, to be paid by them. This Sicily will soon be able to do.

The object I should have had in view, from the first moment of my obtaining possession of Sicily, would have been the union of all the Mediterranean islands into one league under Great Britain, each island being supreme in civil matters, the subsidiary force at our disposal, and commerce quite free between them all. The Mediterranean islands may, I think, be held without any diminution of our disposable force, by the mere interchange of troops, natives of the different islands. Whatever I would do in Sicily, I would do in Sardinia instantly, where there are fine ports, navigable rivers, and forests; the people much more uncivilized than the Sicilians.

The first conquest must be Elba, on account of its fine ports, its fortified strength, its iron mines, and its position on the coast of Tuscany, so favourable for communication with Italy. From Elba a gun-boat flotilla might interrupt the whole trade between Upper and Lower Italy. The grand end of all the operations in the Mediterranean is the emancipation of Italy, and its union in one great State. For this object might be formed an army of men speaking a language understood by Italians, of 30,000. The French have done much for the regeneration of Italy. They have destroyed the prejudices of the inhabitants of the small States of Upper Italy, by uniting them: they have done away with the Pope; they have made them soldiers. A glance over the map tells the rest. The master of Sicily regenerated holds Egypt under his foot: Tunis is his tributary; and the depôt of the commerce of belligerents, the Barbary powers, cease to have ships of war. He watches the fall of the Turkish empire, and stands with expanded wings to pounce upon Greece. He closes the Dardanelles with Lemnos, and forbids the Russians to enter the Archipelago.

Notes on Bombardment.[1]

[Indorsed "1810."]

The want of detailed publications upon the subject of the early campaigns in the French revolutionary wars has considerably embarrassed the efforts made use of to discover instances of towns attacked or taken by bombardment merely, in later years. Egerton's Military Library, that of Dulau, and others, have been resorted to with little success. Such information, however, as has been collected, and which appears at all applicable to the subject, will be shortly detailed.

This has been chiefly sought from the campaigns of Pichegru in 1794-5; that of Buonaparte, in Italy, in 1796; the campaigns of 1799, the operations of which are very ably and ingeniously detailed in a work entitled, "Précis des Evènemens Militaires—Campagne de 1799;" and from the campaign in Prussia, Saxony, Poland, &c., in the years 1806-7.

It may not, however, be improper to premise that the overthrow of the French monarchy scarcely operated a greater revolutionary effect upon the moral and political state of Europe, than the wars which succeeded it have effected a total revolution in the conduct of military enterprise, and in no respect more than what relates to the importance formerly affixed to fortified places.

La Guerre de Sièges, which went upon the imprudence of leaving a fortified place in the rear of an advancing army in the power of an enemy, and which, till the wars of the Revolution, was scarcely ever swerved from, seems now to be at least partially subverted by a practice founded on the principle that the party whose force is prevalent in the field will necessarily and at his ease become possessed of all the fortified places within the countries occupied by his arms.

This apparent change of principle and absolute alteration in

[1] Collected, I presume, by Lord Clancarty, being in his handwriting.—EDITOR.

practice seems to be a natural consequence of the immense masses of force brought into the field by the French since the Revolution. Formerly, when armies were less numerous, the garrisons of fortified towns of any importance bore some proportion to them, and consequently were enabled considerably to harass a retreating force, more especially where that force had previously suffered losses by defeat; but, at the present day, could make but little impression even on the remains of a beaten French army, the apprehension of which, or even of the partial interruption of communication, has not been deemed sufficient to counterbalance the delay of a rapid forward movement by their previous attack and capture. The alteration in practice above described will serve to account for the few instances of regular siege or bombardment detailed in the books above referred to.

On the evening of the 26th April, 1794, the French army invested Menin, and on the 27th and 28th bombarded it so warmly that the fire spread from various parts; but, being threatened with an attack from the Austrian force under Clairfait, it was necessary, as the author says, to beat the enemy in the field, in order to ensure the capture of the place; and this Pichegru did on the 29th, and the town, after this check, despairing of succour, surrendered on the 30th.[1]

April 30th, 1794, Landrecy surrendered to the Allies; and, though trenches were opened before it, and the siege lasted ten days, it may be said to have fallen by bombardment, which, during the continuance of the siege, was so severe, that not more than three houses were left standing: 200 inhabitants and 1,200 soldiers lost their lives. The remainder of the garrison, which surrendered (as the French author says) without making the resistance which was to have been expected, amounted to about 4,400.[2]

[1] Pichegru's Campaigns, p. 74.

[2] Crutwell's Gazetteer, Art. Landrecy. Pichegru's Campaigns, p. 15.

September 29th, 1794. The fort of Crevecœur was taken by bombardment by the army under Pichegru; and a few days after, when the town of Bois-le-duc had only been bombarded, and before the siege artillery just arrived had been mounted, and at the moment when the French General conceived that the siege would be most difficult, if not of impossible success, the Governor desired to capitulate.[1]

In the Campaigns of Buonaparte in Italy, 1796, there occurs nothing in point to the present subject. After the passage of the Adda by the bridge of Lodi, Beaulieu retired on Mantua; the towns of Pizzighitone and Cremona surrendered to the French, the former after a cannonade of one day, the latter without opposition, and three days after, the French entered without resistance the town of Milan, the Castle of which capitulated after about eleven days of open trenches. Peschiera, Castel Nuovo, Verona, Valleggio, fell into the power of the French without resistance.[2]

The city of Turin, garrisoned by the French under Fiorello, was invested by the Russian General, Wukassowich, and cannonaded on the night between the 26th and 27th of May, 1799. On the 27th, in the morning, the Governor was summoned to surrender, but refused, and returned the fire of the besiegers. A shell, however, having burned a house at the Po Gate, the armed *bourgeois* took advantage of the disorder to seize that gate, and opened it to the Allies. The garrison, consisting of about 3,000 men, retired to the citadel.[3]

May 24, 1799, the citadel of Ferrara, a regular pentagon, very strong, and furnished with excellent artillery, surrendered to General Klenau, after a bombardment, which set fire to several magazines. The garrison, consisting of 1,500 men, were suffered to depart on condition of not serving for six months.[4]

[1] Pichegru's Campaigns, p. 84, 86.
[2] Camp. Buonaparte, p. 27, 58, *et seq.*
[3] Précis, p. 140. [4] Précis, 146.

Some days after the general attack upon all the positions of the Archduke, from Zurich to the Mont St. Gothard (1799, August, from the 13th to the 15th) by the French, under Massena, and the concurrent operations in Italy, General Müller, provisionally commanding the French force between Mayence and Manheim, commenced an operation, intended to have been simultaneous with the preceding, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the Archduke Charles. The object of the operation was to draw from the right bank of the Rhine and from the banks of the Neckar and Main those resources, and to seize those towns and places which might otherwise facilitate the march of the new Imperial army towards the Lower Rhine. On the 25th of August, he established his head-quarters at Manheim, and his advanced guards at Heidelberg and Schwetzingen, and on the 2nd and 3rd of September invested Philipsburg. On the first account of this movement, the Archduke, on the 27th of August, detached a corps across the Rhine at Schaffhausen; the corps of Generals Meerveldt and Sztarray were marched to oppose the enemy in this direction; and the Landsturm (or Militia) were raised; and the Archduke himself, with a still greater force, soon after passed the Rhine, and placed his head-quarters at Donauschingen, on the 4th of September.

The French nevertheless commenced the bombardment of Philipsburg on the night between the 6th and 7th of September; but the rapid advance of the corps of General Nauendorf and Sztarray compelled the enemy to raise the siege on the 12th, after a bombardment of five days and five nights; the town, with little exception, being reduced to cinders. This is reckoned the most severe bombardment of the war, and in which the necessary precipitation of the efforts of the besiegers occasioned the adoption of bomb-throwing from ricochet batteries, for the purpose of destroying the defences and silencing the fire of the besieged.[1]

[1] Précis, p. 357, *et seq.*, and 456.

In December, 1799, and early in January, 1800, Coni was, after the defeat of the French in the field, invested by the Austrian army under General Melas. Regular approaches were made, and nineteen artillery batteries constructed, the fire from which was so severe, that the troops defending the works were obliged to abandon them. A heavy bombardment also was carried on, and the town set fire to in several places. This induced the inhabitants to beseech the Austrian General commanding the siege, the Prince of Lichtenstein, to spare the town, who refused, announcing his intention of persevering till a proper person, furnished with full powers to treat for a capitulation, should be sent to his camp. The French Commandant, despairing of relief, seeing that the defence could not be prolonged but by the total destruction of the town, capitulated after nine days of open trenches; and the garrison, consisting of 2,500, surrendered prisoners of war. It does not appear that any breach was made in the main works.[1]

November 6, 1808, to November 29. Glogau, the capital of Upper Silesia, was attacked by bombardment by the corps under General Lefebvre, from ten howitzers.[2] It seems, however, to have been necessary to construct batteries round the place, and to bring up mortars and additional artillery. These arrived on the 29th of November, when, after a few hours' bombardment, the place capitulated: 2,500 men, considerable magazines of biscuit, grain, powder, and near 200 pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the French.[3]

On the 5th of January, 1807, the town of Breslau surrendered to the French, after a siege which lasted from the 7th of December; and, though during its course regular ap-

[1] Précis, vol. ii., p. 343, &c.

[2] 30th Bulletin de la Grande Armée, dated from Berlin, 10th November, 1806.

[3] 38th Bulletin from Posen, 5th December, 1806. Campagne de Prusse, vol. iii., p. 4 and 152.

proaches, parallel and zigzag, were made, it does not appear that the town was at any time completely invested, or otherwise effectually attacked than by bombardment. From a regular journal of the operations of this siege, it appears that General Vandamme reconnoitred on the 7th of December, that two bomb-batteries (*batteries incendiaries*) were placed to the right and left of the gate of St. Nicholas, which commenced firing on the 10th. Additional mortars and two pieces of 24 [two 24-pounders] were sent for to Glogau, and other batteries erected on the prolongation of the trenches, on the 11th and 12th, on the night of which they continued to fire but slowly, from the want of a sufficiency of ammunition. On the morning of the 15th, two parallels being complete, and zigzags of communication opened between them, everything was ready for the third bombardment, which continued till mid-day, when a second summons was sent without effect to the Governor. Soon after this, an attempt was made to surprise the place by a night assault, which failed, and two efforts to relieve the place, on the part of Prince de Pless, were overcome by the besiegers.

On the 29th, all the batteries of the besiegers commenced firing; but even on the 3rd of January, 1807, as the Journal says, the Governor "différa encore de se rendre parcequ'un Général de Génie, enfermé avec lui, l'excitoit pour son amour propre personnel à ne point rendre une place *qui n'étoit point attaquée*. Dans le fait, toute l'artillerie n'avoit été dirigée que contre la ville: ce n'est point la peine d'entreprendre un siège en règle dans lequel l'avantage seroit tout pour l'assiégé, à cause de sa grande supériorité en artillerie." The town, reduced almost to cinders, surrendered on the 5th, with a garrison of between 5 and 6,000 men.[1]

The above instances are all those of which the scanty means of information have enabled a discovery. But, though these are few, and several of them scarcely applicable, it can hardly

[1] Camp. de Prusse, vol. iii., p. 277-299.

require any to fortify a principle so generally acknowledged, so universally practised, so obvious in itself, and impossible to be controverted, as the expediency of attacking an enemy's position before he shall have time effectually to succour the point attacked. An instance of this sort against a fortified town, comprising the double object of capture and diversion, and conducted by bombardment, appears in the above enumeration, in the attack by General Müller on the town of Philipsburg, in August, 1799.

Count de Puisaye to Lord Castlereagh.[1]

Fursdon, Plympton, Devon, 27 Octobre, 1810.

Mylord—Mon respect pour vous ne me permettant pas de faire aucune démarche relative aux affaires que j'ai suivies sous votre direction, sans en avoir obtenu votre agrément, j'ose espérer que ce motif sera une excuse suffisante pour la liberté que je prens de vous adresser cette lettre.

Le mémoire, sur lequel vous aviez eu la bonté de me promettre une prompte décision, étant resté sans réponse, sans doute à cause de votre retraite du ministère, et la mort m'ayant privé de l'appui de mon respectable ami, M. Windham, il ne me reste plus d'autre moyen pour combattre les mauvais effets des intrigues et des calomnies de mes ennemis que de solliciter une décision solennelle et publique sur les réclamations que j'ai adressées au Gouvernement, et de suivre la marche ordinaire en ces sortes d'affaires, en me pourvoyant par conseil et par voye de requête au Conseil privé.

Mais parmi ces réclamations d'ancienne date, il en est une plus nouvelle, qui ne concerne que les services dont j'ai été chargé par le département de la guerre, et en plus grande partie, mylord, sous votre administration.

Cet objet ne pouvant être susceptible d'aucune difficulté,

[1] Count Puisaye's Memoirs in French were published in London in six volumes.

puisque vous en avez, mylord ainsi que M. Cooke, une parfaite connaissance, je n'ai pas voulu remettre à mon Conseil les lettres qui l'établissent, avant d'avoir pris vos ordres à cet égard.

On m'assure qu'un simple certificat de vous, par lequel vous voudrez bien attester que la somme de £840 que je réclame, m'est légitimement dûe par votre département, pour un service secret, suffira pour terminer cette affaire par la voye ordinaire d'office. Je prens donc la liberté de solliciter ce certificat de votre justice, et à fin que vous puissiez facilement vous rappeller les détails, que, sans doute, au milieu de tant d'importantes occupations, vous devez avoir perdu de vue, j'ai, l'honneur de joindre ici quelques notes recueillies sur les pièces originales, qui doivent faire la base de mon mémoire.

Je suis avec respect, mylord, &c.,

Cte. JOSEPH DE PUISAYE.

Notes pour servir à la Rédaction d'un Mémoire.

Le Cte. de Puisaye dégoûté des intrigues qui avaient rendu vains les efforts de tous ceux qui s'étaient sacrifiés pour la cause commune, avait en 1798 pris la résolution de renoncer pour toujours aux affaires publiques. Il a persisté dans cette résolution jusqu'à la rentrée de M. Windham au ministère en 1806.

A cette époque il lui fut impossible de refuser les services qui lui furent demandés par un ministre qui s'était si constamment et si chaleureusement montré son ami. Le Cte. de Puisaye entreprit donc à la sollicitation de M. Windham la direction d'une correspondance avec la France, pour le service du Gouvernement.

Il envoya en Bretagne M. Prigent, qui après y avoir tout disposé suivant ses instructions, et après avoir fourni un grand nombre de renseignemens utiles, revint en Angleterre au printems de 1807. M. Windham était alors remplacé par mylord Castlereagh. Le C. de P. n'ayant pas l'honneur d'en être

connu, se borna à rendre compte à M. Cooke de tous les détails de cette correspondance; et il était déterminé à se retirer de nouveau, lorsque M. Canning lui fit proposer d'agir encore sous sa direction.

Le Cte. de P. n'ayant jamais offert ses services, desira, avant de se rendre à l'invitation de M. Canning, que cette proposition lui fut adressé par écrit ; ce qui ayant été fait, il s'empressa d'organiser des nouveaux moyens de correspondance dans l'intérieur de la France, et jusqu'à Paris, par la Hollande ; tandis qu'il fut convenu qu'il enverrait M. Prigent au Nord de la Bretagne et M. Hermely au Sud ; ayant prévenu M. Canning que, sans cette double disposition, il serait impossible de réussir à rien. M. Canning remit au Cte. de P. les fonds nécessaires pour les arrangemens préliminaires ; il a rendu un compte exact de l'employ de ces fonds à Lord Castlereagh, par l'entremise de M. Cooke.

Bientôt après, mylord Castlereagh, ayant réclamé cette branche de service, comme appartenant à son département, M. Canning en fit part au Cte. de P., qui consentit à continuer sous la direction de mylord Castlereagh, mais sous la condition qu'il en recevrait l'invitation par écrit. Il la reçut par deux lettres successives de M. Cooke au nom de mylord, à qui, dans une entrevue qui suivit de près, il fit part des conditions indispensables pour que cette correspondance ne fut pas croisée par les intrigues qu'il lui indiqua et par les personnes qu'il lui nomma. Il déclara de plus à mylord ce qu'il avait déclaré à M. Canning, sur la nécessité absolue d'envoyer M. Hermely au Sud de la Bretagne, en même tems que M. Prigent irait au Nord. Mylord lui promit que cela serait, et que toutes les précautions nécessaires seraient prises pour prévenir les intrigues que le Cte. de P. ne prévoyait que trop.

M. Prigent partit : il s'établit au Nord de la Bretagne, et remplit exactement les instructions qu'il avait reçues, mais malheureusement M. Hermely ne fut point envoyé au Sud.

Par ce moyen, la porte étant restée ouverte aux intrigues que le Cte. de P. redoutait, et dont il avait les preuves écrites de la main de leurs auteurs (preuves qu'il a communiquées a M. Cooke) M. Prigent a été dénoncé et livré: avec lui, ses secrets sont tombés entre les mains de l'ennemi commun et un grand nombre de personnes devouées ont été jettées dans les prisons. De ce nombre sont les plus proches parens et amis du Cte. de P. Il conserve les doubles des mémoires, et des lettres qu'il a successivement adressées à M. Cooke et à mylord Castlereagh; ces pièces prouvent suffisamment qu'il n'a rien à se reprocher de tant de malheurs qu'il avait indiqué les moyens de prévenir.

Indépendamment du travail et des peines de cœur et d'esprit, qu'a données au Cte. de P. cette malheureuse affaire, elle lui a occasionné, pendant plus de deux ans, la dépense additionelle d'un établissement à Londres, d'environ trois voyages par semaine, pour venir de sa compagne, des fraix de poste d'Angleterre à Jersey, &c. M. Windham et M. Canning avaient promis que ces dépenses seraient payées; et mylord Castlereagh avait pris l'engagement de les couvrir, en portant le Cte. de P. sur son établissement pour £2 par jour.

Le Cte. de P. n'ayant jamais rien reçu pour les services qu'il a rendu à l'Angleterre (qui, au contraire, lui doit des sommes considérables) profita de cette occasion pour terminer ses comptes avec le Gouvernement, et déclara qu'il se contenterait de recevoir ce qui lui était dû, ou un équivalent, plutôt que d'être payé à titre de services. Il présenta à ce sujet un mémoire à mylord Castlereagh, qui lui promit de lui procurer une prompte décision. Cette décision n'étant pas survenue, et n'ayant plus les moyens de faire *à ses fraix*, comme ci-devant, les dépenses d'un service public, il s'est borné, sur environ trois ans qui lui étaient dûs, depuis la rentrée de M. Windham au ministère, à demander qu'il lui fut payé seulement deux. Il a reçu de M. Cooke un à-compte de £600; il lui restait donc dû £840, lorsque Lord Castlereagh

a quitté le ministère. C'est cette somme de £840 dont il réclame aujourd'hui le payement.

Le Cte. JOSEPH DE PUISAYE.

Return of the whole Force of the British Empire.[1]

	Colonels.	Lt.-Cols.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Staff.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Effective rank & file.
Disposable force. Cavalry	29	57	56	284	408	183	166	1,412	572	19,025
Disposable force. Ft. Gds.	3	3	7	72	110	101	37	485	161	7,771
Disposable force. Inftry.	36	105	114	533	761	446	334	2,519	1,116	40,943
Limited Force .	11	71	120	613	515	453	326	2,412	1,408	26,870
Rts. coming home	11	23	24	117	170	105	71	558	264	6,197
Gibraltar . . .	7	12	13	68	102	57	43	338	154	4,682
Malta	9	15	19	102	173	84	66	516	242	7,601
Sir J. Craig . .	5	9	9	46	76	38	30	232	100	3,650
East Indies . .	23	46	45	220	480	175	138	1,138	480	16,451
Ceylon . . .	7	10	14	79	122	70	42	272	134	5,472
W.& Leewd. Isles.	18	32	37	183	350	124	98	842	418	11,327
Jamaica . . .	6	12	12	60	113	47	36	329	132	4,617
North America .	8	11	12	80	96	64	48	372	176	4,460
Honduras . . .	1	2	2	10	12	8	6	54	22	912
Bermuda&N.Pro.	1	1	2	10	12	8	6	54	22	818
New S.W.&Goree	2	2	2	10	14	10	10	67	44	772
Sir D. Baird . .	6	11	13	64	88	52	42	312	140	4,312
	183	422	501	2,551	3,602	2,025	1,499	11,912	5,585	165,880

Summary.

	Men.
Colonels	183
Lieut.-Colonels	422
Majors	501
Captains	2,251
Lieutenants	3,602
Ensigns	2,025
Staff	1,399
Sergeants	11,912
Drummers	5,585
Effective Rank and File . .	165,880
	194,060

[1] There is nothing about this paper which has the appearance of an official Return from the War Offices to indicate the year to which it *belongs. I conjecture that* it must be 1812.—EDITOR.

Brought forward . .		194,060
	Men.	
Militia, Great Britain . . .	56,135	
———, Ireland	19,009	
Commissioned Officers, non-commissioned Officers, and Drummers, suppose	8,000	83,144
Volunteers, Great Britain . .	334,538	
Commissioned Officers, non-commissioned Officers, and Drummers, suppose	35,000	369,538
Grand Total of Land Forces . . .		646,742

Memorandum by Mr. Cooke, on Mr. Russell's Note of the 29th January, 1812.

From this Note it does not appear to me that the case of the ship Acastre can be applied to show that the Berlin and Milan decrees are practically repealed, and cease to exist even as to America. By the Milan decree, every vessel, of whatever nation, which shall have allowed (*aura souffert*) a search from an English vessel, is *denationalized*. Now, it is to be observed that the expression *aura souffert* is capable of different meanings, according to the subject with which it is associated: and, as it is used in the decree with a view to impose the heaviest penalties *upon neutrals*, against every principle of neutral rights, it must, of course, by every principle of law, be construed in the sense most favourable to neutrals. The expression, therefore, does not apply to all vessels equally, whether forcibly searched or otherwise, but is confined to such as may have suffered search without due resistance made. The liberation, therefore, of the Acastre being in strict conformity with the only true and just interpretation of the Milan decree, supposing its existence, cannot be alleged as any argument, much less a proof of its revocation.

Mr. Russell himself supposes that the decree of Milan is thus construed by the French, in his letter dated Paris, 8 May, 1811, respecting the Grace Ann, Greene. She had been captured by an English ship of war, but the crew rose on the captors, and carried her into Marseilles, to which she was bound, on which Mr. Russell says: "The captain considered this recapture of his vessel as an act of resistance to the British Orders in Council, and as exempting his property from the operation of the French decrees, issued in retaliation for those Orders. He likewise made a merit of delivering to this Government nine of its enemies to be treated as prisoners of war. His vessel was liberated in December, and his cargo in the beginning of April last, and there is some difficulty in determining whether this liberation was predicated on the general revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, or on a special exemption from them, owing to the particular circumstances of the case."

Lord Castlereagh to Sir Henry Wellesley.

Draft. Foreign Ocean, March , 1812.

My dear Sir—As some days must elapse before I can hope to obtain the decision of his Majesty's Government on the propositions brought forward by the Duke de l'Infantado, corresponding in substance with those pressed upon your attention by the Spanish Regency, I am desirous of not incurring even this delay in notifying to you my appointment to the Foreign Office.

I shall not detain you by expressing my regret that the public service has been deprived of Lord Wellesley's talents at a moment when, in many points of view, and in none more than with reference to the great cause of the Peninsula, they were of so much value, neither shall I attempt to describe how sensible I am of the great change it must operate in your feelings to have to conduct the duties of your situation with one so much less conversant with the subjects in discussion, and

so much less entitled to your personal confidence. But I trust we are sufficiently known to each other to authorize me to assure you, with the utmost sincerity, that it will afford me the greatest personal gratification if I should be so fortunate as to succeed in reconciling you to remain, under the change that has unfortunately taken place. I do not feel entitled to expect that my wishes can be conclusive on that point, but I look to the interest the public have in not being deprived of your experienced services at the present moment, and to the importance the Prince Regent attaches to your continuing to represent his Royal Highness in the Spanish embassy, for reconciling you to remain at Cadiz. I shall be most anxious to receive a favourable answer from you on this subject. In the mean time, offering my cordial congratulations on the well deserved reward with which the Prince Regent has marked your public services, I beg to assure you, my dear sir, of the sincere regard with which I am ever faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, April 10, 1812.

My dear Lord—I have nothing very particular to add to my despatches of this day's date. It is very important that the clothing, accoutrements, &c., for the Spanish army should be sent out without delay, particularly that part of them which are intended for the depôt at the Isle; and I take the liberty of suggesting that it might be advisable to appoint some person to superintend the making up and despatch of the clothing.

I hope your lordship will see the propriety of continuing the military agents upon the same footing as at present, that is, subordinate to his Majesty's ambassador, and their correspondence to be conducted with him. Without this it is impossible that he can be answerable for their conduct. I would also strongly recommend that all succours from Great Britain to Spain should go through the Spanish Government, and not be

given partially to the provinces, unless, perhaps, in the case of Gallicia, which, from its vicinity to England, may be supplied with more convenience from thence. Nothing will contribute so much to the support of the authority of the Government in the provinces as the placing the succours in their hands.

The intelligence of the taking of Badajoz was received here last night, and has occasioned the liveliest joy. A letter from Huelon, dated the 7th, mentions a report, which the writer states to be entitled to belief, that Ballasteros had entered Seville by Alcala, and La Peune Villemur by Castillejos; but I do not give this intelligence to your lordship as authentic.

I have the honour to be, my dear lord, your most faithful, humble servant,

HENRY WELLESLEY.

General O'Donnell is very anxious to procure his brother's exchange, who was taken at Valencia. He has written to request that I would write to England upon this subject; and, if the exchange of General C. O'Donnell could be effected, his brother, the Regent, would certainly consider himself as under a great obligation to the British Government.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, May 3, 1812.

My dear Lord—In the event of our being enabled to make such an arrangement as shall afford a hope that the Commissioners of mediation can proceed upon their mission with a prospect of success, it should, I think, be advisable that one of them should proceed to the West Indies, and the other to Buenos Ayres, as affording the best chance of speedily reconciling the differences subsisting in America.

I would, therefore, submit it to your lordship whether it might not be advisable to send a frigate here without delay, for the purpose of conveying one of the Commissioners to Buenos Ayres; and the frigate might afterwards proceed to Lima, where, I understand from Captain Fleming and Mr.

Drummond, there are likely to be considerable sums in specie, which may be obtained by bills upon his Majesty's Treasury.

The Commissioner who proceeds to Buenos Ayres might go by land to Lima, if his presence should be required in that city.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

Abstract of the Force of the Armies in Spain and in the Mediterranean, on the 25th of June, 1812.

Lord Wellington's Army	51,426
Cadiz	6,691
Gibraltar	4,299
Sicily and Ionian Islands	22,737
Malta	5,763
	90,916
The Portuguese Army at the same time amounted (exclusive of Recruits, &c.) to	36,452
	127,368

The Cavalry of Lord Wellington's Army amounted at this time to 6,546 horses, exclusive of 657 Horse Artillery; and the Portuguese Cavalry may be roughly estimated at 2,500.

Reinforcements which have sailed for Spain since the 1st of June.

CAVALRY.

21	Horses sailed on the	7th June	Remounts for different Regiments.
32	do.	28th	
100	do.	6th August	
729	do.	27th	
125	do.	4th Sept.	

964 The Brigade of Life and Horse Guards embarked on the 10th and 12th October.

535 Remount Horses, belonging to different Regiments, embarked on the 2nd and 9th November.

Total Cavalry 3,005

ARTILLERY.

295 Horses sailed from Cork and Portsmouth in June; also 116 Horses of the Waggon Train.

223 Artillery Horses sailed in August.
320 do. September.
210 do. 15th October.
156 do. of Waggon Train on 20th
154 do. are under orders.
114 Artillery Horses do.

Total Horses of Artillery, &c. 1,588

INFANTRY.

38th Regiment . .	863	sailed in June.
Detachment . . .	269	
Detachments of various Regiments . . .	1,090	embarked from 15th to 31st August.
59th	880	
Detachments . . .	360	
1 Battalion 1st Guards .	1,569	embarked 13th Sept.
91st	983	do. 17th and 18th.
Detachments . . .	250	
Detachments . . .	3,796	do. from 9th to 31st Oct.
6th Regiment . . .	674	do at Cork, 12th Oct.
20th	785	
Detachments of German Legion	800	now marching to embark.
Total of Infantry .	12,319	

N.B. These numbers appear to include Serjeants, Drummers, &c.

Recapitulation.

	Men.	
Infantry . . .	12,319	4,593 Horses.
Cavalry	3,005	
Artillery . . .	1,588	

Exclusively of the foregoing reinforcements, Lord Wellington's army has been joined by about 3,000 effective rank and file from Cadiz.

The recruits which have embarked to join regiments in Sicily, Malta, or Gibraltar, are not included in the foregoing Return.

Plan for raising a Loan of Ten Millions of Dollars for Spain. Addressed to Nicholas Vansittart, Esq., by Mr. John Irving.

London, July 1, 1812.

To facilitate the operations of the war, it is proposed to raise a loan in Spain to the extent of ten millions of dollars, upon the joint credit and security of England and Spain.

The loan to be opened at Cadiz, and to be undertaken by one or more of the most respectable commercial establishments.

Subscriptions to be paid in specie dollars.

Debentures, as in Ireland, to be issued, bearing interest per diem equal to 10 per cent. per annum, the interest to be paid each half year. An arrangement to be made for the payment of the interest at Gibraltar, in the event of any political reverse happening to Spain.

The capital to be repaid at the option of the two Governments at the end of the war; but, at the latest, in five years.

The British Government to have the supervision and the control of the issue of the Debentures, and the disposal of the funds which shall be raised.

A tax to be levied in Spain, affecting the mass of its population, from which no individual shall be privileged or exempted, equal to the payment of the interest and the redemption of the capital at the period stipulated.

Doubts may be entertained that a loan on a scale of such magnitude may exceed the financial means of Spain in her present exhausted state; but when it is taken into view that, independent of her original stock of specie, she has, during the war, received from her colonial possessions the accumulated treasure of many years, and that she has been the chief depôt of the expenditure of England and France, such a sum, though large, must be inconsiderable, compared with her means. Since the commencement of the Revolution, such has been the state of the Exchange, that the current of gold and silver has maintained a constant and undeviating course towards Spain: none

has flowed out, excepting in a very moderate degree, to America and Barbary for the payment of provisions: these have, in a great measure, been reimbursed through the medium of bills upon England. How, otherwise, could negociations upon the Treasury have been conducted to the extent which has been found practicable? But, supposing the loan were not to be accomplished to the proposed extent, or that it were entirely to fail, the attempt could produce no evil; no responsibility would follow, and England would have the advantage at least of giving an additional proof, if any were wanting, of her inclination and desire to succour Spain. It is true that the public credit of England is at present open to the investment of Spanish capital, and that, from the state of the Exchange and the low rate of the Funds, the inducements are sufficiently powerful as already to have called forth the whole that is likely to be lent upon British security; but it will be obvious that capital so invested is out of control, is liable to fluctuation, and cannot be received back but upon terms so disadvantageous as entirely to countervail the beneficial exchange which might have attended the original remittance.

It may be said, also, that such an operation as that proposed would diminish the facility of raising specie in Spain for the military purposes of England in the Peninsula; but, when that objection is fairly examined, it seems to be totally without foundation. It would have the effect of drawing largely from the hoards of hidden treasure; it would not abstract from but add to the stock of money, and is capable of giving a new and increased activity to the general circulation of the country. The Debentures would operate as an additional capital, and, like the Exchequer Bills of England, would become a ready mode of employing surplus or floating money; and, once rightly understood and fitly appreciated, might, and probably would, become the medium of the larger class of payments.

The moral effects are not entirely to be left out of view. So considerable a sum, so widely dispersed, could not fail to give

an interest beneficial to the Government among the class of capitalists, who, it is to be apprehended, now feel the least inclination to support it.

Founded upon this plan, a paper currency may be created (the details whereof it is not necessary here to state), which, having stability for its support, it may be possible to introduce into general credit and circulation, which, by diminishing the use, would lessen the value of the precious metals; and, if happily and successfully conducted, would contribute more than any single course to the prosperous issue of the contest in which Spain is now engaged.

JOHN IRVING.

General Dumouriez to Lord Bathurst.

11, Leicester Place, 7 Juillet, 1812.

Mylord—J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser une note militaire à laquelle j'attache la plus grande importance dans les circonstances présentes. J'y joins: 1°., la copie d'une lettre de Lord Wellington et ma réponse; 2°., une lettre de moi à Lord Bentinck, parcequelles ont rapport à la note militaire.

Je vous prie de vouloir bien communiquer particulièrement ces pièces à Lord Castlereagh, parcequ'elles sont en partie relatives à son département, et parceque, pendant qu'il était Ministre de la guerre, il m'a toujours témoigné une confiance et une estime dont je serai toute ma vie reconnaissant.

Je me présenterai à votre office Jeudy ou Vendredy matin, si cela vous convient, pour vous porter ces pièces, et en même tems pour vous remercier de la décision favorable que vous avez donnée aux deux malheureuses familles Hollandaises, qui vous doivent leur salut.

J'ay l'honneur d'être très respectueusement, &c.

DUMOURIEZ.

Note Militaire.

7 Juillet, 1812.

L'occasion est à la guerre le principe du bon succès final, si

elle est saisie à propos; comme elle amène les plus grandes calamités à celle des deux nations belligérantes qui la laisse échaper.

Buonaparte avait commis une grande imprudence en portant la guerre en Autriche avant de compléter la soumission de l'Espagne: les Espagnols et leurs alliés, n'en ont pas profité. L'invincible apathie d'un côté, la crainte de se compromettre et la parsimonie de l'autre, ont donné le tems au téméraire et heureux tyran d'abattre la maison d'Autriche et de renforcer la guerre dans la Péninsule. Il en est résulté pour les alliés plus de dépense et de perte en hommes; la guerre est restée au même point; et, au bout de dix campagnes sur les mêmes principes, on ne serait pas plus avancé de part et d'autre. Buonaparte seul y gagnerait, parceque la guerre est son élément.

L'occasion se présente de nouveau plus belle que jamais de délivrer l'Espagne, d'affranchir l'Italie, et de sauver l'Europe: il faut espérer que le Gouvernement Britannique, instruit par l'expérience du passé, ne la laissera pas échapper. Son intérêt, sa gloire, son salut, dépendent de sa conduite présente.

Buonaparte se présente de nouveau avec toutes les forces de son empire à plus de 500 lieues de l'Espagne et de l'Italie; il est déjà arrivé sur les bords de la Pregel, pour conquérir par ses armes ou soumettre par la terreur, l'Empereur Alexandre, qui paraît vouloir lui résister à la tête des forces de son Empire. Le calcul des probabilités et des évènements de cette contestation ne peut pas entrer dans cette note, qui n'est relative qu'à la conduite de l'Angleterre.

Quel que soit l'intérêt qu'elle peut prendre au sort de la Russie et de la Suède, quel que soit l'état de ses négociations avec ces deux Puissances, menacées du poids de la colère du Conquérant, quel que soyent les dispositions des deux Cours de Petersbourg et de Stockholm, qu'on peut regarder comme très douteuses jusqu'à ce que les hostilités soyent commencées, et l'état de guerre bien constaté, le Gouvernement Britannique est

certainement bien convaincu que son état politique au Nord n'est qu'une neutralité armée, soutenue par une forte escadre dans la Baltique, pour l'appuy de son commerce.

C'est même avec beaucoup de prudence et de précaution que cette neutralité armée peut être maintenue de peur que dans le cas où la paix et une alliance venaient à être conclues brusquement entre les deux Puissances menacées et Buonaparte, notre escadre ne se trouvât compromise et en danger dans la Baltique.

Quel que soit l'étendue de nos négociations dans le Nord, quel que soit même l'état des affaires, nous ne pouvons pas aller plus loin, ni faire plus pour ces deux Puissances. Nous avons trop besoin de nos ressources pécuniaires partout ailleurs pour donner des subsides à ces deux Puissances. Si elles faisaient la paix, nous en serions les dupes, comme nous avons été tant de fois de la Russie, de l'Autriche, et de tous nos Alliés du Continent.

Il n'y a qu'un cas où nous pourrions nous écarter du système d'une œconomie prudente: c'est celui où Bernadotte marcherait à la tête de trente mille Suédois en Poméranie, pour opérer une puissante diversion en arrière des armées de Buonaparte; mais il faudrait que ce cas fût bien constaté, et que cette diversion fût en pleine exécution, avant que nous nous engageassions à en partager les frais. Nous ne pourrions pas, sans la plus grande imprudence, payer d'avance un subside qui tournerait contre nous, si la paix se faisait avant l'exécution du traité. Nous ne pourrions donc payer d'avance.

Quant à la Russie, sa guerre est à la vie ou à la mort. Ses préparatifs sont faits; elle a une grande armée, en bon état, et son sort doit se décider indépendamment de nous. Le seul service que nous pouvons lui rendre c'est de lui ménager une paix quelleconque avec la Turquie, si nous pouvons réussir à regagner une influence auprès de la Porte, ce qui arriverait bien vite s'il s'opérait en Italie une révolution pendant l'éloignement de Buonaparte. En ce cas la Russie aurait un ennemi

de moins à combattre, et cet ennemi, pour sa propre sureté, deviendrait bientôt son allié.

Nous ne pouvons donc, dans aucun cas, donner à la Russie ni subside pécuniaire ni troupes, devant employer les uns et les autres ailleurs, même avec plus d'utilité pour elle. Alexandre peut tout au plus désirer de l'Angleterre des armes et des munitions. S'il demandait de l'argent, il faudrait s'en méfier. Conduisant une guerre nationale, au point où il en est, il doit se renfermer dans ses propres ressources, les peser mûrement, et se battre à outrance, ou plier sous le joug. L'argent ne donne pas le courage. Sa privation ne le fait pas perdre. Notre subside, fort ou faible, ne peut rien décider, et nous n'avons pas d'armée à luy envoyer.

Telle est à peu près notre situation politique et militaire à l'égard des deux Puissances du Nord: mais si nous ne pouvons pas leur être utiles directement, nous pouvons leur rendre un service très réel par deux grandes diversions à l'Ouest et au Sud de l'Europe, et elles seront d'autant plus utiles qu'étant lointaines, elles doivent avoir plus de succès. Si elles sont indirectes pour les deux Puissances du Nord, elles sont directes pour nous, et aident à remplir notre but—une paix glorieuse, la cessation de nos énormes dépenses, et le salut du Continent.

Quelque soit le succès de la guerre du Nord, soit qu'elle se prolonge, ou qu'elle cesse brusquement par une ligue générale du Continent contre nous, elle doit occuper Buonaparte et ses armées au moins jusqu'au printems de 1813, sans qu'il puisse renvoyer des renforts en Espagne, et des troupes en Italie. Si elle tire en longueur, son armée diminuera en proportion, et il sera forcé de tirer de nouveaux renforts de la France, de l'Italie, et de l'Espagne; et il épuisera ses finances, car, outre les armées Françaises, il faut encore qu'il paye et entretienne les armées de la ligue Germanique, ainsi que les troupes Polonaises, Suisses, et Italiennes.

Si Alexandre se soumet avant l'hyver, il ne luy procurera pas une grande accession de force, parceque après la dépense énorme

qu'il a faite pour sa défensive, il ne lui restera pas assez de numéraire, pour armer des flottes, pour entretenir une armée mobile, et encore moins pour la faire mouvoir hors de ses états. Ainsi même dans cette dernière hypothèse, Buonaparte aura perdu beaucoup d'hommes, de numéraire, et de force réelle, et surtout un tems précieux, pendant lequel les Anglais auront pu luy faire un mal irréparable par les deux diversions de l'Ouest et du Sud.

La diversion de l'Ouest est en bon train par les grands talents et les succès continuels de Lord Wellington. De l'argent et des renforts, c'est tout ce qu'il luy faut, et surtout chercher par l'influence de notre ambassadeur auprès de la Régence à augmenter tant qu'il sera possible son autorité sur la partie militaire, au moins pour l'admission de ses plans et pour la concurrence exacte dans leur exécution. Lord Wellington avec carte blanche, de l'argent, et des renforts aux divers points qu'il spécifiera, parviendra certainement cette année à chasser les Français au moins jusqu'au delà de l'Ebre, et peut être de toute l'Espagne.

La diversion du Midy est à créer; on en connait le projet, tel qu'il a été conçu par Lord Bentinck, et qu'il est expliqué dans la lettre cy-jointe à cet Ambassadeur. La seule objection qu'on pourrait y faire est que le Gouvernement Britannique s'est fait une règle de ne pas se mêler des affaires intérieures des peuples, et de ne pas les porter à l'insurrection, de peur qu'en cas de calamité, on puisse luy reprocher de les avoir poussés dans le précipice. Cette délicatesse des principes est en pure perte, et elle n'exempte pas le Cabinet de St. James du reproche perpetuel que luy fait Buonaparte, et qu'il fait répéter par toutes ses trompêtes du Continent, de susciter tous les peuples du Continent contre luy en les sacrifiant à une politique Machiavelique.

Laissons dire cet imposteur, et examinons si le principe est appliquable relativement à l'Italie. Cette grande Peninsula est divisée en dix ou douze gouvernements indépendans l'un de l'autre, qui avant l'invasion des Français et la création du

Royaume d'Italie n'avaient entr'eux que des connections presque toujours contradictoires. Depuis cette funeste époque tous ces petits États gémissent avec une égale indignation; mais tous ces petits peuples ne formant pas une nation ne peuvent pas avoir aucun centre de réunion, et sont réduits à des vœux vagues et isolés, jusqu'à ce qu'on leur présente un point d'appuy pour s'insurger.

L'occasion est arrivée de leur présenter: leur tyran est éloigné, et ils ont le tems d'agir pour recouvrer leur liberté. Quant à leur volonté, elle n'est pas douteuse; et il n'y a pas un canton en Italie où le peuple ne soit prêt à se lever, si on luy présente ce point d'appuy qu'ils attendent.

De plus, l'obstacle de la règle de délicatesse et de prudence, que s'est préscrite le Gouvernement, ne se rencontre même pas. Il existe encore trois Puissances, au moins nominales, qui exigent nos secours. Le Pape est la première: il languit dans les fers du tyran, mais son peuple et tout prêt à agir. Le Roy de Sardaigne et le Roy de Naples sont jusqu'icy hors de l'atteinte du terrible Buonaparte. Ils sont nos fidèles Alliés, et nous leur devons tous les moyens d'assistance pour recouvrer leurs États de terre ferme; nous y sommes même aussi interessés qu'eux.

C'est donc au nom de ces deux Alliés fidèles et infortunés que nous pouvons et nous devons agir en Italie, comme des auxiliares puissants, et non pas comme parties principales dans la guerre d'insurrection qui s'y élevera. C'est avec leurs propres troupes, soutenues par nos escadres, et tout-au-plus par quelques garnisons sur les côtes, que nous agirons plus efficacement que si nous y portions la guerre en notre nom. Par cette conduite reservée nous n'enfreindrons en rien la règle que nous nous sommes préscrite, puisque ces deux Alliés sont en pleine insurrection contre la tyrannie de cet Attila, et que, par la même règle nous nous sommes engagés à donner tous nos secours aux peuples qui voudront combattre pour reconquérir leur liberté.

Si nous profitons de l'occasion, qui est unique, et qui ne se

présentera plus, nous ferons en faveur du Nord la diversion la plus utile ; et si cette guerre du Nord se prolonge, nous nous donnerons la chance d'anéanter la tyrannie de Buonaparte et de délivrer le Continent. Si nous la laissons échapper, cet actif conquérant, après avoir soumis le Nord, retombera certainement sur nous avec toutes les forces de terre et de mer du Continent. Nous perdrons alors sans aucun doute la Sicile et la Sardaigne, et nous serons ensuite réduits à défendre l'Angleterre et l'Irlande.

Que deviendra l'Italie si elle s'insurrectionne? Dans quel esprit et sur quels principes se soulevera-t-elle ? Se composera-t-elle en un corps de Nation, pour former une république unique? ou se redivisera-t-elle, comme autrefois, en petites souverainetés monarchiques et républicaines? Chacun de ces États agira-t-il indépendamment et pour son compte, ou sous les loix d'une fédéralité générale comme les États Unis de l'Amérique ou la Confédération Germanique?

Ce sont des questions oiseuses, qui ne présentent que des speculations de Cabinet, et qui ne doivent point en ce moment occuper de véritables hommes d'État. Nous sommes alliés de deux souverains de l'Italie ; nous devons leur aider à recouvrer leurs États de terre ferme ; nous devons pareillement notre secours aux peuples voisins, qui se rallieront avec eux pour chasser les Français. Aidons les à rendre l'Italie libre. Laissons ensuite aux Italiens le soin d'arranger leur constitution, ou nationalement, ou fédéralement, comme ils le jugeront le plus convenable, et surtout sans nous en mêler, nous contentant de la gloire et du profit réel d'avoir délivré une grande contrée des chaines du monstre qu'elle déteste.

Quand faut-il commencer les expéditions sur les côtes de l'Italie? Sur-le-champ, en Juillet et en Aoust, pour éviter les vents d'équinoxe dans une mer aussi tempestueuse que la Méditerranée.

Avec quelles forces faut-il exécuter? Avec les troupes Siciliennes et Italiennes, et tout-au-plus quelques officiers et dé-

tachements Anglais, pour régulariser les premières tentatives, et garder les points de descente pour le cas de non-succès. Il est même à souhaiter que le chef apparent de ces premiers essais soit de préférence luy-même étranger, d'une naissance très élevée, et d'un nom qui inspire respect et confiance aux Italiens, de quelque dénomination qu'ils soyent. La première expédition doit être de six à huit mille hommes au plus, parceque ce n'est qu'un essai qu'on peut discontinuer, si on n'en est pas content: mais il faut porter sur l'escadre au moins cinquante mille armes, des canons, des selles, et tout ce qui peut être nécessaire pour l'équipement d'une armée. Si l'essai réussit, on augmentera les forces, et on y joindra des troupes Anglaises et un Général Anglais, si cela convient aux circonstances qui se présenteront dans la suite.

Où doit se porter cette expédition? Partout, et déterminément nulle part. Cela dépend des localités, des circonstances du moment, et c'est en Sicile même qu'on peut arranger non pas un seul plan mais plusieurs pour exécuter sur-le-champ celui qui sera le plus sous la main. Quel qu'il soit, pour réussir, il faut promptitude et secret.

Cette note, dans tous les points, exigera peut-être de plus amples développements et de réponses aux questions et objections que le Ministère pourra proposer, s'il la juge assez importante pour s'en occuper. Je suis prêt à les donner si on la prend en considération, et si on me demande d'éclaircir et défendre mes opinions.

DUMOURIEZ.

Lord Wellington au Général Dumouriez.

Fuente Guinaldo, May 20, 1812.

J'ay été obligé de revenir en Castille après le siège de Badajoz. Les Espagnols, comme de coutume, ont négligé de jeter dans la place les provisions que je leur avais donné pour ravitailler Ciudad Rodrigo, jusqu'à ce que c'était trop tard. Le convoi était à cinq lieues de la place la nuit du 31 Mars, et

les Français ont passé l'Agueda le 1er Avril au matin. Je leur avais donné l'ordre sur nos magasins à 17 lieues de distance le 16 Fevrier, et pour n'avoir pu franchir cette distance en six semaines, la place aurait été perdue si je n'y avais pas retourné avec l'armée, et nous avons manqué la plus belle occasion que la guerre présentera de faire évacuer les Andalousies par un mouvement direct sur ces contrées.

Marmont a fait une petite course en Portugal, et a manqué un beau coup sur la milice Portugaise, qui était a Guarda, où il y a eu la panique, et tout le monde aurait été détruit s'il les avait poursuivi vigoureusement : mais il a donné du tems pour le rétablissement de l'ordre. L'avant-garde de l'armée repassa le Tage à Villa-velha, et il fut obligé de se retirer avec quelques prisonniers, et sans aucun autre fruit de son expédition.

Guarda est une mauvaise position pour un petit corps, et si on ne veut pas s'y maintenir à toute outrance ; et aussitôt que j'entendis que la milice était là, je leur ai fait dire de s'en aller, mais l'affaire avait eu lieu.

Je suis icy pour couvrir le ravitaillement des places de Ciudad Rodrigo et Almeida. Le Général Hill a marché sur Almaraz, pour y détruire l'établissement de l'ennemi, et je compte me mettre en campagne pour tâcher de faire évacuer les Andalousies, ou de frapper quelque bon coup qui les fera évacuer avant que les Français puissent recevoir des renforts. J'ai lieu de croire qu'on compte à Paris d'être obligé de faire ce sacrifice.

J'ay l'honneur d'être votre très obéissant serviteur,

WELLINGTON.

À Lord Wellington.

Juin 8, 1812.

Mylord, depuis longtems, j'étais déterminé à vous écrire pour vous faire mon sincère compliment sur la prise heroïque de Badajoz ; mais j'attendais vos premiers mouvements, soit au nord, soit au sud, pour juger du parti que vous tireriez de cette rapide conquête. N'étant pas sur les lieux, je voyais un égal

avantage soit à poursuivre Soult, et aller directement le forcer à évacuer les Andalousies, soit à pousser Marmont, le chasser de la Vielle Castille, en vous portant sur Salamanque, menaçant Burgos, et faisant agir les Galiciens sur Leon et Vittoria, ou au moins sur les frontières des Asturies et de la Biscaye, pour s'établir à Durango, avant qu'il arrivât des secours de France; ouvrir, sur la route de Bayonne, une communication avec les chefs des Guerrillas de la Navarre, et commencer de l'Ouest à l'Est une guerre de partis, le long de toute la chaine des Pyrénées, en y sapant les routes, coupant les convois, et poussant des Guerrillas hardies jusques dans les provinces frontières de la France, entre Bayonne et le Roussillon.

Le premier plan, de marcher sur l'Andalousie, était plus direct, plus brillant, et le succès était plus apparent.

Le second était en apparence plus lent et moins sûr, mais il remplissait de même le but de faire évacuer les Andalousies, ce qui est, je crois, l'arrière-pensée et l'ultimatum de Buonaparte pour la campagne présente, parceque son expédition du Nord occupe trop ses moyens militaires et toutes ses idées pour luy laisser la liberté de donner à la guerre d'Espagne toute l'activité et les secours dont elle a besoin; et parceque pendant tout le tems qu'il sera occupé avec toutes ses forces à une si énorme distance de la Peninsule, il y est réduit à une défensive rigoureuse qu'il ne peut établir avec une espèce de sureté qu'en concentrant toutes ses troupes trop éparpillées et trop faibles partout, et les ramenant le long de la rive gauche de l'Ebre, où il peut présumer que les Espagnols ne pénétreront pas avant qu'il ait fini son affaire de Russie.

Un troisième plan, brillant aussi mais plus hazardé, et peut-être impratiquable par l'impossibilité de faire suivre vos subsistances ou d'en trouver dans ces contrées devastées, eut été de marcher directement sur Tolede et Madrid, ce qui eut pareillement forcé Soult à l'évacuation de l'Andalousie, mais vous eussiez eu alors toutes ses forces menaçant votre droite, toutes celles de Marmont menaçant votre gauche, et l'armée de Suchet

en front. Toutes ces troupes réunies auraient pu vous obliger à une retraite très difficile et très dangereuse.

Vous étes sur les lieux, vous étes hardi, sage, et prudent; vous avez préferé le premier plan ; et sans aucun doute j'aurais été du même avis si j'avais été à votre place. Je suis plus fâché que vous ne me paraissez l'être du contretems que vous a produit le caractère Espagnol, qui vous a exposé à perdre tout l'avantage et la gloire du succès de Badajoz, par la perte de Ciudad Rodrigo et d'Almeida, parceque ces bons gens avaient perdu six semaines pour y introduire des subsistances que vous aviez disposées, à dix-sept lieues, par conséquent à leur portée. Si Marmont avait sçu pousser sa pointe, il aurait fait beaucoup de mal avant votre arrivée. Votre contre-marche a tout sauvé, mais il vous a fait perdre un tems précieux.

Je ne suis pas beaucoup plus content de la pointe qu'a été faire Ballesteros sur Malaga, au lieu de marcher sur Seville, et de se réunir au corps de Penna-Villamur quand il en a approché. Certainement à cette époque, ils en auraient chassé les Français; et la levée du siège de l'Isle de Léon en aurait été la conséquence. Je regarde tous les combats que Ballesteros a été donner autour de Malaga, glorieux ou non, comme une imprudence inutile. Soult aurait pu se placer entre luy et le camp de San Roque ; alors que serait-il devenu ?

J'espère que si vous marchez directement en Andalousie comme vous me le mandez, Ballesteros, qui d'ailleurs est le plus actif et le plus intelligent des Généraux Espagnols, répondra cette fois à l'appel que vous luy ferez, et n'ira pas s'écarter dans de diversions lointaines vers Malaga ou Grenade. Ce n'est qu'après vous aurez forcé Soult à évacuer Seville, à retirer, tant bien que mal, ses troupes et son artillerie de devant Cadiz, et à rassembler à Cordoue toutes ses divisions éparses en Andalousie, que vous pourrez lâcher Ballesteros pour faire des diversions, non pas en arrière le long des côtes, mais sur votre droite, en remontant le Guadalquivir, pour menacer la Manche, et forcer les Français à hâter leur retraite pour couvrir Madrid,

et pour achever, encore cette année, l'évacuation de la capitale et de la Castille pour gagner les bords de l'Ebre.

Il y aurait une bonne opération à faire pendant tout ceci contre Valence, en faisant arriver d'Alicante, de Mayorca, et d'Iviça, par le lac d'Albufera, un corps de troupes, qui attaquerait cette place faible et mal garnisonnée par ses derrières, qui avoisinent ce grand lac. Pensez y. Quoique cette opération ne vous soit pas directe et qu'elle ne présente qu'une diversion éloignée et en apparence très indépendante, elle embarrasserait beaucoup les Français, et allarmerait fort le pauvre Roy Joseph, surtout si, à l'aide de vos escadres, on pouvait en même tems renforcer les opérations des Catalans qui vont bien, et sont vraiment les seuls qui se battent avec activité, malgré tous leurs désavantages.

Je ne suis pas aussi content de l'armée de Galice: certainement ce n'est pas votre faute si son organisation n'est pas achevée, et si elle n'opére pas encore offensivement sur votre gauche. Je vois au contraire que le Général Bonnet rentre tant qu'il veut dans les Asturies et la fait reculer. J'espère que Castaños, qui a résidé longtems auprès de vous, aura profité de vos instructions, et donnera à cette partie de la guerre une activité qui pourra vous seconder.

Je ne parle point de ce qui passe icy, quoique ce soit un des motifs qui m'ont fait différer de vous écrire. Je souhaite, et cela est indispensablement nécessaire, que, sous peu de jours, il y ait un Gouvernement formé, et qu'il s'occupe essentiellement et en très grand, de la guerre d'Espagne, pour vous donner sans parsimonie les moyens de profiter de l'absence lointaine de Buonaparte. Si, comme on l'assure, le plan de defensive d'Alexandre est, à l'exemple des anciens Scythes, de faire des deserts entre luy et ce conquérant, celuy-cy se trouvera arrêté et retardé dans sa marche par le défaut des subsistances. Puisse-t-il au bout rencontrer un Pultawa ! En tout cas, quelques soyent ses succès au Nord, vous avez six mois au moins que vous pouvez très bien employer si on vous donne des moyens suffisants et *carte blanche.*

Adieu, mon cher Lord; ma lettre est bien longue, mais elle vous prouve les sentiments avec lesquels j'ay l'honneur d'être, &c.

À Lord William Bentinck.

May 12, 1812.

Mylord—J'ay espéré avoir de vos nouvelles depuis votre arrivée en Sicile, parceque je m'attendais que vous me feriez l'honneur de m'accuser la réception de mes deux lettres du 25 et du 30 Octobre, qui contenaient mon manuscrit sur la Sicile et mes notes au Ministère sur les autres parties de l'Italie, que vous m'aviez demandées; sur lesquelles affaires mes opinions concouraient si parfaitement avec les votres que j'espérais qu'elles pourraient être utiles à vos vues quand les circonstances deviendraient favorables.

Votre silence ne m'a cependant pas étonné. Vous aviez des occupations d'un tout autre intérêt, et il ne fallait pas moins que la fermeté et la prudence que vous avez déployées pour amener les affaires au point où ils sont, quoiqu'encore fort éloigné de celuy où vous tendez, et où je désire vous voir arriver—1°., un Gouvernement solide en Sicile, pour tirer ce pays, intéressant à tous égards, de la nullité où il existe encore, qui laisse sur son Allié tout le poids très onéreux, tant militaire que pécuniaire, de sa défensive—2°., un état militaire assez respectable pour non seulement assurer cette défensive, mais aussi pour s'étendre et influer, quand il en sera tems, sur le sort de l'Italie par une offensive bien arrangée. Tel est votre plan d'accord avec mon opinion. Tel doit être celui de votre cabinet; et je ne doute pas qu'avec vos talents vous ne parveniez à en démontrer la possibilité et opérer l'exécution.

C'est de la Sicile que doit sortir la force qui peut un jour délivrer l'Italie: vous y préparez l'attelier des armes qui doivent abattre le tyran. Le noyau de l'armée de la liberté est là. Les recrues sont dans l'Italie même, et elle y grossira très vite. Vos escadres, sur une pareille étendue de côtes, peuvent choisir de nombreux points de descentes inattendues, et vous pouvez péné-

trer par bien des endroits imprévus dans cette immense presqu'île dont les différents peuples sont mûrs pour une insurrection générale, parceque leurs maux sont intolérables.

Le génie de Lord Wellington a changé la face des affaires en Espagne, et si la nonchalance et le mauvais gouvernement de cette nation, d'ailleurs très estimable par l'héroïsme et la constance de son énergie, empêche qu'elle ne parvienne à chasser au-delà des Pyrénées les satellites de Buonaparte, on peut au moins calculer que la guerre sera interminable, que l'Espagne pourra à la vérité être inondée de sang, d'incendies, et de crimes, par les hordes féroces de ce torrent destructeur, mais qu'elle ne sera jamais soumise.

Toutes les chances sont en ce moment pour Lord Wellington, et ses grands talents me donnent toute confiance. Son plus grand ou son moindre succès dépend du plus ou moins de forces que Buonaparte pourra employer contre luy pour arrêter ses progrès; car, quant au Portugal, Lord Wellington y a introduit une force militaire si imposante que, quelques forces qu'y puisse sacrifier Buonaparte, même en supposant le reste de la Péninsule conquis, il ne peut pas faire sortir les Anglais de Portugal tant que la guerre durera.

Buonaparte a en ce moment des idées trop vastes pour s'assujettir aux règles de la prudence, et suivre un plan méthodique. Il aurait certainement dû assurer la soumission entière de l'Espagne, de la Sicile, et de la Sardaigne, en un mot la soumission entière du Midy et de l'Ouest, avant de se précipiter dans ses projets du Nord. Il a pu le faire très facilement depuis deux ans. J'espère que nous pourrons un jour luy appliquer l'adage, "*Quos perdere vult Jupiter prius dementat.*" Comme toutes ses pensées sont contre l'Angleterre et tendent à sa plus prompte invasion, qui est son hobby-horse, il a cru pouvoir ajourner après cette expédition la soumission complète du Midy et de l'Ouest.

Il lui faut pour cette entreprise difficile une marine qui puisse à-peu-près lutter avec la notre. La France, la Hollande,

l'Italie, l'Espagne même, ne luy présenteraient pas des moyens suffisants; il fallait y joindre la marine entière des puissances du Nord. Le Dannemark, qui est entièrement dans sa main avait perdu toute sa marine et ne pouvait la rétablir que très lentement. Maître de toute la côte méridionale de la Baltique, il avait réussi à mettre sur le trône de Suède un de ses avanturiers sur lequel il comptait, mais dont cette couronne semble avoir ennobli le caractère, et qui parait au moins résister à ses ordres. Alors il luy restait encore à engager la Russie à entrer contre nous dans la ligue générale du Continent dont il devait être l'Agamemnon; mais il a trouvé de la part du faible Alexandre une résistance à laquelle il ne devait pas s'attendre d'après son caractère et ses entours.

Alors son orgueil irrité a été le seul guide de sa politique et de sa conduite militaire. Toutes ses forces, tous ses plans, sont dirigés à renverser les obstacles inattendus que luy présentent la Suède et la Russie, des quelles il ne prévoyait qu'une soumission aveugle à ses volontés. Déjà ses nombreuses légions ont atteint Thorn, et vraisemblablement entreront bientôt sur le territoire Russe, où Alexandre rassemble de son côté des forces considerables. Tout le désavantage apparent est pour les Russes, surtout s'ils ont l'imprudence de donner des batailles. Il est même possible qu' Alexandre se soumette sans résistance.

Mais en admettant les chances les plus favorables pour Buonaparte, il en résultera toujours au moins six mois de délai avant qu'il puisse s'occuper de l'Ouest et du Midy, qu'il épuise et affaiblit par les conscriptions, pour alimenter ses armées du Nord, qui ne pourront pas être assez tôt ramenées en Espagne et en Italie, si l'Angleterre profite de son éloignement pour secourir et animer les Espagnols, et pour insurger les Italiens. Lord Wellington en Espagne, et vous dans la Méditerranée, pouvez tous les deux lui porter des coups funestes, et lui enlever deux couronnes, pendant que, loin de vous, il médite ses projets mal concertés contre votre patrie.

Voilà votre tâche, mon cher lord, et si j'avais vingt ans de

moins, je me trouverais fort heureux si vous vouliez m'admettre auprès de vous. Vous avez en Sicile un co-opérateur, qui, sous votre direction, peut opérer de très grandes choses—c'est le Duc d'Orleans. Vous connaissez à présent son caractère, et je vous réponds de ses talents et de son courage. Vous pouvez le mettre à la tête d'un corps Sicilien, pour aller tenter la fortune en Italie, comme nous en avons parlé dans nos conférences à Londres. Vous avez un motif très fort pour tenir un détachement prêt à marcher—c'est la sureté de la Sardaigne, qui ne peut pas se défendre elle-même.

Quant au choix du plan d'opération de ce corps, vous avez trois points principaux—1°, enlever l'Isle de Corse sous les yeux de la flotte de Toulon; cette expédition est assez difficile, mais elle n'est pas impossible avec du secret, et elle serait très brillante—2°, une descente à Santa Felicità, sous le Mont Circello, où on peut former un camp inexpugnable, qui couperait la communication du Royaume de Naples, et hâterait l'insurrection des Romains et des Tuscans—3°, une descente sur les côtes méridionales de la France, qui aurait peut-être de très grands résultats par le désespoir des habitans, en conséquence de la famine et de la conscription.

Je ne fais que vous indiquer ces trois points. Il en est beaucoup d'autres, et vous avez de quoi exercer votre génie et votre activité plus que le grand Duc d'Ossuna, qui ne vous valait pas.

J'ay l'honneur d'être, &c., D.

Sir H. Wellesley to his Excellency Don Ignacio de Pezuela.

Cadiz, July 21, 1812.

Sir—I have stated very shortly, in the enclosed paper, my opinion relative to the mode of opening the trade of America to Great Britain, and to the advantages that both nations would derive from that measure. I have to request, however, that your Excellency will consider this communication as en-

tirely private and confidential; for, although I am provided with full powers to treat with the Regency for a commercial arrangement, it is not my intention to enter upon it, until I shall learn from your Excellency that the Regency is prepared to receive it favourably.

I should, however, observe to your Excellency that any facilities of trade which may be extended to Great Britain by the Government of Spain should be free of all conditions of receiving an equivalent in the way of a loan, or of farther pecuniary succours; for your Excellency may be assured that, whether the trade of America be opened or not, the Government of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent will make every exertion to assist the cause of Spain, to the utmost extent of their ability.

It is certainly to be expected that the extension of commerce to America will afford increased resources to Great Britain, and will enable her to assist Spain to a greater extent than she has hitherto done; but I must repeat that her exertions have ever been correspondent to her means; and there is no reason to doubt that they will continue to be so, until this contest shall have terminated.

It only remains for me to add that the opinions entertained in the enclosed papers are in exact conformity with those of the British Government.

I request your Excellency, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

Extract of a Letter from the Board of Trade.

The objects which, it is to be presumed, the Government of Spain would propose to themselves in admitting the British Government to a participation in the trade with America, viz., the raising a revenue on the trade to and from their American possessions, the giving encouragement to their own manufactures and a preference to those of Great Britain above that which may be shown to other nations, may, in a great measure, be accomplished by opening the ports in Spanish Ame-

rica to British produce and manufactures, on such reasonable duties as would give, on the one hand, a decided preference to any articles of the produce or manufacture of Spain, coming into competition with those of Great Britain, without, on the other hand, excluding the consumption of those which might be imported from Great Britain, the Spanish Government would raise no inconsiderable revenue, while they would effectually put an end to the clandestine trade now notoriously existing. There might be an Article (if a treaty were desirable) in which it should be provided, for the encouragement of Spanish vessels, that a higher duty should be levied on goods imported in a British than in a Spanish vessel.

It would not, in the opinion of the British Government, be necessary to provide that the commercial advantages proposed to be conceded should be exclusively confined to Great Britain, if the Spanish Government should think it expedient to extend them to other countries either in alliance or amity with Spain; it being, however, always understood, that whatever advantages may be granted to others should be contemporaneously extended to Great Britain.

Sir H. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, July 28, 1812.

My Lord—By the Instructions contained in your lordship's despatch, No. 41, of the 5th ult., I am directed to renew the discussions with the Spanish Regency on the subject of a direct trade between Great Britain and Spanish America. The correspondence relative to the mediation, which has been submitted to your lordship's consideration since the date of that despatch, will have apprized you that no disposition exists here to make any commercial concessions, even for the important object of tranquillizing America; and your Lordship will probably be of opinion that this would not be a favourable moment for bringing this subject again under discussion in an official form.

In the course, however, of the conversations which I had with M. de la Pezuela relative to the mediation, he frequently expressed it to be his opinion that the free trade with America should be granted to Great Britain; and he at length requested that I would communicate to him privately my opinions upon that subject, observing that he should consider himself as extremely fortunate, if, previously to quitting the office of Secretary of State, he should be enabled to arrange this matter to the satisfaction of the Government of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.

I accordingly sent him an extract of the letter dated the 25th of May, 1812, containing the opinions of the Lords of the Committee of Council for Trade, relative to a free trade with the Spanish American possessions, together with private letters from myself, copies of which are enclosed in this despatch.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

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to Lord Castlereagh.

August 3, 1812.

Dear Castlereagh—In reading over the Papers respecting the mediation, the remarks occurred to me which I submit to your consideration.

Yours, H.[1]

From the tone of M. de Pezuela's last notes, and from the probable influence of the merchants of Cadiz upon the Cortes, there seems little hope that the departure of the Commissioners should have been delayed. It is, however, not impossible that the apprehension of the effect which may be produced both in England and in South America by the rupture of the negociation may have induced the Cortes not to persist in the peremptory refusal of the Regency to admit of the extension of the mediation to Mexico, or to allow of commercial intercourse between South America and foreign States, reserving only a preference to Old Spain. Should this be the case, the Cortes

[1] Believed to be from Lord Harrowby.

may attempt to propose some *medius terminus*, and the negociation may still be going on. It seems impossible, if it breaks off, not to incur great embarrassments, either from the jealousy given to Old Spain, if we act according to the intimation in Wellesley's note, and preserve an amicable and commercial intercourse with the rebel provinces, or from the jealousy excited in them if, by putting an end to it, we appear to take part with Old Spain; and it appears therefore to be extremely desirable, by some means or other, to keep the negociation on foot till the new Cortes shall assemble.

Would it be possible to adjust the difference respecting Mexico, by agreeing not to include it within the sphere of our mediation, upon condition that the Regency will issue a Proclamation, proposing, in the first instance, a cessation of all hostilities, and granting a general amnesty, announcing all the privileges which are stated in M. de Pezuela's note to have been established by the Cortes with respect to personal and political rights, and declaring that whatever commercial privileges are conceded to any other provinces, upon their return to loyalty, shall be enjoyed by Mexico?

In respect to commerce, I am not sufficiently informed respecting the present state of our commercial relations with Old Spain to be sure that my ideas are correct. But it seems to me that we should secure a good deal to ourselves, and open a considerable market to South America, if we could prevail upon the Spanish Government to propose that, during the war with France, the commerce of Great Britain, or of any other friendly nation, should be carried on with Spanish America upon the same footing as it is now carried on with Old Spain, perhaps admitting further a considerable difference of duties in favour of Spanish goods, or even of goods brought in Spanish ships. The ultimate arrangement of the commercial relations between Spain, both new and old, and other countries, to be settled by the new Cortes, in which the deputies from Spanish America would have considerable weight.

If there is any thing in these suggestions, it would be desirable that no time should be lost in conveying them, or something to this effect, to Wellesley, to prevent him from putting a final close to the negociations for a mediation.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, August 26, 1812.

My dear Lord—I beg to offer to your lordship my congratulations upon the raising of the siege of Cadiz, an event perhaps the most important of this extraordinary campaign. I do not believe that our military annals afford an example of a campaign, the circumstances of which are more creditable to our arms, or attended with more substantial advantages—two fortresses and two fortified posts taken, almost in the presence of two French armies, each of which equalled in strength that of the Allies—one of these armies defeated in a pitched battle, with the loss of half its numbers—the enemy driven from the interior provinces—the capital recovered, and the siege of this important post raised, which will, I expect, be followed by the complete evacuation of Andalusia—and all this achieved in a campaign of about five months' duration!

We have not yet received intelligence of the evacuation of Seville, but I conclude that it has taken place by this time. The loss of the French before this place must have been immense. The whole surface of the Trocadero is absolutely ploughed up by our shells, and it is impossible that they shall not have done a great deal of mischief, as the roads to the different batteries are entirely exposed to our fire.

I have no account of our Expedition upon the eastern coast, since its arrival at Alicant. There are, however, reports of General Maitland having entered Valencia.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, August 29, 1812.

My dear Lord—You will see, by one of my despatches of this day's date, that the Regency and the Cortes are not upon the best terms, and that General O'Donnell has thought it necessary to send in his resignation. If a Government could be formed, to consist of M. de la Vegas, General O'Donnell, and the Duke of Infantando, (who would easily be managed by the other two) the ministers to be chosen from the Cortes, and all the *employés* in the different departments dismissed, and others appointed, the change would certainly be advantageous; but I am of opinion that no change whatever will take place, and that General O'Donnell's resignation will not be accepted. He told me this morning that he thought it would; but that, in any case, it was absolutely necessary to take measures for forming a closer union between the Government and the Cortes, and that, unless this were brought about, the exertions so much required at the present moment for providing for the defence of the country, by the formation of armies of reserve, &c., were not to be expected from the Government. He is fully impressed with the necessity of making the most of the time afforded by our unexampled successes; but he represents his colleagues as utterly incapable of forming a plan for themselves, and equally averse to deciding upon any plans which may be laid before them. It is mortifying to think that the hopes which we were justified in entertaining from the first proceedings of this Government should now be disappointed; but I hope your lordship will approve of the resolution I have taken, not to interfere in any change which may be proposed, unless persons hostile to England should be chosen.

We have just received intelligence that the expedition which sailed from hence, under General Cruz Monzeon, entered Seville on the 27th, after a smart action with the enemy, who is stated to have suffered considerable loss. The loss of the Allies amounted to 70.

I am sorry to say that the French have succeeded better in Andalusia in reconciling the inhabitants to their usurpation than in any other part of Spain. Their departure excited no demonstrations of joy, either at Port St. Mary's, or at any of the other towns upon the opposite coast; and, with the exception of the first day, there have not been any rejoicings here. I am told, however, that at Seville the Allies were received with the strongest testimonies of joy.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

Sir H. Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, September 12, 1812.

My dear Lord—Since learning that the Cortes had accepted General O'Donnell's resignation, I have heard that it is in contemplation to propose that the Princess of Brazil should be placed at the head of the Regency. Her Royal Highness has a very considerable party in the Cortes; and I know that the Portuguese Minister has instructions to make every possible exertion to support her pretensions. It may therefore be very difficult to prevent her nomination. The Government of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent might possibly feel some reluctance, on account of the intimate alliance subsisting between Great Britain and Portugal, to opposing her Royal Highness's pretensions publicly; but I would request your lordship to favour me, at the earliest possible period, with your opinions upon this subject; and, if the nomination should be in contemplation, I will do every thing in my power to delay the discussion of it, in order that I may previously hear from your Lordship.

I must request your lordship to excuse this private communication; the packet being under weigh, I have not time to write a public despatch.

I have the honour to be, &c., H. WELLESLEY.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Foreign Office, September 26, 1812.

My dear Lord—In transmitting to your lordship the enclosed confidential papers, my object is to put you in possession of the language which has been held here, in the name of the Royal Family in Sicily, on the subject of the events which have lately taken place there, under your influence; the manner in which these communications have been received by me; and the Report which has been made to the Sicilian Government of the feelings entertained by His Royal Highness's Government of the conduct of our allies in that quarter. You will, of course, be able to make the necessary allowance for the colouring which is given to various points of this Report, and I am aware that it must be of assistance to you; in your present criticial negociations with the Sicilian Court, to know the nature of the communications they receive.

I have not thought it necessary in my public letter to allude to the propositions submitted by you to the Hereditary Prince, in answer to his demand that the troops at your disposal should be employed in Italy; but it may nevertheless be expedient that your lordship should understand that this Government would not indeed approve of your originating any measure which might look like an invitation to the Neapolitans to proceed to the election of a sovereign, although the issue of such election might probably be the restoration of the family of Bourbon. We have not acknowledged the usurped dynasty of Naples, and therefore, in our eyes, Ferdinand II. is the rightful sovereign of that country; and your lordship will carefully avoid any language which might directly imply the contrary.

It would certainly be very desirable that the Neapolitans should rise against their present masters, and in favour of the rights of their former sovereign; and, in order to excite such a spirit, I am aware how important it is that they should be

taught to expect a correction of former abuses; but, on many accounts, it would be preferable that the restoration of Ferdinand II., however voluntary on the part of his continental subjects, should be in fact a restoration rather than an election. The improvements which are likely to be adopted in the Sicilian constitution will pave the way for this event, and serve as a pledge of what they may expect; and, under the corrections and alterations which some of the articles are susceptible of and appear to require, there is a fair prospect of Sicily holding out to Italy and to Naples the safe and honourable example of a reformation without violence, and a regenerated constitution, under the sanction and with the aid of the legitimate sovereign.

Memorandum relative to Austria.[1]

The late propositions of Austria seem to demand an answer, that Austria may not have an excuse for any wrong conduct by our silence, interpreted by her into contempt or alienation.

The overtures of Austria consist of three points:—1, that she is in the best situation to judge of the state of Europe; 2, that she considers the present crisis (9 November) as most advantageous for a general peace; 3, that, on these two principles, she wishes to know the dispositions of Great Britain—having ventured distantly to sound Bonaparte, having recommended it to Prussia, and designing to recommend it to Russia.

What is the relation of Austria as to England?

1st. She has joined the continental system of France, for the annihilation of British trade and power.

2nd. She has joined in a confederacy with France and other powers against Russia, in order to enforce that continental system against Great Britain, and entered into a treaty with France, engaging to furnish her contingent of 30,000 men, as an auxiliary in the war.

[1] This Paper I judge to have been written by Mr. Cooke, and I conclude its proper date to be November, 1812.—EDITOR.

As an auxiliary power, she could only enter into the war on the plea of necessity, or because the war in which she assists is in its cause and object *just*.

If she has engaged on the latter principle; if she has adopted the continental system from conviction of its justice; if she has joined against Russia upon that principle to enforce it—she must be understood to propose that Great Britain, in accepting her overtures, and in acquiescing in her taking a lead to bring about a general peace, should acknowledge the justice of the continental system, and be prepared to admit its continuance upon a pacification.

If Austria has not, however, joined Bonaparte upon the justice of his cause, but upon a principle of mere *necessity*—if she considers his cause *unjust*, if she considers his object *unjust* and tyrannical — then she is bound, being relieved from the pressure of necessity, to use every possible means to bring the nation so acting *unjustly* to a change of conduct, and if it will not adopt a change of conduct, to discontinue succours, and afterwards, if it will not relent, to turn against it.

An auxiliary power, forced into a war, especially if forced into a war contrary to its interests, contrary to justice, contrary to public freedom, calculated, if successful, to increase the predominance of an overgrown and tyrannical power, has always a right, and, what is more, is always bound in duty, to use every means for putting an end to the engagement it has been forced into by *necessity*, and to consult its own good, and the happiness and independence of other States. When Austria shows this disposition, and places herself in an attitude suitable to it, she has a right to call upon other powers to co-operate with her; but not before.

I submit, therefore, a Draft. It keeps up communication. The despatch accompanying it may enter into details and reasonings.

Memorandum on the Military Force under Buonaparte.[1]

Avant la guerre actuelle entre la Russie et la France, et avant que les Français eussent organisé leurs armées en divisions et corps d'armée comme elles devaient agir en campagne, et lorsque les troupes Françaises étaient encore cantonnées dans les provinces de la Prusse et du duché de Varsovie, leur nombre était, d'après les notices tirées de sources officielles comme suit:—

		Hommes.
Sous le Maréchal Davoust		100,000
N.B. Toutes les garnisons des places fortes étaient sous ses ordres, comme toutes les troupes cantonnées dans la Prusse et les nouveaux départemens.		
Sous les Maréchaux Ney et Oudinot . . .		40,000
L'armée d'Italie		40,000
Seconde armée d'Italie		12,000
Gardes Françaises		12,000
Sous le Maréchal Victor		12,000
Corps auxiliaire d'Autrichiens		30,000
Bavarois		30,000
Prussiens		20,000
Saxons		20,000
Troupes Wurtembergeoises		10,000
Polonois		30,000
Total . . .		356,000
Mais dans ce nombre n'étaient pas inclues:		
1°. Les troupes de Westphalie. Elles furent portées avec les renforts qu'elles ont reçues depuis à	25,000	
2°. Les troupes du Grand Duc de Hesse: on peut les estimer à	6,000	
3°. Celles du Grand Duc de Bade . .	6,000	
4°. Celles des petits princes d'Allemagne .	6,000	43,000
		399,000

[1] Without name or date; but evidently written during that most disastrous retreat of the French invading army from Russia towards the

Excepté les troupes Polonoises, qui n'avoient pas été en Espagne mais qui étoient cantonnées dans le duché de Varsovie, et excepté le corps auxiliaire des Autrichiens dont le nombre est fixé par le traité d'alliance, tout le reste des troupes Françaises et auxiliaires avoit passé les états Prussiens, étoit logé et nourri par les autorités du pays, et leur nombre pouvait ainsi, par conséquent, être fixé avec un haut dégré de certitude.

Par des informations qu'on avoit dans les armées Russes, sur la force des armées Françaises *après leur formation en divisions et corps d'armées*, on obtenoit le résultat suivant:—

	Hommes.
Corps du Maréchal Macdonald, cont. les Prussiens et la division Grandjean. Cette dernière consistoit en de troupes de la confédération Rhénane, ayant composé auparavant la garnison de Danzic	28,000
Corps du Maréchal Davoust, 6 divisions d'infanterie, 5 divisions de cavalerie	60,000
Corps du Maréchal Oudinot, 3 divisions d'infanterie, 1 division de cavalerie. Ce corps consistoit en Croates, Illyriens, Hollandois, Allemands des nouveaux départemens, troupes de Wurzbourg (restées en garnison à Berlin), lanciers Polonois, et quelques François, principalement cuirassiers .	22,000
Corps du Maréchal Ney; outre 10,000 Wurtembergeois et les Portugais, le reste du corps étoit composé de François. Ce corps avoit une nombreuse cavalerie	45,000
Corps de Jerome Bonaparte, les Polonois et les Westphaliens	45,000
	200,000

end of the year 1812, which, together with the war in Spain, decided the downfall of Napoleon.—EDITOR.

	Hommes.
Porté en avant	200,000
Corps du Maréchal Junot, quelques Bavarois, les Hessois, quelques divisions d'infanterie et de cavalerie Françoises	43,000
Corps d'Eugène Beauharnois. Les Italiens et quelques François	52,000
Corps du Maréchal Victor. Divisions Lagrange, Durutte, et Partonneaux	25,000
Corps du Général St. Cyr, Bavarois. Ce corps étoit joint à celui que commandoit le Maréchal Oudinot. Le nombre en est incertain—peut-être de . .	20,000
Corps du Général Regnier. Les Saxons et une division Françoise	26,000
Corps du Prince Schwarzemberg	30,000
Reserve des gardes Françoises	12,000
Grande reserve de cavalerie sous Murat (nombre inconnu) au moins	20,000
Total . . .	428,000

Si l'on déduit de ce total les erreurs des espions et des déserteurs; qui donnent communément les compagnies et les bataillons au complet, cette dernière évaluation est assez concordante avec la précédente, dans laquelle je mets plus de confiance que dans la dernière. C'est toujours difficile de se procurer un certain dégré de certitude sur le nombre des armées nombreuses en campagne.

Les troupes que Bonaparte avoit ramené de la Russie, arrivées à la Berezina, ne peuvent être évaluées en gardes et autres troupes d'élite que tout au plus .	15,000
Les Maréchaux Victor et Oudinot avoient amené .	20,000
Polonois, tant de ceux qui formoient troupe à-part que de ceux qui firent l'arrière-garde de l'armée Française, tout au plus	10,000
Total	45,000

		Hommes.
Total porté en avant . .		45,000
Déduit de ce nombre, perte en prisonniers de guerre d'après les rapports officiels Russes	25,000	
Morts et blessés dans les différentes affaires, pour le moins	5,000	
	——	30,000
Reste . . .		15,000
À ce 15,000 hommes pourra se joindre :—		
Le corps du Maréchal Augereau		15,000
Celui du Maréchal Macdonald		25,000
Celui du Général Regnier (Saxons) . . .		25,000
Celui du Prince Schwarzemberg		30,000
Total des troupes disponibles .		110,000

dont deux tiers sont composés de troupes étrangères, un tiers de troupes Françaises. Mais cette évaluation ne va que jusqu'au 29 Novembre, et il y a lieu d'espérer que les Russes depuis ce jour auront pris et détruit encore un très grand nombre de troupes ennemies, et que les Français n'arriveront à la Vistule qu'avec environ 90,000 combattans, même si les Autrichiens et les Prussiens demeuroient dans leur alliance, et que les Russes ne les poursuivissent pas au-delà de cette rivière. Les maladies contagieuses, suite immanquable des fatigues essuyées, et des cantonnemens serrés à prendre, ne tarderont pas à diminuer encore d'un tiers ceux qui auront été échappé au fer des Russes. Mais la grande population de la France et des pays soumis, et la vigoureuse organisation militaire dans ces pays fourniront des moyens de créer de nouvelles armées, si le fil qui tient ensemble cette organisation militaire n'est pas coupé.

Perte des troupes étrangères pendant la dernière campagne jusqu'au mois de Novembre.

Troupes Bavaroises, de 30,000 hommes restoient encore	4,000

Troupes Polonoises,	de 60,000 restoient	.	10,000
——— Westphaliennes,	„ 25,000 .	.	5,000
——— Wurtembergeoises,	„ 12,000 .	.	700

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, December 3, 1812.

My dear Lord—I have nothing particular to communicate to your lordship by this packet. No farther progress has been made in the mediation, nor have I any hope that our proposal will be accepted. The Government are certainly averse to it; and, indeed, it would appear, from a note which I lately received from M. Labrador, complaining of the conduct of the Captain of one of his Majesty's ships while at the port of La Guayra, that the Spanish Government are of opinion that the rebellion at the Caraccas originated in the intrigues of the English. A passage in M. Labrador's note contained so strong an insinuation to that effect, that I thought it necessary to require an explanation of it, informing him that, until I received an explanation, I should defer sending a copy of his note to your lordship. I trust your lordship will agree with me in the propriety of clearly ascertaining the sentiments of the Spanish Government upon this head, and of not suffering an insinuation so injurious to our honour and good faith to pass unnoticed, at a moment, too, when we are making an offer of our mediation to effect a reconciliation between Spain and her colonies. I have not yet received M. Labrador's answer.

The Cortes are much out of humour with the Government, and it is supposed that a motion will be made for changing it. I fear, however, that no improvement is to be expected from a mere change of men.

I conclude that your lordship has heard from Lord William Bentinck that he is preparing a farther reinforcement for Spain, which will consist of about 5,000 men more, British and Sicilian; and that he proposes, whenever circumstances admit

of his leaving Sicily, to take the command of the troops on the eastern coast. I have no later advices from Alicant than those of the 17th ult., transmitted to your lordship in my last despatch.

The army of reserve is increasing in numbers, and improving fast, under the active superintendence of General O'Donnell. He complains much of the want of clothing and equipment for the cavalry.

The last letters from Lord Wellington, dated the 27th ult., give me hopes of his coming to Cadiz for a short time, if things should remain quiet in Castile. I anxiously hope that nothing will prevent his coming, as his communications with the Government, particularly upon military affairs, will certainly be productive of the best consequences.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

Mr. Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, December 30, 1812.

My Lord—I have had no immediate occasion to see the Crown Prince since I last had the honour of writing to your lordship in this manner. But I have had a sort of indirect communication with him, through the medium of his confidential secretary and of General van Suchtelen.

Your lordship will see, from what has passed with the French *Chargé d'Affaires*, that the position assumed by this Government is no longer equivocal, and that Sweden may be considered as in a state of declared war against France. The Crown Prince, I most firmly believe, will follow it up by acts of hostility, the moment he shall be enabled to display a sufficient force by the junction of the Russian auxiliary forces, stipulated by treaty. If it were possible to gain Denmark to the common cause, and to effect the union of the Danish and Swedish troops, he would not, I am confident, wait for the Russian auxiliaries to commence operations; and I really be-

lieve, though I will not vouch for that, that if Denmark could be prevailed on to join, the Prince might be induced to wave the demand of the exchange of Norway, and to content himself with an agreement to entertain that proposition of exchange at a future day.

With regard to the scene of action for the commencement of operations—could Denmark be prevailed upon to join, it would obviously be at once on the coast of Germany, and on a point the best calculated to concentrate the operations against the common enemy, and, reaching him at once, to place the Holstein and Jutland peninsula out of the reach of attack. Should Denmark refuse absolutely to abandon her system, I believe still that the Prince Royal, on the junction of the Russian auxiliaries, would consent, without much difficulty, to wave the formerly projected attack on Zealand, leaving that island and the opposite Swedish coast to the vigilance of his Majesty's and to the Swedish marine forces: but the choice of the point of disembarkation on the Continent would no longer depend upon the same considerations; and it might be thought advisable, even in a military point of view, and for the sake of securing his rear from the attack of the Danish forces in Holstein, to make a descent on the Danish Peninsula, and to sweep it down to the frontier of Mecklenburg and Lauenburg.

This would create an immediate war between Sweden and Denmark, and would render necessary measures of defensive precaution, as well on the side of Norway as of Zealand—a circumstance much to be deprecated, as well for the sake of public opinion in Sweden as for the injury it would do by dividing and weakening the Swedish force. Perhaps (but I speak this with great doubt) the Prince might be even induced to avoid the Danish dominions and disembark in Germany; but then he must be absolutely assured of the neutrality of Denmark in the contest, or it would render even his military position uncertain and insecure.

Your lordship sees the great importance of gaining Den-

mark to this cause in the next month or two, and must have, from all your various channels of information, better means of judging than I can have what motives would the easiest lead her to this desirable point, and what probability there is, or may be, of success in it.

With regard to the boon which the Prince Royal may require from his Majesty's Government, for abandoning his first project of a preliminary invasion of Zealand, and for carrying his arms, in conjunction with Russia, directly against the common enemy, I have no reason to suppose that he has abandoned the final motive of annexing Norway to the Swedish crown, and that he will not require the accession of his Majesty's Government to this future annexation.

If I were to act in the sense of your lordship's despatch addressed to Lord Cathcart while he was at Orebro, I should not hesitate to offer to the Prince Royal the accession of his Majesty's Government to the treaties of St. Petersburg and Abo, as the price of carrying the Swedish arms directly against the common enemy, and forming so powerful a diversion in favour of Russia. But I am fully sensible of the change which circumstances may naturally have made in the sentiments of his Majesty's Government; and I may very naturally, it seems to me, conclude that the sacrifice which Great Britain would have made to diminish the pressure on Russia, and to save her, indeed, from apparent ruin, would hardly be deemed necessary or expedient now that the arms of Russia are triumphant, and in their turn threaten the existence and the territories of the invader.

I have, therefore, ventured to say nothing on this point; and, though I have urged to General van Suchtelen to lead this country (the Prince Royal, I mean) to the direct descent on Germany, waving the reduction of Zealand, but securing its incapability of doing harm, I am not very willing to push the same point with the Prince directly, for fear of drawing out *overtures and propositions*, as conditions of this operation,

which it might be embarrassing to his Majesty's Government to entertain.

Still my lord something will be called for, most probably; and whether there is any expectation of gaining Denmark, which would facilitate every thing, whether in the determined adhesion of this power to the cause and to the system of France, which might be previously and authentically ascertained, some positive engagement of a boon to Sweden might not be given eventually and conditionally by his Majesty's Government, it appears to me of great importance that his Majesty's Government should be fully prepared to meet the questions that may arise in the two succeeding months; otherwise, the operations of the succeeding campaign will be once more retarded, and perhaps defeated altogether. The first point certainly will be the arrival of the Russian auxiliaries: and for this purpose Russia now possesses more than sufficient means.

I entreat your lordship's pardon for this long discussion; and I have the honour to be, &c.

EDWARD THORNTON.

Statement of the British Naval Force on the North American Stations, in the year 1810—1813.

In 1810, the British Naval Force on the stations connected with North America was as follows:

	Line.	Frigates.	Sloops.	Brigs.	Total.
Halifax . .	1	7	11	14	33
Jamaica . .	1	8	19	6	34
Barbadoes .	5	10	35	18	68
	7	25	65	38	135

In the course of that year, the final expulsion of the French from the West Indies enabled this country in some degree to reduce her naval force there; but the precarious state of our relations with America, the unsettled disposition of the Spanish settlements, the increasing force of the Haytian Chiefs, and the chance of French national ships or privateers pushing out

and finding shelter in American or Spanish ports, made it inexpedient to reduce our force so low as might at first sight have been expected after the fall of Guadaloupe; the force, therefore, in the beginning of 1811, stood thus:

	Line.	Frigates.	Sloops.	Brigs.	Total.
Halifax .	1	6	7	9	23
Jamaica	1	5	12	5	23
Barbadoes	1	8	22	17	48
	3	19	41	31	94

In the course of that year nothing occurred to induce the Admiralty to increase this branch of the naval force. The French showed no disposition to push out to the West Indies; both the Haytian Chiefs professed friendship for England; the reception of French privateers in the Spanish ports became more improbable; and, though the consideration of possible danger did not cease to operate on the minds of the Admiralty, they thought themselves justified in reducing in a small degree the West India force, so that, at the beginning of 1812, it stood thus:

	Line.	Frigates.	Sloops.	Brigs.	Total.
Halifax .	1	6	10	6	23
Jamaica	1	5	10	3	19
Barbadoes	1	6	12	16	35
	3	17	32	25	77

In the spring of 1812, the aspect of our relations with America grew still more unfavourable, and

May 9, Lord Castlereagh communicated to the Admiralty that discussions were pending with America, the amicable termination of which was very uncertain, and he signified the Prince Regent's pleasure that orders should be sent to the Admirals on that station,

1. To repel any hostile aggression, but also to take care not to commit one.

2. In the event of a declaration of war by America, or the

issue of letters of marque, or any invasion of the provinces and islands, to commence active and direct hostilities, and to sink, burn, or destroy American ships, and to pursue all other measures, offensive and defensive, for the annoyance of the enemy and the protection of his Majesty's subjects.

3. To exercise, except in the specified cases, all possible forbearance towards the citizens of the United States.

May 9. On the same day, orders to this effect were despatched to Admirals Sawyer at Halifax, Stirling at Jamaica, Sir Francis Laforey at Barbadoes, and Sir John Duckworth, then about to sail for Newfoundland.

But, as the negociation, though in a doubtful, was far from being in a desperate state, it was thought proper to take all possible means for preventing these orders being divulged; and they were accordingly communicated to the Admirals in the handwriting of the Secretary of the Admiralty himself, and to the Captains in the writing of the Admirals, so that no clerks were at all aware of the measure.

The same principle of not impeding the negociations by any appearance of doubt of their success, and the same desire not to irritate America by a show of hostile intentions, induced the Admiralty to send out the reinforcements which the increasing probability of a war rendered advisable, successively and in detail, so as not to attract notice; and one heavy frigate was therefore sent out to the Halifax station early, and a second in the latter end of May, a third in June, and a fourth early in July, besides three smaller frigates and four sloops, attached in those three months to convoys bound to the North American stations.

July 3. Admiral Sawyer was ordered, on a communication from Lord Bathurst's Office, to take measures with Sir J. C. Sherbrooke, for the maritime defences of Nova Scotia.

July 9. Instructions were sent, by Lord Castlereagh's desire, to the Admirals, that they should, in the event of Mr. Foster's requiring them to do so, suspend the hostilities, if they shall

have been commenced in consequence of the orders of the 9th of May; which requisition Mr. Foster is to make, if the Americans should revoke their letters of marque (if issued), or should repeal the Acts excluding British ships from their ports.

July 30. The account of the declaration of war by America reached the Government; at this time the force on the different stations was as follows:

	Line.	Frigates.	Sloops.	Brigs.	Total.
Halifax .	1	8	10	6	25
Jamaica .	—	5	5	3	13
Barbadoes .	1	6	12	7	26
	2	19	27	16	64

July 31. An Order in Council, and corresponding orders from the Admiralty, were issued, for the detention of American ships and vessels.

August 3. In order to give effect and combination to the measures of hostility which it would be necessary to take against America, it is decided to unite the three maritime stations that bound the American coast into one command, and Admiral Sir John Warren, Bart. and K.B., is appointed Commander-in-Chief, having under him the former commanders on the respective stations, viz., Vice-Admiral Stirling in the Polyphemus, Rear-Admirals Herbert Sawyer in the Africa, and Sir Francis Laforey in the Dragon.

August 5. The Junon, 38, sailed for North America.

August 8. Sir John Warren receives his instructions from Lord Castlereagh to make a proposition to the American Government, similar to that which Mr. Foster was directed to make in the despatch of the 8th of July, which had not reached him in time; and, in the event of the American Government revoking their letters of marque, Sir John Warren is also to suspend hostilities.

August 14. Sir John Warren, with the St. Domingo, 74,

and Poictiers, 74. sailed from Spithead for his station, having on board mortars, rockets, and other stores for offensive operations against the American coast.

August 19. His Majesty's ship Guerrière is taken by the Constitution. At this period the force actually on the respective stations was as follows:

	Line.	Frigates.	Sloops.	Brigs.	Total.
Halifax .	1	10	10	7	28
Jamaica .	—	5	6	3	14
Barbadoes .	1	6	9	12	28
	2	21	25	22	70

August 28. The Tenedos, 38 guns, sailed for Halifax.

October 5. The account of the capture of the Guerrière was received in England. At this time the force at, or on their way to the united stations, was as follows:

	Line.	Frigates.	Sloops.	Brigs.	Total.
Halifax .	3	12	14	5	34
Jamaica .	—	7	7	2	16
Barbadoes .	1	6	11	7	25
	4	25	32	14	75

October 7. Cleopatra, 32 guns, ordered to Halifax.

October 10. Grampus, 50, ordered to Barbadoes to replace the Dragon, 74, ordered to Halifax.

October 26. Cossack, 22, ordered to Halifax.

October 31. Rear-Admiral Cockburn, in the Marlborough, 74, was ordered to Halifax, to replace Vice-Admiral Sawyer, expected to return in the Africa.

November 18. The Admiralty having received from Sir John Warren accounts of his proceedings, in which they did not perceive as much vigour of operation as they thought they had a right to expect, wrote to him to use every possible exertion against the enemy; and stating to him that the great force already placed at his disposal was most fully equal to

active and vigorous hostility against the American force, both of national vessels and privateers; but that a further and considerable force, particularly of three sail of the line, was ordered to join his flag, to enable him to meet any squadron that the French might send to co-operate with the Americans.

November 20. Victorious, 74, sails for Halifax.

To the above account of force on the North American stations should be added that employed at Newfoundland, which is detached thither annually, but does not remain throughout the year, and which, on the 5th of August, consisted of one 50-gun ship, four frigates, four sloops, and two gun-brigs, making the whole force on the four stations which bound the American coast, at the time of the Guerrière, as follows:

	Line.	50 Guns.	Frigates.	Sloops.	Brigs.	Total.
Halifax . .	1	—	10	10	7	28
Jamaica .	—	—	5	6	3	14
Barbadoes .	—	1	6	9	12	28
Newfoundland	—	1	4	4	2	11
	1	2	25	29	24	81

It is further to be observed that, since the beginning of May, when Lord Castlereagh communicated that there were serious discussions pending with America, five ships of the line, twenty-three frigates, and sixteen sloops, have been despatched with convoys or otherwise, to that quarter.

November 27. The orders for the strict and rigorous blockade of the ports and harbours of the Chesapeake and Delaware were sent to Admiral Sir John Warren.

November 28. The Seahorse, 38, sailed for Jamaica.

December 13. The Ramillies, 74, sailed for Halifax.

December 19. The Cumberland, 74, sailed for Barbadoes.

December 28. The Surprise, 38, sailed for Barbadoes.

January 12. The Hogue and Valiant, 74, sailed for America and the Cressy, 74, and Barrosa, 36, sailed for Bar-

badoes. At this time, the force on the several stations was as follows:

	Line.	50 Guns.	Frigates.	Sloops.	Brigs.	Total.
Halifax . .	8	—	15	16	4	43
Jamaica . .	—	—	9	6	2	17
Barbadoes .	2	1	11	15	6	35
Newfoundland	—	—	2	2	1	5
	10	1	37	39	13	100

January 25. The Vengeur, 74, sailed for Barbadoes, and the Argo, 44, for Jamaica.

In addition to the line-of-battle ships and frigates above enumerated, nine sloops have been sent to reinforce the squadrons on the American stations, since the 25th of November.

It is also to be observed that there are now under orders for North America and Newfoundland the following ships:— Sceptre, 74, Crescent and Rosamond frigates, and ten sloops, which will make the force on the several stations as follows:

	Line.	50 Guns.	Frigates.	Sloops.	Brigs.	Total.
Halifax . .	8	—	15	22	4	49
Jamaica . .	—	—	9	8	2	19
Barbadoes .	4	1	10	16	6	37
Newfoundland	—	—	4	2	1	7
	12	1	38	48	13	112

ALLIANCE OF NATIONS AGAINST FRANCE; CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY; EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH FROM THE EMPIRE.

1813.

Such are the most important points to which the correspondence of this busy and eventful year relates. To enter into the detail of occurrences which must be well known to all the readers of these pages would be a work of supererogation, especially after having given to the public my Narrative of the War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814, and after the many other accounts of that period which have appeared.

I shall therefore content myself with directing attention to the mass of correspondence illustrative of the conduct and exertions of the sovereigns and princes allied against the common enemy, and to the authentic and interesting details furnished by the several agents accredited to the foreign Powers, (of whom I had the honour to be one) as giving a peculiar value to this Section.

A general impression was entertained by all these Ministers that Lord Castlereagh's presence with the

Allied Sovereigns would prove of infinite advantage to the public service, in allaying any jealousies which might arise, and in promoting the execution of such measures as should be jointly agreed upon for the accomplishment of the one grand object. Their opinions had such weight with the Cabinet, that my brother was appointed his Majesty's Plenipotentiary to the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia; and he left England in the last days of December, in pursuance of one of the most honourable and important missions ever confided to a public servant, in order to join the head-quarters of the three Monarchs, then at Freiburg, in the territory of Baden.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, December 8, 1812.

My Lord—Your lordship will see, by my separate despatch of this date, that I have drawn for a further sum of £5,000. The rest of the sum which I have to draw may be raised more leisurely, as I have been enabled to supply a pretty considerable sum of money from the funds remaining in my hands, on which I request your lordship's instructions, and which I can replace when it may be required. It became necessary to proceed as fast as possible in raising the necessary sum, as it is wanted for various agents in Germany; and if the decision of Denmark, of which we are now in daily expectation, should be at all favourable, the communication with France and Germany, as far as the influence of Buonaparte extends, will be difficult, if not totally intercepted. I may say this, in behalf of the French *chargé d'affaires* remaining here, (which, in the abstract, is a matter of little consequence) that it leaves the channels of communication with the Continent more free; and this is a reflection which General van Suchtelen has himself

made to me. Upon this subject, I ought to mention to your lordship that, within this day or two, an officer of considerable distinction in this country, and perfectly well acquainted, as well as connected, with Germany, has been despatched with these views to the Continent.

Count Löwenhjelm, the brother of the Minister at St. Petersburg, and a man of known zeal against the French interest, has been sent to that capital, for the purpose of arranging and accelerating the furnishing of the Russian auxiliary troops, which must now be a matter of great facility. Every thing, in short, convinces me that the disposition to act as early as possible in the spring is really serious; and it is time that his Majesty's Government should be prepared for the resolutions it has to take. The answer of Denmark will determine much; but I always think that the Prince Royal will have an extreme repugnance to march, or will absolutely refuse it, unless some satisfaction can be given by England on the subject of Norway. This refusal would be extremely to be deplored, for there is certainly a greater prospect than has ever yet been presented of restoring the equilibrium of Europe; and it is for his Majesty's Government to think whether, supposing Russia capable of performing this great work alone, it would be for the interest of other powers and of Europe that she should be alone in performing it, and that others should not have their voice and their real force in the accomplishment of this salutary business.

The Prince, with whom I had the honour of dining yesterday, and of having some conversation, gave it as his opinion that Bonaparte would be obliged to recall the whole of his forces from Spain, leaving, on the Eastern and Western Pyrenees, sufficient to guard the passes into France. He thinks that Ballesteros, of whose defection we heard yesterday, has been gained by the French, and he insinuated to me that other circumstances had excited some suspicions in him of the same kind.

With regard to the late conspiracy in France, he mentioned to me that he had heard of other persons of some consequence in the times of the Revolution, (among others, he named Garat) who were supposed to be the secret movers of it. He said that it was not, in the most minute degree, a movement in favour of the House of Bourbon; but I ought to observe to your lordship that, in all the opportunities I have had of hearing his sentiments, I have never yet discovered the smallest inclination towards the restoration of that monarchy. Perhaps he might be brought to it; but for that we must look much to future events.

In the ensuing campaign, the Prince is of opinion that Bonaparte (that is, he added, if he survives the chagrin and mortification of his recent discomfiture) will exert the most of his defensive force from France, to cover Holland and the Belgic provinces, both of them vulnerable, and the latter particularly, by the Prince Royal, who is highly esteemed there.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, December 8, 1812.

My Lord—I beg leave to lay before your lordship a representation of the state in which the Spanish Minister here, the Chevalier de Moreno, is left by his Government, and to interest your lordship's kind offices in his behalf, either with the Regency itself, or with the Spanish Ambassador, Count Fernan Nuñez, which may perhaps be equally effectual. I write this without his knowledge, but with a perfect knowledge of his complaints, which he has often made to me, and of the justice of which I am a daily eye-witness.

He has been now for more than seven and twenty months without the smallest receipt of appointments; and, though he has made all possible retrenchments in his mode of living, he has come, as I learn from all quarters, to the end of every

thing which he can call his own, except his furniture, books, and pictures, and even these he declares he must sell, if he is to continue here without payment.

He lives almost entirely with General van Suchtelen; and it is equally cruel to him and disgraceful to his station that a foreign Minister should be thus dependent on another for almost existence. I cannot, for my own part, give your lordship a better proof of his state than by mentioning the fact, that I supplied him with £100 for the expences of his courier's journey to London and Cadiz, with the treaty of peace; as he naturally felt that repugnance which every gentleman must feel, in discovering to persons at a distance, even the ambassador of his country, the state to which he is reduced. I am sure that he will not be able to proceed to Gottenburg; as it is necessary he should, to receive the small corps of Spanish troops expected there, without similar assistance from myself or General van Suchtelen, who has, I believe, afforded it on many previous occasions in the most handsome manner.

M. de Moreno tells me that he learns from the Regency of orders being given to their Commissioner in London, President of the Philippine Company, to pay him the amount of his claims, but this gentleman will neither accept his drafts, nor yet allow them to be protested; and M. de Moreno learns, by the last arrivals, that he offers now to accept, but only for two-thirds of the amount.

I am persuaded that a word from your lordship to Count Fernan Nuñez would go far towards a favourable termination of this business, which is really cruel towards M. de Moreno, and equally prejudicial to the interests of Spain here, which require all the support that external circumstances can give them.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck.

Draft. Foreign Office, January, 1813.

My Lord—Your despatches of the numbers and dates referred to in the margin [not specified] have been received and laid before the Prince Regent. In signifying to your lordship his Royal Highness's most gracious approbation of your conduct, I am commanded to express the deep regret with which his Royal Highness has observed the delays and obstructions your lordship has had to encounter in the discharge of your public duties.

His Royal Highness is sensible of the sacrifice your lordship has recently made to public duty in postponing your departure for Spain. His Royal Highness is satisfied that your presence in Sicily affords the best, if not the only, hope of bringing the measures in progress to a satisfactory termination; and your lordship's determination on this subject is an additional proof of the zeal, prudence, and firmness, which have guided your conduct, under the many difficulties with which you have had to contend.

In addition to the disappointment felt by the Prince Regent, at the delay which has taken place in giving the royal sanction to the late acts of the Sicilian legislature (a hesitation which is calculated to excite suspicion and distrust throughout the Island), the conduct of the Queen continues to be a subject of equal anxiety and alarm. Her Majesty, notwithstanding her solemn assurances to the contrary, still perseveres in embarrassing the counsels of the Government. Her determination to obstruct, and, if possible, overthrow the existing system of Government, as subversive of her own immediate power, is notorious. For this purpose, it appears there is no extremity to which she is not prepared to push her hostility to the British Alliance, regarding it as the main obstacle to the accomplishment of her own ambitious designs, in prosecution of which every expedient of internal intrigue has been resorted to, and

even treasonable intercourse with the enemy has been employed to forward her purpose.

In addition to the proofs your lordship has been enabled to collect of a treasonable intercourse with the enemy, his Majesty's Government have undoubted information that a deliberate determination exists on the part of the Queen (of which the King and the Hereditary Prince are made the instruments), to obstruct the settlement of the affairs of Sicily, and that active endeavours are now employed to induce foreign courts to countenance these attempts.

If these intrigues affected alone the political state of the Island, and if they did not involve in their consequences the stability of the Alliance, and the defence of the Island against the enemy, the Prince Regent would neither feel himself called upon nor authorized to interfere: but, when a direct intercourse with the enemy has existed, and when it is through the efforts of an internal faction that the conquest of the Island is meditated, his Royal Highness cannot see with indifference these machinations against the common safety.

The moderation with which your lordship has hitherto pressed that the Queen should retire from all interference in public affairs is fully approved. It is the desire of the Prince Regent that her Majesty should be prevailed on to abstain from the interference complained of by such means as may best accord with her Majesty's own feelings and with her personal dignity: but, after past experience and the undoubted proofs which exist of her Majesty's temper and designs, your lordship will consider yourself fully authorized to employ, at your discretion, the same full powers which were confided to you in the Marquess Wellesley's despatch of the [blank], to preserve the alliance, and to protect the Island against the danger that menaces it through her Majesty's influence.

For this purpose, you will represent to his Sicilian Majesty the indispensable necessity of executing with fidelity the assurance given to your lordship, in October last; and when the

Queen finds that her views are unmasked, I trust that her Majesty will, of her own accord, withdraw from the scene of distraction and misery which she has created for herself and for the royal family, and determine to retire to the Continent, till the affairs of the Island are more settled.

If your lordship should find that an arrangement of the Queen's pecuniary affairs, and an addition to her Majesty's income whilst she resides out of Sicily, would give facilities to her voluntary retirement, your lordship is fully authorized to recommend the former measure to the favourable consideration of the Sicilian Government, and to furnish the latter accommodation to her Majesty, at the expense of the British Government.

I have further to acquaint your lordship that I have been authorized to represent in the strongest terms to the Prince Castelcicala the displeasure with which the Prince Regent has observed the progress of affairs in Sicily obstructed by delays and difficulties altogether inconsistent with a sincere desire to give effect to the wishes of the nation as expressed by the Parliament; that his Royal Highness laments to find that neither internal peace nor external security can be hoped for so long as the Queen's influence continues to agitate the Government, and to perplex the counsels and conduct of her son; and that, from past experience, no hope of an alteration for the better in this respect can be entertained so long as her Majesty continues to reside in Sicily; that, under these circumstances, as the faithful ally of his Sicilian Majesty, the Prince Regent has felt himself entitled to represent the necessity of her Majesty's temporary absence from the Island, and also of her Sicilian Majesty and the Hereditary Prince proceeding, with sincerity and without delay, to establish the Government upon a footing which may render the preservation of the alliance consistent with the security of the British army, and with the effectual defence of his Sicilian Majesty's rights and dominions.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, January 9, 1813, Midnight.

My Lord—Your lordship will see, from the accompanying copy of a private letter from Lord Cathcart, the melancholy intelligence of the death of Lord Tyrconnel[1] at Wilna. The gentleman who is the bearer of the letter to Colonel Torrens is gone to-day to Gottenburgh, and will sail in the same packet as conveys this letter; but I still think it right that the letter should go as Lord Cathcart desires.

I have very much to write to your lordship in this form, in regard to my conversations with the Prince, who has desired me to express to your lordship personally the grateful sense he entertains of your conduct towards him, as well on these recent occasions as in Parliament. But I cannot go into this length without too long detaining the packet.

I only beg to add that the proposition which is the subject of Lord Cathcart's private confidential letter seems to have had no suite, and to have been entirely founded on the idea that Buonaparte would have reached Poland with something like a respectable remaining force.

Your lordship's most devoted servant,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.[2]

Draft. January 15, [1813].

My dear Lord—We have not heard anything of you since the 7th December, so that we know nothing of the armies since the passage of the Beresyna, except through the medium of France. What Bonaparte chooses to have disclosed or to have misrepresented appears in our papers, which contain the

[1] George, third Earl of Tyrconnel. This young nobleman, born in 1778, animated by a spirit of military enterprise, joined the Russian army as a volunteer, and died in the month of December, from excessive exertion and fatigue in pursuit of the French in their disastrous retreat.

[2] Ambassador to the Court of Russia.

news from Paris to the 19th. Their silence as to what is called their Grand Army, and the mention merely of Macdonald's and Bertrand's corps, induce us to believe the private account received from the Court, that the whole of the French force which was in the Beresyna has been totally ruined, or has surrendered.

We have not here any intelligence by which we can at all judge of the effects that the campaign has produced on Austria, Prussia, and the Confederation of the Rhine. It seems by the tenour of the French papers and by Bonaparte's permitting his papers to come over regularly, that he is still playing the game of impression, and endeavouring to persuade Europe that his resources are fully sufficient to repair all his disasters, and to reappear in force, and reassume the ascendency.

It is generally believed that, since his return, great symptoms of disgust and discontent have been openly shown at Paris, where he has increased the garrison; and the discontents through the South are said to be general. Yet, notwithstanding the numerous opportunities for a confidential communication to this country, either with a view to a change of government, the restoration of the Bourbons, or the establishment of peace, nothing of the kind has been transmitted: but it should seem that the authorities in Paris, the Conservative Senate, and other *nobles*, who owe their existence to Bonaparte, and dread their own annihilation by a change, are still induced by interest to support his authority.

There have been recently some movements of his army in Spain, which favour the idea of his altering his plan as to that country. The troops are removed from Benavente, Leon, Zamora, and Toro, towards Burgos; but, Soult having spread himself to the Tagus, we can by no means conclude that a retreat is in contemplation; and his notes in the Moniteur threaten the continuation of efforts in Spain with additional vigour.

If Bonaparte at all encourages the game begun by Metternich

for negociating a general peace, all that is doing and writing is explained on that principle. He will of course collect every force he can upon the Oder and Vistula, and keep what he can in Spain, in order to have negociations offered by Austria, whilst his territorial acquisitions are untouched, and the Confederacy of the Rhine unbroken; and he may certainly make safely such sacrifices to Austria as may induce her to play his game. These ideas, however, are mere conjectures, which a real knowledge of the state of affairs may prove to be idle.

I am not without hopes that the late success of the Russians in Persia may make the latter power more prone to peace. Sir G. Ouseley and the Prince Royal of Persia appear by the last despatches to be in possession of full powers from the Shah of Persia to treat; so that, if the Russians are not unreasonable, I hope for a favourable result. The quarrel on the Turkish frontier may possibly accelerate it.

I shall in a few days enter into a discussion, upon the subject of our relations with Persia, with Count de Lieven, and shall then transmit to you the result. Our treaty having been made when Russia and France were united against us, the former power will not be surprised if we looked a little anxiously to the preservation of India under such a combination.

M. Pozzo di Borgo is returning to Russia—who seems very well intentioned and right-thinking, and who certainly is possessed of much lively ingenuity and talent. I am afraid he may lose weight by appearing too much Anglicized. He has very recently thrown his thoughts on paper as to the present crisis; and I send you a copy of his Memoir, which may suggest many useful hints.

The great object on the present occasion is to induce the Emperor of Russia to give confidence to all the Germanic powers, who are by any means capable of being detached from Bonaparte, and I have no doubt his Imperial Majesty would himself be disposed to take that line; but if those whom he employs are not hearty, or not believed to be sincere in that

policy, the views of the monarch will be lost in the distrust of his agents. If, knowing his Ministers, and knowing their principles not fit to be trusted, he still keeps them as the ostensible directors of his politics, no foreign courts will give him the credit which he may personally deserve; and all his measures and negociations will be misconstrued from passing through canals which are believed to be impure.

The general principle of giving confidence to all powers which can be induced to take a part in reducing the power of France and restoring the independence of Germany, which I have above adverted to, is what I can alone recommend as an answer to all the suppositions you suggest in your private letter of the 24th November.

It seems utterly impossible, at the present moment, to prescribe to you any precise scheme, or even to express our particular wishes. Whatever scheme of policy can most immediately combine the greatest number of powers and the greatest military force against France, so as to produce the utmost effect against her, before she can recruit her armies and recover her ascendency, is that which we must naturally desire most to promote. And I should therefore wish that you would not discourage any Russian plans which you think calculated to produce this effect, from any supposition that we may be entangled in any political schemes of our own. Our great object is to take the North of Europe out of the hands of Bonaparte; and, whatever plan can be devised for ensuring success in this main point will not meet with opposition here, because it is not of our suggestion, or does not quite fall in with all our private views.

PS. January 17th.—I had written my letter when your despatches of the 22nd December arrived. We were prepared for the general result by the [statements] in the French papers, and by their report of the capitulation of the Prussian army under General d'Yorck. The desperate measures to which Bonaparte immediately resorted lead us to believe that

the spirit which operated in the Prussian corps is likely to diffuse itself, and that the example will be followed, whenever a protecting force appears sufficient to encourage it.

The letter you enclosed from Vienna supposed that Court precluded from following her wishes by engagements into which she has been reluctantly forced; but I still think there must be means sufficient to remove those scruples, if well applied.

I should hope every measure will be taken by the Emperor of Russia to conciliate the inhabitants of Eastern Prussia, and to induce them to take part against the common enemy, and become the means of detaching the King of Prussia from the French cause. C.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Foreign Office, January 18, 1813.

My Lord—M. Pozzo di Borgo,[1] who is proceeding to St. Petersburgh, with a view of humbly tendering his services to his Imperial Majesty, will have the honour of delivering this letter to your lordship.

[1] Pozzo di Borgo, a native of Corsica, was the son of poor parents, though descended from an ancient family of distinction. The zeal which he manifested in behalf of the French Revolution caused him to be elected deputy for Ajaccio to the National Assembly; but, on his return to Corsica, he attached himself to General Paoli, who aimed at rendering the island independent, under the protection of Great Britain. Hence arose the mortal enmity which ensued between the houses of Paoli and Buonaparte, and which seemed to animate all the efforts of Pozzo di Borgo till the final downfal of Napoleon was accomplished. He had been in the Russian service for several years, when the extraordinary admiration displayed by Alexander for the French Emperor, after the interview at Tilsit, induced him to apply for his dismission. Re-admitted into the Russian service at the date of the above letter, Pozzo di Borgo accompanied the Emperor in the ensuing campaign; and his sentiments are believed to have contributed materially to keep Alexander steady to the determination of the Allies not to make any peace with Buonaparte. After the general peace, he was actively employed in diplomatic engagements, invested with the rank of Count, and successively filled the important post of Ambassador at the Courts of Paris and London.

I have received the Prince Regent's express command to recommend him to your lordship's particular favour and notice, and that you will take the earliest opportunity of laying before his Imperial Majesty the gracious sentiments of approbation and interest with which this gentleman has been honoured by his Royal Highness during his long residence in this country. His abilities, as well as his principles, have frequently attracted the Prince Regent's attention, and his Royal Highness was the more pleased with his sentiments, as they always impatiently awaited the restoration of friendship between Great Britain and Russia.

Before the arrival of any Russian Minister in this country, with the sanction of the Prince Regent, I was the channel of intimating, through your lordship, M. Pozzo di Borgo's desire to return to Russia, if his Imperial Majesty should deign to countenance that wish—a wish which delicacy alone prevented M. Pozzo di Borgo from acting on in the first moment of peace. He now goes back, in consequence of the gracious answer to his request which your lordship was authorized to communicate from the Emperor; and your lordship will assure his Imperial Majesty that it will afford the Prince Regent the utmost personal satisfaction to understand that his Imperial Majesty's gracious intentions have been carried into effect.

I have the honour, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Extracts from a Letter relative to a proposed Expedition to the South of Italy, and the state of the Sicilian Army.[1]

Palermo, ce 20 Janvier, 1813.

J'ai reçu, mon cher Général, votre lettre du 1er Novembre, il y a seulement peu de jours, et Lord W. Bentinck a bien

[1] There is nothing about this letter to justify me in forming a conjecture by whom or to whom it was written. The only signature attached to it is D. The writer admits that he was at the time soliciting employment from the British Government.—EDITOR.

voulu me donner connaissance de celle que vous lui avez écrite en même tems. . . . . .

Actuellement je vous parlerai des conversations que j'ai eues avec Lord William au sujet de vos lettres.

Il m'a d'abord fait une première objection à votre projet de commencer par débarquer en Italie avec un petit corps, pour s'établir sur un point fortifiable de la côte. Cette objection c'est que ce serait attirer l'attention française sur ce point et y préparer plus de difficultés pour les mouvemens de son corps d'opération lorsqu'il arriverait ; et il pense (ce que pense aussi) qu'il vaut mieux arriver tout d'un coup, avec une force capable d'agir immédiatement et de balayer la Péninsule Italienne jusqu'aux Apennins.

La seconde objection qu'il m'a faite, et qui n'est, hélas ! que trop fondée, c'est qu'il ne lui reste pas même assez de troupes en Sicile pour faire une expédition de cette espèce. Nous sommes à cet égard dans le dénuement le plus complet ; et, en vérité, il vaut mieux ne pas dire à quel point. Toute la force disponible, et même plus, beaucoup plus que la force disponible de Sicile, est à Alicante, où elle n'a rien fait, et, selon moi, ne fera rien ; et à moins qu'on ne la fasse revenir en tout ou en partie, veuillez vous persuader, mon cher Général, qu'il est inutile de se flatter d'expéditions sur l'Italie, parceque tous les moyens disponibles de l'Angleterre dans la Méditerranée sont renfermés dans les murs d'Alicante. Faire garnison à Alicante est assurément un emploi bien utile et bien brillant pour un corps de troupes comme celui-là. C'est cependant qu'ils font depuis *huit mois*, et c'est ce qu'ils feront encore pendant toute la campagne de 1813, et Dieu sait jusqu'à quand, si on continue à croire que cette diversion dans l'Est de l'Espagne est plus avantageuse que celle en Italie.

Je crois qu'il est tout aussi incontestable que si Lord William Bentinck avait été débarquer en Italie au mois de Juin dernier, il y aurait fait *de très grandes choses ;* qu'il est incontestable qu'au moyen de cette expédition d'Espagne il n'a été

rien fait. Aussi de quoi se plaint le public?—de ce qu'il n'a été *rien fait*, et en cela le public a raison. Le public a en général raison sur le passé, mais il est rare qu'il aye raison sur l'avenir; et aussi quel est le remède qu'il suggère à l'inaction de l'année passée? De persister dans les mêmes mesures qui l'ont occasionnée. Voilà le public de tous les tems et de tous les pays!—mais alors c'est à ceux qui ont eu la faiblesse de céder à ses déraisonnables clameurs qu'il s'en prend, c'est aux Gouvernemens, c'est aux Généraux, c'est aux Alliés, enfin c'est à tout excepté à lui-même, qui est pourtant en général le plus coupable.

Aujourd'hui c'est à ce pauvre Général Maitland à qui l'on s'en prend, tandis que c'est à la commission dont il a été chargé qu'il faudrait s'en prendre. Je n'entreprendrai pas ici de discuter cette affaire; celà irait trop loin, mais je crois sa cause excellente. Je crois facile de démontrer qu'il ne pouvait rien faire en Catalogne, pays hérissé de places fortes, toutes au pouvoir des Français, qui, outre les garnisons, y ont de Colonnes Mobiles, tandis que l'armée Catalane n'est guères autre chose qu'une réunion momentanée de Miquelets et de Somatènes, qui se dispersent dès qu'ils ont fait leur coup. C'est là plus ou moins l'histoire de toutes les guerrilles Espagnoles; et c'est pour celà qu'il est si difficile d'obtenir leur co-opération avec les armées Anglaises et que les Anglais se plaignent qu'ils ne peuvent pas compter sur les Espagnols. Une armée Anglaise ne peut pas se disperser comme une guerrille; donc elle est toujours susceptible d'être atteinte par l'ennemi après qu'il l'a battue; donc elle est nécessairement prise ou détruite si elle n'a pas de point d'appui; et ce point d'appui, où est il en Catalogne, où toutes les forteresses Françaises sont si rapprochées sur les côtes? Croyez, Général, que plus on discutera à fond les opérations que le Général Maitland pouvait entreprendre en Catalogne, plus on l'approuvera de n'y avoir pas été. On nous a dit qu'il n'avait qu'à prendre Tarragone ou même Barcelone; mais je crois que la meilleure réponse à faire aux auteurs de

ces conseils serait quelque chose dans le genre de celle de Léonidas à Xerxès, *Allez les prendre !*

Il a été tâter Palamos, qui n'est ni Tarragone ni Barcelone, et il y a trouvé une garnison assez forte que pour que ce qu'il eut de mieux à faire fut de s'en éloigner. Je regarde aujourd'hui la Catalogne comme le dernier point de l'Espagne où tiendront les Français.

La Catalogne étant aussi bien garnie de troupes Françaises, je ne vois pas ce que le Général Maitland pouvait faire de mieux que d'aller débarquer à Alicante, le seul point d'appui, le seul point de débarquement couvert et assuré qu'il eut sur cette côte depuis le Roussillon. À peine y a-t-il été que Suchet est venu l'y bloquer avec des forces supérieures, et partout ailleurs, au lieu d'être *bloqué* il eut été *rembarqué*. Et que pouvait-il faire avec son petit corps au milieu des grandes masses Françaises, qui se mouvaient autour de lui ?—*Rien, rien, et cent fois rien.* Aussi l'opinion unanime de tous les Généraux Anglais a été qu'ils ne pouvaient rien faire. Ils ont essayé à droite, à gauche, mais partout ils ont trouvé des forces supérieures, et il a fallu rentrer à Alicante ; ailleurs il aurait fallu se rembarquer.

Vous me direz, et je crois vous entendre d'ici, que je suis goguenard, et moi, je vous en demande pardon bien humblement ; mais c'est que cela m'amuse un peu—d'avoir raison sur vous. C'est un plaisir dont vous avez joui trop souvent en votre vie pour ne pas me passer d'en jouir un peu surtout quand j'avais le très grand avantage de voir les choses de près, et que vous les voyiez de loin. Mais laissons là Alicante et toute cette controverse ! Donnez nous seulement un bon coup d'épaule pour en emporter les troupes et les mener en Italie ; et alors vous êtes absous pleinement de toutes vos hérésies sur le pauvre Maitland et son triste Alicante.

Or, voici ce qu'il faut faire pour y parvenir. Il faut faire un grand Mémoire, qui embrasse et qui traite successivement toutes les parties de cette grande guerre que l'Angleterre fait

à Buonaparte. Votre objet doit être un plan général d'attaque pour la campagne de 1813. Le sujet est beau, et traité par vous il deviendra du plus grand intérêt et sûrement de la plus grande utilité. Là vous pourrez développer tout à votre aise la nécessité où se trouve l'Angleterre d'opérer en Italie, le danger et la honte de ne pas le faire, et les avantages immenses, incalculables, qui ne peuvent pas manquer d'en résulter. Si vous montrez l'Italie totalement dégarnie de troupes Françaises, vous ne montrerez que la vérité. Mais après avoir montré la facilité, la certitude de succès et tous les avantages de cette opération, il convient de passer à l'examen de moyens, et ici mon cher Général, je dois vous dire, quelque reconnaissant que je sois de tous vos bons efforts en ma faveur relativement à cette expédition, que votre idée de la faire faire exclusivement par des troupes Siciliennes, sans qu'elles soient combinées et subordonnées à des troupes Anglaises et à des Généraux Anglais, est absolument inexécutable et inadmissible.

Je suis sûr que si vous étiez sur les lieux, vous l'auriez abandonnée, parceque votre perspicacité aurait bientôt démêlé les obstacles qu'il faudrait des volumes pour vous développer par écrit. Les troupes Siciliennes ont trop peu de consistance pour qu'on puisse avec sécurité les envoyer seules nulle part. Toutes les probabilités sont qu'elles seraient battues ou dispersées. Vous le penseriez comme moi si vous connaissiez leur composition et si vous pouviez les voir de près. Elles sont d'ailleurs en trop petit nombre. La Colonne Mobile, qui en a absorbé la moitié, a absorbé plus de trois quarts de ce qui vaut quelque chose, et une grande partie de cette Colonne Mobile est à Alicante. En outre, ce qui n'est pas de la Colonne Mobile, n'a ni chemises, ni souliers, ni armes, ni presque rien que son prêt. L'artillerie manque un peu de tout; et je ne sais pas quel est le département, où le corps qui n'appartient pas à la Colonne Mobile n'est pas dans le même cas.

La Colonne Mobile est la partie de l'armée Sicilienne dont le Roi a remis la disposition et le payement aux Généraux

Anglais; et il serait aussi impolitique qu'inutile de vouloir diviser cette Colonne Mobile de l'armée Anglaise, ou de la faire agir séparément; et c'est donc autant *politiquement* que *militairement* que je crois que cette idée doit être abandonnée.

Si vous renoncez à ce plan, comme il me semble difficile que vous ne le fassiez pas, lors, mon cher Général, où voulez vous trouver des moyens d'agir en Italie, si ce n'est à Alicante? J'espère que vous n'êtes pas du nombre de ceux qui croyent qu'on nous enverra des troupes d'Angleterre; parceque s'il y restait des troupes disponibles, c'est à Lord Wellington qu'on les enverrait: et je me flatte, par conséquent, que vous reviendrez à l'idée que ce qu'il y a de mieux à faire, c'est tout simplement de rendre à Lord William Bentinck ses troupes d'Alicante et de lui ordonner d'aller débarquer avec elles en Italie. Je m'en flatte d'autant plus que je me rappelle que vous n'avez conseillé la diversion de la Sicile sur l'Est de l'Espagne que comme une opération momentanée, et pas du tout comme une opération permanente; ce qui serait pourtant ce qui arriverait, si on laissait toujours les troupes de l'armée Sicilienne en Espagne; et plus encore, si on les faisait passer sous le commandement direct de Lord Wellington: car alors, malgré toute ma confiance dans son patriotisme et la grandeur de ses vues, je craindrais que tout en sentant la nécessité d'agir en Italie, il ne remit cette opération d'un mois à l'autre et ne la fit manquer en manquant l'occasion, comme cela est arrivé l'année passée.

Il me semble que nous sommes d'accord sur ce que l'expédition ne peut rien faire à Alicante; et quoiqu'il puisse y avoir une différence d'opinion entre nous, sur ce qu'il est possible ou impossible de faire en Catalogne, cependant je ne crains pas que vous pensiez qu'il vaille mieux renoncer à agir en Italie pour agir en Catalogne. Croyez qu'en Italie le succès est sûr et présente des résultats dont les succès en Catalogne ne peuvent pas approcher; tandis qu'il est très incertain que la petite armée d'Alicante pût agir du tout en Catalogne, et

encore plus qu'elle pût y faire aucune impression sur l'ennemi. Je ne vois guères d'autres chances pour elle en Catalogne que celles d'être battue ou rembarquée et quelle différence de ces chances là à celles d'Italie !

Je n'ai pas manqué de communiquer au Prince de Belmonte tout ce que vous m'avez mandé sur son compte auquel il a été très sensible, et dont il m'a bien demandé de vous remercier. Il sent, comme moi, tout le mal que nous font certains discours, certaines insinuations, mais qu'y faire? Y répondre par sa conduite et son allure. Je ne vois rien de plus à faire. Ces discours, ces insinuations, n'ont plus de cours ici, et elles en ont eu, et chez les Siciliens et chez les Anglais, et celà même par des agens moins connus et par conséquent plus séduisans que ceux dont vous me parlez: mais cela est tombé et n'a fait de mal qu'à ses auteurs . . . . . Je ne vous dis rien de Lord William, parceque ou il vous écrit, ou il vous écrira. Je ne lui ai pas laissé ignorer que vous m'aviez instruit de la manière dont il s'est exprimé sur mon compte en vous écrivant. Je vous remercie de tout mon cœur de cette nouvelle preuve de votre ancienne amitié, vous renouvellant l'assurance de la mienne, que vous savez être à toute épreuve.

D.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Foreign Office, January 22, 1813.

My dear Lord—The revolt of General d'Yorck and the advance of the Russian army open most encouraging prospects. I have been induced, under these circumstances, to accept an offer of Colonel de Gneisenau to go immediately to Colberg, with a view of inducing the garrison to declare themselves. He will be authorized, in case the King has not joined the allies, to take the garrison of Colberg *into British pay*, if it is disposed to come over.

With a view of making provision for the wants of the German Legion, and for any other services in the North of

Germany, I propose forwarding a complete equipment of arms, clothing, accoutrements, &c., to the Baltic, for 20,000 men; from which depôt what you require for the Legion will be supplied, in preference to any other service.

My instructions to General Hope will explain our money arrangements for the next year in the North. It is not meant, however, to deprive your lordship of your dominion over the sum of £500,000, placed at your disposal when you went from hence: you will only use your discretion with *a little more caution*, holding in view the other expenses likely to fall upon us, and the faculty of the exchange to enable us to meet it. The crisis is of that magnitude that *we must not starve the cause* by suffering any great object to fail, which can by an effort be brought within our grasp.

I have been sensibly affected by Lord Tyrconnel's premature fate. As General Dornberg will probably soon repair to the Legion, I have requested the Duke of York to look out for two or three fit persons to be attached to your Staff, in order that you may have the means of placing an intelligent officer with each of the armies.

I trust the advance of the Russians will enable your lordship to open a direct communication for your despatches between Memel and Carlsham. I shall instruct the Admiralty to order the light squadron, stationed off the southern coast of Sweden, to give every facility to these arrangements.

Lord Bathurst having, for the present, relinquished his purpose of raising two or three regiments in Russia for general service, you will consider Colonel Lowe (who is represented to me as an officer of great merit) as an instrument in your lordship's hands for conducting the affairs of the Legion. The whole arrangement now takes a diplomatic shape, our advances being in the nature of qualified subsidy.

I hope the late hesitation of Sweden to do what became her has not made any permanent coldness in Russia. I believe it did not arise from any disposition to a change of policy. The

advice given in Russia was certainly very bad. It probably arose from an apprehension that things might end too soon for the separate objects in view.

We had a difficult card to play here. I hope it has been so managed as not to expose Russia to inconvenience; and, whilst both the points, viz., the treaty with Spain and the dismission of the French agent, have been secured without any concession on our part, Sweden has been made to feel her diplomatic errors, without any diminution of friendly sentiments. We have also steadily adhered to our purpose of reserving the objects which Sweden looks to from us to be discussed in connexion with the arrangements for the ensuing campaign.

I have no answer from Vienna. Many thanks for your private letter.

Yours, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, January 27, 1813.

My Lord—Your lordship will easily imagine, from the contents particularly of my last despatch of this evening, that I have had opportunities of conversing with the Prince Royal since I last had the honour of addressing you. My conversations turn upon many subjects, and often in a manner too desultory to admit of a very accurate detail; but they generally bend, more or less, to the opening campaign and to the pending negociations, particularly as to the question of Norway.

It was on one of these occasions that His Royal Highness said to me that he should not be absolutely disinclined, if there were no other possible way of bringing Denmark to the common cause, to wave the demand of Norway. "But then," said he, "what must I have for the loss of Finland? What boon shall I present to this country, to induce it to embark in the same cause? If Denmark is to be indemnified by the cession

of Pomerania, of Mecklenburg Schwerin, of the territory of Lübeck, or of any other country which may be agreed upon for the loss of Norway, that cession must, in the other case, come to Sweden." He declared, at the same time, that the possession of Norway was one, of which he should abandon the hope with the utmost regret, because he should be obliged to abandon, to a certain degree, his always favourite idea of insulating himself from the Continent, and uniting his system of policy indissolubly with that of Great Britain.

To a certain degree, perhaps, he could pursue that system in concert with Great Britain, and in union with the continental possessions of the sovereign. But it is for your lordship to judge whether the cession of Norway to Sweden would not be, on the whole, the most eligible plan, and whether the Crown of Denmark would not be more conveniently indemnified by the adjunction of territories to those it already possesses on the Continent. It is for your lordship to judge, likewise, how far all or any of these considerations ought to be subordinate to the one great object of carrying Denmark along with us voluntarily. Of this much, however, I must persist in constantly assuring your lordship, that the cession of Norway, or perhaps its equivalent in the way above stated, is an indispensable requisite to the active co-operation of Sweden. The Prince will not, because I am morally convinced he cannot, act without it.

The advance of the season makes us look with much anxiety and eagerness for the Russian preparations of their auxiliary troops to act on this side; and I have thought it my duty to urge this matter constantly to Lord Cathcart. The Swedish troops are in such a state of preparation in their cantonments, that they could, at any time, be marched to the coast in a fortnight. So I am assured most positively, and I believe truly. Memel, Königsberg, Liebau, and possibly Dantzick, will present prodigious advantages for the embarkation of the Russian troops; and I should hope that the Russian men-of-

war in England might be in the Baltic early enough to contribute their assistance.

The Prince Royal, in speaking of the naval forces of his Britannic Majesty to be expected in the spring in the Baltic, expressed his particular desire, if it was not absolutely incompatible with the arrangements of Government, to have Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez again in the command, who has acquired great influence by his conduct here, and who, I can assure your lordship, has contributed greatly, by that conduct, to the present state of things. I may venture to say to your lordship that this nomination will be regarded by the Prince as a great mark of personal attention.

I have the honour to be, &c., EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, February 3, 1813.

My Lord—The extract of a despatch from Berlin of the 16th January is from M. de Goltz to the Prussian Minister here, which he was so good as to furnish me with a copy of.

The note relative to a demand of 25,000 men from Denmark contains the substance of a communication received here from the house of the French Minister Alquier, with which it is contrived to keep up a secret communication, unknown to the Chief, but of which I conjure your lordship not to take the smallest notice to any person whatever.

As soon as it was in my power, after the return of M. de Löwenhjelm, I requested an audience of the Prince Royal, which he was so good as to grant me the day before yesterday; and, on my expressing my hope that the news which His Royal Highness had received from the Emperor was satisfactory, he, answering me entirely in the affirmative, communicated to me the letter which he had received from his Imperial Majesty, under date of the 25th December, O.S., and his own answer. The Prince said that I should have a copy of it to communi-

cate to your lordship in confidence, and in my presence directed his confidential secretary to make it; but the latter has thought it perhaps better to throw it into the form of a commuication, and I have the honour of transmitting it in that form to your lordship, as well as the answer of the Prince, which has been sent forward by the messenger of General van Suchtelen. The former is, except as to form, the literal transcript of the letter which I read myself.

Your lordship will see, from this letter of the Emperor, that the Russian auxiliary troops will be embarked from the ports of Prussia, where shipping in abundance may be found for their reception and transport, by which means a space of perhaps two months' time will be anticipated, and the expedition may be prepared to act in April, instead of the end of May, or June, as would have been the case if the embarkation had been made from Finland, or from the opposite coast of the Gulf, Reval, or even Riga. In the mean time, the rapid progress of the Russian arms may diminish even the length of this voyage, and they may be embarked still nearer to the future scene of action in the North of Germany.

The Prince desired me to say to your lordship, with what impatience he now looks forward to the arrival of General Hope here, that circumstance alone having prevented him from sending Baron Wetterstedt to England. According to the idea which I had the honour of mentioning to your lordship, he seemed indeed half inclined still to send him; but I thought it best that they should not cross each other; and I trust the arrival of the next mails (the last being to the 15th ult.) will clear up all doubts on this subject.

His Royal Highness alluded also to a small supply of troops which he gave me to understand he had received the hope of from his Majesty's Government; and he requested me to say that it would be of great importance, were it only to the amount of a single regiment of cavalry and two trains of light artillery, which he seems extremely desirous of having. The opinion

and the reputation of having English troops with him were the circumstances which he dwelt upon much.

Count Löwenhjelm will be sent back to the Emperor, as the Prince Royal informed me, in the course of eight or ten days, and by sea, to the head-quarters of his Imperial Majesty, for the purpose of accelerating the preparations for the embarkation of the troops. His Royal Highness wishes, even before the season for the whole embarkation arrives, to be furnished with a Russian corps of about 3,000 men; and he intends, with about the same number of Swedes, to put himself on ship-board, and fall upon the island of Rügen, carrying off all the French troops which he can find there, and (what is more important) all the magazines of grain, which, he understands, are considerable. Independent of the actual advantage of this step, he hopes by it to distract the attention of the enemy, and to oblige them to increase the garrisons of Stettin and other fortresses on the Oder, perhaps even of Magdeburg, and to draw off the troops from other points which he may afterwards meditate to attack. This idea is of course subordinate to the changes which the course of events may produce; and, upon my word, these advance so rapidly, that I should be little surprised to find Stettin, Cüstrin, and Frankfort, and the whole country to Magdeburg, either occupied by the Russians, or by garrisons (Prussian) no longer their enemies. The example of Prussia may spread like wildfire through the whole of Germany.

With regard to the reported attempt to carry off the King of Prussia, (of which an account is given in the despatch from Berlin, of the 19th ult., from M. de Taube) the Prince Royal, who furnished me with this copy, assured me that, notwithstanding the doubtful manner in which M. de Taube speaks of it, he himself has not the smallest doubt of the intention; that he had, more than three months ago, desired M. de Tarrach to put the King upon his guard, and to request his Majesty to be as much as possible in the midst of his troops, as he knew

it was the intention of Buonaparte, in case of a successful campaign against Russia, to possess himself of the whole royal family of Prussia, and to extend the French empire to the Oder.

In consequence of a communication which I received from Lord Cathcart, relative to the establishment of a few small packet-boats between Liebau and Carlsham, or Ystadt, for which his lordship told me he had received authority from the Emperor, I spoke to the Prince Royal on the same subject. His Royal Highness expressed his entire willingness to do every thing on his side which may be possible: but, as I collected from Lord Cathcart's letter that the expense of this arrangement, as, indeed, the principal benefit, will fall upon us, the Prince seemed to hope that on this side we might undertake the expense, which, though small in comparison, would weigh on the feeble resources of this country. Is it your lordship's pleasure that I should take any steps on this point, which must be done in concert with his Majesty's ships of war, at least in part? I have desired more information from his lordship, and shall probably receive it in a short time. Possibly, the course of events may bring back the port of Kiel to this use, as in the year 1807.

I beg your lordship to accept the assurance of the respectful attachment with which I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

[Enclosure in the foregoing Letter.]

Substance of a Letter from the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Sweden.

25 Décembre, 1812.

L'Empereur Alexandre écrit au Prince Royal sous la date de 25 Décembre qu'il se fait un plaisir de lui annoncer que la Russie se trouve completement nettoyée d'ennemis; que Memel a été occupé, et la garnison, avec le commandant, fait prisonniers de guerre; que le corps Prussien, sous les ordres

du Général York, avait été cerné et coupé de celui de Macdonald, par conséquent forcé de conclure une convention, par laquelle il se sépare entièrement des armées françaises; que Macdonald est resté avec moins de 6,000 hommes; que les tristes restes de la Grande Armée Française se sont portés sur Königsberg; que les corps de Witgenstein, de Tschichagoff, et de Platoff, sont dirigés à leur poursuite; que le Prince de Schwartzemberg se retire du coté de Praga et de Modeline; qu'il est peu probable qu'il puisse effectuer sa jonction avec les restes de la Grande Armée; qu'il parait plutôt porté de prendre des quartiers d'hiver; que la grande armée Russe passe actuellement la frontière, et que son avant-garde va pousser jusqu'à la Vistule; qu'en attendant les corps de Sacken et de Miloradovitch tacheront de s'emparer de Warsovie; que malgré tous ces avantages, S. M. I. croit l'expédition, dont elle est convenue avec S. A. R. pour le printems, plus nécessaire que jamais pour achever completement l'ouvrage; que les positions qu'occupent maintenant les armées Russes offrent bien plus de facilité pour le transport des troupes; et que S. M. I. est convenue avec le Comte de Löwenhjelm, de les faire embarquer dans les ports de Liebau, Memel, et peut-être Königsberg, quand il se trouvera occupé—cela raccourcira de beaucoup le trajet; que S. M. I. fait tout préparer à cet effet pour le commencement d'Avril et assure S. A. R. que toute activité possible y sera mise.

S. M. I. informe le Prince Royal qu'elle a fait faire les démarches nécessaires à Copenhague; que le Chancelier a eu ordre d'en communiquer le contenu à M. de Löwenhjelm, et S. M. espère qu'elles produiront l'effet désiré.

[Enclosure 2.]

Letter from the Crown Prince of Sweden to the Emperor Alexander.

Stockholm, le 1er Janvier, 1813.

Le Comte de Löwenhjelm vient d'arriver. Il m'a remis la lettre que V. M. I. me fit l'honneur de m'écrire le 25 du mois

passé. J'ai à feliciter V. M. des succès rapides de ses armées, et de l'éloignement des troupes ennemies de ses frontières. Ce qui nous revient sur l'état déplorable où se trouvent les Français, surpasse tout ce que l'histoire ancienne et moderne a décrit sur les fautes commises par les généraux, et sur les revers des armées.

Je m'attendais, Sire, que l'Empereur Napoleon, ébloui par sa fortune, commettrait de grandes fautes, dont V. M. profiterait; mais je l'avoue, j'etais bien éloigné de penser qu'il abandonnerait si subitement des braves auxquels il devait sa puissance, et sa gloire.

Si son prestige d'opinion est détruit en partie, il lui reste encore des forces réelles, qui, conduites par des généraux plus sages, et plus calculateurs, peuvent nous opposer, entre l'Elbe et le Rhin, une résistance capable de nous arrêter pendant toute la belle saison, dans cette partie de l'Allemagne, et lui donner le tems de faire mouvoir dans l'intervalle tous les ressorts de la politique et de la jalousie.

Je ne vois donc, Sire, d'autre partie à prendre pour entrainer les Puissances chancelantes que celui de commencer le plutôt possible l'expédition projetée. La réponse que vient de faire le Dannemarc aux communications faites de la part de V. M. ne laisse plus aucun espoir de ramener cette Puissance à ses véritables intérêts. Il ne s'agit plus maintenant que de préparer les moyens de la réduire par une attaque brusque, et décidée sur la Zélande. Cette opération doit nécessairement préceder celles qui nous porteront au premier beau tems sur l'Elbe et le Wéser.

L'assurance que V. M. a la bonté de me donner que le corps de 35 mille hommes sera prêt dans le courant du mois d'Avril a comblé tous mes vœux; et rien ne peut me flatter davantage que l'espoir de prouver au monde que je mérite l'attachement de V. M. par mon dévoûment à la bonne cause.

Le Roi me charge, Sire, de faire ses complimens sincères à V. M. sur tout ce qui arrive d'heureux à vos armées, &c.

Observations upon an Article in the Sicilian Constitution concerning the Political Relation of Sicily and Naples to each other.

BY LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK.

Translation. Palermo, February 17, 1813.

NO. XIII.

Fol. 16, No. 7.—It shall not be lawful for the King, either by treaty, in consequence of his having succeeded to another realm, to cede the kingdom of Sicily, either entirely or in part, to any prince other than his immediate heir: in such a case, every act of his shall be null and void, and the nation shall not be obliged to acknowledge the will of the King.

Observation 1.—The whole of this Article appears too just and reasonable to be questioned: the duties of the Prince and those of his subjects are reciprocal; and, in like manner, as the people cannot alienate the crown, neither, for reasons much more weighty, is the King allowed to yield up his people to another person.

Fol. 17, No. 8.—2. Should the King of Sicily recover the kingdom of Naples, or acquire any other kingdom, he shall send thither his first-born son to govern it, or shall leave his said son in Sicily, and cede to him the kingdom, inasmuch as the said kingdom of Sicily is, from this day forward, declared independent upon that of Naples, and upon every other kingdom or province.

Observation 2.—I strongly recommend the sanction of this Article, for the following reasons:—

1. Because its contents express the common desire of the Sicilian nation.

2. Because that desire is founded upon the truest sentiments of security, prosperity, and independence.

3. Experience demonstrates that all provinces far distant from the seat of empire have always been ill governed. Sicily affords a very clear proof of this, by the declining state to

which it is reduced, notwithstanding it is one of the finest countries on the globe.

4. Experience has likewise shown that the interests of the two kingdoms are different. Naples and her political relations must always follow the great political powers of the Continent; Sicily the greatest maritime power.

5. Experience has, moreover, demonstrated that Naples, despoiled of her independence, passed under the yoke of the principal power of the Continent.

6. And, on the other hand, the same experience has demonstrated that Sicily continued safe during the general destruction of the continental nations, not through the efforts made by Naples, but owing to the succours she received from the first maritime power.

7. Experience shows Naples to be entirely dependent on France; and she must for ever risk being exposed to this condition, unless her power increase and the limits of her empire be extended.

8. It is but too true that Sicily depends on England, but this arises only from the entire neglect of her resources. If, n the sequel, she adopts a wise system of domestic and foreign policy, she may, by her own means, acquire such a power as to sustain her independence. Alliances will then be advantageous to Sicily, as they are to every other nation. But, when her wealth and population increase, and she is capable of sending into the field one hundred thousand troops, she will no longer be in the humble situation of being compelled to apply for protection to some powerful State, to whose honour she must trust alone for her existence. Her alliances will then be maintained upon a footing of equality and reciprocal advantage. Those foreign forces which are admitted into the kingdom will be considered as aiding to defend it, and not as principals; it will then have allies, not masters.

9. It appears, furthermore, that what is evidently just is the best policy.

10. It is notorious that Sicily will never agree to her union with the kingdom of Naples; and, if any such attempt were made, the consequence would be an insurrection, to quell which, no other means would remain at the disposal of the King than the troops of his ally. But how could the latter be justified in contributing towards a measure, by which England would lose every right she has to the attachment of Sicily; and, having disgusted the nation, might force it, in order to maintain its independence, into the hands of the enemy?

11. But the political inconvenience of such an act will become more apparent by supposing a case, which is perhaps of the greatest consequence.

Should it be asked, How can the King recover the kingdom of Naples?—the answer would be, By expelling from thence the French.

In what manner can the French be expelled from it? The reply would certainly be, By the English and Sicilian arms, paid by the Sicilian Parliament. And here the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces would interfere to declare, that the English troops alone are not sufficient for such an enterprise, should even the French troops in Naples be supposed to amount to the smallest number possible.

Does not such an enterprise, therefore, depend upon the co-operation of the Sicilian army? And can it be ever imagined that the Sicilian nation would be disposed to employ the whole of its resources in an enterprise which would tend to the destruction of their independence? Certainly not! As soon, however, as such an obstacle shall have been removed, Sicily will lend her assistance with great alacrity. It is unquestionably her interest to have for her neighbour any one but an individual of the family of Buonaparte. A military chief, who pretends to possess himself of Sicily by right, and who has attempted its conquest, must always be considered as a formidable enemy of the rights and liberty of Sicily. It is none of her least concerns that the crown of Naples should be under

the dominion of the family reigning in Sicily, because this holds out to her the best hopes of friendship and peace. It is, finally, the common interest of Sicily and England that the enormous power of France should be diminished and restrained.

The result of my opinion, therefore, is that the means of recovering Naples, and of obtaining even the so much wished-for union of the two kingdoms under the dominion of the same sovereign, is that of giving the royal sanction to the Article under consideration.

But, as what some affirm is true, that Naples and Sicily are reciprocally necessary to one another, and as it cannot be denied that a strict and firm friendship would be most advantageous to both kingdoms, I should say, Wait till Sicily convince herself of this truth. Concede to her what forms the object of her desires, and it will put an end to all the prejudices by which she is at present governed. She will then perhaps consider such a union dispassionately, and without any fear. The liberty of the press will satisfy her of this, as well as of many other truths. She may perhaps shortly desire and demand what she at present most disapproves of. This kingdom might then perhaps find, in a constitution similar to its own established at Naples, the way to the so much desired union and brotherhood. Being surrounded by powerful neighbours, she might perhaps wish for a united Parliament, like that of Great Britain and Ireland. To conclude, Sicily might perhaps wish to preserve that very King, under whose auspices her liberty and indulgence are happily on the point of being established.

W. C. Bentinck.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Mr. Edward Cooke.

Stockholm, February 18, 1813.

My dear Sir—The messenger Smith brought me yesterday your letter of the 23rd ult., marked *Most private;* and, although

I am not likely to send this letter away before General Hope's arrival puts me a little more in possession of the object of his mission than I am at present, I hasten to answer it now, and to express to you frankly my opinion upon the ideas expressed in it, in order that no after-impression derived from that knowledge may efface what I feel now.

I must own to you candidly, then, that, if I am to take the language of this letter as that of Lord Castlereagh and of his Majesty's Government, there seems to me no hope of any good to be derived from this mission, or from any other; because I see a total want of confidence in the views and in the sincerity of the Swedish Government, or rather of the Prince Royal; and because, as far as I can collect from your expressions, the view in sending General Hope is to render the possession of Norway a contingent and ultimate object, instead of an absolute and immediate one, and to make the co-operation of Sweden in Germany direct, by abandoning the only point of interest which can induce this country (the country, and not the Prince) to undertake any co-operation at all.

I express to you now, before General Hope arrives, my entire and absolute conviction that nothing that can be offered (at least which I can imagine to be offered) to induce this country to forego the claim of the acquisition of Norway for the present will be accepted; because it is impossible that it can be accepted with any hope of fulfilling the other engagements which we should accept. This country cannot be induced to embark, without the prospect of a positive gain, in a cause which is for the most part hateful to it—I mean that of Russia—and against a country which they have not yet unlearned to fear and to look up to—I mean France. If they were embarked contrary to my expectation, the very first reverse would throw them into terror of the consequences, would make them hastily withdraw from the cause, and would probably make them do so by the overthrow of that system of government and of that line of succession which certainly a

great part of this nation adopted with a very different view than that of arraying themselves against France.

If this is the real state of the country, and if the Prince Royal, who considers it as such, and who thinks that nothing but a positive preliminary gain (equivalent to the loss of Finland) can lead them to embark and to *persevere* in a continental co-operation, be right in his conception, I must ask you, in candour, what there is of advantage that he has yet gained, and what other good has been acquired by him, except for Russia and for the common cause? I am no advocate of this man, but I judge him, I think, fairly and dispassionately, and after having well studied all his actions, and his words, and his thoughts, as far as I could penetrate into them.

I ask you, in candour, what he has gained. You will answer me, as in your letter, that by robbery and finesse he has contrived to obtain from the merchants and the Government £700,000, without doing any thing whatever for the common cause. Yet the whole of this sum, and as much more, was spent last summer in the preparation and equipments of the troops, in the forming of magazines, in the hiring and keeping in pay of transport vessels, and in the march to the coast of the whole of the force stipulated to Russia to be furnished; making a real and useful demonstration, after the abstraction of the Russian auxiliary troops left nothing but demonstration in his power. Money he has gained not a sixpence; on the contrary, he has expended as much more; and at this moment he sees himself not a bit more advanced towards the acquisition of the good which he looks forward to for the country than before the Convention of Abo, except that, by the fidelity of his engagements towards Russia then, he has secured in return her fidelity to her engagements now. Hitherto, all that has been done by Sweden, with her weak and unwilling means, has been solely for the advantage of Russia and the common cause; and I must observe to you that there was a particular feeling of delicacy and generosity in the conduct of the Prince

Royal, after his return from Abo, of which you are perhaps not sufficiently aware.

The Prince had probably well studied, during his interview at Abo, the character of the Emperor, and found in it a great share of distrust and suspicion, which was perhaps increased by his recent experience, as well as by the gloomy appearance of the campaign. After the return of the Prince, he instantly set the Swedish troops in motion, drawing them away from the North and from the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia, towards the South and the West, with a view, as he told me at the time, of preventing any possibility of the Emperor's entertaining a suspicion that he had an eye to the perfidious invasion of Finland, after the troops had proceeded from thence to Riga.

Ill-designing persons afterwards endeavoured to infuse this suspicion into the Emperor's mind, and he was weak enough to entertain it, as his affairs looked more gloomy, and even to express to Count Löwenhjelm a suspicion, to which the conduct of the Prince had given so complete a *démenti*. So much for what this country, or rather the Prince Royal, has yet gained.

I am, as I said before, fully persuaded that this country never can be induced to go into a system of continental operations, of which, let us contribute what pecuniary assistance we will, she must, after all, bear the principal expense. It is too poor in resource, and too deficient in good-will. But, even putting the supposition that Sweden could be induced to forego the preliminary acquisition of Norway, for the sake of the ultimate hope of it, I beg you to tell me what is the nature of that *ultimate* expectation, which, you say, will certainly be realized, if Sweden will act directly for the common cause. Do you mean to say that Denmark will entertain the proposition of a *contingent* alienation of Norway, though not of a preliminary cession? Every thing which we have hitherto seen, and which I have laid before his Majesty's Government, gives a positive contradiction to this supposition. Do you mean to say that

if, on the one hand, we can gain Denmark to join in the common cause against France, on the basis of her sole co-operation, without any question of Norway, we can, on the other, and at the same time, give a secret engagement to Sweden that ultimately she shall be put in absolute possession of Norway, without knowing that any possible indemnity will induce Denmark to part with it? You will forgive me if I say to you that such a conduct, which would have all the air of perfidy towards Denmark, would do more to overset Government than any open proposition to oblige the latter to make the cession of Norway to Sweden.

I must go one step farther, and ask you whether his Majesty's Government is in possession of any proof whatever that, if Norway were put wholly out of the question, Denmark would consent to make peace with us, to abandon the alliance of France, and to join her arms to the common cause? When I had an opportunity of speaking with the Danish Chargé d'Affaires, he told me that he thought Denmark might have been gained to the common cause, if Norway had not been demanded. He expressed, however, as he frankly told me, his own simple conviction; but, when I asked him candidly to own whether he could support this opinion by any expression or by any idea derived from the correspondence of his Government, he could not but confess that he had not the smallest foundation for it.

For my own part, I have had ocular demonstration, and, if I can obtain the permission, I may perhaps furnish to Lord Castlereagh the same demonstration, that every step taken by M. de Blome at Petersburgh, I mean, towards Lord Cathcart, and probably every similar step of the Danish Government, has been done with the knowledge, with the concurrence, and perhaps at the dictation, of the French Minister at Copenhagen, Alquier.

Independent of the proof derived from this strong presumption that Denmark will not join the common cause, putting

even Norway out of the question, there exists pretty nearly a positive proof to the same effect. You remember, in my former letters, the proposition made by the Prince of the ultimate cession of the Bishopric of Drontheim alone, if Sweden should be ultimately unsuccessful in procuring a compensation on the Continent for Denmark, and the restoration, with this reserve, of the rest of Norway. By some misapprehension on the part of General Suchtelen, through whom the overture was first made as of himself, he put it as if this country would be satisfied with the sole cession of Drontheim alone, without thinking of the rest of Norway. This, also, which was transmitted by Count de Baudissin, was peremptorily refused. You see, therefore, that Denmark is pretty nearly up to the refusal of a co-operation in the common cause, even if no cession were in question: for, certainly, the Bishopric of Drontheim, which, by its situation, can have no geographical relation with Norway but by sea, or through Sweden, forms an argument very inferior to that of the cession of the kingdom of Norway.

The truth is, I believe, that Denmark regards France as now so low, as to be no longer a subject of apprehension; and she flatters herself that she may preserve her neutrality, as she calls it, as well against France as against Russia and Sweden. In this way, perhaps, she might have no great objection to a peace with England; but, I believe, nothing of an alliance.

I remain, &c., EDWARD THORNTON.

PS. Perhaps I may add a postscript after General Hope's arrival.—E. T.

PS. February 18. You will see by the letters that we have gained pretty fairly the point which his Majesty's Government desires, but I do not yet agree that it alters in more than [one] degree the force of my reasoning. This country, in taking Zealand, thinks she would have the best pledge for Norway; but Jutland and Holstein are no bad pledges; and it is impossible to deprive her of them, with any view to the military safety of an expedition. For God's sake, do not, I

entreat you, increase our work and our difficulties by distrust or doubt, too much, at least, of either. At least, give me credit that I have my eyes open, and with as much anxiety to my own conduct as can be desired at home. I am extremely hurt at Lord Castlereagh's letter to me on the subject of Guadeloupe; and I do not think I have deserved it. But no more of that. At the same time, I cannot see the disadvantage, for *us*, at least, of any part of the Prince's propositions, at least in my open view of the subject.

Truly yours, E. T.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, February 18, 1813.

My Lord—I could only allude, in my despatch, No. 21, of this date, and in rather obscure terms, to the influence which France still continues to possess in the councils of the King of Denmark, and to the strong presumption that almost every step taken of late by M. de Blome and other Danish Ministers, has been in concert with M. Alquier—I may say, rather, positive proof—which I have been for some time in the knowledge of, but which I have not hitherto had the permission to speak of, or to point out the source from which it was derived.

Your lordship will judge of the nature of this proof, from the enclosed copy of an extract of a letter from M. Alquier to Maret, (Duc of Bassano) of the 23rd of December, and which I entreat your lordship, for many obvious reasons, to make no other than the most confidential and cautious use of. I am not at liberty to point out even to you from what source I derived it, although you may be assured of its authenticity.

I derived the secret information which I have detailed in my No. 22, from the Prince Royal, who has, as may be supposed, many secret channels of communication in France and in the departments of the Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

[Enclosure in the preceding Letter.]

Extrait. Du 23 Décembre, 1812.

Par ma première dépêche je vous ai prévenu, Monseigneur, que M. de Rosenkrantz ne perdoit pas l'espérance de trainer encore quelque tems l'affaire qui a jeté le Gouvernement dans de si grands embarras.

M. de Blome a reçu des instructions et malgré que la contenance de M. de Rosenkrantz soit un peu âpretée à mon égard depuis les derniers évenemens, il m'a lu sa dépêche à ses Ministres. Je l'ai trouvée très bien, et l'article qui a rapport aux négociations à entamer m'a paru touché avec beaucoup d'adresse. M. de Blome est invité d'entretenir avec soin ses liaisons avec tout ce qui entoure l'Empereur et les persuader que la seule Puissance que le Dannemarc affectionne est la Russie. Le jeune Baudissin, qui est à Stockholm, a ordre de flatter le vieux Général diplomate accrédité à cette cour, et la mission de Vienne doit faire germer la probabilité d'une paix prochaine.

M. Rosenkrantz m'a témoigné de vives allarmes sur les suites de la négociation entamée par le Baron d'Oxenstjerna. La cour de Russie à ce qui marque M. de Blome, en avait d'abord paru choquée, mais depuis elle a changé d'avis, sans doute sur les représentations du Prince Royal, en faveur duquel l'affection de l'Empereur s'accroit visiblement depuis les derniers succès.

Le Roi est toujours inébranlable dans la constance de ses sentimens pour S. M. l'Empereur Napoléon; mais c'est avec un véritable regret que j'annonce à votre Excellence que les partisans de la Suède font ici des progrès sensibles. La politique qu'a suivie le Prince Royal est préconisée par des militaires du premier rang; et M. de Rosenkrantz m'a paru alarmé de l'affectation que mettent les officiers à parler de ce Prince.

Lord William Bentinck to Lord Castlereagh.

Palermo, February 24, 1813.

My dear Lord—I have been prevented, from want of time, to write officially all that I had to say about the state of affairs, by the Ajax, which conveys this letter. But one of the last packets will be despatched in a week. I have only to add that the King is at Palermo, and talks of resuming the Government. Those who know him best, say he will not: as it was generally reported that he would remove immediately, I wrote to Prince Caparo yesterday, to ask him if it was true, adding that, if such was the King's intention, I was desirous previously of knowing his views on certain subjects affecting the security and tranquillity of Sicily, of which I had been made responsible. I am assured by Prince Caparo that the King has no intention either of not sanctioning the constitution, or of not continuing the present Ministers; that the King is so very weak, that no reliance is to be placed upon him. The absence of the Queen removes in great measure any apprehensions of his making much opposition to the new system. The hereditary Prince is conducting himself extremely well. The Minister of War has been changed, and an excellent man in all respects, Don Ruggiero Settimo, appointed to that situation.

The constitution is very nearly sanctioned; some few articles have been reserved for the King's [assent,] as not coming within the limits of the English Constitution.

Mr. Obins, my private secretary, goes home by the present occasion, and can give your lordship any information that you may desire upon the state of affairs.

I have the honour to be, &c.

W. C. BENTINCK.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, February 25, 1813.

My Lord—The recall of the Prussian Minister from this Court, and the dismission of the Swedish from that of Berlin,

are evidently the effect of the imperious demand of France, although perhaps they were expected: and they cannot, therefore, I think, be entirely regarded as the indication of the Prussian policy.

This I infer so much the more from M. de Tarrach's having previously informed me, that he had received a secret cipher from M. de Hardenberg at Breslau, and an order to correspond immediately with him, passing by all the departments—an order manifestly given on the presumption of the Prussian Minister's remaining here.

It was in a private conference with the Prince Royal that General Hope first heard the communications from Constantinople, Vienna, and Berlin; and he speaks highly of this mark of confidence.

The discourse of Bonaparte at Warsaw might, I think, be published without citing authority.

I beg your lordship to be assured, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh.

Admiralty, March 1, 1813.

Dear Lord Castlereagh—I received the enclosed letter from Mr. Gordon some time ago, and I now transmit it for your consideration.

Yours sincerely, MELVILLE.

David Gordon Esq., to the Right Hon. Viscount Melville.

Dumfries, January 4, 1813.

My Lord—Your lordship may probably recollect my name coupled with the Azore Islands; and the present state of our relations with the United States of America induces me now to have the honour of addressing your lordship.

From my long residence in the United States, I had a better opportunity of knowing the disposition and views of the party at present dominant in that country, than falls to the lot of

many. As few Europeans reside long there without becoming citizens, I was generally considered one: yet, as I remained a British subject, I looked upon and investigated every thing with a British eye and heart; and, from the observations I made, I was convinced that the party at present in power there considered it as their interest to wage war with this country; and I confidently predicted, four years ago, that, if the Administration could not provoke his Majesty's Government to commence hostilities, they would declare war at last themselves.

With these sentiments and expectations, I visited and resided some months at Bermuda and the Azore Islands; and the result of every investigation more and more convinced me of the immense value of both to this country, especially to enable it to control and check any transatlantic power. Bermuda possesses excellent harbours, and, except by a *coup de main*, is secure from attack. The Azores are generally inaccessible to attack, but at present want harbours. I am confident, however, that, at Fayal, two excellent harbours might be made, one of which was never sounded until done by me; and, if that island was in the possession of any enterprising commercial power, a harbour would soon be made, at a moderate expense, by the merchants alone.

A glance at the geographical position of those two clusters of islands, will convince any one that, if both had good harbours, they would give a naval power possessing them the complete control of the Atlantic, and the Azores would naturally support Bermuda, the latter being barren, and the former extremely fertile.

The value of these places is not unknown, either in France or in the United States. In the latter, it is a favourite measure in prospect to get possession of the Havannah and Bermuda, as giving the complete command of the Leeward West India trade. And the value of the Azores is so well known in France, that a French engineer surveyed a bay at Fayal, and ascertained the practicability of making a harbour: and

an expedition was actually fitted out at Bordeaux, by orders of the Directory, to take possession of the Azores, when the downfal of the then reigning party put a stop to it.

By your lordship's introduction in May, 1809, I had the honour to state to Lord Bathurst the importance of those islands; to point out how British trade to them might be benefitted; and particularly, in the mean time, recommended the appointment of a Consul-General, which latter suggestion was adopted. I own I was desirous of that appointment; and, had I obtained it, I should have been better enabled to point out to his Majesty's Ministers the vast importance of these islands to the trade of Great Britain and her colonies, which I now take the liberty of doing.

Your lordship will recollect that, eighteen months ago, I presumed verbally to state to you that, in the event of hostilities with the United States, the Azores and the vicinity thereof would be a principal resort of the cruisers and privateers of that country; and the result has already proved the correctness of the opinion I gave, and which was founded upon my knowledge of the intentions of those in the United States likely to command cruisers and privateers; and your lordship must bear in mind that those classes of persons have an influence in such a Government as that of the United States, which is hardly credible in Europe.

The bold, rocky shores of the Azores enable privateers to lie under them unobserved in the day time, and, if discovered, the variableness of the winds among these islands enables them to elude pursuit. If there were a harbour at Fayal, a very small naval force stationed there would be sufficient to check the enemy's cruisers among and in the immediate vicinity of the Azores; but I am decidedly of opinion that a harbour at Fayal would be of much more extensive use to the trade and navy of Britain.

Firstly, I think it ought to be made a place where his Majesty's ships might go for supplies of fresh provisions and

water, and even get slight repairs and refitments when cruising on the south-west coasts of Europe, or when, by a long continuance of easterly winds, they are prevented from reaching a port in the British Channel.

Secondly, It would be a port where either single running ships might seek for convoy, or vessels separated from East or West India convoys might rendezvous again.

Thirdly, It would be a place where all vessels in distress in that track might put in, and get repaired and revictualled; and,

Fourthly, From being brought into notice, it would be a place where vessels would touch for information, and in this way might be of great use, in case of any unusual danger from hostile fleets being at sea, on the breaking out of any new war.

It would be presumptuous in me to point out how liberty is to be got from the Portuguese Government to carry the above plans into execution; but, considering the relative situation of that Government and this, I think there would be little difficulty. At present, the Azores are of little benefit either to the trade or the revenue of Portugal; and it is probable an advantageous exchange might be made, either for Fayal alone, or for the whole of the Azores, for some of the ancient Portuguese settlements in the East Indies. Possibly, if this could not be effected, a temporary permission might be granted to form a port for the advantage of carrying on the present war. Of one thing, however, I am very certain, viz., that the inhabitants of the Azores would gladly be under the British Government; and also that, in a few years, those islands would become among the most valuable of our insular colonial possessions.

Should any thing I have pointed out be thought useful, and your lordship should determine to adopt any measures consequent thereon, I trust I shall not be forgot, on appointing agents to promote the execution thereof.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

DAVID GORDON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, March 13, 1813.

My Lord—Your lordship will have heard, before this reaches your hands, from General Hope, the account of the arrival of M. Signeul from Paris, with new propositions (if they can be called so) on the part of Bonaparte to this Government, and to the Prince Royal. They are in effect no other than the old ones made formerly at Orebro, brought forward again, comprising offers of money, of territory at the convenience of Sweden, that is, on the side of Finland and Russia; and a renewed refusal of Norway, as being inconsistent with the engagements and friendship subsisting between France and Denmark. All these ideas are presented not in an official or tangible form, but in private letters, written at the instance of Bonaparte by the Prince's personal friends, and in the conversation held to Signeul by the Duke of Bassano, before his departure.

If any thing can be called new in these propositions, it is the insinuation thrown out in the same manner to tempt the ambition of the Prince Royal, that Bonaparte would, after putting his armies once more on foot, retire from the military command, and confine himself to the civil concerns of the empire, leaving the military command of all his armies to the Prince; and he assures him of his entire confidence in him for the future, as absolutely as if nothing had happened.

All this I derive—and indeed General Hope derived it—from the conversation of the Prince Royal; and I did not find that M. d'Engeström, who was directed to make the same communication to me, (*pour être dans les règles*) had any thing more, or any thing written to impart to me. It is certain that Bonaparte is alarmed with the idea of the Prince's appearing on the Continent; and the latter assures me of his conviction that this event, when it shall take place, will be the signal of some movements in the interior of France.

Signeul will not return to France, but will go to Altona,

with a view of afterwards proceeding to Hamburgh as Consul, if that place should be freed. The Prince's first idea, and I believe while General Hope was here, was to let him go to Lisbon in that character; but the reflection that he might be regarded, and perhaps very justly, with an evil eye there, prevented his mission, as well as that to London, for the same reasons. There have not been wanting persons to persuade the Prince to let him return to France, to be attached to the suite of the Princess; but the good sense of the former put a stop to this idea, the execution of which would have a very injurious effect on Russia and England, and of which Bonaparte would not fail to avail himself, in order to excite suspicions. I spoke very strongly on this point to M. d'Engeström, when he mentioned it; but the Prince's previous determination rendered any other step unnecessary.

It was the Prince, whom I see occasionally, that assured me of the excellent spirit that reigned in Germany, and of which he only feared the too precipitate efforts. He desired me to say to your lordship that it will be within his plan to take possession of Rostock and Wismar; and that he shall *alimenter* his troops by repeated transports, till he has got them to the amount of fifteen or twenty thousand men, when he would most probably proceed himself to the opposite coast. I doubt whether the first part of the expedition can sail to Pomerania till towards the end of this month, owing partly to the naval preparations, partly to the season. General Sandels, a very good officer, will command it.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, March 13, 1813.

My Lord—When I saw the Prince Royal, a day or two ago, he communicated to me a note under date of the 13th of

February, *intended* to be given by the Duke of Bassano to M. d'Ohsson, which had not, at the period of the last accounts from Paris, been delivered, but of which he had received a copy through a secret channel, probably by some of the letters which Signeul brought. This note, which is evidently written *ad captandum*, recapitulates with much falsehood the complaints of France against Sweden; speaks of the demand of Norway, which excited indignation in the breast of the Emperor; and of the engagement to aid Denmark with 40,000 men; and throws out insinuations of *des haines personnelles, et d'une ambition mal dirigée*, which are evidently directed against the Prince Royal, as well as of his having concealed from the King the friendly propositions of France.

I thought to have had a copy of this note, but I have it not, probably through some mistake of the Prince's secretary, and I will endeavour to send it by the next mail. The Prince, however, informed me that, on the presumption of its being finally delivered to M. d'Ohsson, he had prepared a letter to Bonaparte on the subject of it, which he hoped and intended to have published at a proper season, when its effect would be the greatest, but of which he would furnish me with a copy, for your lordship's private and confidential perusal; begging earnestly that it might not pierce to the public, as the best part of its effect (intended for France) would be weakened or lost by a premature exposure.

Your lordship will receive this copy under this cover, and will see with pleasure how much it will render impossible any sort of conciliation with that man, and tend to overthrow him in the opinion of the French people. It did not require this proof of the Prince's sincerity in the cause he has undertaken, of which we see more and more satisfactory proofs every day.

The notions in regard to Austria, in my public despatch, are derived from the Prince's verbal communications, which, he assures me, come from confidential sources at Vienna.

Your lordship will see, from the rapid progress of events

about us, the necessity of speedy decision on the subject of the advances *pour la mise en campagne;* and I see the possibility, with the continuance of an easterly wind, of being under the necessity of making some part of them even without your lordship's instructions, unless I can see the service impeded in its progress, without coming to its assistance.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Sir Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh.

Cadiz, March 17, 1813.

My dear Lord—I have had the pleasure of receiving your lordship's private letter of the 15th February, and likewise your despatches up to the 4th of March.

Your lordship will, no doubt, be surprised at the late proceedings of the Cortes with respect to the Regency. Their conduct has, as usual, been precipitate and violent; and it seems that their resentment has not yet subsided; for they still talk of bringing the late Regents to their trial. The Cardinal de Bourbon has displayed some firmness in carrying into execution the decree of the Cortes relative to the Inquisition, which has been read in the several churches of Cadiz; and the most peremptory orders have been sent to Seville to enforce its publication in that city, if necessary. The change in the Government is attended with this advantage, that it has apparently broken the neck of the Princess of Brazil's party; but I doubt whether the measures of the present Regency will be more efficient than those of the last.

In the mean while, our enemies are at work; and two publications have appeared, the one calling in question the right of the Cortes to confer the command of the Spanish armies upon a foreigner; and the other recommending that the powers which have been granted to the military authorities should be withdrawn. I am very anxious for the opening of the campaign, because the first successes of the British arms will crush

this mischievous spirit, which I have always observed to prevail during the intermission of active operations in the field, and to cease to produce any effect at the first intelligence of any success.

Perhaps, therefore, it might be advisable to delay making any attempts to obtain a participation in the trade with South America until the commencement of the campaign. Your lordship, however, may be assured that I shall avail myself of the first favourable opportunity to carry into effect your instructions upon that subject.

I took an opportunity of mentioning to M. Labrador your lordship's anxiety to bring to an amicable arrangement the point of etiquette between the courts of Petersburg and Madrid, mentioning how much the separation of the ambassadors was liable to misconception, and the fact (of which he certainly was ignorant) that France and Austria had admitted the Court of Russia to a parity of rank. I am concerned to say, however, that I did not succeed in producing any change in M. Labrador's opinions upon this subject. His conduct at Bayonne unfortunately acquired for him a reputation for firmness, which he appears determined to uphold, by the rejection of almost every proposition which is made to him, in a manner the most repulsive that can possibly be imagined.

He told me that, in any other times, he would have recalled Count Fernan Nuñez, for compromising the dignity of Spain, and Messrs. Bardaxi and Moreno, for their conduct in Sweden. I doubt much his friendly disposition to the alliance, and many people think that he is inclined the other way.

I think it right to apprise your lordship that, since Count Fernan Nuñez has been in England, he has held out hopes to the Government here that a loan might be procured in England, provided a participation in the trade with South America were granted to the British nation. He sent over some project for a loan in England, which he desired might be carefully concealed from me. I have no doubt that his project

was, like all other Spanish plans for procuring money, impracticable. But I am persuaded that your lordship will agree with me that no benefit can result from an interruption of the confidence which ought to subsist between the Spanish Government and me.

I remain, with great respect, &c.,

H. WELLESLEY.

I had almost forgotten to congratulate your lordship upon the late glorious successes in the Pyrenees. I believe this to be the only place out of France where the intelligence of Soult's defeat will not have been received with every possible demonstration of joy.

The Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz to Queen Charlotte.

Breslau, le 19me Mars, 1813.

Madame ma Sœur—J'éprouve un plaisir bien vif en voyant revenir le moment où il m'est permis d'offrir à V. M. l'expression des sentimens d'amitié et de dévouement que je n'ai jamais cessé de nourrir pour elle et pour toute sa maison royale. Je me rappelle avec attendrissement la tendre affection que V. M portoit à feue mon épouse, et je sollicite pour mes enfans une partie de l'intérêt qu'elle avoit daigné lui accorder. J'espère que l'Angleterre et la Prusse vont resserrer les liens qui les unissaient, et que des circonstances impérieuses avoient relâchés. Je le désire pour l'avantage réciproque des deux nations, mais en particulier parceque cette nouvelle union me fournira souvent l'occasion de réitérer a V. M. l'assurance et de l'attachement sans bornes avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Madame ma Sœur,

de Votre Majesté, le très affectionné frère,

FREDERIC GUILLAUME.

À. S. M. la Reine des Royaumes Unis de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, Madame ma Sœur.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, March 19, 1813.

My Lord—Your lordship may imagine that, in my letter to Count Baudissin, contained in my Despatch, No. 35, I did not venture to express my firm belief of the disposition of this Government to admit of modifications in the conditions to be proposed to Denmark, without having previously ascertained that fact by a conversation with the Prince Royal. It was, indeed, his own unreserved opening on the subject that gave me the idea of writing to Count Baudissin in the manner I did.

The Prince declared to me, and desired me to assure your lordship to that effect, that, if Denmark would accede to the proposed Alliance, joining their forces to those of the Allies, he would be contented with the cession of the Bishopric of Drontheim alone, against an equivalent indemnity on the side of Swedish Pomerania, population for population, to be ceded to Denmark at the same time; that, if Denmark would go on with the principle of cession against indemnity, for the rest of Norway, he would most readily agree to that principle, receiving the other divisions only as fast as equivalent indemnities should be secured to Denmark: if, however, there existed insurmountable objections to this further cession of the rest of Norway, on the side of Denmark, sufficient to keep her, on account of them, out of the common cause; and if, on the other hand, the sentiment prevailing in England against this demand of Norway might render it a subject of embarrassment to the Prince Regent's Government, and might make a cession of indemnity to Sweden on the Continent a more eligible mode of settling this question, he would consent to wave all claims to the rest of Norway (the Bishopric of Drontheim, as I said, alone excepted), and take for Sweden the indemnity on the Continent that might have been intended for Denmark.

The Prince Royal declared to me that he should abandon with pain the system he had formed on the subject of the

union of Norway with Sweden, which rendered this country insular, and united it indissolubly with Great Britain; that he would prefer the completion of this system for Sweden to any territory that could be offered on the Continent; and that it could be only from a desire of meeting the wishes of the British Goverment that he could consent to abandon this system. He informed me that your lordship had expressed an earnest wish that Sweden would content herself with an indemnity elsewhere; and that he was anxious to show how much further he was willing to go even than he had promised, for the sake of meeting the wishes of the Prince Regent's Government.

It was on this ground that I made use of the expressions which I have noticed to your lordship, in my letter to Count Baudissin. If Denmark has any desire of uniting herself in any manner with the common cause, I think there is a probability, from this disposition on the part of Sweden, to bring this great point to bear. But I must confess to your lordship that I have great doubts about it. Three weeks are now nearly elapsed since the date of your answer to M. de Rosenkrantz, and nearly one week since the arrival of the copy here; and yet the Danish Minister, Count Baudissin, has no intimation of it from his Government. If I judge from reports of increased activity in the military and marine preparations of Denmark, that Government appear to have made up their minds to resistance, and to a continued union with France. Should no proposition come from M. de Rosenkrantz, in consequence of my letter, the inference will be still stronger. It may be then necessary to make another and more decided attempt; for a fortnight or three weeks longer must be nearly the utmost term of uncertainty.

The Prince informed me that he had formed an idea of sending Baron Wetterstedt to Copenhagen on some pretence or other, for the purpose of sounding, once for all, the intentions of the Danish Government; and he asked me to give him my

opinion of this step, wishing, as he was pleased to say, to adopt no plan in which I did not entirely concur. I must observe that M. d'Oxenstjerna (who, by the by, is little capable of conducting a delicate negociation) is by this time on his return with leave of absence. There was nothing in the proposed mission of M. de Wetterstedt which did not strike me, and I trust it must strike your lordship in the same point of view, as advantageous to the proposed object; but I begged the Prince not to come to a definitive resolution on it, until we saw the effect of your lordship's answer to M. de Rosenkrantz, by the proposition to be made to me, or by the silence he may observe towards me. This is the present state of the business, and a few days more must give some insight into what may be expected from Denmark.

Should this mission of M. de Wetterstedt take place, it has occurred to me that I might avail myself of some pretext to go as far as Helsingburgh, from whence, or even from Copenhagen, if the Danish Government choose I should go there, the last effort might be made, in concert with M. de Wetterstedt, to gain Denmark to the common cause.

20th March, 7 P.M. To-day, having dined alone with the Crown Prince, I had the opportunity of repeating to his Royal Highness the substance of what I have written above to your lordship, particularly as it relates to Norway and to Denmark; and I find I have stated with perfect correctness his idea, with the exception of one circumstance, which is his desire to have from Denmark either the city of Frederickstadt or Frederickshall in Norway, as a guarantee that Sweden should not be attacked from thence.

I mention this circumstance, as it might make difficulties; but I do not, I confess, think that this would be insisted on or required, if once Denmark entered into the Alliance, and joined her troops to those of the Allies.

The Prince thought that he might possibly send M. de Wetterstedt to Copenhagen about the time that he should

himself be at Carlscrona, on his way to Germany; but this will depend very much on what comes to me from M. de Rosenkrantz. I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, March 26, 1813.

My Lord—The Messenger Morand, who conveyed to England Lord Cathcart's despatches of the 6th or 7th from Kalisch, the Imperial head-quarters, was the bearer of a packet, which he sent through me, for General Suchtelen. This packet contained a copy of the treaty with Prussia, and a letter from the Emperor Alexander to the Prince Royal. His Royal Highness allowed me the perusal of the latter, which gives to the Prince the most cordial assurances of the exertions he will make to fulfil his engagements with Sweden, and conveys to him hopes of adding a corps of Prussian troops to the allied Swedish and Russian army, to be assembled in the North of Germany. The same letter mentions that the armistice made by Russia with the Austrian troops under Prince Schwarzenberg was unlimited in its duration, and that no efforts would be left unemployed to bring Austria into the system of the Allies. Perhaps, in mentioning these points to your lordship, I am only repeating what Lord Cathcart may have already written.

When I saw the Prince Royal yesterday, he desired me to inform your lordship that he hoped, by the 20th of next month, to have an army of five-and-twenty or thirty thousand Swedes in Pomerania, amounting, with the Pomeranians, to about three and thirty thousand men; that he should be able to leave behind him in Sweden an effective force of eight-and-twenty thousand old troops, besides five different classes of the conscription; so that he should regard Sweden as in perfect security from all attack from Denmark. Towards the 15th of next month, he will probably set off from hence for Carlscrona.

He desired me likewise to say to your lordship that, being arrived on the other side, and joined by the Russians and the German Legion (but this latter must be a more distant event) he means, if all negociation with Denmark shall be fruitless, to bring her into the common cause, to enter Holstein, and to occupy it as a member of the Germanic body, with a declaration to this effect, or without any declaration at all, and with a simple military occupation, according to the wish of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's Government. He mentioned it to me thus early, that your lordship may have time to give me instructions upon this subject; and, indeed, it may be necessary for the Prince Regent's Government to think upon some general principles of policy for the political conduct of the approaching campaign, from which so many alterations in the existing state of Europe may be expected.

I ought to add to your lordship that the Prince Royal asked me yesterday if it was in my power, or if I was willing, to accompany him, or to follow him, into Germany, which, he was pleased to say, he was very desirous of, as much from the acquaintance he had made with me, as from the circumstance of General Suchtelen's being with him, as an accredited Minister of Russia to this court; though, from his being under the military command of the Prince, he does not appear ostensibly in that character. I informed the Prince Royal that I must necessarily wait for your lordship's orders on this subject.

I have the honour to be, &c., EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stockholm, March 26, 1813.

My Lord—I put under this cover the official note of the Duke of Bassano to M. d'Ohsson,[1] which has been now officially delivered to the latter, who is on his way home; but I enclose, in the same way as before, the copy of the Prince Royal's letter to Bonaparte, which I send because it has been

[1] This note I have not met with.—EDITOR.

in some degree altered from the copy which I sent some days ago to your lordship. The original itself, will, I believe, go to-day or to-morrow by a courier to Paris, whose passport I saw made out to-day, while I was with Count d'Engeström. I have only to repeat my request to your lordship that neither the note nor the letter, which is a sort of answer to it, may be made public in England; it being intended to publish them both here when the proper time arrives.

I have yet no notice, through the Danish *Chargé d'Affaires*, of the letter which I addressed to him on the 13th current, nor any intimation that your lordship's answer to M. de Rosenkrantz has been received, or that any proposition will be made in consequence of it. Perhaps the post of to-morrow may bring something. In the mean time, I learn that M. de Rosenkrantz writes to Count Baudissin that the Emperor Napoleon means to form a camp at Cassel of 80,000 men, and that he will then give battle to the Russians. I learn this as well from the Prince Royal as from Count d'Engeström, who, I presume, has seen M. de Rosenkrantz's letter (as it passes through the Post Office), and the former added to me that M. de Rosenkrantz said that Denmark would abide the issue of that battle before any answer should be made to the Swedish propositions on the subject of Norway. Perhaps I am not quite exact as to the sense; but the meaning was, that Denmark would not abandon her system with France, while there remained any hope of an effectual support from the latter. This must be soon seen.

The Prince told me that he meant to send the Baron de Wetterstedt very shortly to Copenhagen, for the purpose of learning something decisive as to their future views. I shall, I take it for granted, learn the nature of his instructions; and, if there is any opening, shall do my utmost to bring the question to a favourable issue for the common cause. I must own, however, that I do not entertain any very sanguine hopes. The Prince Royal, however, has mentioned to me, on more

than one occasion, that he has learnt that the Queen of Denmark is very favourable to the project of an alliance with Sweden, on the footing of the cession of Norway, connecting it with the projected marriage of one of her daughters with the Prince Royal's son; and he added, that he believed M. de Rosenkrantz himself was not disinclined to it.

I learn from Count Baudissin, that at the notification at Paris of the Danish proposition of peace made to England, Bonaparte and his Minister expressed some astonishment and much anger, but at length acquiesced in it by saying that, if it would preserve Norway, it was very well. The Prince, who gave me similar intelligence, added that Bonaparte expressed himself to Count Waltersdorff on this point with great warmth. He said that it was owing to his own refusal to obtain the cession of Norway to Sweden that he must ascribe much of the French misfortunes in Russia; that, if he had obtained that cession, Sweden would have joined his cause, would have formed a powerful diversion in Finland, would have menaced Petersburg, and would, consequently, have had a most considerable effect in counteracting the misfortunes of the campaign; that, therefore, he never would consent that Norway should be given to his most mortal enemy. I think these accounts may both of them be correct, and that M. de Baudissin may have suppressed to me a part of the account, of which the whole may have come into the hands of this Government by the passage through the post.

I beg your lordship to be assured of the respect with which I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

[Enclosure.]

Copie de la Lettre de S.A.R. le Prince Royal de Suède à S.M. l'Empereur et Roi.

Aussi long tems que V. M. n'a agi ou fait agir que contre moi directement j'ai du ne lui opposer que du calme et du

silence ; mais aujourd'hui que la Note du Duc de Bassano à M. d'Ohsson cherche à jetter entre le Roi et moi, le même brandon de discorde qui facilita à V. M. l'entrée en Espagne, toutes les relations ministérielles étant rompues, je m'adresse directement à elle, pour lui rappeler la conduite loyale et franche de la Suède même dans les tems les plus difficiles.

Aux communications que M. Signeul fut chargé de faire par ordre de V. M. le Roi fit répondre que la Suède, convaincue que ce n'était qu'à vous, sire, qu'elle devait la perte de la Finlande, ne pouvait jamais croire à votre amitié pour elle, si vous ne lui faisiez donner la Norvège pour la dédommager du mal que votre politique lui avait fait.

Pour tout ce qui, dans la Note du Duc de Bassano, est rélatif à l'invasion de la Poméranie, et à la conduite des corsaires Français, les faits parlent, et en comparant les dates, on jugera, sire, qui de V. M. ou du Gouvernement Suédois, a raison. Cent vaisseaux Suédois étaient capturés et plus de deux cent matelots mis aux fers, lorsque le Gouvernement se vit dans la nécessité de faire arrêter un forban, qui, sous le pavillon Français venait dans nos ports enlever nos bâtimens, et insulter à notre confiance dans les traités.

M. le Duc de Bassano dit que V. M. n'a point provoqué la guerre avec la Russie, et cependant, sire, V. M. a passé le Niemen à la tête de 400,000 hommes.

Du moment où V. M. s'enfonça dans l'intérieur de cet empire, l'issue ne fut plus douteuse. L'Empereur Alexandre et le Roi prévirent déjà dès le mois d'Août la fin de la campagne et ses immenses résultats.

Toutes les combinaisons militaires assuraient que V. M. serait prisonnière. Vous avez échappé à ce danger, sire, mais votre armée, l'élite de la France, de l'Allemagne, et de l'Italie, n'existe plus. Là sont restés sans sépulture des braves qui sauvèrent la France à Fleurus, des Français qui vainquirent en Italie, qui resistèrent au climat brûlant de l'Égypte, et qui

fixèrent la victoire sous vos drapeaux à Marengo, à Austerlitz, à Jena, à Halle, à Lübeck, à Friedland.

Qu'à ce tableau déchirant, sire, votre âme s'attendrisse, et s'il le faut pour achever l'émouvoir, qu'elle se rappelle la mort de plus d'un million de Français, restés sur le champ d'honneur, victimes des guerres que V. M. a entreprises.

V. M. invoque ses droits à l'amitié du Roi—qu'il me soit permis de vous rappeler, sire, le peu de prix que V. M. y attacha dans des momens où une réciprocité des sentimens eut été bien utile à la Suède. Lorsque le Roi, après avoir perdu la Finlande, écrivit à V. M. pour la prier de conserver à la Suède les Isles d'Aland, elle lui répondit, Adressez vous à l'Empereur Alexandre: il est grand et généreux—et pour combler la mesure de son indifférence, elle fit insérer dans un journal officiel, au moment de mon départ pour la Suède (Moniteur du 21 Septembre, 1810, No. 264) qu'il y avait un interrègne dans ce royaume, pendant lequel les Anglais faisaient le commerce impunément.

Le Roi se détacha de la coalition de 1792, parceque cette coalition prétendait de partager la France, et qu'il ne voulait point participer au démembrement de cette belle monarchie. Il fut porté à cet acte, monument de sa gloire politique, autant par attachement pour le peuple Français que par le besoin de cicatriser les playes du royaume. Cette conduite sage et vertueuse, fondée sur ce que chaque nation a le droit de se gouverner par ses lois, par ses usages, et par sa volonté—cette conduite est la même qui lui sert de règle dans ce moment.

Votre système, sire, veut interdire aux nations l'exercice des droits qu'elles ont reçu de la Nature—ceux de commercer entre elles, et de s'entr'aider, de correspondre et de vivre en paix; et cependant l'existence de la Suède est dépendante d'une extension des relations commerciales, sans lesquelles elle ne peut pas se suffire.

Loin de voir dans la conduite du Roi un changement de système, l'homme éclairé et impartial n'y trouvera que la con-

tinuation d'une politique juste et constante, qui dut être dévoilée dans un tems où les souverains se réunissaient contre la liberté de la France, et qui est suivie avec énergie dans un moment où le Gouvernement Français continue de conjurer contre la liberté des peuples et des souverains.

Je connais les bonnes dispositions de l'Empereur Alexandre, et du cabinet de St. James, pour la paix. Les calamités du Continent la réclament, et V. M. ne doit pas la repousser. Possesseur de la plus belle monarchie de la terre, voudra-t-elle toujours en étendre les limites, et léguer à un bras moins puissant que le sien le triste héritage des guerres interminables? Votre Majesté ne s'attachera-t-elle pas à cicatriser les playes d'une révolution, dont il ne reste à la France que les souvenirs de sa gloire militaire et de malheurs réels dans son intérieur? Sire, les leçons de l'histoire rejettent l'idée d'une monarchie universelle, et le sentiment de l'indépendance peut être amorti mais non effacé du cœur des nations. Que Votre Majesté pèse toutes ces considérations et pense une fois réellement à cette paix générale, dont le nom profané a fait couler tant de sang.

Je suis né dans cette belle France que vous gouvernez, sire; sa gloire et sa prospérité ne peuvent jamais m'être indifférentes: mais, sans cesser de faire des vœux pour son bonheur, je défendrai de toutes les facultés de mon âme et les droits du peuple qui m'a appelé et l'honneur du souverain qui a daigné me nommer son fils. Dans cette lutte entre la liberté du monde et l'oppression, je dirai aux Suédois, " Je combats pour vous et avec vous, et les vœux des nations libres accompagnent nos efforts." En politique, sire, il n'y a ni amitié ni haine; il n'y a que des devoirs à remplir envers les peuples que la Providence nous appelles à gouverner; leur loix et leurs priviléges sont les biens qui leur sont chers, et si, pour les leur conserver, on est obligé de renoncer à d'anciennes liaisons et à des affections de famille, un Prince qui veut remplir sa vocation ne doit jamais hésiter sur le parti à prendre.

M. le Duc de Bassano annonce que V. M. évitera l'éclat d'une rupture; mais, sire, n'est ce pas Votre Majesté qui a interrompu nos relations commerciales en ordonnant la capture des vaisseaux Suédois au sein de la paix? N'est ce pas la rigueur de ses ordres qui nous a interdit toute espèce de communication avec le Continent depuis trois ans, et qui depuis cette époque fait retenir plus de cinquante bâtimens Suédois à Wismar, Rostock, et autres ports de la Baltique?

M. le Duc de Bassano ajoute que Votre Majesté ne changera pas de système, et qu'elle repoussera de tous ses vœux une guerre qu'elle considérerait comme civile; ce qui indique que Votre Majesté veut retenir la Poméranie Suédoise, et qu'elle ne renonce pas à l'espoir de commander à la Suède et d'avilir ainsi, sans courir aucun risque, le nom et le caractère Suédois. Par le mot de guerre civile, V. M. désigne, sans doute, la guerre entre les alliés: or, on ne sçait le sort qu'elle leur destine. Mais que V. M. se rappelle le mécontentement qu'elle fit éclater, en apprenant l'armistice que j'accordai à cette brave nation en Avril, 1809, et elle y trouvera la nécessité où ce pays s'est vu reduit de faire tout ce qu'il a fait jusqu'ici présent pour conserver son indépendance, et se préserver des dangers où l'aurait entrainé votre politique, sire, s'il l'eut moins connue.

Si les évènemens qui se sont passé depuis quatre mois ont fait rejeter sur les généraux de Votre Majesté le désarmement et l'envoi en France comme prisonniers de guerre des troupes Suédoises de la Poméranie, il ne se trouvera pas, sire, une prétexte aussi facile de réfuter, que jamais V. M. n'a voulu confirmer les jugemens du Conseil des Prises, et que depuis trois ans elle fait des exceptions particulières contre la Suède, malgré que ce tribunal ait prononcé en notre faveur. Au reste, sire, personne en Europe ne se méprendra sur le blâme que V. M. jette sur ses généraux.

La Note du Ministre des affaires étrangères au Roi et la réponse que M. Cabre lui fit le 4 Janvier, 1812, vous prouve-

ront, sire, que S. M. avait été au-devant de vos désirs en mettant en liberté tous les équipages des corsaires. Le Gouvernement depuis lors a porté les égards jusqu'à renvoyer des Portugais, des Algériens, et des Nègres, qui, pris sur les mêmes corsaires, se disaient sujets de V. M. Rien ne devait donc s'opposer à ce que V. M. eut ordonné le renvoi des officiers Suédois, et cependant ils gémissent encore dans les fers.

Quant aux menaces que contient la Note du Duc du Bassano, et aux 40,000 hommes que V. M. veut donner au Dannemarc, je ne crois point devoir entrer dans des détails sur cet objet, d'autant plus que je doute que le Roi de Dannemarc puisse profiter de ce secours.

Pour ce qui concerne mon ambition personnelle, sire, j'en ai une très grande, je l'avoue. C'est celle de servir la cause de l'humanité, et d'assurer la liberté de la presqu'île Scandinave. Pour y parvenir, je compte sur la justice de la cause que le Roi m'a ordonné de défendre, sur la persévérance de la nation, et sur la loyauté de ses Alliés.

Je suis, &c., &c.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. Foreign Office, April 8, 1813.

My dear Lord—I hope my official despatches will furnish you and my Brother with the means of coming to a satisfactory arrangement with the two allied Courts; and that they will be disposed to do justice to our exertions in their support. The few additional observations which occur, I shall throw into a private letter, which you will consider as addressed to you both.

On the political part of the arrangement I foresee little difficulty. To make war and to treat together is so obviously the policy of all parties, that I apprehend no hesitation on the part of either power; neither can I suppose you will experience any great reluctance, even on the part of Prussia, to

gratify the Prince Regent, by *abating the nuisance* of which those small territories, *enclavés* in Hanover, amount to. The larger arrangements, at least, in the North, are in principle understood. The reintegration of Prussia in extent of power is not, of course, intended to supersede the indemnities for Denmark, in case she joins; and in the application of these principles hereafter we may hope that Great Britain and Russia will see justice done.

The political arrangement of Europe, in a larger sense, is more difficult at this early moment to decide on. So much depends on events, that it is perhaps better not to be too prompt in encountering litigated questions. The main features we are agreed upon—that, to keep France in order, we require great masses—that Prussia, Austria, and Russia, ought to be as great and powerful as they have ever been—and that the inferior States must be summoned to assist, or pay the forfeit of resistance. I see many inconveniences in premature conclusions, but we ought not to be unprepared.

As an outline to reason from, I send you, as a private communication, a despatch on which the confederacy in 1805 was founded; the Emperor of Russia probably has not this interesting document at head-quarters: (interesting it is to my recollection, as I well remember having more than one conversation with Mr. Pitt on its details, *before he wrote it*) some of the suggestions may now be inapplicable, but it is so masterly an outline for the restoration of Europe, that I should be glad your lordship would reduce it into distinct propositions, and learn the bearings of his Imperial Majesty's mind upon its contents. An unofficial communication of this nature between two powers that have no partialities to indulge may prepare them the better to fulfil their duties at a future moment.

The financial part of your instructions requires some management. With the extent of provision I think our Allies cannot but be satisfied. I should hope also the distribution between Russia and Prussia will be considered as fair. What I mean

to press is, to spare the exchange as much as possible, by their respectively taking a due proportion of the subsidy in effects; and to make them feel also that, without commercial liberality, we shall be unable to carry our measures into effect.

The point of most delicacy to determine, will be how the deferred subsidy can best be made available. Mr. Vansittart has promised me some remarks on this subject, which you will receive before any decision can be taken on the detailed execution of the measure. This need not delay the conventional arrangements on the general principle, as there can be no doubt that British credit, whether applied conjointly or separately with that of the Allies, may be made available in some way or other. Perhaps the course most effective would be, were it possible, to prevail upon some of the great houses on the Continent to take the five millions in deposit, and to advance funds in the nature of a loan upon these securities. This would obviate the inconveniences of a paper currency, which, being new to the mass of the people, may be exposed to distrust, and thus become depreciated.

If this cannot be done to the full extent, it may be necessary to have recourse to the creation of a new medium. No doubt your lordship will find persons at Berlin well versed in the consideration of such subjects. This deferred subsidy is the only expedient by which we can further sustain our Allies on the Continent, and it must be so arranged as not to admit of its being remitted home, whilst outstanding, else it will lower the exchange to nothing.

The pressure of business in this office, and the constant attendance it is my duty to give in the House of Commons, have rendered it impossible for me to address your lordship as often as I could wish. I beg you will not consider that I am the less satisfied with your successful labours because I do not tell you so; and I hope the future may be as pregnant with auspicious events as the past.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. April 9, 1813.

My Lord—I transmit, by command of the Prince Regent, a letter received a few days since from the Count Metternich, with my answer, of which your lordship will make an official communication to the Emperor of Russia. I also transmit a letter received by His Royal Highness from the Emperor of Austria, with the answer returned thereto, which your lordship is authorized to read to his Imperial Majesty, not, however, giving a copy.

Your lordship, perhaps, has not been apprised of the circumstances referred to in my letter to Count Metternich previous to Baron de Wessenberg's departure from Vienna. The intentions of the Emperor being to offer his intermediation to the three principal belligerents being stated at Paris, the intervention was immediately accepted by Buonaparte. A few days afterwards, Maret made a speech to the Legislative Assembly, on proposing the conscription, of which the enclosed is an extract, which speech was officially communicated by Otto to the Austrian Government. Count Metternich immediately felt that such a declaration put an end to all possibility of intervention. He, in consequence, declared to Otto that the measure was abandoned, as neither Great Britain nor Russia would receive an agent who was the bearer of such a communication.

Two days afterwards, another courier from Paris brought orders to Otto to declare (probably at M. Floret's suggestion) that this paragraph was suppressed, and it accordingly did not appear in the official paper. Upon this apparent disavowal, (evidently a trick to embark Austria in a negociation, which Buonaparte hoped to turn to his own purposes) the intervention was resumed, and the negociators were despatched to their respective destinations. Baron Wessenberg left Vienna on the 8th of February, and on the 14th, Buonaparte, in transmitting the Concordat, addressed to the Legislative Assembly a speech, of which I enclose a copy.

It is impossible to conceive a transaction more replete with bad faith, insult, and rejection of every notion of accommodation. I trust the Emperor of Austria will feel the personal indignity put upon him as he ought. Nothing but consideration for his Imperial Majesty could have induced his Royal Highness under such circumstances to receive Baron Wessenberg's mission.

As this transaction at once proves that misfortune has had no other effect on Buonaparte's character than to aggravate all his former propensities, I hope it may be the means of bringing Austria to assert herself without loss of time. I can add nothing to the considerations which his Royal Highness has brought before his Imperial Majesty in support of such a decision. I have only to desire your lordship will conform your language to the sentiments therein expressed, and that you will request the Emperor of Russia to use his endeavours to give them effect. I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.[1]

Draft. Foreign Office, April 10, 1813.

My dear Lord—I have conversed so fully with my Brother on all points connected with your joint concerns, that I hope there is no impression of mine that you can be desirous of being acquainted with, upon which you will not have the means of information from him. I have begged him particularly to suggest to you the importance of directing the Emperor's anxious attention to Holland. Nothing short of driving the French across the Rhine, and providing a safe existence for that country, can give us a good barrier against France, and a safe communication with our Allies on the Continent. What may be the most effectual means of accomplishing this object

[1] This letter alludes to the period when the Editor was sent to join the armies in the North of Europe, and when he resigned his situation as Adjutant-General of the army in Spain.

may depend on circumstances, but I hope the object will be held steadily in view.

My Brother will also converse with you about the Duke of Cumberland's excursion to the Continent. His Royal Highness told me yesterday, he meant to pay a visit to the Emperor, and, I think he said, to offer his military services; but he did not intend to remain for any time at head-quarters, as he wished to avoid the appearance of any interference in what was going on.

I must beg your lordship to excuse this hasty note.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Honourable Sir Charles Stewart[1] *to Lord Castlereagh.*

Hamburgh, April 19, 1813.

Dear Castlereagh—It is hardly possible that I can afford you, in the hurried state of my arrival, and in my anxiety to hasten my progress forward, that detailed or accurate information I could wish; but you will make allowances while I hastily sketch the heads of the different intelligence that has come to my knowledge.

Mr. Cockburn, the Consul here, has probably informed you of what is immediately known in this place, as well as of the details of the late affairs. In consequence of the Viceroy's attempt from Magdeburg, on the 6th, failing, it is conjectured that the enemy are withdrawing; and their main concentration seems to be towards Erfurt, Wurzburg, and Frankfort. Davoust's corps is certainly retiring from the Aller, and the belief is that the French will pass the Weser.

General Tettenborn's force, which is advanced towards Celle, in the neighbourhood of Bremen, consists of about 4,000 infantry, and 3,000 cavalry. In the latter are four regiments of Cossacks, and two of dragoons; one of these is Prussian, and he has one or two battalions of Prussians to

[1] Now Marquess of Londonderry.

assist the formation of his levies, included in his infantry force. General Czernicheff's corps amounts to about 3,000 more; besides which, there are detachments and new formations on the Lower Elbe, consisting of about 5,000 cavalry, and 2,000 infantry.

General Walmoden arrived here two days ago, (I conclude Lord Cathcart will have fully apprised you of the reasons of his proceeding to this quarter) and he sets out to-day, to take the command of the new levies on the Lower Elbe; and Generals Tettenborn and Czernicheff are placed under his orders I understand he has instructions from the Emperor to re-establish, as far as possible, with the aid of the troops under his orders, the former state of things in Hanover and Hesse, if success should carry him so far.

The members of the Regency of Hanover are in this place, together with Count Kilmansegge; so I have no doubt Count Münster is accurately informed of every part of the Hanoverian arrangements. The Regency here are employed in fixing the civil authorities in the different towns, as the French leave them. Generals Walmoden and Tettenborn have concerted to press the enemy's left, and, building upon their force in cavalry, the French having little or none, they are sanguine as to their movements.

General Vandamme commands in Bremen, where he has about 5 or 6,000 men, and he has fortified the place. It is, however, probable that, if the Viceroy is retiring from Magdeburg, Davoust's corps withdrawing from the Aller is the natural consequence; and harassed as the French appear to be on every side by different bodies of Russian cavalry in all directions, with their communications, if not cut off, at least very uncertain, with their garrisons left in the different fortresses completely shut up, and, above all, *la morale* being quite destroyed in the French army—combining, I say, all these together, a retreat nearer the great mass of their force may be their best policy. It is supposed they have 70 or 80,000 men

in the neighbourhood of Frankfort and Wurzburg, under Ney, and the force at Magdeburg, including the Viceroy's and Davoust's, is averaged at 40,000.

The Saxons, who received orders to separate from the French, in consequence of which it was reported that the King meant to join the Allies, are at Torgau, and they have a considerable force in cavalry. The King is gone to Ratisbon.

In my public despatch, I have given you the little information I can as yet obtain of the general positions of the Allied corps. Their immediate plans and operations you will naturally feel I must as yet be ignorant of; but, as far as I can form an opinion, the Emperor's movements are wholly directed southward on the line of the enemy's retreat. It is possible that Vandamme's corps may be thrown on its retreat into Holland, to occupy Wesel, which I hear is strong, but I should doubt it; however, there is evidently no intention of the Allies acting with any part of the main force in a northward direction. General Tettenborn, whom I have had some conversation with, seems to have been left to his own discretion as to his operations, having, however, a general line of movement pointed out to him. But, as the Emperor's head-quarters are to be established on the 22nd at Dresden, every thing is advancing, and Tettenborn, who is a sanguine and active character, is satisfied in his own mind the French will be across the Rhine before the month of June. He has, therefore, readily entered into Count Walmoden's plan of an immediate general reconnaissance *en avant;* but the means are not sufficient in their hands for the force about Bremen, if they make any stand.

It will occur to you, with regard to the Hanoverian levies, that, if the country is at all clear of the enemy, raising the corps in various different places will be much more expeditious and advantageous than having any general point of *rassemblement*, and sending the arms, if possible, to the different districts: for it would be attended with much inconvenience to

bring all the population of the country probably to one quarter. I have stated this to Baron Ompteda and Kilmansegge, who are now here, and I hope to have their ideas before I close this letter, as I should be very unwilling to interfere in arrangements in much abler hands.

Having stated to you, as far as I have been informed, what are the immediate movements on the Lower Elbe, I shall next advert to the Swedish corps, 11,000 of which, I understand, are landed at Stralsund, and the Prince Royal is expected on the 25th, with 10,000 more. Count Bernstorff's arrival in England will put you in possession of any new projects on the part of Denmark. (I can hear of nothing here.) When the offer of the Danish troops came to Tettenborn, of which I enclose you a copy from Prince Dolgorouki, (A) he treated it civilly, but at the same time gave no positive encouragement, until he should be more acquainted with the real intentions of the Court of Denmark. However, Danish troops are on their march to this town, although they are not permitted to enter it, and no one believes they will ever, under any circumstances, be prevailed upon to pass the Elbe.

I have thought it expedient, as I may be delayed for horses, to forward Lord Cathcart's despatches by the Messenger Basset: his lordship will therefore be entirely prepared on my arrival. I enclose you a copy of the letter I have addressed to him (B), in which I have ventured to express what, I fear, will be the case with regard to Sweden and Denmark, judging from reports here. It is certainly unfortunate at this moment that any circumstance should interfere with the bringing these powers completely forward, with their whole weight and strength, into the North of Germany: our exertions, without them, will be of comparatively less moment. I think, from what General Tettenborn dropped in conversation, he supposes it will end in indemnity being held up to Sweden elsewhere, and that we shall not have the Prince Royal much in advance of Swedish Pomerania. The politics here are clearly a great distrust both of

Swedes and Danes. The exact military state of the Prince Royal's affairs at the head-quarters, on his landing at Stralsund, will not only be a point of importance and interest for you to have information of, but also may be essential for Lord Cathcart and myself; and therefore I purpose detaching Colonel Cooke, either from hence or Berlin, with instructions, of which I will enclose you copies, together with your despatches for the Prince Royal and Mr. Thornton. The latter, I think, can scarcely have yet received your orders to leave Stockholm. I have no doubt, however, Lieut.-Colonel Cooke will make his way, even if Mr. Thornton should not have arrived.

It is needless for me, until I have been able to profit by Lord Cathcart's experienced views, and until I know more, to enter into the possible or probable effects of the Convention signed at Breslau on the 7-19 March, by Stein and Hardenberg. Nothing, in my conception, but the rapidity of the progress of the Allies can make me comprehend the rapidity with which Russia and Prussia have decided on an important arrangement for the North of Germany, without previous communication with that power, without whose powerful aid they may be deceived in their future expectations. It is probable also that Sweden will have strong feelings on this Convention. Besides, the first object is to get rid of the enemy: so long as they are still on the Elbe, this settlement is strangely premature; and if, by any treachery, it should make its appearance in the *Moniteur*, it may possibly be productive of much evil to the common cause. I shall naturally look for your full instructions as to the language to be held on the subject; and until they arrive, I doubt whether Lord Cathcart and myself can make any great progress in our joint object. I hear they are going so expeditiously to work in the arrangement, that Alopeus, late Russian Ambassador in London, is appointed Civil Administrator of the 5th Section under the new division.

The 4th Article of this Convention appears to me the most

objectionable in its present shape. You have, of course, this document long ere this, but I send a copy (C) as put into my hands.

I shall forbear further comments; but Baron Ompteda's language is very strong. He lays the whole to the Minister Stein, whom he calls, *from his influence*, the Emperor of Germany. He states that he manages every thing in this quarter —Nesselrode keeping himself out of it, both from not being so well acquainted with Germany, and having enough of other matters on his hands.

The appointment of General Walmoden to the chief command here has given universal satisfaction. He is fortunately intimate with General Tettenborn, who is a German, and only entered the Russian service in the year 1798, as also with Czernicheff. Walmoden has given an *ensemble* to the operations, which, I have no doubt, will be attended with the best effects.

Mr. Horne has not exactly arranged the point to which he at first proceeds, but I shall be able to inform you in my next letters: he will probably go first to Plauen or Greitz. You will have every intelligence from Mr. Cockburn, and you will hear of the progress of the Hanoverian arrangements in the outset from Colonel Lyons' communications, and through Count Münster; and Lieut.-Colonel Cooke will soon be at Stralsund with the Swedish corps. After the arrangements with Lord Cathcart, I shall be able to acquaint you with my own motions: my object will be to secure on all quarters the best and most constant intelligence.

I annex an *exposé* which Tettenborn sent me (D). I believe it contains little more than what you have already received from Mr. Cockburn.

General Tettenborn mentions to me his having received yesterday some private letters from Vienna, in answer to some communications he made commenting on the impolicy of the Emperor of Austria's allowing the present opportunity for the

deliverance of Europe to pass by. The letters assured him that he would soon perceive the conduct of Austria was guided by the soundest wisdom and profound calculation; and that she would come forward, when prepared, in a manner the most effectual and the most unexpected. He has accounts also from Paris: these do not credit Bonaparte's immediate departure for the army.

I send you some information as to the Hanoverian corps now forming (E).[1]

I understand the transports have arrived off Cuxhaven, with the stores and arms, to-day.

I am ever, my dear Castlereagh, your most affectionate,

CHARLES STEWART, M. G.

[Enclosures in the preceding Letter.]

A.

Prince Dolgorouki to General Tettenborn.

Mon Général—Sa Majesté le Roi de Dannemarc, conformément à la démande de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, notre Maître, vient de se réunir à la bonne cause. Le Colonel de Hafner vous a déjà informé qu'une division Danoise, forte de 10,000 hommes sera prête d'occuper Hambourg, Lübec, et Travemunde dès que vous l'en aurez requise.

Sa Majesté m'a fait ordonné de vous en instruire de mon coté, et c'est un véritable bonheur pour moi de le mander à votre Excellence tant à cause du bien général qui en resulte, que par le part que j'ai pu avoir à l'entière réussite de la mission dont j'ai été chargé.

Je saisis cette occasion pour prier itérativement votre Excellence de vouloir m'honorer de ses nouvelles, et pour vous prier, mon Général, d'être persuadé des sentimens de la très haute considération, &c., &c.,

Le Prince DOLGOROUKI.

Copenhague, le 24 Mars—10 Avril.

[1] This Paper I have not met with.—EDITOR.

B.

The Hon. Charles Stewart to Lord Cathcart.

Hamburgh, April 18, 1813.

My dear Lord—I think it expedient to despatch a messenger to your lordship, to notify my arrival at this place this morning, having left Yarmouth on the 13th, as well as to send by him your despatches of which I am the bearer, as it is possible I may be detained for want of horses on my route.

The anxiety I naturally feel for an early personal communication with your lordship will induce me to hurry my journey as much as possible to the head-quarters; and it is my intention not to take any step with regard to presenting my credentials to the King of Prussia, until after I have communicated with your lordship.

From the little I have learnt since my arrival here, which, in the first moments, is received as well as given in a hasty and imperfect manner, and from the hope I entertain of soon communicating with your lordship, it is not necessary for me to detain you at any length.

Mr. King was at Heligoland on the 16th, waiting to return to England. He gave me the latest intelligence he had.

Lord Walpole arrived in England the day I left it; but no alteration or addition to my instructions took place.

Colonel Lyon, who is charged with the armament commencing in the Electorate, has probably arrived ere this at Cuxhaven. He brings arms and everything requisite for his undertaking, and, from the communication which I had with Major Kintzinger there, and that I have since had here with Count Kielmansegge, the people are quite enthusiastic, and only waiting for arms, which is the general cry.

General Walmoden leaves this to-day for the neighbourhood of Zelle. It appears that he is going to place himself at the head of the detachment on the Lower Elbe, as well as to assume the chief command in this quarter; and, as the enemy have retired from the Aller, leaving only 5,000 men in Bre-

more. It is confidently believed they will pass the Weser. They are represented as being dreadfully harassed by the cavalry that press upon them. The French are burning the boats on the Weser, and taking every measure that indicates alarm; and I understand General Tettenborn and Count Walmoden have agreed on a movement forward. The former is to make a show, and to attempt an attack on Bremen, even with the small means which I think he has: the latter is to push forward his reconnaissances as far as he can. I conclude these are only hints to harass and alarm, as there must surely be a considerable French corps still in the neighbourhood of Hanover. But the affair of the 2nd, under General Dornberg, has occasioned the most universal enthusiasm, and probably has given rise to more enterprise.

Count Walmoden's and Colonel Lyon's arrangements, on the arrival of the latter, I fear, may somewhat clash, but this was not foreseen at home. Indeed, the rapid and extraordinary progress with which operations have been carried on goes almost before every project that can be formed in England.

This very much applies to some of the main points on which I am instructed (as your lordship will perceive by the despatches); and it is certainly with no little surprise that I was shown to-day a copy of the Convention entered into at Breslau, on the 7-19 March, between Russia and Prussia—a Convention which, I am afraid, in many points, will be little conformable to the general ideas of his Majesty's Government, and certainly by no means foreseen from the nature of my instructions, and will probably bring further and more detailed instructions from England, so soon as it is known there.

Count Bernstorff passed us at sea for England. He goes, I conclude, to negociate what is already decided. The Danes, seeing their situation, determined to make a merit of necessity, and, declaring for the Allies, sent to occupy Hamburgh, &c. At the same time, they adhere more tenaciously to Norway than ever, and, I suppose, send Bernstorff to remonstrate

with England against her injustice, if she should persevere in wresting Norway from them. Now Denmark has come forward as a volunteer in the cause, Sweden is still looking to this first object more than any other: 11,000 of the Swedes are landed, I hear, at Stralsund, and the Prince Royal is expected with 10,000 more: but it is apprehended that, from the main point of Norway, which must be settled between these two powers, and from their respective decisions which they both seem to adhere to, all the first exertions we might derive *immediately* in the progress of the campaign in the North of Germany from them will in a great measure be lost and postponed, until the primary object is settled.

As I think it may be very interesting to have immediate communication with the Swedish corps, on the Prince Royal's arrival, I purpose sending Lieut.-Colonel Cooke, who is attached to my mission, to Stralsund, either direct from hence, or from Berlin, with the letters I have for the Prince Royal and Mr. Thornton. It does not occur to me that I must take up more of your lordship's time at present.

I have the honour, &c.,

CHARLES STEWART, M. G.

C.

Convention between Russia and Prussia, relative to the Administration of the Provinces of Germany which may be occupied by their Armies.

Les armées combinées de LL. MM. l'Empereur de Russie et le Roi de Prusse, étant sur le point d'entrer dans les États de la Confédération du Rhin, et dans les provinces du Nord de l'Allemagne réunies à l'empire Français, les deux Souverains ont jugé nécessaire de se concerter, tant sur les principes politiques à proclamer au moment de l'occupation de ces pays, que sur la mode d'après laquelle ils doivent être administrés au plus grand avantage de la cause commune. A cet effet, sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies a nommé M. le

Baron de Stein et son Secrétaire d'État, le Comte de Nesselrode; et sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse son Chancelier d'État le Baron de Hardenberg, et son Lieutenant Général de Scharnhorst; lesquels, après avoir pris en mûre considération les sentimens de modération et de justice qui caractérisent si éminemment les deux Souverains, ont jugé que les mesures suivantes rempliront le mieux leurs intentions bienfaisantes.

I°. Il sera immédiatement publié, au nom des deux Souverains, une proclamation dont le sujet est ci-joint. Elle se borne à annoncer que les deux Puissances n'ont d'autre but que de soustraire l'Allemagne à l'influence et à la domination de la France, et à inviter les princes et les peuples à concourir à l'affranchissement de leur patrie. Tout Prince Allemand qui ne répondra pas à cet appel dans un delai fixé sera menacé de la perte de ses États.

II°. Il sera établi un Conseil central d'Administration, muni d'un pouvoir illimité. Les Puissances alliées nommeront chacune un membre à ce Conseil. Pour le moment, il sera composé des délégués de la Russie et de la Prusse. A mesure que les armées des autres Puissances prendront une part active aux operations en Allemagne, elles acquerront la faculté de nommer également chacune un membre à ce Conseil, et particulièrement sa Majesté le Roi d'Angleterre. Les Princes d'Allemagne qui accéderont à la Coalition n'auront que la nomination collective d'un membre.

III°. Les attributions du Conseil consistent principalement à organiser dans les pays occupés des Administrations provisoires, de les surveiller, et de leur fixer des principes d'après lesquels ils doivent utiliser les ressources de ces pays en faveur de la cause commune.

IV°. Les revenues des pays occupés seront partagés entre la Russie et la Prusse, en parties égales. La Régence du pays d'Hanovre y participera dans la proportion du contingent qu'elle fournira.

V°. Tous les pays qui seront occupés depuis la Saxe jusqu'à

la frontière de la Hollande, à l'exception des anciennes provinces Prussiennes et de celles de la maison d'Hanovre, doivent être divisés en cinq grandes sections, savoir—

1. La Saxe et les Duchés.

2. Le Royaume de Westphalie à l'exclusion du Hanovre et des anciennes provinces Prussiennes.

3. Les Duchés de Berg, de Westphalie, et de Nassau.

4. Le Département de la Lippe.

5. Le Département des Bouches de l'Elbe, et du Mecklenbourg.

VI°. On préposera à chaque section un Gouverneur civil et militaire. Le premier dépendra du Conseil central, le second du Général-en-Chef, pour tout ce qui a rapport aux opérations militaires. Le Gouverneur civil formera auprès de lui un Conseil local provisoire, qui l'assistera dans l'exercice de ses fonctions.

VII°. Le Conseil central sera aussi chargé de régler tout ce qui tient à la levée des recrues, du système des réquisitions, et des magazins pour les armées actives et aux armémens à executer dans les pays occupés.

VIII°. On y organisera: 1. Une armée de ligne.—2. Une Milice.—3. Une levée en masse, en donnant la promesse formelle que jamais, dans aucun cas, ces troupes ne serviront à un autre but qu'à celui de défendre l'Allemagne contre les usurpations de la France. Ces formations auront lieu sous la protection d'un corps de l'armée alliée.

IX°. Le Conseil aura la faculté de choisir, pour les places des Gouverneurs et pour les administrations locales, les individus qu'il jugera les plus propres à remplir ces fonctions, tant par leurs talens que par la considération dont ils jouissent auprès de leurs compatriotes.

X°. Les arrangemens arrêtés dans ce plan seront immédiatement communiqués à l'Autriche et à l'Angleterre.

Fait a Breslau le 7—19 Mars, 1813.

CHARLES Baron de STEIN. } Signé { Le Baron de HARDENBERG.
Le Comte NESSELRODE. } Signé { v. SCHARNHORST.

D.

Exposé de la Position des Armées Alliées Russes et Prussiennes, au commencement du mois d'Avril, 1813.

Les places encore occupées par l'ennemi sont toutes cernées par des corps plus ou moins considérables selon la force de la garnison qui y est enfermée.

Le Lieutenant-général Loewis commande le corps devant Danzig.

L'armée dont le général Barclay de Tolli a pris le commandement, après que l'Amiral Tschischagoff a donné sa démission est partagée, dans ce moment, en trois corps, dont l'un est devant Thorn, l'autre devant Cüstrin, et le troisème devant Modlin.

Le Général Sacken observe les débris de l'armée du Prince Poniatowski, qui s'a retiré sur Crakau. La place de Czenstochau s'a rendu aux troupes de ce général.

Le Lieutenant-général Tauenzien fait le siége de Stettin ; le Général Schuler fait celui de Glogau ; le Général Balk celui de la citadelle de Spandau.

L'armée du Comte de Wittgenstein, dont les corps Prussiens des Généraux York et Bulow font partie, a passé l'Elbe le 10me Avril à Roslau, et le quartier-général fut établi à Dessau, après avoir battu le Prince Viceroi d'Italie près Magdebourg. Un détachement commandé par le Général Borstell est resté sur la rive droite de l'Elbe, vis-à-vis de Magdebourg.

L'armée Prussienne, sous les ordres du Général Blücher, marche sur Erfurt ; son avant-garde est arrivé dans ses environs.

La grande armée Russe commandée par le Maréchal Prince Kutusow-Smolenskoi, ainsi comme le corps d'armée du Général Miloradowitsch, marche sur l'Elbe. Les renforts dont cette armée avoit besoin pour compléter les regiments, sont arrivé avant qu'elle se mit en marche.

Les renforts très considérables destinés pour l'armée de Wittgenstein la vont rejoindre incessamment.

Le quartier général de sa Majesté l'Empereur va arriver le 21me Avril à Dresden.

Une armée de réserve, forte de soixante et dix bataillons et de quatre vingt seize escadrons est arrivée sur le Niemen.

Toute la Prusse prend les armes. L'organisation d'une milice (Landwehr) forte de 200,000 hommes sera bientot achevée: elle sera soutenue, en cas que les frontières seront menacées par la levée en masse (Landstürm).

Le Lieutenant-général Comte de Wallmoden a pris le commandement de l'armée du Nord de l'Allemagne, et va diriger les organisations militaires dans les pays délivrés du joug Français: son quartier-général est à Hambourg.

Le Général Tettenborn, qui commande un corps de l'armée du Nord, a poussé ses avant-postes jusqu'aux portes de Bremen, et jusqu'à Verden sur le Weser. La formation de la légion hanséatique, forte de trois bataillons d'infanterie, de huit escadrons de cavalerie, et d'une batterie de 12 pièces d'artillerie, sera achevée en peu de jours. De même, plusieurs bataillons et escadrons de la légion Hanovrienne seront bientôt en état de pouvoir combattre l'ennemi.

Le Général Dörnberg est arrivé à Celle; après la défaite du Général Morand à Lunebourg il n'y a eu que des escarmouches où la cavalerie légère des corps de Dörnberg et de Tettenborn ont fait prisonniers une quantité de gensd'armes, de douaniers, et de soldats Français. Il parut que le maréchal Davoust avoit l'intention de disputer le passage de l'Aller; cependant le Général Montbrun, qui commande son avant-garde évacua Celle sans être attaque.

Ce qui regarde l'intention de l'ennemi, il paroit qu'il tâchera de prendre position entre Erfurt et Wurzbourg: il sera possible qu'il se rassemblera sous les canons de cette place.

A Magdebourg il y a, selon les nouvelles les plus sûres, une garnison de 20 ou 25,000 hommes. A Wittenberg il n'y avoit que 1,800 hommes pour garder le pont. Les dernières nouvelles disoient que le Général Wittgenstein avoit ordonné

de bombarder la ville, si l'ennemi refuseroit de se rendre. Tout était prêt pour exécuter cette mesure.

Au reste, la ligne de l'Elbe n'est plus tenue par l'ennemi. A Torgau, le Général Leroy (Saxon) avoit refusé de laisser entrer des troupes Françaises, qui ont voulu y chercher asyle, après l'évacuation de Dresden.

La ville de Bremen est occupée par 4,000 Français sous les ordres du Général Vandamme. Il n'y a plus d'ennemi sur la rive droite du Weser dans le duché de Bremen.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. April 20, 1813.

My dear Lord—I enclose for your information a confidential memorandum received from Count Münster on the affairs of Germany, as connected with the treaty of Breslau. I do not send it officially to your lordship, as it is prepared upon imperfect information, and refers to questions upon which the British Government may not think the moment yet arrived for taking a decision. But this memoir, with its enclosures, will so far open the points to your lordship's observation as to enable you the better to furnish me with further information upon the views that prevail among the several powers interested.

The great question is how the control within the Germanic body is hereafter to subsist. In latter times, the rivalship between Austria and Prussia weakened the confederacy, and gave the ascendency to France. To render Austria, in fact as well as in name, predominant, many intelligent persons, of which Count Münster was one, would have preferred to see the power of Prussia somewhat reduced. Perhaps in theory they were right in that sentiment; but it appeared to me from the first, as your lordship knows, that the great object was to embark Prussia in the war; that, without her aid, Russia could do nothing offensively; and that the declaration of Prussia was an indispensable preliminary to any change in

the system of Austria. My opinion was, therefore, in full coincidence with the treaty of Breslau, that Prussia must be secured, and to be secured and embarked with effect, she must be reintegrated. It is impossible not to perceive that this indispensable act of policy revives the question of ascendency between the courts of Vienna and Berlin, which it may be difficult hereafter to arrange; but this is a secondary evil, and must be managed in subordination to the great object of their present union against France.

Count Münster adverts to a letter of Gneisenau's to the Chancellor Hardenberg, in which he quotes my opinion as countenancing a divided confederacy in Germany, under the separate protection of the two great military powers. He certainly must have misunderstood me. I may and probably did speak of the importance of both being restored to their former station and authority, as the natural and necessary barriers to secure the North and the South of Germany against France; but, as to their internal relations, I never had sufficiently considered the subject to have formed a conclusive opinion, more particularly as to the expediency of dissolving the ancient constitution of the Germanic body.

I observe a right is reserved to the *Powers* not named in the Convention of Breslau to send a Minister to the Council, as soon as their armies take the field, the *Princes* having only a common representative. I presume in the former class not only Sweden, but Saxony, Bavaria, and the more considerable Germanic States of the second order, are meant to be included: to confine their influence within the limits of a joint representative would be to exclude them from the confederacy.

I should be glad your lordship would send me any ideas that may occur on these subjects. It is, however, desirable to encourage the Allied Powers not to waste their deliberations at present upon these subjects: it is time enough, when the enemy is overcome, to provide for the future; at present, controversy ought to be discountenanced.

I beg your lordship will send a copy of this letter, with its enclosure, to Sir C. Stuart.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Foreign Office, April 20, 1813.

My dear Lord—From the language held by M. Baudissin at Stockholm, the measures to entangle our officers in an armistice, in contradiction to the decision of this Government, then known at Copenhagen, and from the obscure, but I must suppose untrue, account, given through Mr. Bille, of Prince Dolgorouki's mission, I am inclined to believe that Alquier is still the principal adviser of his Danish Majesty. Your lordship will feel the importance of correcting any false impressions that may have grown out of Prince Dolgorouki's intercourse with the Danish Government. The object seems to be to accelerate the Swedes as much as possible in their preparations for opening the campaign, and, when they have the means of applying force, to bring the court of Copenhagen to a categorical decision.

Mr. Thornton, in his No. 26, notifies that the Prince Royal means to assemble his whole force in Pomerania, and from thence to advance to the Elbe, and towards Holstein. That movement, whilst it threatens Denmark, will afford the most favourable occasion for requiring the Danes to declare themselves, which they will postpone doing, if they are permitted, till it is seen whether France can make any effectual effort in the North.

I hope we may be in time to stop Bernstorff. When I last wrote, I had reason to presume that he was on his passage to England. The ill effects that may be produced on the rising spirit on the Continent, if negociations are supposed to be in progress here, renders it highly desirable to negociate, if at all, elsewhere.

If the Swedes assemble in Pomerania, Hamburgh is the natural place for discussion, which ought not to be allowed to

hang, if the landing should be in Holstein. I conclude Mr. Thornton will have taken measures to bring the Danish Government to an explanation on the side of Copenhagen. Your lordship will concert with his Imperial Majesty the best means of bringing the whole to bear, and will instruct Mr. Thornton accordingly. Circumstanced as Great Britain and Russia are with Sweden, the only question is how far Sweden can be prevailed on to relax. She is undoubtedly entitled to the full measure of the treaties of Wilna and Abo from both powers; and, if it could be accomplished without serious inconvenience, I sincerely believe the policy of excluding Denmark from the other side of the Baltic is the *wise course* for all our future interests; but the difficulty of forcing the point has led us to look for some middle terms.

Mr. Thornton is possessed of every view that has at any time been taken of possible expedients, and can best judge to what Sweden can be reconciled. If Denmark can, by management, be embarked, it is a great object; but we must not be exposed to a treacherous neutrality, which, with the prospect of ultimately losing Norway (should the Allies prevail), will convert her into an active enemy at the first moment of disaster. Make Denmark a friend, *if you can*; if not, the sooner the Prince Royal is enabled (Zealand being blockaded) to overwhelm her continental provinces, the better.

Yours, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

General Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Berlin, April 23, 1813.

Dearest Castlereagh—I regret that I was delayed a day at Hamburgh, but it was not possible to avoid it; and, indeed, I derived the greatest satisfaction from witnessing the active exertions General Tettenborn is making there. It is incredible what he has produced under arms in a month. I was excessively pleased with him.

I travelled day and night hither, and arrived last night, and

shall set out again this evening for Dresden. I send you in an official letter the news. Count Golz being the only acting Minister here, I thought it my duty to call upon him, stating generally the object for which I was proceeding to the King of Prussia's present residence. Count Golz informed me that he was just setting out for Sweden, to renew with that power their friendly relations. He talked much in favour of the step Denmark had taken to join herself with the Allies, and said he hoped such proceeding would have its due weight in averting any pending loss of possession with which she was threatened. I heard all he said, but gave him very little reply.

He stated the Prussians to have nearly 120,000 regulars under arms, besides all the militia, which are embodying. Their army, he added, never was in so fine a state. The King, in the very best spirits, sees that he has difficulties, and that he has every thing at stake; but he is, nevertheless, determined, and very sanguine. Jacobi was sent to England with full instructions as to the King's views and wishes; but I cannot learn what these were here. He went by Sweden, rather, I believe, to soften the Prince Royal relative to the arrangements concluded at Breslau; and as, in the jumble, he may have missed seeing him, I should not be surprised if Count Golz's mission is to keep Bernadotte in good humour.

Count Golz imagines that Wittgenstein will refuse the propositions made by the garrison of Spandau. This he dreads, for its locality makes it of enormous moment to this city. The truth is, that the French gave out that an enormous plunder was lodged in Spandau, belonging to the Viceroy. If the garrison are allowed to go out with their baggage, &c., of course all this will be secured; whereas Wittgenstein is justly desirous his Russians should get the booty. The civil Minister wants the place on any terms; the General will only listen to a complete surrender as prisoners of war. It is most probable, therefore, it will be attempted by assault.

From what I can discover in Golz's observations, there is already a little jealousy between the Russian and Prussian generals. He deems the former, in all matters relating to the attack of places, extremely inexperienced. He laid great stress on the immense importance it would be to the security of Prussia to recover their fortresses, and seemed to imagine that *money* was the only rapid and certain mode of effecting this object. He stated that none of the commanders, to his knowledge, would be proof against large offers, and argued how desirable it would be if England could assist them in this way.

I stated that I conceived such measures, on the part of Great Britain, wholly out of the question; that, if the allied armies could drive the French over the Rhine, the fortresses would not long hold out; that we had but one object to look to now, which was to annihilate Bonaparte by force of arms, and not by treachery or gold.

The events likely to take place by the forward movement of the French may be of the greatest importance to the campaign; and, if the Allies are victorious, the French must pass the Rhine.

I am much hurried, and, as I shall write immediately on my arrival at Dresden, I shall only say, farewell.

Ever your most affectionate,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Dresden, April 26, 1813.

Dearest Castlereagh—As Lord Cathcart proposes sending the messenger Kraus (who has arrived with important news from Vienna) to England to-day, it will be impossible for me, arriving only yesterday, to write at any length. However, I am anxious to say a few words on a subject not connected with my own duties, but concerning which I have had some conversation with Lord Cathcart.

His lordship read to me his last private despatch to you,

relative to the Swedish Convention. He clearly points out his own opinions and construction of this treaty. I own, however, as far as I am master of the subject, I did not understand that the cession of Guadaloupe and the subsidy were either given by Great Britain, or received by Sweden, for *an immediate forbearance*, on her part, on the Norway question. On the contrary, I conceived the Prince Royal would be justified, under the Convention, in driving the Danes out of their continental possessions, (Denmark resisting the demand of Norway) as a primary operation, before he engaged in the more general object of carrying his exertions forward against the common enemy.

It appears to me that the *second Article* of General Hope's treaty points this out, although the word "*directe*," in the preceding one, may be applied in a different and positive sense. But again, in Article III., the same word "*directe*" might be argued differently. I think I can hardly have been deceived in this point, as I well remember canvassing the probability with you, if Denmark resisted in Holstein, of the Swedes being detained in an isolated operation there, which would render all their efforts for general objects this campaign nugatory. You seemed, in reply, to be of opinion that the Danes, in no event, could hold Holstein against Sweden, and that Denmark had no alternative but to cede with a good grace, pressed as she was on all sides; otherwise, force would make her comply.

The construction General Hope and Mr. Thornton have of the Convention may differ from Lord Cathcart's; but he is so decidedly of opinion the treaty would be wholly trifling, if it had not bought, as it were, the *absolute forbearance* of Sweden (for that every thing else was secured by the treaty of Abo), I entirely yielded my views of the question, and merely wrote this private letter as a *Pièce justificative* of myself in having been led (which I conclude I have) into error on the subject. I have felt it right to do so, the more particularly as Lord

Cathcart has alluded to me in his private despatch to you on this point.

It certainly was not foreseen, when the treaty was concluded, that the Russians would have passed the Elbe by the beginning of April. Events have so outstripped calculations, otherwise the operation of a Swedish army in Holstein (Denmark being still French, and the French still on the Oder) might have been desirable at the time of the Convention, as a forerunner to what would afterwards arise, although the idea is so reprobated now by Lord Cathcart. His lordship will fully apprize you of Colonel Pozzo di Borgo's mission. He seems to believe it will set all matters to rights, and I sincerely hope it may. There is a letter of yours to Count Löwenhjelm, which he shows, I understand, putting my construction on things.

I have been unable to touch on any subject as yet with Lord Cathcart, the Emperor and King of Prussia being only just arrived; and, the military operations being so very momentous, every thing else must be secondary. Lord Cathcart also will write fully to you by this conveyance himself.

Ever, my dearest Castlereagh, yours most affectionately,

CHARLES STEWART.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to H.R.H. the Duke of Cumberland.

Dresden, April 27, 1813.

Sir—Conformably to your Royal Highness's commands, I lost no time, on my arrival at the head-quarters of the allied armies, in communicating with Lord Cathcart as to your Royal Highness's immediate intention of proceeding to this place. His lordship was already apprized by an official despatch of this circumstance, and his lordship availed himself of the earliest opportunity of informing his Majesty the Emperor of your Royal Highness's gracious intention of paying him a visit.

Lord Cathcart has transmitted to me a copy of the despatch which he has written, since his interview with the Emperor, to the Secretary of State, in which his Imperial Majesty's sentiments are expressed by his lordship. As, however, I think it more than probable that your Royal Highness may have set out before this letter can reach England, which might produce some alterations in your Royal Highness's general arrangements, I think it my duty to forward a copy of Lord Cathcart's letter to Hamburgh, to meet your Royal Highness, in the event of your arrival there.

The head-quarters of his Imperial Majesty and the King of Prussia are to be together during the time of their operations in the field; and, in addition to the great want of quarters this occasions, there is rather a discountenance to British officers with the army. This appears to me to be the case in the little I have seen.

With regard to the idea your Royal Highness had, and which you did me the honour confidentially to communicate to me, I did not think myself (when I saw the letter of Lord Cathcart) in any matter authorized to open upon it.

If things proceed favourably, and your Royal Highness goes to Hanover, or if you come to Berlin, I would endeavour in any manner to be of service, if your Royal Highness pursues your excursion; and it only remains for me to add that, as far as is in my power, your Royal Highness may command me.

I have the honour to be your Royal Highness's most dutiful servant, CHARLES STEWART, M.G.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Draft. Foreign Office, April 28, 1813.

My dear Lord—My official letter will give you our general impressions on the late unfortunate occurrence. We have done every thing in our power to check jealous feelings, and have no doubt you will have done the same. Neither Russia nor Great Britain (were it even politic) can now break with

Sweden, without a loss of character; and the only object now is to render the alliance useful to the common cause.

We never have disguised from ourselves the embarrassments of the Norwegian point; but it was an engagement made in the day of adversity, for the preservation of Russia. That it has essentially contributed to save her, and with Russia the rest of Europe, cannot be doubted; and this must not be forgotten in the day of prosperity, either for our own convenience, or to conciliate the sentiments of powers that were then seeking their safety in the connexion of France. We must have a clear case of good faith on the part of Russia, as well as on our own, or we cannot go to Parliament for subsidy.

I feel the same about Sweden, that we shall not be able to carry her subsidy, if she attempts to conquer Norway on the Continent by any other mode than what may best contribute to the destruction of the French power; and the Prince Royal must only look to Holstein and to the Danes, as he would to any other hostile force occupying a position which menaced his communications: but to make Sweden act in this spirit, you must manage the Prince Royal with the same kindness he experienced in former times, when his friendship was essential. Rely upon it, that a change of conduct will make an impression deep in proportion as it may be supposed that Russia can now do without him.

You must recollect that he is entitled, by his engagements with Russia, to be at this moment in Norway, with all his own, and 35,000 of her troops. He is now on the Continent, I hope for important purposes; but don't try to cut down his army, because, at the instance of Great Britain, he has come there. I don't mean that, at the present moment, he *can* have his Russians; and I am sorry (obviously in jealousy of Prince Dolgorouki's mission) that he has claimed them, when he knew they could not be forthcoming: but, whilst we shall labour to push him forward, don't let him, in your quarter, be pulled back by mistrust or disappointment, when the means

of liberally upholding him in his military situation are to be found.

I express these sentiments confidentially to your lordship; because I find that, in addition to his other indiscretions, (to use the mildest term) Prince Dolgorouki has said at Copenhagen, or been made to say, that the Emperor would not give the Prince Royal a man; that 35,000 Russians would make him too strong in Germany; and that his Court could not trust him. Your lordship will feel how much calculated such insinuations are to inspire the sentiments which they impute.

Those who look at the war on the larger scale at the headquarters of the army must feel impatient at any subtraction of effort from the main object; and it is right to resist by all suitable means any thing that has such a tendency: but there has been something in the late transaction (with the aid of Danish mystification) which gives it the air of a change of policy, a passing by Sweden to get at Denmark. I trust, however, it will soon be stripped of this impression, and that a proceeding so inconsistent with the principles of the alliance between Great Britain and Russia, so justly a matter of umbrage to Sweden, and so derogatory in the language used by the Government of Denmark to the Emperor's own personal dignity, will be disavowed; and I wish your lordship to be quite explicit with his Imperial Majesty as to the extent to which it is felt here, and as to the importance that is attached to its being effectually done away.

I am afraid the Convention of Breslau will also be a point of some unpleasantness in Sweden. It seems rather studiously to pass by Sweden, as having any prominent claim to attention as a member of the Germanic body. The name of Sweden does not occur in it, nor is any reference made to that power in the 4th Article, where the distribution is made of the revenues of the territories under administration. I think this omission was unfortunate; as I know Sweden was much consulted in the early projects by Baron Stein, Count Münster,

&c., upon the formation of such a Council; and although I conclude a Swedish representative will be received, yet, her name being omitted gives an ungracious colour to the transaction.

The choice of Pozzi di Borgo for the mission to Stralsund has given great satisfaction here; as he knows the sentiments of all parties. I hope the sending instantly General Hope to the Prince Royal will not be received as a less satisfactory proof of our desire to smooth every thing to meet the Emperor's wishes; and, as an old personal friend of your lordship's, if there should remain any points to explain or to manage, I have desired him to go to you without delay; and I know, when you meet, all difficulties will be surmounted.

As this is the first and only embarrassment we have had, I feel confident matters will soon be put to rights; but it can only be done by making the Prince Royal feel that he is not to be given up on the point of Norway, and that, acting his part fairly towards the confederacy, the station which he was encouraged to expect he should fill is to be preserved to him.

It is not necessary to explain at any length why Bernstorff was sent away so peremptorily. The bearer of a proposition so extravagantly inadmissible could expect no other reception; but it became indispensable, under the impressions created by Prince Dolgorouki's overture.

I don't know that I have any thing further to add but to request your lordship to apprize his Imperial Majesty that, conceiving it may advance the operations of the campaign if a battering train and the necessary ammunition for the siege of Magdeburg was embarked and sent to Heligoland, to be passed up the Elbe when wanted, orders have been given accordingly.

Believe me, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

As I have not time to write to my brother on business, I know you will communicate in confidence to him, and send

him copies of my two public letters, for his information, that he may regulate his language on the subjects to which they relate accordingly. These unpleasant topics, however, cannot be too little dwelt upon, when once explained.

General Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Dresden, April 29, [1813], at night.

Dearest Castlereagh—Kraus has been delayed another day, which I lament, as his news is important; but I suppose it has been unavoidable. Kraus had positive orders not to delay more than twelve hours with Lord Cathcart, and now he has been three days. I have had two long conferences with Lord Cathcart to-day. I think he begins to admit I have not been wholly wrong in my conception of the Swedish question, as despatches from Thornton arrived last night, which, I surmise, argue the point as I have done; and, during our conversation, the Swedish Minister Löwenhjelm come in with his budget, just arrived, and he opened before me.

He talked of your letter to the Prince Royal leaving no doubt upon the point. He stated, *operations against the common enemy* was purposely worded in the confined shape in the treaty, with a view, on the part of our negociators, to make it in the most *presentable* shape to come before Parliament; and finally he declared that, whatever Lord Cathcart might persuade him to believe, all his official instructions and documents contradicted his lordship's comments and readings.

When he left us, I told Cathcart I thought the awkward part was your letter, which, no doubt, would be held up against his constructions; and, however good policy might make us wish now *entire forbearance* had been purchased, I feared he would not be able to persuade Sweden this was accomplished.

He showed me next Hardenberg's despatches, which are everything but a *Declaration* for Austria. You have them so

much more fully probably in all parts, that it is needless for me to add a word. Cathcart then put me in possession very confidentially of all the last despatches, and entered very kindly on every subject with me. He seemed to be a little hurt that the *cream* of all the late arrangements had reached the Emperor through Lieven, before he, C., even was acquainted with them; and, when he opened his *portefeuille*, expecting to afford much satisfaction, the Emperor was aware and had answers for everything. He said this had never occurred before, and he should express himself to you as to its inexpediency. In running over the subsidiary treaty, the Emperor seemed to be most struck by the large number of men to be employed so far from his own frontier: 150,000 he was prepared for, but not more. He promised, however, to appoint plenipotentiaries without delay to commence the business.

The German Legion, I understand, is going on rapidly, and is ordered forward to Königsberg as soon as possible: 4,200 are already under arms. The Swedish Minister seemed very anxious in his inquiries after them. By the by, he told us anecdotes just come to his knowledge, worth relating, as it shows intentions. The Emperor of Austria had just determined on permitting the sale of saltpetre to any amount to Prussia, never having furnished or permitted supplies of any kind to be granted to the French army on their retreat. Also, a very rich merchant of this town affirms that the Austrian Government have taken measures for an immediate issue of paper money, which, with them, is as decisive as the march of troops, or the collecting of forces.

An officer is just arrived from Wilson, at Chemnitz. The enemy are moving on our left: their advance has reached Jena. In consequence of their approach, the allied army are more closely concentrating on the Saale, between Merseburg on the right, and Altenburg on the left. Wittgenstein has removed from Dessau to the former place. Miloradovich is thrown forward towards Plauen, to strengthen the left; and the move-

ments are indicative of a serious event, of which, from the enthusiasm prevailing, there can be no doubt, although, as you will see by Bonaparte's document, he reckons his forces at 200,000 men, and he states himself 170,000 collected here. I hope the Allies will force him to fight in the plain; but the misfortune is, the country near the Thuringian forest is exactly what will enable him, if he is beat, to get off well, without being annihilated by the Cossack cavalry; and, having his fortresses on the Rhine, he does not risk so much as the Allies in a battle, who, if worsted, would have difficulty, with only one good bridge here, over the Elbe, and Magdeburg, &c., in the hands of the enemy. However, there is nothing to fear. Before I close this, I may hear more accurate details.

You will, I am sure, consider the difficulty and delicacy I should encounter, with Lord Cathcart on the immediate spot, in giving any public details officially, not communicated by him; so I shall confine my official letters to simple points immediately indispensable to relate, and write *secretly* to you all I hear, or that comes under my observation, as well as *privately* what is necessary, and you will use your own judgment with the whole.

You will see, by the enclosed, I have been attacked already by my friend Sir Robert Wilson. I believe Cathcart and he have had many differences; but Wilson does not give me a great proof of friendship, by asking me, *immediately* on my arrival, to separate him from Cathcart, who must take such a measure on my part extremely ill. I shall throw complete cold water on this application, and, while I am under Cathcart, shall be most scrupulous with him, which I know is essential.

Colonel Campbell is still here. I hope Cooke is at Stralsund by this time. Horne is not yet come forward; but I think the military intelligence is most wanted now; and if he proceeds somewhere towards Bavaria, he may collect most information. I hear the Duke of Wirtemberg has escaped from the French,

to join the Allies; but this is not official. I will now release you, dearest Castlereagh, as I am sure you will have enough to wade through by this conveyance.

Ever your most devoted and affectionate,

C. S.

The points of cession to Hanover, I have reason to apprehend, will meet no opposition: on the contrary, to become greater herself, Prussia would give more than required; and, indeed, if I have good information, Prussia all along has been preparing in the most effectual manner for Bonaparte's ruin.

Note pour M. de Rehausen de la part de S.A.R. le Prince Royal de Suède.

Wenersborg, 30 Avril, 1813.

Le Général Hope propose de la part du Prince Régent, au Prince Royal de se charger non seulement du commandement de la Légion Allemande, mais encore de son entretien, de sa nourriture, et de sa solde, moyennant un fonds que le Gouvernement Anglais mettrait à sa disposition. Cette Légion a été d'abord très mal composée, et les cadres ont commencé à être remplis par des déserteurs de tous les pays. L'habillement, l'équipement, &c., ont déjà couté des sommes considérables, et des maladies contagieuses ont reduit ce corps, d'environ huit mille qu'il était, à moins de quatre mille.

Maintenant que l'armée Suédoise va se trouver sur le Continent Allemand, rien ne s'oppose à ce que cette Légion joigne à cette armée. L'armée Suédoise étant plus particulièrement destinée à agir entre le Bas Elbe et le Rhin, il est naturel que le Gouvernement Anglais désire que ce corps soit réuni aux Suédois, qui conjointement avec les Hanoveriens, pourront former une masse propre à entreprendre les opérations que les conjonctures pourront préparer. Il importe donc que le Prince Royal soit instruit si le Gouvernement Anglais persiste dans son premier projet, s'il en est ainsi des fonds qui doivent être

destinés pour ce service; et la capitulation doit être conclue incessamment.

Le Prince accepte d'avance toutes les conditions que le Gouvernement Anglais proposera, et il croit que, vu la difficulté de pouvoir recruter la Légion par des hommes capables de rendre de bons services, il faut se borner pour le moment à fixer son complet au nombre de six mille combattans. M. de Rehausen est invité à voir le Général Hope, et à lui demander quelques renseignemens là-dessus. Il les transmettra au Prince Royal par M. Forsell, qui lui remettra la dépêche dont il est porteur et à lui demander si M. de Rehausen a quelque chose à communiquer à son Altesse Royale. Il pourra le dire à Major Forsell, mon aide-de-camp, qui possède la confiance de son Altesse.

Le Prince Royal désire que M. de Rehausen demande au Gouvernement Anglais qu'il veuille lui fournir encore cinq mille fusils. M. de Rehausen fera son possible pour presser cet envoi, qu'il fera diriger sur Gothembourg.

The Hon. Sir Charles Stewart to Lord Castlereagh.

Head-quarters, Würzen, May 17, 1813.

My dear Castlereagh—Since my despatch, No. 11, of the 5th instant, relative to the proceedings that had taken place up to that period, with regard to forwarding the object of the instructions on the subsidiary treaty, the constant movements of the army have prevented, until yesterday, any further measures being adopted. But, being invited, with Lord Cathcart, to a preliminary conference on that day with the plenipotentiaries of his Imperial Majesty and the King of Prussia, we proceeded generally to discuss the objects of the Convention, and we received the outline of a *projet* from his Imperial Majesty's Minister, M. de Nesselrode, which is under our consideration, and which appears to be drawn up to have the treaties of concert and subsidy separate with Russia and

Prussia. It also contains many objectionable points unnecessary here to detail, until the discussions have been gone into.

Baron Hardenberg proposed to me, in addition to the treaty of subsidy and concert, a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with Prussia. I acquainted him that I had no instructions on this head. M. de Nesselrode also put into our hands his plan for the Federative Paper; and, although not reduced to an official shape, yet it appears to me advantageous thus early to enclose you a copy of it—

Firstly, because we have not yet been furnished with the ideas promised from Mr. Vansittart.

Secondly, because there are many of its articles not only objectionable, but positively contrary to the instructions received from you; and I have reason to suppose the plan received came from the hands of Baron Stein, whose definitive propositions they are. It is right as early as possible to have, on our part, your full instructions on this head. As far as I am concerned, I must say the subject is of so intricate and important a nature, that, if the ideas are to be carried immediately into effect, I think no time should be lost in sending out a proper person here, completely qualified, and master of the detail, or in proposing that some individual should be sent to England from hence.

The 3rd Article, relating to the entire responsibility of England to give a fictitious credit to the Paper, has been drawn from a knowledge that, such is the state of the finances of Russia and Prussia, it is well ascertained they could never, under the stipulation even of six months after a peace, redeem their portion.

The 10th Article, permitting this Paper to be exchanged against Exchequer Bills, is positively contrary to the instructions in your private letter of the 9th of April to Lord Cathcart.

I hope the paper transmitted in my private letter of

the 15th instant, will give you further information on this subject.

We are to have another meeting in a day or two, on the Convention, and I hope this business may be, in some degree, proceeded on, as I sincerely regret the little progress that has hitherto been made.

I forgot to acknowledge sooner the receipt of your private letter and the other papers by the Messenger Vick.

Ever, my dear Castlereagh, your most affectionate,

CHARLES STEWART.

Observations sur le Projet d'une Papier Monnaie Fédérative, émise de concert par la Grande Bretagne, la Russie, et la Prusse, accompagnée d'une Ébauche d'un Projet de Convention.

1°. La mesure d'une Papier Monnaie, émise par trois Souverains différens, qui en sont responsables dans des proportions inégales est une mesure si nouvelle qu'avant de l'embrasser, on ne sauroit trop aller à la recherche des moyens propres à assurer son crédit, et au devant des contestations qui pourroient s'élever dans la suite entre les Puissances co-signataires de ce Papier.

2°. Quant à son crédit, il seroit impossible de se flatter qu'une masse de 5 millions sterling (ce qui fait 30 millions de Thalers Prussiens) émise trop subitement dans les pays au nord de l'Elbe n'éprouvât pas une dépréciation croissante, qui diminueroit d'autant les secours qu'on en espére. Il paroit donc indispensable de ne l'émettre qu'à fur et à mesure des besoins, et dans une proportion régulière convenue d'avance. Si 1,500,000 Thalers par mois pouvoient remplir les besoins auxquels il s'agit de pourvoir, cette émission conduiroit de Juillet, 1813, jusqu'au Mars, 1815.

La lenteur de l'émission d'un pareil Papier est indispensable pour lui donner le tems de sortir autant que possible du marché, à mesure qu'il y entre, unique moyen de préparer et

de maintenir le crédit des nouvelles émissions, qui se succéderont de mois en mois. Malheureusement il paroit que les Ministres Russes et Prussiens insisteront sur ce que l'émission de chaque mois seroit au moins de 2½ millions de Thalers, en se fondant sur l'étendue et l'urgence de leurs besoins, et sur ce qu'il a déjà été convenu à Londres, disent-ils, que la totalité seroit émise dans le cours d'une année.[1]

3°. À ce premier moyen d'assurer le crédit de ce Papier il paroîtroit utile de pouvoir en ajouter un autre, pour en faire sortir de la circulation une partie plus ou moins forte à mesure qu'il y entreroit. Ce moyen consisteroit à attacher un intérêt de 6 p. $\frac{0}{0}$ par an, ou de ½ p. $\frac{0}{0}$ par mois aux billets dont les porteurs les auroient déposés à certains dépôts désignés dans quelques ports de mer, éloignés du théâtre de la guerre, en attachant alors à ces billets deposés un intérêt de ½ p. $\frac{0}{0}$ par mois à dater de leur enrégistrement au dépôt. Nonseulement M. le Baron de Stein a adopté la proposition de cette mesure mais il pense qu'elle pourra être facilitée en Allemagne plus que partout ailleurs par des arrangemens faits de gré à gré avec les provinces et les communautés, afin que les billets, ou une partie des billets, qu'elles recevront pour réquisitions en nature, fût immédiatement consignée à ces dépôts.[2]

4°. La 3me mesure indispensable à leur crédit consiste à trouver quelque moyen de rassurer pleinement les porteurs contre toute crainte de ces émissions clandestines auxquelles la plûpart des Gouvernemens continentaux se sont si souvent

[1] Il seroit d'autant plus essentiel pour la Grande Bretagne d'insister sur ce que l'émission soit graduelle, que l'expérience des paix séparées doit éclairer sur la possibilité d'une rupture entre les trois Puissances contractantes avant la paix générale, et il importe de se réserver en pareil cas la faculté de rappeler le commissaire signataire ou de révoquer ses pouvoirs.

[2] M. Niebuhr, de son côté, croit que cette mesure n'aura le succès qu'on en attend, qu'autant l'intérêt promis sera payable de 6 en 6 mois même *pendant la guerre*, &c., qui ne laisseroit pas d'avoir quelques inconvéniens et de compliquer un peu la gestion.

portés. Un moyen simple d'y parvenir seroit de diviser l'émission totale en 30 numéros des millions, pour que chaque billet portât en tête le numéro du million dont il fait partie; ainsi que le numéro de la série qu'il compose. Par ce moyen, il deviendra impossible d'émettre un seul billet au delà de 30 millions convenus sans jeter dans la circulation deux billets, qui portant le même numéro, de la même série, du même million, ne manqueroit pas d'être découvert.

5°. Finalement, un 4me moyen propre à assurer leur crédit est de fixer leur remboursement à une époque la plus rapprochée possible, mais pas tellement rapprochée néanmoins que son rapprochement fût de nature à inspirer des doutes, fondés, sinon sur la volonté, du moins sur la capacité des Gouvernemens contractans à effectuer ce remboursement.

L'époque précise de Juillet, 1815, qu'on a proposée en Angleterre, paroit avoir des inconvéniens de plus d'un genre.

6°. D'abord elle suppose que la guerre sera terminée en 1815; or, quoiqu'on soit en droit de s'en flatter, s'engager au remboursement simultané de tous les billets en 1815 seroit, en quelque manière, annoncer au Gouvernement Français qu'à cette époque les Alliés se trouveront non-seulement au terme de leurs ressources mais tenus de rembourser les emprunts qui les auront aidés jusqu'alors; et qu'en conséquence la France doit faire les plus grands efforts pour ne point poser les armes avant le remboursement d'une époque si prochaine. En outre s'il venoit à échoir pendant la prolongation de la guerre, les embarras de la Grande Bretagne pour acquitter ses 2½ millions sterling, espèces, meritent d'être pris en sérieuse considération. Quant aux deux autres puissances contractantes, il ne faut pas perdre de vue, 1°., que les finances Prussiennes sont aux abois, et iront de plus en plus en se détériorant pendant la guerre; 2°., que les 10 millions de Thalers que la Russie sera appellée à rembourser en espèce pour sa part, lui coûteront pres de 40 millions de roubles en papier, et cela à une époque où elle devra recommencer les payements de sa dette étrangère et de

leurs arriérages. Aussi les deux Secrétaires de l'Empereur, sont-ils expressément convenus que si l'on veut que la Russie puisse, sous de très grands embarras, effectuer à la paix son remboursement de 10 millions Thalers *espèces*, il faut lui accorder tout au moins un terme de trente mois, pour les recueillir par dégrés.

7°. Un délai le plus long possible pour la partie du remboursement qui échoira à la Russie et à la Prusse est donc indispensable, et paroit même plutôt de nature à augmenter qu'à diminuer le crédit du Papier fédératif, car il n'est point d'homme éclairé en finances qui puisse croire à la capacité de ces deux puissances de rassembler 15 millions *espèces* en Juillet, 1815, si la guerre prolonge en 1814. D'ailleurs, les inconvéniens d'un délai seront considérablement atténués, et par l'intérêt de $\frac{1}{2}$ p $\frac{0}{0}$ par mois qu'on propose d'attacher à tout le Papier fédératif, à dater des ratifications de paix, et par l'acquiescement que donnera sans doute la Grande Bretagne à l'idée de prendre sur elle le remboursement de la première moitié à rembourser.

8°. Mais la plus grande difficulté est relative à l'article qui doit fixer la responsabilité de chacune des trois Puissances, de façon que, bien que co-signataires des billets, aucune des trois ne soit responsable pour celle des deux autres qui se trouveroient hors d'état de remplir sa part des engagemens simultanés. L'article 111 du projet de convention inclus ne laisse aucun doute à cet égard. Mais ce n'est point ainsi que les Commissaires Russes et Prussiens entendent, ou affectent d'entendre le sens de leurs dépêches de Londres. Ils tournent autour de l'idée d'appeler la Grande Bretagne à leur secours si non de supporter définitivement, du moins pour *avancer* les 15 millions de leurs remboursement ;[1] et ils se proposent d'y insister de leur mieux. Mais je prends la liberté d'observer que si la

[1] Tel étoit entr'autres l'un des objets principaux d'une ébauche de convention qu'on a communiquée, et dont voici l'article 111. "LL. MM., &c., reconnoissent expressément le devoir sacré de rembourser à la Grande

Grande Bretagne étoit disposée à y acquiescer, la chance d'avoir en définitif tout le remboursement à sa charge seroit si contraire qu'il vaudroit mieux pour elle, ou se donner d'emblée tout le mérite d'un subside de 5 millions sterling, en le prenant d'avance entier à sa charge, ou n'émettre des billets qu'au nom de la Grande Bretagne pour 2½ millions sterling; seulement dans la proportion d'un million de thalers par mois.

9°. Encore, et même en supposant que la Grande Bretagne y consentit, un papier semblable, remboursable en espèces sonnantes, peu de mois après la paix auroit-il pour elle cet inconvénient majeur et impossible à éviter, qu'ayant à Londres un plein crédit, il y seroit infailliblement envoyé sous la forme de lettres de change, pour y pomper des métaux précieux, tandis que c'est précisément parceque le Gouvernement Britannique ne peut pas en fournir au delà d'une certaine somme qu'il offre son crédit. Le même inconvénient ne sera point attaché au Papier fédératif, si la Russie et la Prusse doivent en rembourser la moitié sans qu'on connoisse d'avance celle qui leur échoira en payement. Aucun papier semblable ne sauroit obtenir en Angleterre un crédit suffisant pour craindre de l'y voir arriver sous la forme de *traites* commerciales.

10°. Si les négociateurs Russes et Prussiens échouent dans cette demande, ils insisteront vraisemblablement pour que le Gouvernement Britannique prenne du moins, et dans tous les cas, à sa charge, le remboursement de 2½ millions sterling, lors

Bretagne les avances faites pour leur avantage, mais la possibilité d'une prolongation de la lutte présente, qui épuiseroit même d'avantage les moyens de leurs États, surtout ceux de S. M. le Roi de Prusse, pour satisfaire à des engagemens aussi majeurs, leur fait craindre qu'ils ne sauroient faire le remboursement à leur charge au terme fixé, et qu'il ne convient pas de le reculer pour soutenir le crédit du Papier à créer, S. M. B. consent à faire alors l'avance de la moitié qui tombe à la charge de LL. MM. et à en accepter le remboursement en cinq termes annuels à commencer du 1er Juillet 1815, moyennant des intérêts à 5% p. pour le tems que LL. MM., &c., resteront débitrices de S. M. B."

même qu'on n'auroit émis du Papier fédératif que pour 2¼ millions sterling, ou pour moins de 5. Ceci contribueroit, sans doute, plus ou moins, au crédit de la première moitié du papier qu'on se propose d'émettre. Mais lorsqu'on aura émis toute la portion, dont le remboursement échoiroit à la Grande Bretagne seule, peut-être ses deux Alliés seroient ils moins disposés à poursuivre la lutte et à continuer l'émission d'un papier dont le remboursement de la dernière moitié retomberoit exclusivement sur eux.

11°. Il paroîtroit convenable de réserver à la G. B. la faculté de faire ses payemens en *dollars*, en fixant d'avance à cet effet, la valeur pour laquelle ils seroient reçus. On assure ici que lors des derniers, subsides, les piastres, tant les nouvelles que les vielles, passoient couramment en Allemagne pour *un Thaler et demi*, et que c'est leur valeur. D'après celle-ci, 4 dollars feroient 6 Thalers, ou 1 liv. sterling, ce qui ne seroit certainement pas onéreux. Il est cependant à désirer que la Trésorerie Angloise soit consultée et donne préalablement son avis sur ce dernier article.

12°. Et comme le Gouvernement Prussien ne fait qu'un gain tout-a-fait insignifiant sur la fabrication de leurs Thalers, peut-être couperoit on court à toutes les difficultés, en convenant par un article séparé et secret que l'Angleterre sera autorisée à frapper la quantité de Thalers Prussiens dont le remboursement la compétera, le tout sous l'inspection du Ministre de Prusse, et en lui rendant les coins après avoir frappé la somme nécessaire.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stralsund, May 28, 1813.

My Lord—I thought it right, on learning the intelligence of this day, to address a letter, by an officer of the Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, who was returning thither as courier, to apprize the Duke of Cumberland of what was passing, and of the necessity which there seemed to General Hope and

to myself to be that his Royal Highness ought to be within the reach of his Majesty's ships. Should any movement be made by the enemy in Berlin, this necessity will be pressing.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stralsund, June 14, 1813.

My Lord—Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke has spoken to me upon the subject of his position here, and has represented to me that he is apprehensive when the season of action commences again that he shall have little means of obtaining that military information which will enable him to give distinct and useful details to his Majesty's Government, unless he shall possess some specific character, or some sort of credence to the person of the Prince Royal of Sweden as Commander-in-Chief. Without this, he thinks, and perhaps justly enough, that, having no regular admission to the general staff (the État-Major), nor any strict claim to be acquainted with the preliminary movements and distribution of the troops, he shall be able to give your lordship very imperfect accounts of any events which may occur, or indeed do justice to the operations of the Prince Royal.

He thinks that this may be remedied by furnishing him with a specific employ in the united Swedish army, such, for instance, as the inspection of the German Legion, and the control of its numbers, when in the pay of the British Government, according to the result of which inspection the pecuniary payments to be made by me must be regulated; or by authorizing me to give him, or by your lordship's self giving him a sort of *créditif* to the Crown Prince, in a military view, which may enable him to convey adequately the information which may be required by his Majesty's Government.

I submit these ideas to your lordship as they are suggested to me, of which, however, I acknowledge much of the force, and have only to observe that Colonel Cooke is regarded favourably by the Prince Royal.

I hope your lordship will not think I go much out of my line, if I venture to suggest to your lordship the vast importance of military demonstrations, during the armistice, on the coast of England opposite Holland and East Friesland, and the North of Germany between it and the Elbe, in order to prevent as much as possible the withdrawing from thence of troops to reinforce the French army in Silesia. The most vigorous prosecution possible of the campaign in Spain would have the same effect, but no man is more sensible than Lord Wellington of the importance of such a measure; and Buonaparte, in making a six weeks' armistice, certainly calculated upon drawing reinforcements from Spain.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

[Thus endorsed by Lord Castlereagh.]

Prepare a letter to Mr. Thornton, desiring him to present Colonel Cooke to the Prince Royal as the officer whom the Prince Regent desires to be considered as accredited, on the part of this Government, at the head-quarters, in the absence of Sir C. Stewart, and that it is his Royal Highness's wish that he may be furnished with the necessary information to enable him to keep his Majesty's Government, as well as Sir C. Stewart, informed of the military movements of the Prince Royal's army.

Mr. Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stralsund, June 21, 1813.

My Lord—In the conversation which I had yesterday with the Prince Royal, on the subject of the Hanoverian Legion, in company with Count Wallmoden, Baron Killmansegge, and

Brigadier-General Lyon, the Prince entered into a long discussion (a little misplaced, as I thought) upon the measures to be taken by Great Britain and by Sweden in concert, in case the present armistice should be terminated by a pacification between Russia and France, to the exclusion of the two former powers. I should have thought it somewhat premature to have addressed your lordship at present upon this subject; but as I find that his Royal Hignness has spoken to Baron Hammerstein for the information of Count Münster, and that M. de Wetterstedt has written a despatch on the same point to M. de Rehausen, which your lordship will probably see, and which M. de Wetterstedt read to me, I ought not to neglect to call your lordship's attention to it.

The Prince Royal entered into the question with so much warmth, that I apprehended at first he had received some sinister intelligence from the Imperial head-quarters; but I ascertained afterwards, as well from himself as from Baron de Wetterstadt, that none whatever had arrived, nor had there been any alteration whatever in the political aspect of affairs since the last accounts by M. Pozzo di Borgo. It is right to premise this to your lordship, in order to prevent any impression of alarm with regard to the conduct of Russia, which the starting of this subject might excite in his Majesty's Government.

The Prince took occasion, from the question of completing the Hanoverian Legion, to observe to Count Wallmoden the importance of giving all the force possible to the armaments in the North of Germany, not only with a view to co-operate with Russia and Prussia at the close of the armistice, but also with that of being able to act independently of those powers, in case they should make a separate peace: if the military force of Sweden and of England united could be increased to 50,000 men, at the least, he observed, they would be able to re-embark (in the event of Russia's separate peace), fall upon the Island of Zealand, which, in that case, they would inevitably carry,

and, establishing themselves there and in the other islands, be able to carry on a successful war, in this or the succeeding campaign, even on the Continent, or at any rate present a point of union for any future struggles which might be made on the Continent for the liberties of Europe. He observed that, while Sweden should obtain by this measure the kingdom of Norway (without which it was impossible, he said, that he or the Swedish army could return to Sweden), Great Britain might keep the Island of Zealand as a mean for the restitution of Hanover at a future peace; and if that was not obtained, might possess it, with the neighbouring islands, in perpetuity, either for itself or for the line of the Royal House, in which of right should remain the possession of the Electorate.

Your lordship has had too many (ancient as well as recent) proofs of my opinion of the importance of Zealand to the security of Sweden and of the Baltic for England, not to be aware that I coincided in opinion with the Prince Royal, though I hardly uttered a syllable on the subject. It was, in fact, for the first time that the Prince Royal spoke of it to me or before me with so much detail, sensible perhaps of the repugnance which I felt at entertaining such propositions at this particular moment, of which even the discussion is calculated to alienate and to embitter, though they cannot, in common political and military prudence, be too soon maturely considered and determined upon, at least in secret.

The publicity with which these conversations are held, and the vanity of persons with whom they are discussed, are injurious circumstances; but they are in the character of the Prince Royal, though they are not always the effect of a voluntary effusion, but I believe are the result of deliberate reflection. In the present case, the Prince certainly wished to act upon Count Wallmoden, who is a good deal depressed by the present aspect of things, and is perhaps constitutionally given to view events in the least favourable point of view, and *he was desirous of* opening to his personal ambition a prospect

which might tend to give him a better opinion of the final issue, whatever might be the conduct of Russia and Prussia in regard to peace.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Stralsund, June 21, 1813.

My Lord—I had communicated to me a few days ago, through a confidential channel, which your lordship will easily conjecture, the letter of the Emperor of Russia to the Prince Royal of Sweden, dated at Peterswaldau, the 7th of June, N.S., in which his Imperial Majesty gives to the latter a very detailed and satisfactory account of the motives which induced his Majesty to yield to the stipulations of the armistice, particularly as to its duration, contrary to his own sentiments. I should have given your lordship a more detailed account of this letter, but Baron de Wetterstedt, who communicated it to me on the following day, by direction of the Prince Royal, informed me that your lordship would see a copy of it through the channel of M. de Rehausen, to whom it has already been sent.

From the views taken in that letter of the motives of the armistice, and of the determination of the Courts of Prussia and Russia to take the first opportunity of declaring it broken, if the French should do anything in violation of it, it is not to be thought that there exists any intention of coming to a congress for the purpose of a general, and still less of a separate pacification; and the gentleman who showed me this letter, and in whose English ideas I have, as your lordship must have, an entire confidence, was earnest to impress this opinion upon me, for the sake of its being imparted to his Majesty's Government. It is, however, in the papers relative to the negociation of armistice, certainly taken for granted by the French, that the

armistice was to lead to a negociation by congress, though nothing in the Russian correspondence quite warrants them to draw this conclusion. I wish very much not to believe that there will be a congress; but I am drawn, in spite of myself, and in spite of the appearances to the contrary from the Emperor's letter, to believe that there still may be an idea of that sort. The circumstance of the omission of a very important paper in the documents relative to the armistice, both as regards the Russian mission here and the Swedish Government (to whom all the other *Précis* have been sent), makes this suspicion a little more credible. This paper is a letter of the 16th May, N.S., from Count Nesselrode to Count Stadion, in which the former says that "Elle (S.M.I.) y a énoncé les conditions auxquelles la paix pourroit se conclure sur des Bases solides et stables qui concilieroient l'intérêt de tous les alliés." If your lordship is in possession of this document, through the communications of Lord Cathcart, it would be very desirable to have a copy of it here. I have taken no public notice of all the others, which have been imparted to me as well by this Government as by M. Pozzo di Borgo, because I take it for granted Lord Cathcart has placed your lordship in possession of the whole.

I ought not to conceal from your lordship that there exists a very great distrust and jealousy here, which perhaps it would not be right, certainly not easy, entirely to eradicate. So far to soften it as not to let it interfere with the most cordial co-operation, (if co-operation is intended) is as much as can be done at present. If the interview proposed by the Prince Royal is acceded to by the Emperor, more may be done in a few hours than an age of correspondence can produce. It has certainly been meant as a touchstone of the real intentions of the Emperor, and if it is not accepted by the latter (even at the Imperial head-quarters, where the Prince would go, if no middle point can be found), I am afraid the distrust will be almost irremoveable; and all the movements, even on a renewal

of hostilities, will be calculated on a latent idea of the possibility of being abandoned.

I impute entirely to this distrust the effusion which I describe to your lordship in my other letter of this date, and which might be regarded else as a little premature and misplaced. The want of confidence on the part of the two Allied Courts, in not giving the very earliest intimation of the first proposition by the French of an armistice, is another ground of mistrust, which has really been of great injury to the cause. It is now evident that all the French operations have been calculated upon the certainty of its taking place at a given time. Hamburg was pressed with that sole view: and the Prince declares that Oudinot (the Duke of Reggio) had orders to get possession of Berlin, even at the expense of half his corps, because an armistice, dating its dispositions from 8th June, at midnight, would have left this capital, as well as Hamburg, in possession of the French. Luckily, the former project has failed; but the latter would have failed, if the Prince Royal, by being apprized of an intended armistice, could have seized Hamburg by the sudden advance of a considerable force, which the armistice would then have left in safety.

I am impatient to hear from your lordship in answer to my letter of 21st May. I am here entirely without assistance, having neither Secretary of Legation, nor private secretary, and assailed by a business of detail, connected with the legion, the stores, deserters, and a consular business, which is as much out of my calculation as out of the usual line of my employments. I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Foreign Office, June 22, 1813.

My dear Lord—Until we hear from you again, I can say nothing about armistice, &c. We have the articles through Paris, but nothing later from you than the 1st of June.

I approve of the authority you have given, as notified in your private letters in cipher.

I am sorry to observe asperities still existing between the Emperor and Prince Royal. As the Prince Royal has expressed his wish that they should meet and settle all matters in the true spirit of a common cause, I hope you will be enabled to bring this about. I am sure three hours would do more, so employed, than volumes of despatches and autographical letters.

As I shall have occasion to write immediately upon your lordship's next despatches, I shall not now detain you further.

CASTLEREAGH.

Suggestions respecting the proposed Federative Paper.

BY THE RIGHT HON. N. VANSITTART.

It appears to me that the proposed Federative Paper can obtain the credit necessary to render it an available resource only in the event of the operations of the war having a favourable appearance. It seems impossible that it should be readily received in a country which is in danger of being occupied by the enemy; and therefore, as long as the allied armies are obliged to continue their retreat, I am persuaded that an issue of paper of this kind would be so far from having any good effect, that it might preclude the possibility of having recourse to such an operation, in case events should afterwards take a more favourable turn. There is no doubt the enemy will attempt to embarrass the operation, and perhaps to turn it to their own advantage, by issuing forged paper. This may, in a great degree, be guarded against in countries which are secure from an incursion; but, wherever the enemy penetrate, it will be carried to such an extent as to create the utmost confusion, and entirely to discredit the real paper. It never ought, therefore, to be issued but in places perfectly secure,

and at considerable distance in the rear of the line of operations.

Supposing that circumstances admit of the attempt, I think Sir F. d'Ivernois' *projet* extremely well drawn, and perfectly agreeable to my view of this subject. I think, however, the 5th Article would be improved by adopting a suggestion of Mr. Niebuhr's, mentioned in the Observations, (par. 3) that the notes, which shall be deposited and registered, shall receive a half-yearly interest *during the war*. This seems to me essential to their credit, and could not be attended with material inconvenience, if the payment was confined to one place. For this purpose, some bank or public company must be declared general agent to the Allied Powers. For this appointment the Maritime Society of Berlin has been suggested to me as the most proper company to be employed, supposing the French to be effectually driven from the vicinity of the Elbe. Other banks might, however, be authorized to receive and register the paper, with a view to its bearing interest, payable after peace, as directed in the 5th Article in its present form; and every facility and encouragement should be given to the negociation of the paper, which, in fact, converts it into a funded debt in the most convenient manner, and must greatly contribute to keep up the credit of what may remain in common circulation.

It might much contribute to this effect, to hold out a priority of payment to such paper as shall be first registered; and it is deserving of consideration whether the 5th, 7th, and 8th Articles, should not be modified accordingly.

Lord Castlereagh to the Hon. Sir C. W. Stewart.

Foreign Office, June 22, 1813.

My dear Charles—I return the financial *projets*, with such remarks as Mr. Vansittart has been enabled to make upon them. The scheme itself of a federative paper originally ap-

peared to us full of difficulty in the execution; but anxious to encourage a great exertion, we did not hesitate to agree to bear our share, if the system could be reduced to practice; but it is too much to expect that we should take the whole, with all its possible abuses, upon ourselves.

There would be nearly equal difficulty in introducing a British paper into circulation in Germany, under the present circumstances, with one jointly issued by the combined powers.

If it should be found that the credits of the three powers cannot be advantageously combined in the same paper, we might undertake to be answerable for an issue not exceeding 750,000 thalers per month in a paper, for the reimbursement of which Great Britain should be separately liable, till the whole sum of £2,500,000 was issued, which would be in about twenty months — but our responsibility cannot be pushed beyond the original limits, nor ought we to bear more than our share of the progressive monthly expenditure of the armies.

You will observe Mr. Vansittart approves Sir F. d'Ivernois' ideas. We cannot give you an assistant from hence more conversant with such subjects; and, with Lord Cathcart's concurrence, you may call upon him to give his active aid in conformity to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's suggestion.

I am surprised there should have been any doubt, as to the mode of realizing the subsidy on the Continent, when it was expressly stated from the first that the credit was to be in London. What you represented in reference to Sweden was perfectly correct. Having a credit to a certain extent on the British Treasury, the Swedish Government draws bills on London, or Rehausen orders a banking house here to remit to Sweden or Stralsund, arranging with the Treasury the payments of such bills to the extent of the monthly instalment receivable on account of subsidy.

Russia and Prussia must, when you have settled the instalments, authorize their ministers here to act in the same manner, or the Russian and Prussian Governments may draw on London, as above described, to the extent of the monthly payments. The funds will be ready for them, subject to a proportional deduction in each month for stores, &c., sent.

I am sure I have already been very explicit on this head in former despatches, especially to Lord Cathcart, in which I urged the extreme importance of our Allies giving full scope to British commerce, in order that they might draw their subsidy at a more favourable rate of exchange. It is too unreasonable, first to cramp our commerce by prohibitions and high duties, and then to expect us to incur the loss of exchange produced by their own injudicious policy.

The whole question of money is become a very difficult one, since Hamburg has been reoccupied, and the Allies have fallen back. I trust, however, Austria will take her part, and that the sources of remittance may again be extended. Should treaties be signed, and the public service require any advances previous to the ratifications being exchanged, you and Lord Cathcart may draw to the extent of the monthly instalments, which, upon the two millions sterling, ought not, with a view to the exchange, to exceed £200,000 in any one month.

I am, &c., CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lieut.-General Sir Charles Stewart.

Foreign Office, June 22, 1813.

My dearest Charles—We are in great anxiety to hear from you upon the armistice. Its extension to the 20th of July puzzles and alarms us for the temper of Austria. We have done every thing to prevail upon the Prince Royal to manage matters with *your parties*, and I trust all may be arranged before the resumption of hostilities. Nothing would have half

so good an effect as a *personal* interview. I have written officially to recommend it; and I do hope Lord Cathcart and you will both labour to bring it about.

I send you such ideas as have occurred upon federative paper and finance; the latter is a most difficult subject, and will require much consideration. The principle alone will, I conclude, be recognised in the treaty, the execution remaining open to subsequent arrangement. Lieven has been pressing the sufficiency of Russian and Prussian securities, as inducement to us to make ourselves answerable for the whole; but the House of Commons, after the Austrian loans, will never hear of *lending* again to a foreign power; and we do not feel that we could possibly propose such an amount in any shape to Parliament; exclusive of any liability to any part of their share, which was expressly protested against in Article 4, we shall have to propose six and a-half sterling millions for the North.

I don't quite understand from your joint public, and your sole private letter, how the Hanoverian point is finally to stand.

The last *projet* of Hardenberg, enclosed in your private letter, appears to me very objectionable, as I understand it. It appears to involve engagements to Prussia too important to be mixed with a question of Hanoverian *arrondissement*.

Your account of the battle of Bautzen has been very much approved, and all your other detailed accounts have given me much satisfaction.

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to the Hon. Sir Charles W. Stewart.

Foreign Office, June 30, 1813.

My dearest Charles—I have sent back Addington's servant with despatches. Cathcart is directed if possible to bring Austria to a point, and, if she takes the field, to give her half a million to help her on. We have ordered such regiments as

can be spared to proceed to Stralsund, to strengthen the Prince Royal: including cavalry and artillery, we shall send towards 5,000 men. Thornton has also orders to extend the German Legion from 10 to 15,000 men. We shall also form a depôt of arms, &c., at Stralsund, upon which you may draw, after the 70,000 sent to Colberg are actually used, but you must make it clear that the men are ready before you give the arms, as we are running Mulgrave dry. I fear the whole unappropriated supply cannot exceed 20 or 30,000. Has Russia given any of the 50,000 sent to Riga over to Prussia?

Wellington, as you will see by the bulletin, is getting on fast.

It has occurred to me that, in the event of hostilities recommencing, and the Prince Royal advancing, the Northern operation may become a great feature, and essentially interesting to Prussia; if so, and you should find politics dead at head quarters, possibly you might deem it expedient, leaving Cathcart to look after the concern at head-quarters, to attach yourself to Bernadotte *for a time*. Of course this could only be done with *perfect concurrence* of the King of Prussia; but it occurs to me that, as his Majesty cannot well in person superintend the Prince Royal's operations, the King of Prussia might find a particular advantage in having you with him to animate his exertions, and to direct them as far as possible in the spirit of his policy and interests. Hope thinks the Prince would be glad to have you with him, and to lean on your advice and support. This is a point to be judged of on the spot, and upon a confidential discussion of it with the Court to which you are immediately accredited.

We hope to finish our business in the House of Commons next week.

Yours ever, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Foreign Office, June 30, 1813.

My dear Lord—In the present wavering state of Austrian politics, I have deemed it advisable to direct your lordship to endeavour to bring the Court of Vienna to a private explanation of its views. It is not for Great Britain to goad other powers into exertions which they deem inconsistent with their own safety; but it is material we should know on what we have to reckon, as well as to evince the disposition we feel, as far as our means will permit, to sustain the Continental powers in accomplishing their own, as well as the general safety; and as a proof that such is our disposition towards Austria, your lordship is authorized to make them an advance, if actually "*en lutte*" against France.

The rapid progress of the British arms in Spain will, I trust, prove that we are not disposed to be inactive, and that it is not by pecuniary efforts alone that we are ready to contend for a better order of things.

It has not been deemed advisable to send your lordship any precise orders as to the negociations that may possibly arise, pending the armistice. Opinions given from hence, under an imperfect knowledge of circumstances, might tend to embarrass, rather than assist. Our *general views* and *existing engagements* are sufficiently understood, both by your lordship and our Allies, to have their due influence in any decision to be taken.

I have arranged with Lord Bathurst, in addition to all the supplies already notified for Russian, Prussian, and Swedish armaments, to establish a depôt at Stralsund, from whence issue should be made of arms, &c., to such corps as are actually organized, and ready to receive them. As our supplies are becoming scarce, we must not let them lie idle in the magazines of our Allies—they must now be spared only upon *an actual want* proved to exist; and in their distribution,

relative claims must be weighed upon principles of military efficiency.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Foreign Office, June, 1813.

My dear Lord—I enclose to your lordship, for your information, the accompanying copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Thornton, on the subject of the heavy guns and ordnance stores which had been ordered to the Baltic for the siege of Dantzic, or other important service, and in the appropriation of which, it is the intention of this Government that the wishes of the Emperor of Russia should be consulted. Your lordship will therefore take the necessary steps for learning the desire of his Imperial Majesty upon this point; and you will communicate the same to Mr. Thornton for his information and guidance. CASTLEREAGH.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Cathcart.

Foreign Office, July 3, 1813.

My dear Lord—I consider it of so much importance that your lordship should be informed of the state of affairs in Spain without loss of time, that I shall not detain the messenger for any other object, reserving for a separate communication such instructions as may arise out of events that may give so new and important a character to the relative situation of all the belligerent powers.

I shall use all possible means to send this intelligence through Heligoland to the Continent, in the hope that it may thereby transpire and become known at head-quarters, even before the arrival of the messenger.

The private accounts represent the army to have been only partially engaged; the cavalry hardly at all. The French army meant to move upon the great road to Bayonne by Mondragon, but they were turned and thrown on the Pampeluna road without artillery or any species of equipment.

Mina, who is in Arragon, sent to Lord Wellington to ac-

quaint him that the division of Murray's army from Alicant had landed at Tarragona, and, after being four days before the place, carried it by storm. This event, if confirmed, will place Suchet in a very critical situation.

Lord Wellington meant to follow the enemy up.

CASTLEREAGH.

I enclose the extract of Lord Wellington's letter relative to Tarragona.

Mr. Edward Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Griefswald, July 3, 1813.

My Lord—In Count Nesselrode's despatch to General Suchtelen, accompanying the communications which he exhibited to me, the former undertakes to justify the conduct of Russia in not having mentioned, among the bases of a general pacification, the satisfaction to Sweden on the subject of Norway; observing that this could not have been brought forward without giving France a right of interfering in a business already decided, (as far, at least, as stipulations can decide) and proceeding to assert the Emperor's perseverance in the fulfilment of his engagements towards Sweden.

This neglect, however, of the interests of Sweden, notwithstanding the reasoning of M. Nesselrode, which is not without force and justice, has once more deeply mortified the Prince Royal, and he has expressed himself to me upon it, and upon the want of attention to the interests of Great Britain, with a good deal of warmth. I thought it my duty to endeavour, under present circumstances, to palliate this conduct, both as it relates to Great Britain and to Sweden, by observing that his Majesty's Government, having declined the mediation of Austria, could not, perhaps, expect that her interests should be put forward by that power; and that, in the case of Sweden, it would be, perhaps, as well that Bonaparte should be first reminded of the interests of Denmark, by having the claims *of Sweden put forward* at once.

Your lordship will observe, by my despatch of this date, that the prospects of gaining Austria do not seem to be much increased by the visit of the Emperor of Russia in Bohemia. I am afraid the Emperor of Austria is not to be gained to a hostile declaration against France by any inducements that Russia and Prussia can at present offer to him. The proof of this appears to me incontestible, in the circumstance of his having required of these two powers, in the first instance, to bring forward the most unpalatable conditions of peace, in order that, Bonaparte refusing them, he might declare against him with a better grace; and that, when such propositions were made as were of rather difficult digestion, Austria, instead of acting upon them, retrenches, modifies, and retouches them, in order to render them more palatable to Bonaparte. This is the conduct of a power seeking reconciliation, rather than justifiable grounds for a declaration of hostilities; and I should utterly despair of any good to be derived from the pending interview, if it were not to be hoped that the Prince Royal might have influence enough to encourage the two Allied Courts to continue the war, and to draw Austria into it by an application to her fears, since every other motive is ineffectual.

It is evident that Austria dreads as much a peace between the Allied Courts and France, to which she is not a party, as a hostile declaration against the latter. If Russia can be prevailed upon to act upon Austria, by threatening to make a separate peace with France, if the other will not declare herself; if she will hold a higher tone to her, and point out the inevitable danger which hangs over her head, should the other powers make a peace without her, perhaps Austria may feel the necessity of coming to some decision. This seems to be the opinion of M. Pozzo di Borgo; and I have no doubt he will do every thing in his power to work the Emperor Alexander to the desired point.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Mr. Thornton to Lord Castlereagh.

Trachenberg, July 12, 1813.

My Lord—After I had written my despatch No. 74, and while Lord Cathcart and myself were in conversation with the Prince Royal, about noon to-day, Count Stadion brought to his Royal Highness an answer from the Emperor of Austria, under date of the 9th current, to a letter which the Prince addressed to his Imperial Majesty from Stralsund, on the 23rd of May, and of which, if I mistake not, General Hope transmitted a copy to your lordship. This answer of the Emperor contains a more formal avowal than appears was to have been given in writing of his determination to enforce by arms the general security and independence, if negociation should fail; I may, perhaps, on my return to Stralsund, be able to send your lordship a copy of this letter.

The Austrian Cabinet had likewise received from Count Bubna, at Dresden, such intelligence as the latter could ferret out of the great events which it appears have taken place in Spain, where, on the 21st of June, Lord Wellington obtained a signal victory over the French army, with the loss of all their artillery, and with a rout as complete (for so it was represented) as the retreat from Moscow. Your lordship will be by this time in possession of these glorious details; but it is curious to observe the degrees by which this intelligence crept out, it having been at first kept secret even from Marat, Duke of Bassano; and the latter, afterwards speaking to Count Bubna of the great concentrations of the French troops in Spain, of which he would soon hear, and being asked by Count Bubna whether upon the Douro or upon the Ebro—answered, upon neither, but in the province of Biscay. Soult has been hastily despatched from Dresden, to take the command in Spain, if in Spain it can be now called; and the Count Bubna, stating that all the reinforcements expected by France would *reach Buonaparte* before the 20th of July, expresses his con-

viction that the only motive for Buonaparte's yielding to the prolongation of the armistice was his anxiety to ascertain the turn which affairs would take in Spain.

This great event has certainly given Austria courage; but it may also be the more apprehended that Buonaparte may be induced by it, in order to gain time to divide the Allies, to accede to the modified bases of pacification proposed by Austria. The two Allied Courts have, it is true, not yet accorded to these bases, nor will they probably; but such an acceptance on the part of Buonaparte is calculated to put the co-operation of Austria to some hazard, unless she be fully determined to have recourse to arms. It is from that point, more than from any other, that danger is now to be apprehended; because it appears to me that the forces which might be brought against France by the other powers alone ought to be sufficient, if there were but courage to make use of them, and if Austria were to continue neutral.

I have just received a copy of the Emperor's letter, which I have the honour of transmitting to your lordship, with a request that it may be on no account brought into any circulation. I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

Copie.

[Enclosed in Mr. Thornton's private and secret letter of July 12, 1813.]

The Emperor of Austria to the Prince Royal of Sweden.

Monsieur mon Frère et Cousin—Le Comte de Neipperg m'a remis la lettre que V.A.R. m'a adressée de son quartier général à Stralsund le 23 Mai dernier. Je la remercie des sentimens qu'elle a bien voulu m'exprimer. Elle connoit ceux que je lui porte et que je voue au brave peuple Suédois. Sans rivalité, animés d'un égal esprit de bienveillance, l'Autrichien et le Suédois sont appellés à soutenir les droits communs à tout État: c'est dans ces vues que V.A.R. est arrivée sur le Continent, et ce sont également elles qui dictent les efforts que je

fais pour arriver par voie de négotiations, et à leur défaut par celle des armes, à un état de repos qui forme le premier besoin de l'Europe.

Les derniers renseignemens qui me sont parvenus du quartier général de L.L. M.M. l'Empereur de Russie et le Roi de Prusse m'ont fait le plus sensible plaisir, en me donnant l'espoir, que les obstacles qui sembloient s'opposer à la coopération des forces sous les ordres de V.A.R. se trouvent écartés. Je regarde cette coopération comme un des appuis les plus forts de la cause que les Puissances peuvent de nouveau se trouver appellées à defendre par une guerre, qui ne saurait offrir des chances de succès, qu'autant qu'elle sera soutenue par les moyens les plus grands et surtout les plus unanimes. Les talens de V.A.R. et son dévouement à la cause commune serviront éminemment les efforts réunis des premières Puissances de l'Europe. Je charge le Comte de Stadion de remettre la présente lettre à V.A.R. et de lui réitérer de vive voix les assurances des sentimens particuliers d'estime et de considération très distinguées avec lesquels je suis, Monsieur mon Frère et Cousin, de votre Altesse Royale le bon Frère et Cousin,

FRANÇOIS.

Brandeis, en Bohême, le 9 Juillet, 1813.

Mr. Thornton to the Hon. Sir Charles Stewart.

Trachenberg, July 12, 1813, noon.

Sir—I have had the honour of receiving your letter No. 5, which I cannot at this moment answer, except in this hasty manner. You are perhaps not aware that I have never had a sight of your instructions until yesterday, when Lord Cathcart communicated them to me. This perhaps is not to be wondered at; but I am a little surprised, I must confess, that Colonel Cooke should have been ignorant of them, or should have left me in ignorance of the nature of his commission. I *must infer the first* rather than the second of the alternatives,

from the circumstance, that he engaged me to write to Lord Castlereagh, for the purpose of representing the equivocal and undefined situation in which he was placed, and that I did at his request absolutely write such a letter, which I can have no difficulty in showing to you, when I have the honour of seeing you. This circumstance acquits me, I flatter myself, fully of the charge of withholding from him any confidence and protection which it was in my power to give him; and I must own that I am extremely mortified that he should have given you such an opinion.

With regard to the nature of his commission, which I take for granted is entirely military, so far can I be from having anything to represent against it, that it would be the greatest satisfaction to me to be relieved from details, to which I have no inclination, because I have no knowledge of them, and to confine myself entirely to the political part of my mission, to which I feel myself a little more competent. When I say this, I trust you will believe me when I add, that I shall be still more gratified to see you superintending, near the person of the Prince Royal and his army, military details for which you are so eminently qualified. I can repeat this with truth, because I can appeal to what I have already said to General Hope on that subject: and I think that you will soon see the propriety of this measure.

I shall endeavour to set off in the course of this night on my return, and shall travel without stopping till I reach Berlin, where I should wish to remain for about eight-and-forty hours.

The King of Prussia and Baron d'Hardenberg proceed to Berlin to-morrow; and the latter, when I called upon him this morning, to request for myself a courier-passport, begged me to say to you that he should stay three or four days at Berlin, and wished to see you there. I will therefore regulate myself according to your convenience, by meeting you at any intermediate point between Berlin and Stralsund which you may

name, or at the latter place, if you think it better to stay there. I would offer to stay for you at the former place; but it appears to me of more consequence that I should reach Stralsund as quick as possible; and I would not even have taken the route of Berlin, had it not been in the hope of making some pecuniary arrangements there.

I send the messenger Guy with my letters for England; I would have put them under a flying seal for your perusal, if I had not been apprehensive that by some unforeseen accident he might miss you, though he proceeds with the sergeant you sent me; but I have directed him, if he finds you at Stralsund, to give you the despatches, of which you can break the seal, and afterwards close them again. He goes as far as Rostock, to Admiral Hope, and is the bearer likewise of Lord Cathcart's despatches.

While Lord Cathcart and myself were this morning with the Prince Royal, Count Stadion came in to communicate intelligence, which had been received through Prague, from Count Bubna, at the French head-quarters at Dresden, of a great victory obtained by Lord Wellington, on the 21st of June, over the French in the north of Spain. The dates from Dresden are of the 5th, 6th, and 7th of July, in letters journal-wise. In the first, it is said that Buonaparte had received most disastrous intelligence from Spain, the particulars of which, however, had not escaped even to the Duke of Bassano himself. On the succeeding day Count Bubna discovers, *par une source très sure*, that, on the day mentioned, Lord Wellington had defeated an army of three corps under Reilly, another, (whose name I could not catch) and a third general, name not mentioned, with the loss of all their artillery, and with a *débandade* not inferior to the retreat from Moscow; that the remains had sought refuge in the mountains of Pampeluna, and that Suchet was endeavouring to retreat as fast as possible into France, but it was not thought that he could effect it. [The Prince Royal thought, however, that he might

do so by the route of Catalonia and Roussillon.] I ought to add, that Soult had been immediately despatched from Dresden, by Paris, to the Spanish frontiers, to take the command again of the French armies. On the 7th, the Duke of Bassano observed to Count Bubna, that he must be prepared to hear of great concentrations of the French forces in Spain, of the evacuation of Madrid, &c.; and on the latter alluding to the accounts he had read in the Berlin Gazette, and asking him whether it was on the Douro or on the Ebro that these concentrations were to be made, the former answered, in neither, *but in Biscay*.

I think it possible you may not yet have an account of this great event from England; but it cannot be long in reaching you. It is impossible to express the pleasure it appears to have given here: nothing could be more auspicious than the moment of its arrival. The Prince Royal thinks that the French army will be very soon withdrawn from Silesia, and that Buonaparte must soon commence his retreat nearer the Rhine. I have no doubt of its effect upon Austria. This is visible in the answer of the Emperor to the Prince, which came to-day from the Austrian head-quarters.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

EDWARD THORNTON.

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